RHETORICAL GRAMMAR

IN WHICH THE

COMMON IMPROPRIETIES

IN

READING AND SPEAKING

ARE DETECTED,

AND THE

TRUE SOURCES OF ELEGANT PRONUNCIATION

ARE POINTED OUT.

WITH A

COMPLETE ANALYSIS OF THE VOICE.

SHOWING ITS

SPECIFIC MODIFICATIONS,

THEY MAY BE APPLIED TO DIFFERENT SPECIES OF SENTENCES

AND THE SEVERAL

FIGURES OF RHETORIC.

TO WHICH ARE ADDED,

OUTLINES OF COMPOSITION,

OR,

PLAIN RULES FOR WRITING ORATIONS,

AND SPEAKING THEM IN PUBLIC.

THE SIXTH EDITION,

WITH CONSIDERABLE ALTERATIONS AND ADDITIONS.

BY JOHN WALKER,

AUTHOR OF THE CRITICAL PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY, ELEMENTS OF ELOCUTION, &c.

Est autem in dicendo quidam cantus. CICERO ORAT.

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TO

DR. SAMUEL JOHNSON.

SIR,

If the conferring of benefits be what commonly constitutes a Patron,—to Students in Elocution you are the greatest patron in the kingdom. You not only first awakened the public to an attention to their language, but, by an Herculean labour, afforded them a guide, which has conducted them to a thousand improvements. This was sufficient to attract the admiration and acknowledegments of your country, if you had not shown, by your moral and critical writings, that, though you were the only person proper to undertake so laborious a task, you were almost the only one who ought to have been exempted from it. But though I am proud of an opportunity of confessing my obligations to your public labours, I am much more ambitious of telling the world, that I have been long

honoured with the friendship and advice of him whose name will be mentioned among the Lockes, the Newtons, and the Fenelons, as the friend of Revelation; and whose life is an indisputable proof of the sincerity of his attachment to it.

I am,

SIR,

With the greatest Respect,

Your obliged

Humble Servant,

J. WALKER.

PREFACE

TO THE THIRD EDITION.

THE present edition is almost a new work. The praxis of sentences, so arranged as to lead the pupil from the easiest to the most difficult, seemed better calculated for the lower class of pupils in reading than for students in rhetoric; and therefore this has been omitted. The want of Rules for Composition, so essential in rhetoric, has been supplied from the best source—Blair's Lectures: and what was deficient even in these has been furnished from Professor Ward's Lectures on Oratory:—so that with the original matter on the elegant pronunciation of words, on accent, emphasis, and inflexion of voice, and the proper pronunciation of the Figures of Rhetoric, it is presumed the present work is the most perfect of its kind in the language.

A powerful motive, indeed, for enlarging the Rhetorical Grammar to its present size, was, to

give a complete idea of the two circumflexes of the speaking voice. The two simple inflexions, the rising and falling, had been several times delineated on copper-plates, in Elements of Elocution; but the two complex inflexions, called circumflexes, though frequently described, had not been marked out to the eye; and these appeared so inseparable from the human voice, so new, and of such real utility in teaching to read and speak, that I could scarcely think I had discharged my duty to my country, till I had given these modifications of the speaking voice as clear an explanation as I was able.

The sanguine expectations I had once entertained, that this analysis of the human voice would be received by the learned with avidity and applause, are now over. I have almost worn out a long life in laborious exertions; and, though I have succeeded beyond expectation in forming readers and speakers in the most respectable circles in the three kingdoms, yet I have had the mortification to find few of my pupils listen to any thing but my pronunciation. When I have explained to them the five modifications of the voice, they have assented and admired; but so difficult did it appear to adopt them, especially to those advanced in life, that I was generally

obliged to follow the old method, (if it may be called so) "read as I read, without any reason for it."—But without pretending to the gift of prophecy, I think I can foresee, that sooner or later these distinctions of the voice must become the vehicle of instruction in reading and speaking. It is not improbable that the active genius of the French, who are so remarkably attentive to their language, may first adopt this vehicle; and if this should happen, I hope it will be remembered, that an unassisted and unpatronised Englishman was the first who discovered and explained it.

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INTRODUCTION.

RHETORIC, or the Art of Persuasion, is of such importance in the great concerns of society, that it is not surprising so much has been written on this subject in every age and nation, where the Arts and Sciences have been cultivated. The power of pleasing and persuading those whom we address has excited every faculty in the mind of man, to detect, if possible, the secret springs of that pleasure and persuasion, which give us such dominion over the feelings of our fellow creatures.

The ancients have left us everlasting monuments of their excellence in this art, and, in their endeavours to investigate the principles of it, have descended to such niceties as we think childish and insignificant: but that branch of Oratory which Demosthenes called the first, the second, and the third part of it, and which was so assiduously cultivated by the ancients—that, alas! perished with them, and left their compositions like a lifeless corpse, beautiful in death, but deprived of all that vigour and energy, which agitated and astonished their wondering auditors. We hear at this distance but a faint echo of that thunder in Demosthenes, which shook the throne of Macedon to its foundations; and are sometimes at a loss for that conviction in the arguments of Cicero, which balanced, in the midst of convulsions, the tottering republic of Rome.

This part of Rhetoric, which consists in pronunciation and action, and which may be called the Soul of Oratory, is, from its very nature, less capable of being communicated by writing, and has therefore been less improved by the joint labours of succeeding ages; and thus, while invention, disposition, and elocution, in the ancient sense of the word, have been cultivated by the moderns to the highest degree of perfection, Pronunciation or Delivery has scarcely attained mediocrity. The importance, however, of this part of Oratory has induced several ingenious men to give the outlines of it upon paper; and to describe, as well as they were able, those variations of voice, which the various structure and import of a sentence seemed to require. Numberless have been the attempts to mark to the eye some of those modifications of tone and inflexion, which form the essence of a good enunciation. Pauses, dashes, and notes of interrogation, exclamation, and parenthesis, are but so many attempts to facilitate the delivery of written language, and, if properly adapted, have undoubtedly a considerable use. Nay, marking the emphatic words in a different character is sometimes found highly advantageous; but the most simple, the most marking, and the most useful method of all, seems hitherto to have been entirely neglected,—and that is distinguishing the speaking voice into its two essential turns or inflexions, the rising and the falling. This neglect is the more remarkable, as the want of some such distinction of the voice has unquestionably been the occasion, that so little progress has been made in conveying the art of speaking upon paper, and teaching it by rules.

Almost all our writers on this subject, after

giving rules for pausing, tell us there are certain tones and inflexions of voice, which are of much more importance to the meaning of the words we read than the points we make use of, however judiciously adapted. But here they generally leave us. The Interrogation and Exclamation points, indeed, are said not only to require suitable pauses, but likewise an elevation of voice, and the Parenthesis a moderate depression of it. Mr. Perry, in his English Grammar, has gone so far as to tell us, that the Interrogation, when it does not begin with the relatives *who*, *which*, or *what*, or the adverbs *how*, *where*, *when*, &c., requires an elevation of voice; and an old writer, Charles Butler, of Magdalen College, Oxford, has in his English Grammar gone one step farther, and told us, that this species of Interrogation not only requires an elevation but a different *turn* of voice. Here was a hint which one would have imagined would have set some grammarian at work to inquire what this *turn* of voice was: but more than a hundred years passed without any such inquiry; till the author of the present work, about twenty years ago, when he was preparing to give lessons at Oxford; and trying every method to gain some permanent modifications of the speaking voice, in order to form some certain rules for reading or adapting the voice to the structure and meaning of a sentence, observed, that every word had necessarily either an upward or a downward turn, or continued in a monotone. This distinction he thought of such importance as to make him hope it might attract the notice of the public; and he accordingly introduced it in a work called *Elements* of *Elocution*, but found no notice taken of it, till within these last three or four years, and then very imper-

fectly. About ten years ago he observed, that these two turns, the upward and the downward, were sometimes united on the same syllable, or, as it may be called, in the same explosion of voice, and formed a compound turn, either beginning with the upward and ending with the downward, or *vice versâ*, and these compound turns he called circumflexes. Here he began to flatter himself that he had made a discovery, and found means to bind that varying Proteus, the speaking voice; as he conceived that there was no *tortuous* or *zigzag* turn in speaking, which might not be reduced to one of these modifications, and consequently, that he had some permanent *data* on which to found a system of Rhetorical pronunciation.

It is to the novelty and utility of this distinction that the author claims the attention of the public. He has already written largely on it, but has still something to add. By the blessing of Providence he has lived long enough to see the truth of his principles universally assented to, and, in some instances, adopted in practice. The utility of them he is fully persuaded of by a thousand experiments; but of this the public at large are undoubtedly the best judges.

RHETORICAL GRAMMAR.

THAT part of Rhetoric which relates to composition has been so elaborately treated both by the ancients and moderns, that I shall in some measure invert the common order, and at first chiefly confine myself to that branch of it which relates to pronunciation and delivery. Preparatory to which it will be necessary to settle the pronunciation of several letters, syllables, and words, which are not only often mispronounced by the younger class of pupils, but which are frequently little understood by those who are more advanced in the art. Without quoting Quintilian, we may easily conclude, that if these first principles of speaking are not distinctly and accurately learned, whatever we acquire afterward must be faulty and erroneous. I shall therefore begin with settling the true pronunciation of those letters, syllables, and words, which are the most liable to be mistaken by the generality of readers and speakers.

OBSERVATIONS ON SOME OF THE PRINCIPAL FAULTS IN THE PRONUNCIATION OF THE GENERALITY OF PUPILS, WITH THE METHODS OF CORRECTING THEM.

Too slightly sounding the accented Vowels.

ONE of the most general faults in reading is a slight, short, mincing pronunciation of the accented vowels. This produces a harsh, insignificant, and trifling sound of the words, instead of that bold, round, mellow tone, which ought to be considered as the basis of speaking. The vowels which ought most to be attended to are the *a* and *o*. *E* is the slenderest of all the vowels, and *i* and *u* are diphthongs which terminate in slender sounds, and do not afford a sufficient quantity of sound to gratify and fill the ear: but the *a* in all its three sounds in *bare*, *bar*, and *war*; *fatal*, *father*, and *water*, has a bold, full sound, which the ear dwells upon with pleasure. The sound of *o* likewise, when lengthened by *e* final, as in *tone*, or ending a syllable, as in *noble*, &c., may be prolonged with great satisfaction to the ear; and it is to a judicious prolongation of the sound of these vowels, that pronunciation owes one of its greatest beauties. Words of this kind should therefore be selected and pronounced, first by the teacher, and afterward by the pupil, slowly and distinctly.

Too slightly sounding the unaccented Vowels.

THERE is an incorrect pronunciation of the letter *u*, when it ends a syllable not under the accent, which not only prevails among the vulgar, but is sometimes found in better company;

and that is giving the *u* an obscure sound, which confounds it with vowels of a very different kind. Thus we not unfrequently hear *singular*, *regular*, and *particular*, pronounced as if written *sing-e-lar*, *reg-e-lar*, and *par-tick-e-lar*; but nothing tends more to impoverish and vulgarise the pronunciation than this short and obscure sound of the unaccented *u*. It may, indeed, be observed, that there is scarcely any thing more distinguishes a person of a mean from one of a good education than the pronunciation of the unaccented vowels. When vowels are under the accent, the prince and the lowest of the people, with very few exceptions, pronounce them in the same manner: but the unaccented vowels, in the mouth of the former, have a distinct, open, and specific sound; while the latter often totally sink them, or change them into some other sound. Those, therefore, who wish to pronounce elegantly, must be particularly attentive to the unaccented vowels, as a neat pronunciation of these, forms one of the greatest beauties of speaking.

The other vowels, when unaccented, are liable to nearly the same indistinctness and obscurity as the *u*. The first *e* in *event*, the first *o* in *opinion*, and the *i* in *sensible*, *terrible*, &c. are apt to go into an obscure sound approaching to short *u*, as if written *uvvent*, *uppinion*, *sensubble*, *terrubble*, &c.—while polite pronunciation, that is the least deliberate, requires these vowels to be heard nearly as distinctly, and with as much purity, as when under the accent. Thus the *e* in *event* should be pronounced nearly as *e* in *equal*; the *o* in *opinion* as that in *open*; the *i* in the unaccented terminations *ible*, *ity*, and at the end of other syllables not under the accent, ought to have the sound of *e*, and this sound to

be preserved distinct and pure, as if written *sen-se-ble, ter-re-ble, de-ver-se-ty, u-ne-ver-se-ty*, &c.: nay, so strong a tendency has a good speaker to open the vowels *e* and *o*, when ending a syllable immediately before the accent, that we frequently hear these vowels in the words *effect, efface, occasion, offence*, &c., pronounced as if the consonant were single: this is certainly a deviation from rule, but it is so general among polite speakers, and so agreeable to the ear, as to be a distinguishing mark of elegant pronunciation. For the sound of unaccented *a*, of *e* before *r*, and *i* when it has the diphthongal sound like *eye*, see Critical Pronouncing Dictionary, in the principles prefixed, at Nos 92, 98, 114, 115, &c., 554.

Wavering and uncertain Pronunciaion of Vowels under the Secondary Accent.

THE Secondary Accent is that stress we may occasionally place upon another syllable, beside that which has the principal accent, in order to pronounce every part of the word more distinctly, forcibly, and harmoniously. Thus this accent is on the first syllable of *conversation, commendation*, and the principal accent on the third. But from a want of attending to the analogies of the language, our best orthoepists have been at the greatest loss for the quantity of the vowel under the secondary accent, when followed by a single consonant. This may be seen at large in Principles prefixed to the Critical Pronouncing Dictionary, No 530, &c. It will be only necessary to observe here, that those polysyllables which have the principal accent on the third syllable, whether we place a secondary accent on the first syllable or not, have every vowel,

except *u* in that syllable, unless an inverted diphthong succeed, invariably short. Thus the *o* in the first syllable of *proposition*, *provocation*, *profanation*, the *a* in the first of *lamentation*, the *e* in *demonstration*, and the *i* in the first of *diminution* are all short; but if an inverted diphthong succeed the first syllable, every vowel except *i* retains its open sound, as *amiability*, *deviation*, *filiation*, *spoliation*, *dubiosity*, &c. Where it may be observed that the *u* is always pronounced long and open, though under the secondary accent, as *lucubration*, *cumulation*, &c.

There is the greater necessity for the observation of this rule, as it tends to give a firmness and decision to a part of pronunciation which is very loosely and variously marked in most of our pronouncing dictionaries. A vague idea of the propriety of preserving the simple in the compound, and of distinguishing the inseparable preposition from the rest of the word, makes many, who are but superficially acquainted with the analogies of the language, willing to show their precision by pronouncing the *o* in *proposition* as open as that in *propose*, and the *e* in *preparation* like that in *prepare*; but a larger view of the language would have shown these critics, this would be to overturn the most settled analogies of pronunciation. If we attend to those sounds which the English ear has almost universally received and acknowledged, we shall find the result to be this general rule. When a penultimate vowel, with the accent upon it, ends a syllable, before a single consonant, that vowel is long and open, as *paper*, *decent*, *silence*, *local*, *lucid*, &c.—but when any antepenultimate vowel, except *u*, is under the same predicament, it is short, as *fabulous*, *delicate*, *diligence*, *providence*, *luculent*. This genuine analogy of Eng-

lish pronunciation has been crossed and counteracted by an affectation of reducing our quantity to that of the Latin; but, though this pedantry has prevailed in words of two syllables, where, to the great injury of the sound of our language, it has reduced long vowels to short ones, it has made little alteration in polysyllables, where we find the antepenultimate, or preantepenultimate, accent still preserves its shortening power, notwithstanding the attempts of some speakers to pronounce the first *e* in *legislature*, and the first *o* in *proposition*, long. An Englishman, therefore, who wishes to follow that path which nature (or, which is nearly the same, unpremeditated custom) has chalked out, will, as far as polite usage will permit him, pronounce the penultimate vowel long and open, and the antepenultimate short and shut. Thus a proper mixture of long and short vowels will be preserved, and the ear be indulged in that vernacular propensity, which nature seems to have given it.

See this explained at large in Principles of English Pronunciation, prefixed to the Critical Pronouncing Dictionary, N^os^ 544, 545, &c., and Key to the Classical Pronunciation of Greek and Latin Proper Names, page xxv, N° 18, &c

Liquid Sound of K, C, or G hard, before the Vowels A and I.

THERE is a fluent liquid sound of these consonants before the two vowels *a* and *i*, which gives a smooth and elegant sound to the words in which they occur, and which distinguishes the polite pronunciation of London from that

of every other part of the island. This pronunciation is nearly as if the *a* and *i* were preceded by *e*. Thus, *kind* is sounded as if written *ke-ind; card*, as *ke-ard;* and *regard*, as *re-ge-ard*. When these vowels are pronounced short, as in *cabbage*, *gander*, *kindle*, &c., the interposition of the sound of *e* is very perceptible, and indeed unavoidable; for though we can pronounce *guard*, *cart*, and *kind*, without interposing the *e*, we cannot pronounce *carriage*, *garrison*, and *kindred* in the same manner. The words that require this liquid sound in the *k*, *c*, and *o* hard, are but few. *Sky*, *kind*, *guide*, *gird*, *girt*, *girl*, *guise*, *guile*, *card*, *cart*, *carp*, *carpenter*, *carpet*, *carve*, *carbuncle*, *carnal*, *cartridge*, *guard*, and *regard*;—these and their compounds are perhaps the only words where this sound occurs; but these words are so much in use as to be sufficient to mark a speaker as either coarse or elegant, as he adopts or neglects it.

This sound is taken notice of by Steele in his English grammar, p. 49, so long ago as the reign of queen Anne: but he ascribes it to the consonant's being followed by a palative vowel, as he calls the *a* in *can*, the *e* in *get*, and the *i* in *begin*, which he says, "are sounded as if "written *cyan*, *gyet*, *begyin*, &c., because the "tongue can scarce pass from these guttural "consonants to form the palative vowels, but "it must pronounce *y*; but it is not so before "the other vowels, as in *call*, *gall*, *go*, *gun*, "*goose*, *come*, &c." This observation of Steele's goes no farther than to such words as cannot possibly be pronounced without the intervention of the *e* or *y* sound; but to this it may be added, that though such words as have the long sound of the *a* in *father*; or the same long sound heard before *r* final, or followed by an-

other consonant in the same syllable, as *car*, *card*, *regard*; or such words as have the long *i*, or the short *i* followed by *r*, as *kirk*, *gird*, *girl*; —I say, though these words may be pronounced without the intervention of *e* or *y*, yet with it they are not only more mellow and fluent, but infinitely more elegant and fashionable,

At first sight we are surprised that two such different letters as *a* and *i* should be affected in the same manner by the hard gutturals, *g*, *c*, and *k*; but when we reflect that *i* is really composed of *a* and *e*, our surprise ceases; and we are pleased to find the ear perfectly uniform in its procedure, and entirely unbiassed by the eye. From this view of the analogy, we may see how much mistaken is a very solid and ingenious writer on this subject, who says, that "*ky-ind* for *kind* is a "monster of pronunciation, heard only on our "stage." Nares's Orthoepy, p. 28. See Critical Pronouncing Dictionary, under the word GUILT.

The liquid Sound of T, D, S, and soft C, after the Accent, and before the semiconsonant Diphthongs.

NOTHING can be better established in the genuine pronunciation of our language than the liquid sibilation of these consonants, when the accent comes after them, and the inverted diphthongs succeed. This is evident in the numerous terminations in *tion*, *sion*, *cion*; and if we had words ending in *dion*, it is not to be doubted but that they would flow into the same current of sound.

The general ear, true to analogy, melts these consonants into the soft hiss before the long *u*;

for though apparently a single letter, it is composed of *e oo*, or rather *y oo*, and is therefore not only not a pure vowel, but a semiconsonant diphthong, exactly in sound like the pronoun *you*. Hence we hear polite speakers always pronounce *educate*, as if written *edjucate*; *virtue* as *verchew*, *verdure* as *verjure*: and if the general ear were not *corrupted* by being *corrected*, we should in the same analogy hear *Indian* pronounced *Injian*; *odious*, *ojeous*; and *insidious*, *insidjeous*. In this pronunciation of these words, the speaker has always the strongest analogy on his side; but he ought to avoid sinking the *i*, and reducing the *Indian* into two syllables, as if written *In-jan*; *odious* as *o-jus*; and *insidious* as *insid-jus*. The *i* ought to be heard distinctly like *e* in these words, as if written and divided into *In-je-an*, *o-je-us*, *insid-je-ous*, &c.

For want of attending to this evident analogy, there are few English words more frequently mispronounced than the word *pronunciation*. A mere English scholar, who considers the word to *pronounce* as the root of it, cannot easily conceive why the *o* is thrown out of the second syllable; and therefore, to correct the mistake, sounds the word as if written *pronounciation*. Those who are sufficiently learned to escape this errour, by understanding that the word comes to us either from the Latin *pronunciatio*, or the French *prononciation*, are very apt to fall into another, by sinking the first aspiration, and pronouncing the third syllable like the noun *sea*. But these speakers ought to take notice, that, throughout the whole language, *c*, *s*, and *t*, preceded by the accent, either primary or secondary, and followed by *ea*, *ia*, *io*, or any similar diphthong, always becomes aspirated, and are pronounced as if written *she*. Thus the very

same reasons that oblige us to pronounce *partiality*, *propitiation*, *especially*, &c., as if written *parsheality*, *propisheation*, *espesheally*, &c., oblige us to pronounce *pronunciation* as if written *pronunsheashun*. See Principles prefixed to the Critical Pronouncing Dictionary, Nos 357, 450, 461, and the word ECCLESIASTICK. We may conclude by observing, that this liquid sound of these letters is no fanciful departure from true orthography, but is the genuine and spontaneous production of the national ear; and as it tends to give a mellow flow of sound to a considerable part of the language, it should certainly not be discouraged.

In this word, and some of the other examples, it may be noted, that the secondary accent operates on these letters exactly in the same manner as the primary: and that as the secondary accent is before the *cia*, it makes it *she-a*, as much as the primary before *tion* makes it *shun*.

Suppressing the Sound of the final Consonants.

ONE great cause of indistinctness in reading, is sinking the sound of some of the final consonants, when they are followed by words beginning with vowels, and of some when the next word begins with a consonant. Thus the word *and* is frequently pronounced like the article *an*, both before a vowel and a consonant, as, *Both men and money are wanting to carry on the war*; where we hear this sentence as if written, *Both men an money are wanting to carry on the war*. The suppression of *d* in this case is, however, much more tolerable than when it is followed by a vowel, and particularly the vowel *a*, followed by *n*; for in this position there is

not only a disagreeable repetition of the same sound, but, in some measure, a confusion in the sense. Thus we often hear that *A subject is carried on by question and answer*, as if written, *The subject is carried on by question an answer*; and *He made his meal of an apple and an egg*, as if written, *he made his meal of an apple an an egg*. So that it ought to be made a general rule always to pronounce the *d* in *and*, when a vowel begins the next word, and particularly when that word begins with *an*.

The sound of *f*, when final, is liable to the same suppression when a consonant begins the succeeding word, and particularly the *th*. Nothing is more common than to hear *The want of men is occasioned by the want of money*, pronounced *the want o'men is occasioned by the want o'money*; and, *I spoke of the man who told me of the woman you mentioned*, as if written, *I spoke o' the man who told me o' the woman you mentioned.*

It may, however, be observed in mitigation of this, that where there is no pause between words, the last consonant of one word, and the first of another word, are very apt to coalesce, like double consonants, which are really double only to the eye; but when there is a perceptible pause at the end of a sentence, or member of a sentence, the final consonant ought then to be pronounced distinctly; and instead of letting the organs remain on the last letter till the sound dies, they ought to be smartly separated, by sounding what the French call the mute *e* after the final consonant. All the mute consonants are liable to this imperfect pronunciation, but it is in none more perceptible than in words ending with *t* or *d*, especially if preceded by another consonant. Thus, if I say, *I took down my*

hat, but before I had put it on my head, Mr. Johnson came into the room, and let the tongue remain on the palate on the *t* and *d,* at the end of the words *hat* and *head,* they want much of that articulation they would have if the tongue were smartly separated by a rebound, as it were, from the palate, and the mute *e* pronounced after them somewhat as if spelled in this manner: *I took down my hat-te, but before I had put it on my head-de, Mr. Johnson came into the room.*

The same want of articulation may be perceived in the following sentence, if the tongue be suffered to remain too long on the palate, on the consonants at the end of the words in the following sentence: *He received the whole of the rent, before he parted with the land.* And the superior distinctness of pronouncing it with the *t* and *d,* finished by a smart separation of the organs, and somewhat as if written, *He receive-de the whole of the ren-te, before he parte-de with the lan-de.* The judicious reader will observe that this rule must be followed with discretion, and that the final consonant must not be so pronounced as to form a distinct syllable; this would be to commit a greater errour than that which it was intended to prevent: but as it may with confidence be asserted, that audibility depends chiefly on articulation, so it may be affirmed that articulation depends much on the distinctness with which we hear the final consonants; and trifling therefore as these observations may appear at first sight,—when we consider the importance of audibility, we shall not think any thing that conduces to such an object below our notice.

The rough and smooth Sound of R.

SCARCELY any letter is more difficult to pronounce with propriety than the *r*. What forms great part of the peculiarity of the Irish accent, as it is called, is the rough and harsh pronunciation of this letter; and the soft, smooth, or rather inarticulate sound of it, marks a striking singularity of what is called the cockney pronunciation, or the pronunciation of the common people of London; so that the true sound of this letter seems to lie in the medium between these extremes.

But first it will be necessary to observe, what I have never found noticed by any of our orthoepists, that as the Greek and some other languages have a rough and a smooth, or a harsh and a soft *r*, so has the English, and that each of these are proper in certain situations. The rough *r* is formed by jarring the tip of the tongue against the roof of the mouth, near the fore-teeth; the smooth *r* is a vibration of the lower part of the tongue, near the root, against the inward region of the palate, as close to each other as possible, without coming into contact. The first *r* is proper at the beginning of words, and the second at the end of words, or when succeeded by a consonant. In England, and particularly in London, the *r* in *bar*, *bard*, *card*, *regard*, &c. is pronounced so much in the throat as to be little more than the middle or Italian *a*, heard in *father*, as if written *baa*, *baad*, *caad*, *regaad*; while in Ireland the *r*, in these words, is pronounced with so strong a jar of the tongue against the fore-part of the palate, and accompanied with such an aspiration, or strong breathing at the beginning of the letter, as to pro-

duce that harshness we call the Irish accent. But if this letter is too forcibly pronounced in Ireland, it is often too feebly sounded in England, and particularly in London, where it is sometimes entirely sunk; and it may, perhaps, be worthy of observation, that provided we avoid a too forcible pronunciation of the *r*, when it ends a word, or is followed by a consonant in the same syllable, we may give as much force as we please to this letter at the beginning of a word, without producing any harshness to the ear. Thus *Rome*, *river*, *rage*, may have the *r* as forcible as in Ireland; but *bar*, *bard*, *card*, *regard*, &c., must have it nearly as soft as in London. This letter, therefore, forms an exception to the foregoing rule.

Hissing too much the Terminations tion, sion, &c.

THERE is a vicious manner of pronouncing these terminations, by giving them a sharp hiss, which crushes the consonants together, and totally excludes the vowels, as if the words *nation*, *occasion*, &c., were written *na-shn*, *occa-zhn*, &c. As words of these terminations are very numerous in the language, any improper mode of sounding them must tarnish the whole pronunciation, and therefore ought to be most carefully guarded against. These terminations, therefore, ought to be pronounced as distinctly as if written, *nashun*, *occazhun*, &c. The diphthong *io*, for want of the accent, is sunk into that sound which is annexed to the *o* in the last syllable of *honour*, *favour*, *terrour*, &c., which can be classed with nothing so much related to it as short *u*.

Pronouncing s *indistinctly after* st.

THE letter *s* after *st*, from the very difficulty of its pronunciation, is often sounded inarticulately. The inhabitants of London of the lower order cut the knot, and pronounce it in a distinct syllable, as if *e* were before it; but this is to be avoided as the greatest blemish in speaking: the three last letters in *posts*, *fists*, *mists*, &c., must all be distinctly heard in one syllable, and without either permitting the letters to coalesce, as if written *pose*, *fiss*, *miss*, &c., or suffering the *ts* to make a distinct syllable like the vulgar of London, as if written *pos-tes*, *fis-tes*, *mistes*, &c., but letting the *t* be heard, however feebly, yet distinctly, between the two hissing letters. For the acquiring of this sound, it will be proper to select nouns that end in *st* or *ste*; to form them into plurals, and pronounce them forcibly and distinctly every day. The same may be observed of the third person of verbs ending in *sts* or *stes*, as *persists*, *wastes*, *pastes*, &c.

Pronouncing w *for* v, *and inversely.*

THE pronunciation of *v* for *w*, and more frequently of *w* for *v*, among the inhabitants of London, and those not always of the lower order, is a blemish of the first magnitude. The difficulty of remedying this defect is the greater, as the cure of one of these mistakes has a tendency to promote the other.

Thus, if you are very careful to make a pupil pronounce *veal* and *vinegar*, not as if written *weal* and *winegar*, you will find him very apt to pronounce *wine* and *wind*, as if written *vine* and *vind*. The only method of rectifying this habit

seems to be this. Let the pupil select from a dictionary, not only all the words that begin with *v*, but as many as he can of those that have this letter in any other part. Let him be told to bite his under lip while he is sounding the *v* in those words, and to practise this every day till he pronounces the *v* properly at first sight: then, and not till then, let him pursue the same method with the *w*; which he must be directed to pronounce by a pouting out of the lips, without suffering them to touch the teeth. Thus, by giving all the attention to only one of these letters at a time, and fixing by habit the true sound of that, we shall at last find both of them reduced to their proper pronunciation, in a shorter time than by endeavouring to rectify them both at once.

Not sounding h *after* w.

THE aspirate *h* is often sunk, particularly in the capital, where we do not find the least distinction of sound between *while* and *wile*, *whet* and *wet*, *where* and *were*, &c. Trifling as this difference may appear at first sight, it tends greatly to weaken and impoverish the pronunciation, as well as sometimes to confound words of a very different meaning. The best method to rectify this is, to collect all the words of this description from a dictionary, and write them down; and instead of the *wh*, to begin them with *hoo* in a distinct syllable, and so to pronounce them. Thus let *while* be written and sounded *hoo-ile*; *whet*, *hoo-et*; *where*, *hoo-are*; *whip*, *hoo-ip*; &c. This is no more, as Dr. Lowth observes, than placing the aspirate in its true position, before the *w*, as it is in the Saxon, which the words come from; where we may observe, that, though

we have altered the orthography of our ancestors, we have still preserved their pronunciation.

Not sounding h *where it ought to be sounded, and inversely.*

A STILL worse habit than the last prevails, chiefly among the people of London, that of sinking the *h* at the beginning of words where it ought to be sounded, and of sounding it, either where it is not seen, or where it ought to be sunk. Thus we not unfrequently hear, especially among children, *heart* pronounced *art*, and *arm*, *harm*. This is a vice perfectly similar to that of pronouncing the *v* for the *w*, and the *w* for the *v*, and requires a similar method to correct it.

As there are but so very few words in the language where the initial *h* is sunk, we may select these from the rest; and, without setting the pupil right when he mispronounces these, or when he prefixes the *h* improperly to other words, we may make him pronounce all the words where *h* is sounded, till he has almost forgot there are any words pronounced otherwise. Then he may go over those words to which he improperly prefixes the *h*, and those where the *h* is seen but not sounded, without any danger of an interchange. As these latter words are but few, I shall subjoin a catalogue of them for the use of the learner. *Heir*, *heiress*, *herb*, *herbage*, *honest*, *honesty*, *honestly*, *honour*, *honourable*, *honourably*, *hospital*, *hostler*, *hour*, *hourly*, *humble*, *humbly*, *humbles*, *humour*, *humourist*, *humourous*, *humourously*, *humoursome*. Where we may observe, that *humour*, and its compounds, not only sink the *h*, but sound the *u* like the pronoun *you* or the noun *yew*, as if written *yewmour*, *yewmourous*, &c.

Suppressing e *where it should be pronounced, and pronouncing it where it should be suppressed.*

THE vowel *e* before *l* and *n* in a final unaccented syllable, by its being sometimes suppressed and sometimes not, forms one of the most puzzling difficulties in teaching young people to read. When any of the liquids precede these letters, the *e* is heard distinctly, as *woollen, flannel, women, syren*; but when any of the other consonants come before these letters, the *e* is sometimes heard, as in *novel, sudden*; and sometimes not, as in *swivel, sadden*, &c. As no other rule can be given for this variety of pronunciation, perhaps the best way will be to draw the line between those words where *e* is pronounced, and those where it is not; and this, by the help of the RHYMING DICTIONARY, I am easily enabled to do. In the first place, then, it may be observed, that *e* before *l*, in a final unaccented syllable, must always be pronounced distinctly, except in the following words: *shekel, weasel, ousel, nousel,* (better written *nuzzle,*) *navel, ravel, snivel, rivel, drivel, shrivel, shovel, grovel, hazel, drazel, nozel.* These words are pronounced as if the *e* were omitted by an apostrophe, as *shek'l, weaz'l, ous'l,* &c., or rather as if written, *sheckle, weazle, ouzle,* &c.—but as these are the only words of this termination that are so pronounced, great care must be taken that children do not pronounce *travel, gravel, rebel,* (the substantive,) *parcel, chapel,* and *vessel,* in the same manner; a fault to which they are very liable.

E before *n*, in a final unaccented syllable, and not preceded by a liquid, must always be suppressed, except in the following words: *sudden, mynchen, kitchen, hyphen, chicken, ticken,* (better

written *ticking),* *jerken, aspen, platen, patch, marten, latten, patten, leaven* or *leven, sloven.* In these words the *e* is heard distinctly, contrary to the general rule which suppresses the *e* in these syllables, when preceded by a mute, as *harden, heathen, Heaven,* as if written *hard'n, heath'n, Heav'n,* &c.; nay even when preceded by a liquid in the words *fallen* and *stolen,* where the *e* is suppressed, as if they were written *fall'n* and *stol'n: garden* and *burden,* therefore, are very analogically pronounced *gard'n* and *burd'n,* and this pronunciation ought the rather to be indulged, as we always hear the *e* suppressed in *gardener* and *burdensome,* as if written *gard'ner* and *burd'nsome.*

This diversity in the pronunciation of these terminations ought the more carefully to be attended to, as nothing is so vulgar and childish as to hear *swivel* and *Heaven* pronounced with the *e* distinctly, or *novel* and *chicken* with the *e* suppressed. To these observations we may add, that though *evil* and *devil* suppress the *i,* as if written *ev'l* and *dev'l,* yet that *cavil* and *pencil* preserve the sound of *i* distinctly; and that *latin* ought never to be pronounced, as it is generally at schools, as if written *lat'n.*

OBSERVATIONS ON THE PRONUNCIATION OF CERTAIN WORDS MOST FREQUENTLY MISTAKEN IN READING.

The true Sound of the Auxiliary Verbs; also when ed *makes an additional Syllable, and when not.*

THE auxiliary verbs, *shall, would, could, should, are,* and *have,* should never be pronounced *shawll, wold, cold, shold, air,* and *haive,* but *shal, wood, cood, shood, arr,* and *hawv**.

The participial termination *ed* must never be pronounced as a distinct syllable, unless preceded by *d* or *t,* except in the language of Scripture. One distinction indeed seems to have obtained between some adjectives and participles, which is, pronouncing the *ed* in an additional syllable in the former, and sinking it in the latter. Thus when *learned, cursed, blessed,* and *winged,* are adjectives, the *ed* is invariably pronounced as a distinct syllable; but when participles, as *learn'd, curs'd, bless'd,* and *wing'd,* the *ed* does not form an additional syllable. Poetry, however, assumes the privilege of using these adjectives either way, but correct prose rigidly exacts the pronunciation of *ed* in these words,

* The auxiliary verbs are as irregular in their pronunciation as in their form; and recur so often in forming the moods and tenses of other verbs, that too great care cannot be taken to pronounce them exactly right. For this purpose it would be a useful exercise, to make the pupil frequently conjugate the two auxiliary verbs *are* and *have* through all their moods and tenses; taking particular care, that *are* is pronounced like the first syllable of *ar-dent; have* with the *a* short, as in the first syllable of *tavern;* and *shall,* exactly as the first syllable of *shal-low.*

when adjectives, as a distinct syllable. The *ed* in *aged* always makes a distinct syllable, as *an aged man;* but when this word is compounded with another, the *ed* does not form a syllable, as *a full-ag'd horse.*

It is perhaps worthy of notice, that when adjectives are changed into adverbs, by the addition of the termination *ly*, we often find the participial *ed* preserved long and distinct; even in those very words where it was contracted when used adjectively. Thus, though we always hear *con-fess'd*, *profess'd*, *design'd*, &c., we as constantly hear *con-fess-ed-ly*, *pro-fess-ed-ly*, *de-sign-ed-ly*, &c. The same may be observed of the following list of words, which by the assistance of the Rhyming Dictionary I am enabled to give, as the only words in the language in which the *ed* is pronounced as a distinct syllable in the adverb, where it is contracted in the participial adjective. *Forcedly*, *enforcedly*, *unveiledly*, *deformedly*, *feignedly*, *unfeignedly*, *designedly*, *resignedly*, *restrainedly*, *refinedly*, *unconcernedly*, *undiscernedly*, *preparedly*, *assuredly*, *advisedly*, *composedly*, *dispersedly*, *diffusedly*, *confusedly*, *unperceivedly*, *resolvedly*, *deservedly*, *undeservedly*, *reservedly*, *unreservedly*, *avowedly*, *perplexedly*, *fixedly*, *amazedly*, *forkedly*.

When you *is to be pronounced like* ye; *and* my *like* me, &c.

ANOTHER very common errour in reading arises from pronouncing the personal pronoun *you* in the same manner, whether it is in the nominative or the oblique case; or, in other words, whether it is the principal or the subordinate word in a sentence. It is certain that the pronouns *you* and *my*, when they are contradistinguished

from other pronouns, and consequently emphatical, are always pronounced with their full open sound, *you*, *my*. But it is as certain, if we observe the pronunciation of correct conversation, that we shall find them sounded *ye* and *me*, when they are subordinate words in a sentence, and have no emphasis on them. For example; YOU *told him all the truth*. Here the word *you* is a nominative case, that is, it goes before the word denoting action, and must therefore be pronounced full and open, so as to rhyme with *new*. In this sentence also, *He told* YOU *before he told any body else;* the word *you* is in the oblique case, or comes after the word denoting action, but as it is emphatical by being contradistinguished from *any body else*, it preserves its full open sound as before. But in the sentence, *Though he told you, he had no right to tell you*—here the pronoun *you* is in the oblique case, or follows the word denoting action, and, having no distinctive emphasis, invariably falls into the sound of the antiquated form of this pronoun, *ye*; and as if written, *Though he told ye, he had no right to tell ye**.

The same observations hold good with respect to the pronoun *my*. If we were to say, *My pen is as bad as my paper*, we should necessarily pronounce *my* like *me*, as, in this sentence, *pen* and *paper* are the emphatical words; but if I were to say, *My pen is worse than yours*, here *my* is in

* Perhaps it was this pronunciation of the pronoun *you*, when in the oblique case, which induced Shakspeare and Milton sometimes to write it *ye:* though, as Dr. Lowth observes, very ungrammatically.

The more shame for *ye*, holy men I thought *ye*.
Henry VIII.

His wrath which one day will destroy *ye* both.
Milton, Par. Lost. b. ii, l. 704.

antithesis with *yours*, and consequently must be pronounced long and full, so as to rhyme with *high*, *nigh*, &c.

The word *your* is exactly under the same predicament. When the emphasis is laid upon this word, it is always pronounced full and open, exactly like the substantive *ewer*; as, *The moment I had read Your letter I sat down to write Mine*: but, when it is not emphatical, it sinks naturally into *yur*; exactly like the last syllable of *Law-yer*, as, *I had just answered yur first letter as yur last arrived.* On the contrary, if it were to be said, *I had just answered Your first letter as Your last arrived*, with *your* sounded like *ewer*, as in the former sentence, every delicate ear would be offended. A few examples may serve to illustrate these observations still farther.

"Your paper is a part of my tea-equipage; "and my servant knows my humour so well, "that calling for my breakfast this morning, (it "being past my usual hour) she answered, the "Spectator was not yet come in." Spect. N°. 92.

In this example we find every *my* but the fourth may be pronounced so as to rhyme with *high*, and it would intimate the singularity of the tea-equipage, the servant, and the humour, as opposed to, or distinguished from those who have no such tea-equipage, servant, or humour; but breakfast, having no such singularity or opposition of meaning to other breakfasts, cannot have *my* before it pronounced like *high* without being absurd. Not that the sense necessarily requires the full sound of *my* before the former words, but admits of it only; nay, the repetition of their sound being disagreeable to the ear, and the sense not demanding it, perhaps the best mode of reading this passage would be to confine

the full sound of *my* to that which precedes the word *humour*. *Your* at the beginning of the sentence, requires the full sound rhyming with *pure;* as it distinguishes the Spectator from other papers, but in the following part of the same letter:

" Having thus, in part, signified the esteem " and veneration which I have for you, I must " put you in mind of the catalogue of books " which you have promised to recommend to " our sex; for I have deferred furnishing my " closet with authors, till I receive your advice " in this particular, being your daily disciple, " and humble servant," " LEONORA."

However we may pronounce the word *your* preceding the word advice, the last *your* must necessarily be pronounced short like *yur*. This sound of the possessive pronoun *your* always takes place where it is used to signify any particular species of persons or things. Thus Addison, speaking of the metaphors which professional men most commonly fall into, says, " *Your* men of business usually have recourse to " such instances as are too mean and familiar." Spect. N°. 421.—And Cleopatra, in All for Love, speaking of the Roman poets, says,

——— Mere poetry!
Your Roman wits, your Gallus and Tibullus,
Have taught ye this from Cytheris and Delia.
DRYDEN.

When of, for, from, *and* by, *are to have a long, and when a short Sound.*

A DISTINCTION similar to those we have been observing seems to have taken place in the pronunciation of the preposition *of*. The consonant

of this word is almost invariably pronounced like the consonant *v*; and when the word does not come before some of the pronouns at the end of a sentence, or member of a sentence, we sometimes suffer the vowel *o* to slide into the sound of the vowel *u*; and the word may be said to rhyme with *love*, *dove*, &c. Thus, in the well-known couplet in the tragedy of the Fair Penitent.

Of all the various wretches Love has made,
How few we find by men of sense betrayed!

The two *ofs* in this couplet we find, may, without any very palpable departure from propriety, be pronounced as if written *uv*; rhyming with *dove*, &c.—but when the words *it*, *him*, *her*, *them*, or any other personal pronoun follows *of*, either in the middle or at the end of a sentence, the word *of* must then be pronounced as when heard singly, rhyming with the first syllable of *nov-el*, *hov-el*. Thus every ear will readily perceive the impropriety of reciting the following sentence in this manner,—*We never know the true value uv time till we are deprived uv it*; and the superior propriety, as well as harmony of this manner,—*We never know the true value uv time till we are deprived ov it.*

The same observations hold good with respect to the words *from*, *by*, *for*, and every word that in certain positions may admit of a less distinct and emphatical sound; for we may allowably pronounce *from* as if written *frum* in the sentence, *I delivered him* FROM *the danger he was in*; but we must always pronounce it nearly as if written *fraum* in such sentences as the following: *I came* FROM *him*; *I delivered him* FROM *it.*

The word *by* is liable also to a double sound in different situations; that is, sometimes like

the verb *be*, and sometimes like *buy*. Thus we may say either, *He died by* (*be*) *his own hands:* or, *He died by* (*buy*) *his own hands:* but we must necessarily pronounce it *buy*, when it comes before the word *it*, *him*, or any similar word at the end of a sentence: as, *whatever was the weapon, he died by* (*buy*) *it.*

In the same manner we may say, *I wrote to a friend for* (*fur*) *his advice:* but we must invariably say, *He would not give me his advice though I wrote for* (*faur*) *it.* In these instances we plainly perceive, that there is something left to taste, and something established by custom. But notwithstanding the little hold we have of these fleeting sounds, that convey to us these less important parts of a sentence, we have still sufficient perception of them for establishing this general rule. When these signs of cases, *of*, *from*, *by*, *for*, are in the middle of a sentence, they are sometimes liable to a double sound; but when at the end of a sentence, or member of a sentence, and succeeded by *it*, *him*, *her*, or *them*, they are invariably pronounced as when heard singly *of*, *from*, *by*, *for*, &c.

How to pronounce the Possessive Pronoun THY.

FROM what has been already observed of the pronoun *my*, we are naturally led to suppose, that the word *thy*, when not emphatical, ought to follow the same analogy, and be pronounced like *the*, as we frequently hear it on the stage: but if we reflect, that reading or reciting is a perfect picture of speaking, we shall be induced to think, that in this particular the stage is sometimes wrong. The second personal pronoun *thy* is not, like *my*, the common language of every subject; it is used only where the sub-

ject is either raised above common life, or sunk below it into the mean and familiar. When the subject is elevated above common life, it adopts a language suitable to such an elevation, and the pronunciation of this language ought to be as far removed from the familiar as the language itself. Thus, in prayer, pronouncing *thy* like *the*, even when unemphatical, would be intolerable: while suffering *thy*, when unemphatical, to slide into *the* in the pronunciation of slight and familiar composition, seems to lower the sound to the language, and form a proper distinction between different subjects. If therefore it should be asked, why, in reciting epic or tragic composition, we ought always to pronounce *thy* rhyming with *high*, while *my*, when unemphatical sinks into the sound of *me*, it may be answered, because *my* is the common language of every subject, while *thy* is confined to subjects either elevated above common life, or sunk below it into the endearing and familiar. When, therefore, the language is elevated, the uncommonness of the word *thy*, and its full sound rhyming with *high*, is suitable to the dignity of the subject; but the slender sound like *the* gives it a familiarity, only suitable so the language of endearment or negligence, and for this very reason is unfit for the dignity of epic or tragic composition. Thus in the following passage from Milton:

Say first, for Heav'n hides nothing from thy view,
Nor the deep tract of Hell———
Parad. Lost, b. 1.

O thou, that, with surpassing glory crown'd,
Look'st from thy sole dominion, like the God
Of this new world; at whose sight, all the stars
Hide their diminish'd heads; to thee I call,
But with no friendly voice, and add thy name,
O Sun, to tell thee how I hate thy beams.
Parad. Lost, b. 4.

Here pronouncing the pronoun *thy*, like the word *the*, would familiarise and debase the language to prose. The same may be observed of the following passage from the Tragedy of Cato:

> Now, Cæsar, let thy troops beset our gates,
> And bar each avenue; thy gathering fleets
> O'erspread the sea, and stop up ev'ry port;
> Cato shall open to himself a passage,
> And mock thy hopes.———

Here the impropriety of pronouncing *thy* like *the* is palpable: nor would it be much more excusable in the following speech of Portius, in the first scene of the same tragedy:

> Thou seest not that thy brother is thy rival;
> But I must hide it, for I know thy temper.
> Now, Marcus, now thy virtue's on the proof:
> Put forth thy utmost strength, work ev'ry nerve,
> And call up all thy father in thy soul.

As this pronoun is generally pronounced on the stage, it would be difficult for the ear to distinguish whether the words are

> Thou know'st not that *thy* brother is *thy* rival—or
> Thou know'st not that *the* brother is *the* rival, *&c.*

and this may be one reason why the slender pronunciation of *thy* should be avoided as much as possible.

Perhaps it will be urged, that though these passages require *thy* to be pronounced so as to rhyme with *high*, there are other instances in tragedy where the subject is low and familiar, which would be more suitably pronounced by sounding *thy* like *the:* to which it may be answered, when Tragedy lowers her voice, and descends into the mean and familiar, as is frequently the case in the tragedies of Shakspeare, the slender pronunciation of *thy* may be adopt-

ed, because, though the piece may have the name of a tragedy, the scene may be really comedy. The only rule, therefore, that can be given, is a very indefinite one; namely, that *thy* ought always to be pronounced so as to rhyme with *high*, when the subject is raised and the personage dignified: but when the subject is familiar, and the person we address without dignity or importance, if *thy* be the personal pronoun made use of, it ought to be pronounced like *the*: Thus, if, in a familiar way, we say to a friend, *Give me thy hand*, we never hear the pronoun *thy* sounded so as to rhyme with *high*: and it is always pronounced like *the* when speaking to a child; we say, *Mind thy book*, *Hold up thy head*, or *Take off thy hat*. The phraseology we call *thee and thouing* is not in so common use with us as the *tutoyant* among the French; but as the second personal pronoun *thou*, and its possessive *thy* are indispensable in composition, it seems of some importance to pronounce them properly.

How to pronounce the Adjective Possessive Pronoun MINE.

I CALL this word an adjective possessive when it is used before a substantive, as it constantly is in Scripture when the substantive begins with a vowel: as "*Mine eyes* have seen "thy salvation:" and a substantive possessive when it stands alone, as "This book is "mine." In reading the Scripture we are at no loss about the pronunciation of this word, as the dignity and solemnity of the composition invariably directs us to give the *i* its long sound. as in the substantive; but in Milton, and other

composition, where there is no such dignity or solemnity, this pronunciation of the word has an intolerable stiffness, and ought not to be used. Thus, in the Spectator, N° 195, Mr. Addison says, "Were I to prescribe a rule for "drinking, it should be formed upon a saying "quoted by Sir William Temple:—The first "glass for myself, the second for my friends, "the third for good humour, and the fourth for "*mine* enemies." In Milton too,

-Methought,
Close at *mine* ear, one call'd me forth to walk.
Parad. Lost.

In Shakspeare also:

——— Sleeping within *mine* orchard,
My custom always in the afternoon,
Upon my secure hour thy uncle stole,
With juice of curs'd hebona in a phial,
And in the porches of *mine* ears did pour
The leperous distilment.——— Hamlet.

In all these instances we find a formality, a staleness and uncouthness of sound, that is peculiarly displeasing to the ear: and as this mode of writing was introduced when our pronunciation may be said to have been in its infancy, for the sake of euphony (for it is clearly ungrammatical), so now that it may be said to have arrived at its maturity, the very same reason seems to entitle the present age to alter it: that is, I mean the pronunciation of it, by substituting *my* pronounced like *me* in its stead.

The disagreeable sound which *mine* has, in these cases, to the ear, has inclined several readers to pronounce it *min*; but by thus mining the matter (if the pun will be pardoned me) they mutilate the word, and leave it more disagreeable to the ear than it was before. Readers therefore seem to have no choice but to pro-

nounce it always as it is written, and to let the author be answerable for the ill sound: or, in all language, but that of Scripture, to change it into *my* pronounced like *me*. Shakspeare seems to have used this word ludicrously in the Merry Wives of Windsor, where Falstaff says, "*Mine* "host of the garter:—truly *mine* host, I must "turn away some of my followers:" and the host, by requesting Falstaff to speak scholarly and wisely, seems to intimate that this use of the word *mine* before a vowel or an *h* was the most correct way of speaking.

But though *thy*, in familiar or ludicrous language, will admit of being changed in sound to *the*,—*mine* will on no occasion suffer an alteration into *min*. When it is used familiarly, it is always a burlesque upon the grave use of it, and therefore requires the grave sound to be retained, or the humour of it would be lost.

The indistinct sound of the word NOT.

From the frequent pronunciation of this word without the least necessity of placing an accent on it, we find it sometimes fall into an indistinctness which almost reduces the sound of it to nothing. When it is emphatically opposed to something positive, as, *Though he asserts it is so, I assert it is* not *so*; here the word has its genuine full sound, rhyming with *hot*, *shot*, *lot*, &c.; but when there is no such opposition in the sense, we often hear it dwindle into *nut*, as *This is a hint which I have* nut *observed in any of our writers on this subject*. Here we shall find the generality of readers lay an accent upon *have*, and pronounce the word *not* in the obscure manner I have been describing; where it may be observed, though there ought not to be any

emphasis on it, as in the former example, it should certainly be sounded exactly in the same distinct manner in both places.

That the word *not* in a simple negative sentence does not require an accent, but is pronounced like an unaccented syllable of the word that precedes it, may be gathered from the colloquial contraction of the negative phrases, *cannot, shall not, do not,* into *ca'n't, sha'n't, don't,* &c. It is true that these contractions ought never to appear in print, except in comedies and farces, where the language of the lowest vulgar is often adopted; but it is perhaps impossible to refuse them a place in spoken language, where the subject is common and familiar; though even here they should be indulged as little as possible: but be this as it may, they certainly tend to show that a simple negative lays no stress on the negation, or custom would never have so much obscured it in the contraction. It may be observed in passing, that as these contractions have disappeared in print; they have been gradually vanishing from polite conversation; and as they ought never to have place in public speaking, so those speakers in private may be looked upon as the most elegant who make the least use of them.

How to pronounce the Participial Termination ING.

The participial termination *ing* is frequently a cause of embarrassment to readers who have a desire to pronounce correctly; nor is it easy to solve the difficulty. We are told, even by teachers of English, that *ing* in the words *singing, bringing,* and *swinging,* must be pronounced with the ringing sound which is heard when

the accent is on these letters, in words of one syllable, as *king*, *sing*, and *swing*, and not as if written without the *g*, as *singin*, *bringin*, *swingin*. No one can be a greater advocate than I am for the strictest adherence to orthography, as long as the public pronunciation pays the least attention to it; but when, from the nicest observation of the best speakers, I find letters given up, with respect to sound, I then consider them as ciphers. It is from observation I can assert, that our best speakers do not invariably pronounce the participial *ing* so as to rhyme with *sing*, *king*, and *ring*, but sometimes only as the preposition *in*. In the first place, whenever the verb ends with *ing*, as to *sing*, to *bring*, or to *fling*, the repetition of the ringing sound in the syllables immediately following each other would have a very bad effect on the ear, and, instead of *singing*, *bringing*, or *flinging*, our best speakers universally pronounce them *singin*, *bringin*, and *flingin*: for the very same reason, we ought to admit the ringing sound when the verb ends with *in*; for if, instead of *sinning*, *pinning*, and *beginning*, we should pronounce *sinnin*, *pinnin*, and *beginnin*, we should fall into the same disgusting repetition as in the former examples. That *ing* should not always have its ringing sound when a participial termination, is not very wonderful, when we consider how much it is the custom of pronunciation to shorten and obscure vowels, in final syllables, that are not under the stress. What a trifling omission is the *g* after *n* in these syllables, to the mutilation of *oient* in the plurals of French verbs into *a*! But trifling as it is, it savours too much of vulgarity to omit it in any words but where the same sound immediately precedes, as in *singin*, *bringin*, *flingin*, &c.; without saying any thing of the ambiguity it

may possibly form by confounding it with the preposition *in*. *Writing*, *reading*, and *speaking*, therefore, are certainly preferable to *writin*, *readin*, and *speakin*, wherever the language has the least degree of precision or solemnity, and more particularly in reading or speaking in public.

How to pronounce the word TO, *when succeeded by the Pronoun* YOU.

I HAVE frequently observed some little embarrassment in readers, when they have met with these words without any accentual force on them; as in the phrases, "I spoke *to you* "about it long ago."—"He went *to you* about "some important business."—In these phrases, where *you* is without accent or emphasis, and is according to the foregoing rule, pronounced *ye*, we sometimes hear the *to* sounded as if written *te*; as, "I spoke *te ye* about it long ago," &c. But it may be observed, that though the *you* may very properly in this situation be sounded like *ye*, yet *to* must always preserve its true sound, as if written *two*, at least when we are reading, however it may be suffered to approach to *te* when we are speaking; for it must be ever kept in mind, that there will always be a slight difference between easy or cursory conversation, and reading or oratorical speaking; or, in other words, between speaking and talking: the one will admit of many contractions and slightnesses in pronunciation, which would be wholly inexcusable in the other. Writers on this subject commonly content themselves with referring us to the practice of the best speakers; and without all question, this is the principal object of attention; but

with the same advice that others give, I have attempted to add a few rules, by way of rendering the advice more useful.

Having premised these observations on words, we shall next proceed to sentences; as words, arranged into sentences, may be properly called the subject matter of the Art of Reading.

Reading defined. Its Relation to Speaking.

READING is not ill defined by a late writer on the subject, where he calls it artificial speaking*. It is an imitative art which has eloquent speaking for its model, as eloquent speaking is an imitation of beautiful nature. Reading, therefore, is to speaking, what a copy is to an original picture; both of them have beautiful nature for their object: and as a taste for beautiful nature can scarcely be better acquired, than by a view of the most elegant copies of it, speaking, it is presumed, cannot be more successfully taught, than by referring us to such rules as instruct us in the art of reading.

The art of reading is that system of rules, which teaches us to pronounce written composition with justness, energy, variety, and ease. Agreeably to this definition, reading may be considered as that species of delivery, which not only expresses the sense of an author, so as barely to be understood, but which, at the same time, gives it all that force, beauty, and variety, of which it is susceptible: the first of these considerations belongs to grammar, and the last to rhetoric.

The sense of an author being the first object of reading, it will be necessary to inquire into those divisions and subdivisions of a sentence,

* Rice's Introduction to the Art of Reading.

which are employed to fix and ascertain its meaning: this leads us to a consideration of the doctrine of punctuation.

Punctuation may be considered in two different lights, first, as it clears and preserves the sense of a sentence, by combining those words together that are united in sense, and separating those which are distinct; and, secondly, as it directs to such pauses, elevations, and, depressions of the voice, as not only mark the sense of the sentence, but give it a variety and beauty which recommend it to the ear; for in speaking, as in other arts, the useful and the agreeable are almost always found to coincide, and every real embellishment promotes and perfects the principal design.

In order, therefore, to have as clear an idea of punctuation as possible, it will be necessary to consider it as related to grammar and rhetoric distinctly. A system of punctuation may be sufficient for the purposes of grammar; or, in other words, it may be sufficient to clear and preserve the sense of an author, and at the same time be but a very imperfect guide to the pronunciation of it. The art of speaking, though founded on grammar, has principles of its own: principles that arise from the nature of the living voice, from the perception of harmony in the ear, and from a certain superaddition to the sense of language, of which grammar takes no account. These principles necessarily influence our pronunciation, and direct us to pauses, which are entirely unknown to every system of punctuation in use.

But though the punctuation in use does not answer all the purposes of reading and speaking, it must, nevertheless, be allowed to be of considerable advantage. It does not indeed give us

half the pauses which a just pronunciation seems to require; and those pauses it *does* give are seldom such as precisely mark the sense of a sentence; but still it directs the eye to intervals proper for some pauses, and serves to keep members from running into each other, and confounding the sense of the sentence: and if a few simple rules*, founded on the nature of a sentence, were adopted by writers and printers, there is not the least doubt but the art of reading might be greatly facilitated and improved.

But the business of this essay is not so much to construct a new system of punctuation, as to endeavour to make the best use of that which is already established; an attempt to reduce the whole doctrine of rhetorical punctuation to a few plain simple principles, which may enable the reader, in some measure, to point for himself: for this purpose, it will, in the first place, be necessary to exhibit a general idea of the punctuation in use, that we may be better enabled to see how far it will assist us in the practice of pronunciation, and where we must have recourse to principles more permanent and systematical.

General Idea of the common Doctrine of Punctuation.

Dr. LOWTH defines punctuation to be, "the "art of marking in writing the several pauses, "or rests, between sentences, and the parts of "sentences, according to their proper quan- "tity or proportion, as they are expressed in a "just and accurate pronunciation." Others, as Sir James Burrow and Dr. Bowles, beside con-

* For these Rules, see Elements of Elocution, p. 98.

sidering the points as marks of rest and pauses, suppose them to be hints for a different accent of voice, or rules for regulating the modulation of the voice, in reading; but whether this modulation of voice relates to all the points, or to the interrogation, exclamation, and parenthesis only, we are not informed. Grammarians are pretty generally agreed in distinguishing the pauses into

The period The colon The semicolon The comma	marked thus

and those pauses which are accompanied with an alteration in the tone of voice into

The interrogation The exclamation The parenthesis	marked thus	? ! ()

The period is supposed to be a pause double the time of the colon; the colon, double that of the semicolon; and the semicolon, double that of the comma, or smallest pause; the interrogation and exclamation points are said to be indefinite as to their quantity of time, and to mark an elevation of voice; and the parenthesis to mark a moderate depression of the voice, with a pause greater than the comma.

The Use of the Comma.

A SIMPLE sentence, that is, a sentence having but one subject, or nominative, and one finite verb, admits of no pause. Thus in the following sentence: *The passion for praise produces excellent effects in women of sense. The passion for praise* is the subject, or nominative case, to the verb *produces*, and *excellent effects in women of*

sense is the object or accusative case, with its concomitant circumstances or adjuncts of specification, as Dr. Lowth very properly terms them; and this sentence, says the learned bishop, admits of no pause between any of its parts, but when a new verb is added to the sentence, as in the following: *The passion for praise, which is so very vehement in the fair sex, produces excellent effects in women of sense.* Here a new verb is introduced, accompanied with adjuncts of its own, and the subject is repeated by the relative pronoun *which*: it now becomes a compounded sentence, made up of two simple sentences, one of which is inserted in the middle of the other; it must, therefore, be distinguished into its component parts by a point, placed on each side of the additional sentence.

In every sentence, therefore, as many subjects, or as many finite verbs, as there are, either expressed or implied, so many distinctions there may be: as, *My hopes, fears, joys, pains, all centre in you.* The case is the same, when several adjuncts affect the subject of the verbs: as, *A good, wise, learned man is an ornament to the commonwealth*; or, when several adverbs, or adverbial circumstances, affect the verb: as, *He behaved himself prudently, modestly, virtuously.* For as many such adjuncts as there are, so many several members does the sentence contain; and these are to be distinguished from each other as much as several subjects or finite verbs. The reason of this is, that as many subjects, finite verbs, or adjuncts, as there are in a sentence, so many distinct sentences are actually implied; as the first example is equivalent to—*My hopes all centre in you, my fears all centre in you,* &c.—The second example is equivalent to—*A good man is an ornament to the commonwealth, a wise*

man is an ornament to the commonwealth, &c. The third example is equivalent to—*He behaved himself modestly, he behaved himself prudently*, &c.; and these implied sentences are all to be distinguished by a comma.

The exception to this rule is, where these subjects or adjuncts are united by a conjunction: as, *The imagination and the judgment do not always agree*; and *A man never becomes learned without studying constantly and methodically.* In these cases the comma between the subjects and adjuncts is omitted.

There are some other kinds of sentences, which, though seemingly simple, are nevertheless of the compound kind, and really contain several subjects, verbs, or adjuncts. Thus in the sentences containing what is called the ablative absolute: as, *Physicians, the disease once discovered, think the cure half wrought;* where the words, *the disease once discovered*, are equivalent to, *when the cause of the disease is discovered.* So in those sentences, where the nouns are added by apposition: as, *The Scots, a hardy people, endure it all.* So also in those, where vocative cases occur: as, *This, my friend, you must allow me.* The first of these examples is equivalent to, *The Scots endured it all*, and *The Scots, who are a hardy people, endured it all*; and the last to—*This you must allow me*, and *this my friend must allow me.*

The Use of the Semicolon, Colon, and Period.

WHEN a sentence can be divided into two or more members, which members are again divisible into members more simple, the former are to be separated by a semicolon.



EXAMPLE.

But as this passion for admiration, when it works according to reason, improves the beautiful part of our species in every thing that is laudable; so nothing is more destructive to them, when it is governed by vanity and folly.

When a sentence can be divided into two parts, each of which parts are again divisible by semicolons, the former are to be separated by a colon.

EXAMPLES.

As we cannot discern the shadow moving along the dial-plate, so the advances we make in knowledge are only perceived by the distance gone over.

Here the two members, being both simple, are only separated by a comma.

As we perceive the shadow to have moved, but did not perceive it moving; so our advances in learning, as they consist of such minute steps, are only perceivable by the distance gone over.

Here the sentence being divided into two equal parts, and those compounded, since they include others, we separate the former by a semicolon, and the latter by commas.

As we perceive the shadow to have moved along the dial, but did not perceive it moving; and it appears that the grass has grown, though nobody ever saw it grow: so the advances we make in knowledge, as they consist of such minute steps, are only perceivable by the distance gone over.

Here the advancement in knowledge is compared to the motion of a shadow, and the growth of grass; which comparison divides the sentence into two principal parts: but since what is said of the movement of the shadow, and of the growth of grass, likewise contains two simple members, they are to be separated by a semicolon; consequently, a higher pointing is required, to separate them from the other part of

the sentence, which they are opposed to: and this is a colon.

When a member of a sentence forms complete sense, and does not excite expectation of what follows, though it consist but of a simple member, it may be marked with a colon.

EXAMPLES.

The discourse consisted of two parts: in the first was shown the necessity of fighting; in the second, the advantages that would arise from it.

The Augustan age was so eminent for good poets, that they have served as models to all others: yet it did not produce any good tragic poets.

When a sentence is so far perfectly finished, as not to be connected in construction with the following sentence, it is marked with a period.

The Interrogation, Exclamation, and Parenthesis.

THE note of interrogation is used to show that a question is asked: as, *What day of the month is this?* It likewise distinguishes a question from a sentence in the imperative mood: as, *Do you return?* Interrogative sentences require an elevation of the voice, except the question be asked by the pronouns, *who, which, what;* or the adverbs, *how, where, when,* &c.; for in these cases you must give a moderate cadence to your voice, and let the pause be governed by the sense of the subject*.

* This distinction of the voice, applied to the distinction of interrogative sentences, into those that begin with and without the interrogative words, is extracted from a spelling-book, written by Mr. Perry, a very industrious, accurate, and ingenious writer on English pronunciation, at Edinburgh. This author, and one Charles Butler, of Magdalen College, Oxford, in his English Grammar, 1633, are the only writers in whom I ever met with the least hint of this very important distinction.

A parenthesis is a sentence inserted into the body of another sentence, to illustrate its meaning, but is neither necessary to the sense, nor at all affects the construction. It marks a moderate depression of the voice, with a pause greater than a comma.

EXAMPLE.

When they were both turned of forty (an age in which, according to Mr. Cowley, there is no dallying with life) they determined to retire, and pass the remainder of their days in the country. *Spect.* No. 123.

An exclamation denotes an emotion of mind, and requires an elevation of voice, with a pause equivalent either to a comma, colon, semicolon, or period, as the sense demands.

EXAMPLE.

These are thy glorious works, parent of good!
Almighty! Thine this universal frame,
Thus wondrous fair! Thyself how wondrous then! *Milton.*

This is the most concise and comprehensive scheme of punctuation I could possibly collect from the several authors, who have written on this subject; but these rules, though sufficient to prevent confusion in writing, are very inadequate to the purposes of a just and accurate pronunciation: as it is certain that a just, a forcible, and easy pronunciation, will oblige a judicious reader to pause much more frequently, than the most correct and accurate writers or printers give him leave. But I must again observe, that when I contend for the propriety, and even necessity, of pausing, where we find no points in writing or printing, I do not mean to disturb the present practice of punctuation: I wish only to afford such aids to pronunciation as are actually made use of by the best readers and speakers, and such as we must use in reading and speak-

ing in public, if we would wish to pronounce with justness, energy, and ease.

Rhetorical Punctuation.

PUNCTUATION, or the doctrine of pausing, if philosophically considered, will be found to extend much further than is generally supposed: for if pausing is that resting between words and members of sentences, which marks their several degrees of connexion and dependance on each other, whatever difference is found in the degrees of connexion or dependance, so many different marks ought to be adopted to point them out. But though the degrees of connexion and dependance are confessedly many and various, there are no more than four marks by which to denote them. It is true, these marks sufficiently answer the purposes of written language, by keeping the members of sentences from running into each other, and producing ambiguity: but when we regard them as guides to pronunciation, they fail us at almost every step. Those who are acquainted with the Art of Reading feel this very sensibly; and are obliged to supply the deficiencies of the points, by pauses which are suggested to them by the structure and import of the sentence. Many hints have been offered to assist the reader and speaker in the practice of pausing, and more might be given by an attentive observer; but that which appears to have been overlooked by all our punctuists, is, that pausing is often relative: that is, that many pauses owe their existence not so much to the necessity of distinguishing the subordinate parts of a sentence, as to the necessity of showing the actual subordination of one member to another; or, in other words, in order

to class together such portions of a sentence as belong to each other more intimately than those that are not so classed. Thus, in the following sentence.

"Half the misery of the greatest part of man-
"kind might be extinguished, would men alle-
"viate the general curse they lie under by mu-
"tual offices of compassion, benevolence, and
"humanity." *Spectator*, N° 169.

If we make a pause at *misery*, and none at *mankind*, we find an improper classification of the words; which is immediately removed either by pausing at *mankind* and not pausing at *misery*; or by pausing at them both, or by pausing at neither.

Another instance will show us more clearly how punctuation depends upon classification, or such an association of parts as shows the union and distinction of such as are similar and such as are different.

When the proud steed shall know why man restrains
His fiery course, or drives him o'er the plains;
When the dull ox, why now he breaks the clod,
Why now a victim, and now Egypt's God:
Then shall man's pride and dulness comprehend
His actions', passions', being's use and end.
Pope's Essay on Man.

In the last couplet of this passage, if we pause at *comprehend* without pausing at *dulness*, we shall not sufficiently distinguish the subject and the verb; if we place a pause at *dulness* and not at *comprehend*, we shall not distinguish the verb from that class of words which forms its object; but, if we pause both at *dulness* and *comprehend*, we shall mark both these distinctions, and class all the words together, according to their respective similarities and differences.

Pausing, therefore, does not seem to depend so much on placing a pause in any particular part of a sentence, as in that part which most requires it. Thus we may very properly place a pause in the middle of a complex nominative case; but if, after this, we join the whole nominative to the verb, without a pause, we shall soon perceive an improper classification of words: which proves that pausing is relative, and that a pause is proper or improper, not absolutely and considered by itself, but relatively and as it stands connected with other pauses; which can arise from nothing but the perception of the impropriety of distinguishing the parts of a subordinate portion, such as those which form the nominative case to the verb, and not distinguishing the two superior portions; the verb, and the nominative case: which is the same absurdity as to distinguish the parts of a part, and not the parts of a whole. Thus we may distinguish the superior parts without distinguishing the inferior, but not *vice versa.*

As this idea of punctuation is at least new and curious, it may deserve a little further illustration.

"As this cruel practice of party-lying tends to
" the utter subversion of all truth and humanity
" among us, it deserves the utmost detestation
" and discouragement of all who have either the
" love of their country, or the honour of their
" religion at heart." *Spectator,* N° 451.

This sentence has but two commas in it, as it lies in the Spectator before me; but who is there of the least discernment who does not perceive a great number of other pauses which might be adopted for the purpose of more distinctly conveying the sense? In the first place, the compound nominative contains a class of words end-

ing at *lying*, which are united as forming the subject of the verb, *tends;* which may be very properly distinguished from the next class of words which form the object of the verb; and as this object is compounded of two subordinate classes, namely, *the utter subversion*, and *of all truth and humanity among us;* we may pause better at *subversion* than in any other part of this clause; and as the next principal constructive member has for its nominative a single word, and that only a personal pronoun, it admits of no pause after it: but the regimen of the succeeding verb, consisting of several classes of words, requires a pause after the verb, to distinguish it from the regimen, and a pause at *discouragement*, to distinguish the class which forms the former part of the regimen from the latter; and a pause at *all*, to distinguish the persons understood by this word and the next member which describes them; and this last descriptive member, beginning with the nominative *who*, and the verb *have*, being followed by another compound member consisting of two parts, which form the regimen of the verb, must have a pause at *have*, and another at *country*, in order to distinguish the verb from the regimen, and the parts of the regimen from each other.

It must not be understood that I recommend all these pauses as necessary. Certainly not. What I wish to inculcate is, that, if we pause oftener than the common punctuation sets down for us, our pauses ought to take place in those parts of the sentence where the words naturally fall into classes; and that if we pause at a subordinate class of words, we must necessarily pause at a superior class, otherwise we shall produce disorder and confusion in the thought.

It may perhaps be objected to this system,

that there are some classes of words which cannot be separated from other classes without a manifest impropriety. Thus, in the following sentence from Mr. Addison:

"I consider a human soul without education
"like marble in the quarry; which shows none
"of its inherent beauties till the skill of the po-
"lisher fetches out the colours, makes the sur-
"face shine, and discovers every ornamental
"cloud spot and vein that runs through the
"body of it." *Spect.* N° 215.

Here it may be said, that *cloud*, *spot*, and *vein*, form a class, and ought, therefore, to be distinguished from *ornamental* by a pause between that word and *cloud*, as well as between *cloud* and the two following words. To this objection it may be answered, that if we consider the word *ornamental* as an adjective qualifying only the word *cloud*, the words *every ornamental cloud* may be considered only as one object, as the words *every ornamental* are only like an adjective before the substantive which refuses a pause (See Elements of Elocution, p. 23). But if we consider *every ornamental* to qualify *spot* and *vein* as well as *cloud*, and only omitted for the sake of brevity, these words do not so much form one distinct class, as three distinct classes forming altogether one compound class, governed by the verb *discovers*. Here, too, we may perceive the general rule takes place which forbids a pause between the adjective and the substantive in the natural order, and which makes it improper to pause at *ornamental*. But if we suppose this word elliptically omitted before *spot*, another general rule obliges us to pause after *cloud*, that the mind may supply the word *ornamental*; for nothing can be more uniform

in correct pronunciation, than the rule that enjoins us to make a pause wherever there is an ellipsis in the language.

This appears to be the true *rationale* of Punctuation; and, with this principle in view, we shall be enabled to enter into a detail of those rules which are commonly laid down in our grammars, to judge of the justness of them, and to add such others as none of our punctuists have taken notice of.

But, first, it will be necessary to make a distinction of punctuation, which will sound new to every one, and that is into visible and audible. Visible Punctuation is that which separates a sentence into its several parts, and shows the degree of separation that exists by the time of the pause between the several parts; and Audible Punctuation annexes to these pauses such a turn or elevation and depression of the voice as the sense and structure of the sentence seem to require. Of both these in their order.

A Practical System of Rhetorical Punctuation.

Of Visible Punctuation.

BEFORE we give such directions for pausing, or dividing a sentence, as will in some measure enable us to avoid the errors of common punctuation, it will be necessary to inquire into the nature of a sentence, and to distinguish it into its different kinds. Sentences are of two kinds; a period, or compact sentence, and a loose sentence. A period, or compact sentence, is an assemblage of such words, or members, as do not form sense independent of each other; or, if they do, the former modify the latter, or

inversely. A loose sentence is an assemblage of such words, or members, as *do* form sense, independent of those that follow, and at the same time are not modified by them: a period, or compact sentence, therefore, is divisible into two kinds; the first, where the former words and members depend for sense on the latter, as in the following sentence: *As we cannot discern the shadow moving along the dial-plate, so the advances we make in learning are only perceived by the distance gone over.* Here we find no sense formed till the last word is pronounced; and this sentence, for distinction's sake, we may call a direct period: the second kind of period, or compact sentence, is that, where, though the first part forms sense without the latter, it is nevertheless modified by it; as in the following sentence: *There are several arts which all men are in some measure masters of, without being at the pains of learning them.* Here, if we stop at *masters of,* we find complete sense formed, but not the whole sense; because what follows modifies or alters the meaning of it: for it is not said simply, that *there are several arts, which all men are in some measure masters of,* but with this qualification or change in the sense, *without being at the pains of learning them,* which reduces the general to a particular meaning; and this sentence we may call an inverted period. The loose sentence has its first members forming sense, without being modified by the latter; as in the following sentence: *Persons of good taste expect to be pleased at the same time they are informed; and think that the best sense always deserves the best language.* In which example we find the latter member adding something to the former, but not modifying or altering it.

This difference of connexion between the

members of sentences, and consequently the different pauses to be annexed to them, will be better understood by attending to the different influence of the conjunction *that* and the relative *which* in the following passage:

A man should endeavour to make the sphere of his innocent pleasures as wide as possible, *that* he may retire into them with safety, and find in them such a satisfaction as a wise man would not blush to take. Of this nature are those of the imagination, *which* do not require such a bent of thought as is necessary to our more serious employments, nor at the same time suffer the mind to sink into that negligence and remissness, *which* are apt to accompany our more sensual delights. *Spectator*, No. 411.

In the first of these sentences we find the conjunction *that* modifies or restrains the meaning of the preceding member; for it is not asserted in general, and without limitation, that a man should make the sphere of his innocent pleasures as wide as possible, but that he should do so for the purpose of retiring into himself: these two members, therefore, are necessarily connected, and might have formed a period, or compact sentence, had they not been followed by the last member: but as that only adds to the sense of the preceding members, and does not qualify them, the whole assemblage of members, taken together, form but one loose sentence.

The last member of the last sentence is necessarily connected with what precedes, because it modifies or restrains the meaning of it; for it is not meant, that the pleasures of the imagination do not suffer the mind to sink into negligence and remissness in general, but into that particular negligence and remissness which is apt to accompany our more sensual delights. The first member of this sentence affords an opportunity of explaining this by its opposite; for here it is not meant, that those pleasures of the

imagination, only are of this innocent nature which do not require such a bent of thought as is necessary to our more serious employments; but that of this nature are the pleasures of the imagination in general; and it is by asking the question, whether a preceding member affirms any thing in general, or only affirms something as limited or qualified by what follows, that we shall discover whether these members are either immediately or remotely connected; and, consequently, whether they form a loose or a compact sentence: as the former member, therefore, of the last sentence is not necessarily connected with those that succeed, the sentence may be pronounced to be a loose sentence.

Sentences thus defined and distinguished into their several kinds, we shall be better enabled to give such rules for dividing them by pauses, as will reduce punctuation to some rational and steady principles. Previously, however, to these rules, it will be necessary to observe, that, as the times of the pauses are exceedingly indefinite, the fewer distinctions we make between them, the less we shall embarrass the reader;—I shall beg leave, therefore, to reduce the number of pauses to three: namely, the smaller pause, answering to the comma; the greater pause, answering to the semicolon, and colon; and the greatest pause, answering to the period. The ancients knew nothing of the semicolon; and if we consider practice, and real utility, I believe it will be found, that the three distinctions of the ancients answer every useful purpose in writing and reading.

RULES FOR PAUSING.

The principal Pause in the compact Sentence.

RULE I. Every direct period consists of two principal constructive parts, between which parts the greater pause must be inserted: when these parts commence with conjunctions that correspond with each other, they are sufficiently distinguishable; as in the following sentence:

As no faculty of the mind is capable of more improvement than the memory, so none is in more danger of decay by disuse.

Here we may observe, that the first constructive part begins with *as*, and the second with *so*; the expectation is excited by the first, and answered by the latter: at that point, therefore, where the expectation begins to be answered, and the sense begins to form, the principal pause is to be used; and, by these means, the two contrasted and correspondent parts are distinctly viewed by the mind.

A period may be direct, and may be properly called a compact sentence, where only the first conjunction is expressed.

EXAMPLE.

As in my speculations I have endeavoured to extinguish passion and prejudice, I am still desirous of doing some good in this particular. *Spectator.*

Here the word *so* is understood before *I am*, and the long pause as much required, as if *so* had been expressed; since it is here the sentence naturally divides into two correspondent, and dependent parts.

That point, therefore, where the sense begins to form, or where the expectation begins to be

answered, is the point which we must be the most careful to mark; as it is here the sentence naturally divides into its principal constructive parts, and it is here that in every sentence and member of a sentence the principal pause takes place.

RULE II. Every inverted period consists of two principal constructive parts, between which parts the greater pause must be inserted; these parts divide at that point where the latter part of the sentence begins to modify the former: in periods of this kind, the latter conjunction only is expressed, as in the example: *Every one that speaks and reasons is a grammarian, and a logician, though he may be utterly unacqainted with the rules of grammar, or logic, as they are delivered in books and systems.* If we invert this period, we shall find it susceptible of the two correspondent conjunctions *though* and *yet*; as, *Though utterly unacquainted with the rules of grammar and logic, as delivered in books and systems, yet every man who speaks and reasons is a grammarian, and a logician.* This inversion of the order of a sentence, is, perhaps, the best criterion of the connexion of its parts; and proves that the former, though forming complete sense of itself, is modified by the latter. Thus, in the phrases, *Christ died for him, because he died for all.—Many things are believed, though they exceed the capacity of our wits.* HOOKER.

In these phrases, if we do but transpose the noun and pronoun, and invert the order, the sentences will be perfectly the same in sense, and the connexion will be more apparent; as, *Because Christ died for all, he died for him.—Though many things exceed the capacity of our wits, they are believed.*

Wherever, therefore, this transposition can

take place, we may be certain of a necessary connexion in the sense, and that the principal pause lies between the two parts.

The principal Pause in the loose Sentence.

RULE III. Every loose sentence must consist of a period, either direct or inverted, and an additional member which does not modify it; and, consequently, this species of sentence requires a pause between the principal constructive parts of the period, and between the period and the additional member.

EXAMPLE.

Persons of good taste expect to be pleased, at the same time they are informed; and think that the best sense always deserves the best language.

In this sentence an inverted period is constructed at the word *informed;* which requires a pause at *pleased,* because here the former part of the sentence is modified by the latter; and a pause is required at *informed,* because here another member commences. Let us take another example.

The soul, considered abstractedly from its passions, is of a remiss and sedentary nature; slow in its resolves, and languishing in its executions. *Spectator*, No. 255.

Here a direct period is formed at *nature,* the principal constructive parts of this period separate at *passions;* and here must be the larger pause: the succeeding members are only additional, and require a larger pause between them and the period they belong to, and a smaller pause between each other at *resolves.*

The subordinate Pause in the compact Sentence.

HAVING given an idea of the principal pause in a sentence, it will be necessary to say something of the subordinate pauses, which may all be comprehended under what is called the short pause.

And first it may be observed, that by the long pause is not meant a pause of any determinate length, but the longest pause in the sentence. Thus, the pause between the nominative and the verb in the following sentence:

The great and invincible Alexander, wept for the fate of Darius.

The pause here, I say, may be called the long pause, though not half so long as the pause between the two principal constructive parts in the following sentence:

If impudence prevailed as much in the Forum and courts of justice, as insolence does in the country and places of less resort; Aulus Cæcina would submit as much to the impudence of Sextus Æbutius in this cause, as he did before to his insolence when assaulted by him.

Here the pause between the words *resort* and *Aulus Cæcina* may be called the long pause, not so much from its duration, as from its being the principal pause in the sentence: the long pause, therefore, must always be understood relatively to the smaller pauses: and it may pass for a good general rule, that the principal pause is longer, or shorter, according to the simplicity or complexity of the sentence. See page 45.

RULE IV. The subordinate pauses are easily distinguished in such sentences as consist of parts corresponding to parts, as in the last example; where we may observe, that the whole

sentence readily divides itself into two principal constructive parts at *resort*: the first part as readily divides into two subordinate parts at *justice*; and the last, into two other subordinate parts at *cause*; and these are all the pauses necessary. But if, either from the necessity of drawing breath, or of more strongly enforcing every part of this sentence, we are to admit of more pauses than these, it cannot be denied, that, for this purpose, some places more readily admit of a pause than others: if, for instance, the first subordinate part were to admit of two pauses, they could no where be so suitably placed as at *impudence* and *Forum*; if the next might be overpointed in the same manner, the points would be less unsuitable at *does* and *country* than at any other words; in the same manner, a pause might be more tolerable at *Cæcina* and *Æbutius*, and at *before* and *insolence*, than in any other of the subordinate parts of the latter division of this sentence.

The parts of loose sentences which admit of the short pause must be determined by the same principles. If this sentence has been properly defined, it is a sentence consisting of a clause containing perfect sense, followed by an additional clause which does not modify it. Thus, in the following example:

Foolish men are more apt to consider what they have lost, than what they possess; and to turn their eyes on those who are richer than themselves, rather than on those who are under greater difficulties.

Here a perfect sentence is formed at *possess*, and here must be the longest pause, as it intervenes between two parts nearly independent: the principal pause in the first member of this sentence, which, respecting the whole sentence, may be called a subordinate pause, is at *lost*.

and that of the last member at *themselves;* if, for the sake of precision, other and shorter pauses were admitted, it should seem most suitable to admit them at *men* and *consider* in the first member, at *eyes* and *those* in the first part of the second member, and at *those* in the last. In these observations, however, it must be carefully understood, that this multiplicity of shorter pauses is not recommended as necessary or proper, but only as possible, and to be admitted occasionally: and to draw the line as much as possible between what is necessary and unnecessary, we shall endeavour to bring together such particular cases as demand the short pause, and those where it cannot be omitted without hurting either the sense or the delivery.

RULE V. When a nominative consists of more than one word, it is necessary to pause after it.

When a nominative and a verb come in a sentence, unattended by adjuncts, no pause is necessary, either for the ear or understanding; thus in the following sentence: *Alexander wept:* —no pause intervenes between these words, because they convey only two ideas, which are apprehended the moment they are pronounced; but if these words are amplified by adjuncts of specification, as in the following sentence: *The great and invincible Alexander, wept for the fate of Darius.* Here a pause is necessary between these words, not only that the organs may pronounce the whole with more ease, but that the complex nominative and verb may, by being separately and distinctly exhibited, be more readily and distinctly conceived*.

* It is not a little astonishing that so acute a grammarian as Beauzée should make the propriety of a pause in this case depend, not on the necessity of distinguishing parts more or less

This rule is so far from being unnecessary, when we are obliged to pause after the verb, that it then becomes more essential.

EXAMPLE.

This account of party patches will, I am afraid, appear improbable to those who live at a distance from the fashionable world. *Addison's Spect.* N° 81.

If in this sentence we only pause at *will*, as marked by the printer, we shall find the verb swallowed up as it were by the nominative case, and confounded with it; but if we make a short pause, both before and after it, we shall find every part of the sentence obvious and distinct.

That the nominative is more separable from the verb than the verb from the objective case, is plain from the propriety of pausing at *self-love*, and not at *forsook*, in the following example:

connected, but on the necessity of breathing. If the sense is impaired by a pause, a pause is absolutely inadmissible in the longest as well as the shortest sentence; but if a pause between the nominative and verb, where the nominative consists of many words, does not injure the sense, but rather clears and strengthens it, we may safely pronounce that a pause between every complex nominative and verb is not only admissible but necessary.

His examples of sentences where we may pause, and where we may not, are the following:

L'homme injuste ne voit la mort que comme un fantôme affreux. Theor. des Sent. chap. 14.

La venue des faux Christs, et des faux prophétes, sembloit être un plus prochain acheminement à la dernière ruine. Bossuet Disc. sur l'Hist. Univ. P. II.

But if the foregoing observations are just, a pause in speaking is quite as admissible at *injuste* as at *prophétes:* for, to use his own words—*C'est une erreur sensible, de faire dépendre le dégré d'affinité de phrases de leur plus ou moins d'étendue; un atome tient aussi peu à un autre atome qu'une montagne à une montagne.* Gram. Generale, vol. ii, p. 592.

Self-love forsook the path it first pursu'd,
And found the private in the public good.
Pope's Essay on Man.

The same may be observed of the last line of the following couplet:

Earth smiles around with boundless bounty blest,
And Heav'n beholds its image in his breast. *Ibid.*

In these instances, though the melody invites to a pause at *forsook* and *beholds*, propriety requires it at *self-love* and *Heaven.*

RULE VI. Whatever member intervenes between the nominative case and the verb is of the nature of a parenthesis, and must be separated from both of them by a short pause.

EXAMPLES.

I am told that many virtuous matrons, who formerly have been taught to believe that this artificial spotting of a face was unlawful, are now reconciled, by a zeal for their cause, to what they could not be prompted by a concern for their beauty. *Addison's Spect.* N° 81.

The member intervening between the nominative *matrons* and the verb *are*, may be considered as incidental, and must therefore be separated from both.

When the Romans and Sabines were at war, and just upon the point of giving battle, the women, who were allied to both of them, interposed with so many tears and entreaties, that they prevented the mutual slaughter which threatened both parties, and united them together in a firm and lasting peace. *Addison's Spect.* N° 81.

Here the member intervening between the nominative case *women*, and the verb *interposed*, must be separated from both by a short pause.

RULE VII. Whatever member intervenes between the verb and the accusative case, is of the

nature of a parenthesis, and must be separated from both by a short pause.

EXAMPLES.

I knew a person who possessed the faculty of distinguishing flavors in so great a perfection, that, after having tasted ten different kinds of tea, he would distinguish, without seeing the colour of it, the particular sort which was offered him.

Addison's Spect. No. 409.

The member intervening between the verb *distinguish*, and the accusative *the particular sort*, must be separated from them by a short pause.

A man of a fine taste in writing will discern, after the same manner, not only the general beauties and imperfections of an author, but discover the several ways of thinking and expressing himself, which diversify him from all other authors.

Addison, Ibid.

The member intervening between the verb *discern*, and the accusative *not only the general beauties and imperfections of an author*, must be separated from both by a short pause.

RULE VIII. Whatever words are put into the case absolute, must be separated from the rest by a pause.

EXAMPLES.

If a man borrow ought of his neighbour, and it be hurt or die, the owner thereof not being with it, he shall surely make it good.

Here, *the owner thereof not being with it*, is the phrase called the ablative absolute, and this, like a parenthesis, must be separated from the rest of the sentence by a short pause on each side.

God, from the mount of Sinai, whose gray top
Shall tremble, he descending, will himself
In thunder, lightning, and loud trumpet's sound,
Ordain them laws. *Milton.*

Here, *he descending*, neither governs, nor is go-

verned by any other part of the sentence, and is said to be in the ablative absolute; and this independence must be marked by a short pause before and after the phrase.

RULE IX. If an adverb is placed after the verb, and consists but of one word, it must be separated from what follows by a pause.

EXAMPLE.

He did not act *prudently* in one of the most important affairs of his life, and therefore could not expect to be happy.

RULE X. If the adverb consists of more words than one, or forms what is called an adverbial phrase, it ought to be separated both from the verb and what follows by a pause.

EXAMPLE.

Thus man is, by nature, directed to correct, *in some measure*, that distribution of things, which she herself would otherwise have made. *Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments.*

RULE XI. Words or phrases in apposition, or when the latter only explains the former, have a short pause between them.

EXAMPLE.

-Goddess of the lyre,
Which rules the accents of the moving spheres,
Wilt thou, *eternal Harmony*, descend
And join this festive train?

RULE XII. When two substantives come together, and the latter, which is in the genitive case, consists of several words closely united with each other, a pause is admissible between the two principal substantives.

EXAMPLES.

We may observe, that any single circumstance of what we have formerly seen often raises up a whole scene of imagery, and awakens numberless ideas that before slept in the imagination. *Spectator*, No. 417.

I do not know whether I am singular in my opinion, but for my own part, I would rather look upon a tree in all its luxuriancy, and diffusion of boughs and branches, than when it is cut and trimmed into a mathematical figure. *Ib.* No. 415.

Correct reading would admit of a pause in the first example at *circumstance*, and, in the last, rather at *diffusion* than at *luxuriancy.*

RULE XIII. *Who* and *which*, when relative pronouns, and *that*, when it stands for *who* and *which*, always admit of a pause before them.

EXAMPLES.

A man can never be obliged to submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied, who is the person, who has a right to exercise it. *Locke.*

To which we may add, their want of judging abilities, and also their want of opportunity to apply such a serious consideration as may let them into the true goodness and evil of things, *which* are qualities, *which* seldom display themselves to the first view. *South.*

Vanity is the foundation of the most ridiculous and contemptible vices, the vices of affectation and common lying; follies *which*, if experience did not teach us how common they are, one should imagine the least spark of common sense would save us from. *Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments.*

The word *which*, in the last example, that ought to have a pause before it, has one after it; this latter pause is certainly proper, as a member intervenes between *which* and the governing words, and printers never fail placing this last pause, but almost as uniformly neglect a pause before the relative in this situation, though the pause *before* will be acknowledged

by every judicious ear to be as necessary in the one case as in the other. A pause *before* these relatives ought never to be omitted, as we are certain by this pause never to hurt the sense, and are sure to gain time, breath, and foresight to proceed. The uncertainty of printers in this essential pause may be guessed at, from the punctuation of a passage, which follows *that*, which I have just quoted.

The foolish liar, who endeavours to excite the admiration of the company by the relation of adventures which never had any existence, the important coxcomb who gives himself airs of rank and distinction which he well knows he has no just pretensions to, are both of them no doubt pleased with the applause which they fancy they meet with. *Ib.* p. 192.

In this passage we only see a pause before the first relative; but why that is distinguished it is not very easy to guess.

This rule is of greater extent than at first appears; for there are several words usually called adverbs, which include in them the power of the relative pronoun*, and will therefore admit of a pause before them: such as *when*, *why*, *wherefore*, *how*, *where*, *whither*, *whether*, *whence*, *while*, *till*, or *until*: for *when* is equivalent to *the time at which*; *why* or *wherefore* is equivalent to *the reason for which*; and so of the rest. It must however, be noted, that when a preposition comes before one of these relatives, the pause is before the preposition; and that, if any of these words are the last word of the sentence, or clause of a sentence, no pause is admitted before them; as, *I have read the book, of which I have heard so much commendation, but I know not the reason why. I have heard one of the books much commended, but I cannot tell which*, &c.

* See Ward's English Grammar, 4to.

It must likewise be observed, that, if the substantive which governs the relative, and makes it assume the genitive case, comes before it, no pause is to be placed either before *which*, or the preposition that governs it.

EXAMPLE.

The passage of the Jordan is a figure of baptism, by the grace *of which*, the new-born Christian passes from the slavery of sin into a state of freedom peculiar to the chosen sons of God. *Abridgment of the Bible.*

RULE XIV. When *that* is used as a causal conjunction, it ought always to be preceded by a short pause.

EXAMPLES.

The custom and familiarity of these tongues do sometimes so far influence the expressions in these epistles, *that* one may observe the force of the Hebrew conjugations. *Locke.*

There is the greater necessity for attending to this rule, as we so frequently find it neglected in printing. For fear of crowding the line with points, and appearing to clog the sense to the eye, the ear is often defrauded of her unquestionable rights. I shall give two instances, among a thousand, that might be brought to show where this is the case.

I must therefore desire the reader to remember *that*, by the pleasures of the imagination, I mean only such pleasures as arise originally from sight. *Spect.* No. 411.

It is true, the higher nature still advances, and by that means preserves his distance and superiority in the scale of being; but he knows *that*, how high soever the station is of which he stands possessed at present, the inferior nature will at length mount up to it, and shine forth in the same degree of glory. *Spect.* No. 111.

In these examples, we find the incidental member succeeding the conjunction *that* is separated from it by a pause; but the pause, which

ought to precede this conjunction, is omitted: this punctuation runs through our whole typography, and is the more culpable, as the insertion of the pause after *that*, where it is less wanted than before, is more apt to mislead the reader than if he saw no pause at all.

RULE XV. When the adjective follows the substantive, and is succeeded either by another adjective, or words equivalent to it, which form what may be called a descriptive phrase, it must be separated from the substantive by a short pause.

EXAMPLES.

He was a man, learned and polite.
It is a book, exquisite in its kind.
It was a calculation, accurate to the last degree.

That no pause is to be admitted between the substantive and the adjective, in the inverted order, when the adjective is single, or unaccompanied by adjuncts, is evident by the following example from Pope:

Of these the chief the care of nations own,
And guard with *arms divine* the British throne.

For the reason of this, see Elements of Elocution, p. 23.

Those who have not considered this subject very attentively, will, I doubt not, imagine, that I have inserted above twice the number of points that are necessary; but those who are better acquainted with the art,, will, I flatter myself, agree with me that a distinct, a deliberate, and easy pronunciation, will find employment for every one of them. Much undoubtedly will depend upon the turn of voice, with which we accompany these points; and, if this is but pro-

perly adapted, the sense will be so far from suffering by so many pauses, that it will be greatly improved and enforced And this leads us to a consideration of one of the most important parts of delivery; which is, the slide or inflexion of voice, with which every sentence, member of a sentence, and even every word, is necessarily pronounced; without a knowledge of this it will be impossible to speak intelligibly of the interrogation, exclamation, and parenthesis, which seem distinguished from other sentences more by a peculiar inflexion of voice, than by pausing; nor can accent and emphasis be completely understood without considering them as connected with a certain turn or inflexion of voice; and this must be the next object of our inquiry.

Audible Punctuation.

As describing such sounds upon paper as have no definite terms appropriated to them like those of music, is a new and difficult task, the reader must be requested to as nice an attention as possible to those sounds or inflexions of voice, which spontaneously annex themselves to certain forms of speech, and which, from their familiarity, are apt to be unnoticed. If experience were out of the question, and we were only acquainted with the organic formation of human sounds, we must necessarily distinguish them into five kinds: namely, The monotone, or one sound, continuing a perceptible time in one note, which is the case with all musical sounds; a sound beginning low and sliding higher without any perceptible intervals, or beginning high and sliding lower in the same manner; which is essential to all speaking sounds: the two last of these may be called simple slides

or inflexions; and these may be so combined as to begin with that which rises and end with that which falls, or to begin with that which falls and end with that which rises; and if this combination of inflexion is pronounced with one impulse or explosion of the voice, it may not improperly be called the circumflex or compound inflexion: and these are the only possible modifications the human voice is susceptible of. For first, if there is no turn of voice, it must continue in a monotone; secondly, if the voice be inflected, it must be either upwards or downwards, and so produce either the rising or falling inflexion; thirdly, if these two be united on the same syllable, it can only be by beginning with the rising and ending with the falling inflexion, or *vice versa;* as any other mixture of these opposite inflexions is impossible.

A writer*, who seems to have taken up two of the distinctions of voice I have been describing, tells us, that the two inflexions of voice, which accompany the pauses are, that which conveys the idea of continuation, and that which conveys the idea of completion; but nothing can be less satisfactory than this account of the use of these inflexions; for the first, which is said to imply continuation, ought always to be used at the end of an interrogative sentence beginning with the verb, and almost always at the end of a sentence which terminates with a negative member, as is abundantly shown in Elements of Elocution, page 219, 220, &c.; and for the second, which is said to imply completion, we find it so often introduced where the sense is incomplete; particularly in the series, which see here-

* Enfield's Speaker, page xxvi. See also Preface to Elements of Elocution, page viii.

after, and in those sentences where we enforce a concession in order to strengthen the conclusion, and in a thousand instances where emphasis occurs, that scarcely any thing can be more vague and uncertain than the rule laid down by this author.

The truth is, nothing will enable us to adapt these inflexions properly, but distinguishing sentences into their various kinds, and considering nicely the structure and meaning of these sentences, and the several distinctions to which these modifications of voice are liable; which is too delicate as well as too laborious a task for the generality of writers, and therefore it is no wonder we find such superficial directions as the bulk of our treatises on this subject abound in. I flatter myself I have led the way in this laborious task, in Elements of Elocution, to which the curious reader must be referred for full satisfaction. In the present work I purpose to confine myself to what may be considered as more immediately necessary to practice; for which purpose, after explaining these turns of voice to the ear as accurately as possible, I shall endeavour to assist the ear by the eye, in comprehending the several modifications of voice, and then attempt to apply them to the several sentences and parts of sentences according to their different structure and meaning.

Explanation of the Inflexions of the Voice.

THOUGH we seldom hear such a variety in reading or speaking as the sense and the satisfaction of the ear demand, yet we hardly ever hear a pronunciation perfectly monotonous. In former times we might have found it in the midnight pronunciation of the bell-man's verses

at Christmas; and now, the town-cryer, as Shakspeare calls him, sometimes gives us a specimen of the monotonous in his vociferous exordium "*This is to give notice!*"—the clerk of a court of justice also promulgates the will of the court by that barbarous metamorphosis of *Oyez! Oyez! Hear ye! Hear ye!* into *O yes! O yes!* in a perfect sameness of voice. But, however ridiculous the monotone in speaking may be in the above-mentioned characters, in certain solemn and sublime passages in poetry it has a wonderful force and dignity; and, by the uncommonness of its use, it even adds greatly to that variety with which the ear is so much delighted.

This monotone may be defined to be a continuation or sameness of sound upon certain syllables of a word, exactly like that produced by repeatedly striking a bell;—such a stroke may be louder or softer, but continues exactly in the same pitch. To express this tone upon paper, a horizontal line may be adopted; such a one as is generally used to express a long syllable in verse; thus (-).

The grand description of the riches of Satan's throne, in the beginning of Milton's second book of the Paradise Lost, affords us an opportunity of exemplifying the use of this tone:

> High on a throne of royal state, which far
> Outshone the wealth of Ormus or of Inde:
> Or whēre the gōrgeous Eāst, with rīchest hānd,
> Shōw'rs, on her kīngs barbāric, pearl and gold,
> Satan exalted sat.

The rising inflexion is that upward turn of the voice we generally use at the comma, or in asking a question beginning with a verb: as, *Nó, say you; did he say Nó?* This is commonly called a suspension of voice, and may not

improperly be marked by the acute accent thus (′).

The falling inflexion is generally used at the semicolon and colon; and must necessarily be heard in answer to the former question, *He dìd; he said Nò*. This inflexion, in a lower tone of voice, is adopted at the end of almost every sentence, except the definite question, or that which begins with the verb. To express this inflexion the grave accent seems adapted: thus (`).

The rising circumflex begins with the falling inflexion, and ends with the rising upon the same syllable, and seems as it were to twist the voice upwards. This inflexion may be exemplified by the drawling tone we give to some words spoken ironically; as the word *Clodius*, in Cicero's Oration for Milo. This turn of the voice is marked in this manner (ˇ).

But it is foolish ᵥ in us to compare Drusus Africanus, and ourselves, with Clodius; all our other calamities ᵥwere tolerable, but no one can patiently bear the death of Clodius.

The falling circumflex begins with the rising inflexion, and ends with the falling upon the same syllable, and seems to twist the voice downwards. This inflexion is generally used to express reproach; and may be exemplified by the drawling tone we hear on the word *you*, in Hamlet's answer to his mother, who says—

Queen. Hamlet, you have your father much offended.
Hamlet. Madam, yoû have my father much offended.

This turn of the voice may be marked by the common circumflex: thus (^).

Both these circumflex inflexions may be exemplified in the word *so*, in a speech of the Clown in Shakespeare's *As You Like It.*

I knew when seven justices could not make up a quarrel; but when the parties were met themselves, one of them thought but of an if: as if you said sǒ, then I said sô; and they shook hands and were sworn brothers.

The slightest attention to those turns of voice on the word *so*, which every one who has the least idea of comic humour must necessarily adopt in reading this passage, will sufficiently exemplify the existence and utility of these two circumflexes.

These five modifications of the voice may be called absolute; as they are the only possible ways of varying it so as to make one mode essentially different from the other. High and low, loud and soft, quick and slow, which may accompany them, may be called comparative modifications, as what is high in one case may be low in another, and so of the rest.

Explanation of Plate I.

BY the foregoing analysis of the voice, we perceive it is divisible into two simple inflexions; the rising and falling inflexion; and each of these again is divisible into two sorts of the same kind. The rising inflexion is divisible into that which marks a pause where the members are intimately connected in sense, (as at the word *satisfactorily*, N° V.) and that where they terminate in a question (as at N° I. on the word *No*); in both which places the inflexion of voice is exactly the same, but should be somewhat higher and more continued at the note of interrogation, than at the comma. The falling inflexion is likewise divisible into that which marks a member containing perfect sense not necessarily connected with what follows (as N° I. at the semicolon at *did:* and at N° IV. at

the colon at *commandments*); and that which marks the close of a period (as N° IV. at *man*): these two are essentially the same inflexion, and differ only as they are pronounced in a higher or lower tone,—the former terminating the members at *did* and *commandments*, in a middle or higher tone; and the latter, after a gradual fall of voice upon the preceding words, sinks into a lower tone upon the word *man*.

The two circumflexes, N° VI. and N° VII. fall and raise, and raise and fall the voice upon the same syllable, in which operation the vowel seems to be considerably extended: for which reason, in the rising circumflex, N° VI. I have extended the vowel *o* by doubling it, and giving the first part of the vowel to the falling, and the last to the rising inflexion. In the other example, N° VII. *you*, being a diphthong, admits of a double sound, exactly equivalent to the letter *u*, which, being analysed, is no more than *ye oo*, pronounced as closely together as possible (See Critical Pronouncing Dictionary in the Principles, N° 39, 171, and N° 8, in the notes); and therefore, if we might be permitted to violate spelling for the sake of conveying the sound, the first part of the word might be pronounced *ye*, with the rising inflexion, and the last part like *oo*, with the falling.

In this exhibition of the several inflexions of the voice to the eye, we have an opportunity of observing the true nature of accent. The accented syllable, it may be observed, is always louder than any other either before or after it; and when we pronounce the word with the falling inflexion, the accented syllable is higher as well as louder than either the preceding or succeeding syllables; as in the word *satisfàctory*, N° III. But when we pronounce this word with

the rising inflexion, as in N° II. though it is louder and higher than the two first syllables, it is certainly lower than the three last. Did he answer *satisfáctorily?* Those who wish to see a more minute investigation of the nature of *accent*, may consult Elements of Elocution, Part II. page 183.

The different States of the Voice.

AFTER the foregoing analysis of the voice into its several modifications or inflexions, we may take occasion to give a sketch of those states or varieties of which it is susceptible in other respects. Besides the inflexions which have been just enumerated, the only varieties of which the voice is capable, independent of passion, are, *high*, *low*; *loud*, *soft*; and these, as they succeed each other in a more or less rapid pronunciation, may be either *quick* or *slow*. The terms forcible and feeble, which are certainly not without ideas to which they are appropriated, seem to be severally a compound of two of these simple states; that is, *force* seems to be loudness and quickness, either in a high or a low tone; and *feebleness* seems to be softness and slowness, either in a high or a low tone. This, however, I wish to submit to the consideration of the philosophical musician. As to the tones of the passions, which are so many and various, these, in the opinion of one of the best judges in the kingdom, are *qualities* of sound, occasioned by certain vibrations of the organs of speech, independent on high, low, loud, soft, quick, or slow, which last may not improperly be called different *quantities* of sound.

It may, perhaps, not be unworthy of observation to consider the almost unbounded variety

which these principles produce by a different combination with each other. The different quantities of sound, as these states of the voice may be called, may be combined so as to form new varieties by uniting with any other that is not opposite to it. Thus high may be combined with either loud or soft, quick or slow; that is, a high note may be sounded either in a loud or a soft tone, and a low note may be sounded either in a loud or a soft tone also; and each of these combinations may succeed each other more swiftly or slowly. While *forcible* seems to imply a degree of loudness and swiftness, and *feeble* a degree of softness and slowness, either in a high or a low tone. This combination may, perhaps, be more easily conceived by classing these different quantities in contrast with each other.

High, loud, quick,	Forcible may be high, loud, and quick; or low, loud, and quick.
Low, soft, slow,	Feeble may be high, soft, and slow; or low, soft, and slow.

The different combinations of these states may be thus represented:

High, loud, quick	Low, loud, quick
High, loud, slow	Low, loud, slow
High, soft, quick	Low, soft, quick
High, soft, slow.	Low, soft, slow.

When these states of the voice are combined with the five modifications of voice above-mentioned, the varieties become exceedingly numerous, but far from incalculable. Perhaps they may arise (for I leave it to arithmeticians to reckon the exact number) to that number into which the ancients distinguished the notes of music; which, if I remember right, were about two hundred.

Practical System of the Inflexions of the Voice.

WORDS adopt particular inflexions, either according to the particular signification they bear, or as they are either differently arranged or connected with other words. The first application of inflexion relates to emphasis, which will be considered in its proper place; the last relates to that application of inflexion, which arises from the division of a sentence into its component parts, by showing what turns or slides of voice are most suitable to the several distinctions, rests, and pauses of a sentence. For this purpose the rising inflexion is denoted by the acute accent, thus (´), and the falling inflexion by the grave accent, thus (`).

COMPACT SENTENCE.

Direct Period, with two Conjunctions.

RULE I. Every direct period, so constructed as to have its two principal constructive parts connected by correspondent conjunctions, requires the long pause with the rising inflexion at the end of the first principal constructive member.

EXAMPLES.

As we cannot discern the shadow moving along the dial-plate, so the advances we make in knowledge are only perceived by the distance gone over.

As we perceive the shadow to have moved, but did not perceive it móving: so our advances in learning, consisting of insensible steps, are only perceivable by the distance.

As we perceive the shadow to have moved along the dial, but did not perceive it moving; and it appears that the grass

has grown, though nobody ever saw it grow: so the advances we make in knowledge, as they consist of such minute steps are only perceivable by the distance.

Each of these three sentences consists of two principal correspondent parts; the first commencing with *as*, and the last with *so;* as the first member of the first sentence is simple, it is marked with a comma only at *dial-plate;* as the second is compounded, it is marked with a semicolon at *moving*; and as the last is decompounded, it is marked with a colon at *grow:* this punctuation is according to the general rules of pausing, and agreeable to good sense; for it is certainly proper that the time of the pause should increase with the increase and complexity of the members to which it is annexed, as more time is required to comprehend a large and complicated member than a short and simple one; but whatever may be the time taken up in pausing at the different points, the inflexion annexed to them must always be the same; that is, the comma, semicolon, and colon, must invariably have the rising inflexion.

The same may be observed of the following sentences:

Although I fear it may be a shame to be dismayed at the entrance of my discourse in defence of a most valiant man; and that it no way becomes me, while Milo is more concerned for the safety of the state than for himself, not to show the same greatness of mind in behalf of him: yet this new form of prosecution terrifies my eyes, which, whatever way they turn, want the ancient custom of the Forum, and the former manner of trials. *Cicero's Oration for Milo.*

Although, son Marcus, as you have now been a hearer of Cratippus for a year, and this at Athens, you ought to abound in the precepts and doctrines of philosophy, by reason of the great character both of your instructor and the city; one of which can furnish you with knowledge, and the other with examples; yet, as I always to my advantage joined the Latin

tongue with the Greek, and I have done it not only in oratory, but likewise in philosophy; I think you ought to do the same, that you may be equally conversant in both languages.

Cicero's Offices, book i. chap. 1.

These sentences begin with the concessive conjunction *although*, and have their correspondent conjunction *yet*; and these conjunctions form the two principal constructive members. The words *him*, and *examples*, therefore, at the end of the first members, must have the rising inflexion, and here must be the long pause.

This rule ought to be particularly attended to in reading verse. Many of Milton's similes, commencing with the conjunction *as*, have the first member so enormously long, that the reader is often tempted to drop his voice before he comes to the member beginning with the conjunction *so*, though nothing can be more certain than that such a fall of the voice is diametrically opposite to the sense.

Thus, in that beautiful description of the affected indignation of Satan, at the command of God to abstain from eating of the tree of life:

She scarce had said, though brief, when now more bold
The tempter (but with show of zeal and love
To man, and indignation at his wrong)
New part puts on, and as to passion mov'd
Fluctuates disturb'd, yet comely, and in act
Rais'd as of some great matter to begin.
As when of old some orator renown'd
In Athens or free Rome, where eloquence
Flourish'd, since mute, to some great cause address'd,
Stood in himself collected, while each part,
Motion, each act won audience, ere the tongue
Sometimes in height began, as no delay
Of preface brooking through his zeal of right:
So standing, moving, or to height up grown,
The tempter all impassion'd thus began.

Par. Lost, b. ix. v. 664.

In this passage, if we do not make a long pause with the rising inflexion on the word *right* we utterly destroy the sense.

In the same manner we may observe some of Homer's similes to extend to such a length before the application of them to the object illustrated, that the printer, and perhaps Mr. Pope himself, has sometimes concluded the first part with a full stop.

Direct Period, with only one Conjunction.

RULE II. Every direct period, consisting of two principal constructive parts, and having only the first part commence with a conjunction, requires the rising inflexion and long pause at the end of this part.

EXAMPLES.

As in my speculations I have endeavoured to extinguísh passion and préjudice, I am still desirous of doing some good in this particular. *Spectator.*

Here the sentence divides itself into two correspondent parts at *prejudice*; and as the word *so* is understood before the words *I am*, they must be preceded by the long pause and rising inflexion.

If impudence prevailed as much in the Forum and courts of justice, as insolence does in the country and places of less resórt; Aulus Cæcina would submit as much to the impudence of Sextus Æbutius in this cause, as he did before to his insolence when assaulted by him.

If I have any genius, which I am sensible can be but very small; or any readiness in speaking, in which I do not deny but I have been much conversant; or any skill in oratory, from an acquaintance with the best arts, to which I confess I have been always inclíned: no one has a better right to demand of me the fruit of all these things than this Aulus Licinius.

Cicero's Oration for Archias.

If after surveying the whole Earth at once, and the several planets that lie within its neighbourhood; we contemplate those wide fields of æther, that reach in height as far as from Saturn to the fixed stars, and run abroad almost to an infinitude; our imagination finds its capacity filled with so immense a prospect, and puts itself upon the stretch to comprehend it.
Addison's Spectator, No. 428.

In the first of these examples, the first part of the sentence ends at *resort*, and the second begins at *Aulus Cæcina*. In the second sentence, the first parts ends at *inclined*, and the second begins at *no one*; and in the third, the first part ends at *infinitude*, and the second begins at *our*; between these words, therefore, in each sentence must be inserted the long pause and rising inflexion.

All these sentences commence with a conjunction, and may be said to have a correspondent conjunction commencing the second part of the sentence, not expressed but understood. In the first sentence commencing with *if*, *then* is understood at the beginning of the second part; the sense of this conjunctive adverb *then* may be plainly perceived to exist by inserting it in the sentence, and observing its suitableness when expressed.

If impudence prevailed as much in the Forum and courts of justice, as insolence does in the country and places of less resort; *then* Aulus Cæcina would submit as much to the impudence of Sextus Æbutius in this cause, as he did before to his insolence when assaulted by him.

The same insertion of the word *then* might be made in the two last examples commencing with *if*, and the same suitableness would appear; for though correct and animated language tends to suppress as much as possible the words that are so implied in the sense as to make it unnecessary to express them, yet if, when inserted, they are suitable to the sense, it

is a proof the structure of the sentence is perfectly the same, whether these superfluous words are expressed or not.

The exception to this rule is when the emphatical word in the conditional part of the sentence is in direct opposition to another word in the conclusion, and a concession is implied in the former, in order to strengthen the argument in the latter: for in this case the middle of the sentence has the falling, and the latter member the rising inflexion.

EXAMPLES.

If we have no regard for religion in yòuth, we ought to have some regard for it in áge.

If we have no regard for our òwn character, we ought to have some regard for the character of óthers.

In these examples, we find the words *youth* and *own character*, have the falling inflexion, and both periods end with the rising inflexion: but if these sentences had been formed so as to make the latter member a mere inference from, or consequence of, the former, the general rule would have taken place, and the first emphatic word would have had the rising, and the last the falling inflexion.

EXAMPLES.

If we have no regard for religion in yóuth, we have seldom any regard for it in àge.

If we have no regard for our ówn character, it can scarcely be expected that we should have any regard for the character of òthers.

RULE III. Direct periods, which commence with participles to the present tense, consist of two parts; between which must be inserted the long pause and rising inflexion.

EXAMPLE.

Having already shown how the fancy is affected by the works of nature, and afterwards considered in general both the works of nature and of art how they mutually assist and complete each other, in forming such scenes and prospects as are apt to delight the mind of the behólder; I shall in this paper throw together some reflections on that particular art, which has a more immediate tendency than any other, to produce those primary pleasures of the imagination, which have hitherto been the subject of this discourse. *Spect.* N° 415.

The sense is suspended in this sentence till the word *beholder*, and here is to be placed the long pause and rising inflexion; in this place also it is evident, the word *now* might be inserted in perfect conformity to the sense.

Inverted Period.

RULE I. Every period, where the first part forms perfect sense by itself, but is modified or determined in its signification by the latter, has the rising inflexion and long pause between these parts as in the direct period.

EXAMPLES.

Gratian very often recommends the fine táste, as the utmost perfection of an accomplished man.

In this sentence the first member ending at *taste* forms perfect sense, but is qualified by the last; for Gratian is not said simply to recommend the fine taste, but to recommend it in a certain way; that is, as the utmost perfection of an accomplished man. The same may be observed of the following sentence:

Persons of good taste expect to be pléased, at the same time they are informed.

Here perfect sense is formed at *pleased*; but it is not meant that persons of good taste are

pleased in general, but with reference to the time when they are informed; the words *taste* and *pleased*, therefore in these sentences, we must pronounce with the rising inflexion, and accompany this inflexion with a pause; for the same reasons, the same pause and inflexion must precede the word *though* in the following example:

I can desire to perceive those things that God has prepared for those that lóve him, though they be such as eye had not seen, ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive. *Locke.*

LOOSE SENTENCE.

A loose sentence has been shown to consist of a period, either direct or inverted, and an additional member which does not modify it; or, in other words, a loose sentence is a member containing perfect sense by itself, followed by some other member or members, which do not restrain or qualify its signification. According to this definition, a loose sentence must have that member which forms perfect sense detached from those that follow, by a long pause and the falling inflexion.

As in speaking, the ear seizes every occasion of varying the tone of voice, which the sense will permit; so in reading, we ought as much as possible to imitate the variety of speaking, by taking every opportunity of altering the voice in correspondence with the sense: the most general fault of printers*, is to mark those mem-

* The grand defect of the points is, that only two of them, the comma and period, necessarily mark a continuation and completion of sense: the semicolon and colon, by being sometimes placed after complete sense, and sometimes where the sense continues, are very fallacious guides, and often lead the reader to an improper turn of voice. If to the colon and semicolon were annexed a mark to determine whether the sense

bers of loose sentences, which form perfect sense, with a comma, instead of a semicolon, or colon: and a similar, as well as the most common fault of readers, is to suspend the voice at the end of these members, and so to run the sense of one member into another; by this means, the sense is obscure, and a monotony is produced, instead of that distinctness and variety, which arises from pronouncing these members with such an inflexion of voice as marks a certain portion of perfect sense, not immediately connected with what follows; for as a member of this kind does not depend for its sense on the following member, it ought to be pronounced in such a manner, as to show its independence on the succeeding member, and its dependence on the period, as forming but a part of it.

In order to convey precisely the import of these members, it is necessary to pronounce them with the falling inflexion, without suffering the voice to fall gradually as at a period; by which means the pause becomes different from

were complete or not, it must certainly be of the greatest assistance to the reader, as he would naturally accompany it with a turn of voice, which would indicate the completeness or incompleteness of the sense, independent on the time; and such a mark seems one of the great *desiderata* of punctuation. I know it may be said that the completeness or incompleteness of the sense is of itself a sufficient guide, without any points at all: yes, it may be answered, but without the gift of prophecy we are not always able to determine at sight whether the sense is complete or not; and sometimes even when we have the whole sentence in view, it is the punctuation only that determines whether the member of a sentence belongs to what goes before, or to what follows. The intention of the points is, in the first place, to fix and determine the sense when it might otherwise be doubtful; and, in the next place, to apprise the reader of the sense of part of a sentence before he has seen the whole. A mark, therefore, which accomplishes this purpose, must unquestionably be of the utmost importance to the art of reading.

the mere comma, which suspends the voice, and marks immediate dependence on what follows; and from the period, which marks not only an independence on what follows, but an exclusion of whatever may follow, and therefore drops the voice as at a conclusion. An example will assist us in comprehending this important inflexion in reading:

All superiority and pre-eminence that one man can have over another, may be reduced to the notion of quality, which, considered at large, is either that of fortune, body, or mind. The first is that which consists in birth, title, or riches: and is the most foreign to our natures, and what we can the least call our own, of any of the three kinds of quality. *Spect.* N° 219.

In the first part of this sentence the falling inflexion takes place on the word *quality*; for this member we find contains perfect sense, and the succeeding members are not necessarily connected with it; the same inflexion takes place in the next member on the word *riches*; which, with respect to the sense of the member it terminates, and its connexion with the following members, is exactly under the same predicament as the former, though the one is marked with a comma, and the other with a semicolon, which is the common punctuation in almost all the editions of the Spectator. A little reflection, however, will show us the necessity of adopting the same pause and inflexion on both the above-mentioned words, as this inflexion not only marks more precisely the completeness of the sense in the members they terminate, but gives a variety to the period, by making the first and the succeeding members end in a different tone of voice. If we were to read all the members, as if marked with commas, that is, as if the sense of the members were absolutely dependent on each other, the necessity of attending to this inflexion

of voice in loose sentences would more evidently appear. This division of a sentence is sometimes, and ought almost always to be, marked with a semicolon, as in the following sentence at the word *possess*.

EXAMPLE.

Foolish men are more apt to consider what they have lost than what they possèss; and to fix their eyes upon those who are richer than themselves, rather than those who are under greater difficulties. *Spectator*, N° 574.

The result of these examples is one almost invariable rule, namely, that however the inflexions may alter upon the pauses in every other part of the sentence, yet in that part of the sentence where the sense begins to form, we must constantly adopt the rising inflexion. This is abundantly exemplified in the sentences already produced, and is indeed one of the most general rules in reading. Those who wish to see a farther application of the inflexions, must consult Elements of Elocution, vol. i. p. 180.

Orthoëpial Figures;

OR,

Figures of Pronunciation.

As we call that a figure of speech which has a peculiarity of meaning, and differs from the most simple and ordinary sense of the words; so I call those figures Orthoëpial, where the peculiarity of the phrase requires a peculiarity of pronunciation. Under these figures of Orthoëpy, I class the Interrogation, the Exclamation, and the Parenthesis; which are generally said, by our grammarians, to require some peculiar modulation of the voice; and to these I shall add other figures, which may be called, The *Com-*

mencement, The *Contrast*, The *Series*, The *Question* and *Answer*, The *Echo*, The *Antecedent*, The *Variation*, *and* The *Cadence*. I shall not contend for the strictly logical propriety of this classification, but shall content myself with hoping that it may have a tendency to place several important particulars of pronunciation in a clearer and more distinct point of view; and by that means gain them a more attentive consideration, and an easier admission to the understanding. Nothing can be a greater proof of the advancement of science than a new Nomenclature. If new combinations and new distinctions of ideas are discovered, there must necessarily be new terms to express them.

The Interrogation.

IT must be first observed, that, with respect to pronunciation, all questions may be divided into two classes; namely, into such as are formed by the interrogative pronouns or adverbs, and into such as are formed only by an inversion of the common arrangement of the words*; the first with respect to inflexion of voice, except in some few cases, may be considered as purely declarative; and like declarative sentences, they require the falling inflexion at the end: and the last, with some few exceptions, require the rising inflexion of voice on the last word; and it is this rising inflexion at the end which distinguishes them from almost every other species of sentence:—of both these in their order.

* Mr. Harris calls the former of these questions indefinite, and the latter definite; as these may be answered by *yes* or *no*, while those often require a whole sentence to answer them. See *Hermes*, b. i. p. 151.

The indefinite Question, or the Question with the Interrogative Words.

RULE I. When an interrogative sentence commences with any of the interrogative pronouns or adverbs, with respect to inflexion, elevation, or depression of voice, it is pronounced exactly like a declarative sentence.

EXAMPLES.

How can he exalt his thoughts to any thing great and noble, who only believes that, after a short turn on the stage of this world, he is to sink into oblivion, and to lose his consciousness for èver? *Spectator*, Nº 210.

As an illustration of the rule, we need only alter two or three of the words to reduce it to a declarative sentence; and we shall find the inflexion, elevation, and depression of voice on every part of it the same.

He cannot exalt his thoughts to any thing great or noble, because he only believes that, after a short turn on the stage of this world, he is to sink into oblivion, and to lose his consciousness for èver.

Here we perceive, that the two sentences, though one is an interrogation, and the other a declaration, end both with the same inflexion of voice, and *that* the falling inflexion; but if we convert these words into an interrogation, by leaving out the interrogative word, we shall soon perceive the difference.

Can he exalt his thoughts to any thing great or noble, who only believes that, after a short turn on the stage of this world, he is to sink into oblivion, and to lose his consciousness for éver?

In pronouncing this sentence with propriety, we find the voice slide upwards on the last words: contrary to the inflexion it takes in the two former examples. If grammarians, therefore, by the elevation of voice, which they attribute to the question, mean the rising inflexion, their rule, with some few exceptions, is true only of questions formed without the interro-

gative words; for the others, though they may have a force and loudness on the last words, if they happen to be emphatical, have no more of that distinctive inflexion which is peculiar to the former kind of interrogation, than if they were no questions at all. Let us take another example:—*Why should not a female character be as ridiculous in a man, as a male character in one of the female sex?* Here the voice is no more elevated at the end than if I were to say—*A female character is just as ridiculous in a man, as a male character in one of the female sex;* but if I say, *Is not a female character as ridiculous in a man, as a male character in one of the female sex?* Here not only the emphasis, but the rising inflexion is on the last words; essentially different from the inflexion on these words in the first question, *Why should not a female character be as ridiculous in a man, as a male character in one of the female sex?* We may presume, therefore, that it is the emphasis, with which these questions sometimes terminate, that has led the generality of grammarians to conclude, that all questions terminate in an elevation of voice, and so to confound that essential difference there is between a question formed with and without the interrogative words.

RULE II. Interrogative sentences commencing with interrogative words, and consisting of members in a series depending necessarily on each other for sense, are to be pronounced as a series of members of the same kind in a declarative sentence. See *Series,* page 106.

EXAMPLES.

From whence can he produce such cogent exhortations to the practice of every vìrtue, such ardent excitements to piety and devòtion, and such assistance to attáin them, as those which are to be met with throughout every page of these inimitable writings? *Jenyns's View of the Internal Evid.* p. 41.

Where, amidst the dark clouds of pagan philosophy, can he show us such a clear prospect of a future státe, the immortality of the sòul, the resurrection of the dèad, and the general júdgment, as in St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians?

Ibid. p. 40.

The definite Question, or the Question without the interrogative Words.

RULE I. When interrogative sentences are formed without the interrogative words, the last word must have the rising inflexion. If there be an emphatical word in the last member, followed by several words depending on it, which conclude the sentence, both the emphatical word and the concluding words are to be pronounced with the rising inflexion*: thus the words *making one*, and *cause of the shipwreck*, in the two following examples, have all the rising inflexion.

EXAMPLES.

Would it not employ a beau prettily enough, if, instead of eternally playing with his snuff-box, he spent some part of his time in máking one? *Spectator*, No. 43.

If the owner of a vessel had fitted it out with every thing necessary, and provided to the utmost of his power against the dangers of the sea, and that a storm should afterwards arise and break the masts, would any one in that case accuse him of being the cáuse of the shipwreck?

Demosthenes on the Crown. Rollin.

Would an infinitely wise Being make such glorious beings for so méan a purpose? Can he delight in the production of such abòrtive intelligencies, such shórt-lived reasonable beings? Would he give us talents that are not to be exérted, capacities that are not to be grátified? *Spectator*, No. 111.

It is said of Diogenes, that meeting a young man who was going to a feast, he took him up in the street and carried him home to his friends as one who was running into imminent danger, had he not prevented him. What would that philosopher

* That is, the word *one* is to be pronounced as if it were an unaccented syllable of the word *making*, and as if written *makingone*. See *The different Forces of Emphatical Words.*

have said had he been present at the gluttony of a modern meal?

Would not he have thought the master of a family mad, and have begged his servants to tie down his hands, had he seen him devour fowl, fish, and flesh; swallow oil, and vinegar, wines, and spices: throw down sallads of twenty different herbs, sauces of a hundred ingredients, confections and fruits of numberless sweets and flávours? *Spectator*, No. 195.

Should a spirit of superior rank, who is a stranger to human nature, accidentally alight upon the Earth, and take a survey of its inhabitants, what would his notions of us bè? Would not he think that we are a species of beings, made for quite different ends and purposes than what we really áre? Must not he imagine that we were placed in this world to get riches and hónours? Would not he think that it was our duty to toil after wealth, and station and títle? Nay, would not he believe we were forbidden poverty by threats of eternal punishment, and enjoined to pursue our pleasures under pain of damnátion? He would certainly imagine that we were influenced by a scheme of duties quite opposite to those which are indeed prescribed to us. *Ibid*, No. 575.

In these examples we find, that, however variously the voice may employ itself on the rest of the sentence, the concluding words on the last member must necessarily be suspended with the rising inflexion. The only exception to this rule is, when these interrogative sentences are connected by the disjunctive *or*; for in that case the sentence or sentences that succeeded the conjunction are pronounced as if they were formed by the interrogative words, or were merely declarative.

RULE II. When interrogative sentences connected by the disjunctive *or*, succeed each other, the first ends with the rising, and the rest with the falling inflexion.

EXAMPLES.

Shall we in your person crówn the author of the public calamities, or shall we destròy him?

Æschines on the Crown. Rollin.

Is the goódness, or wìsdom, of the divine Being, more manifest in this his proceedings? *Spectator*, No. 519.

Exclamation.

THIS note is appropriated by grammarians to indicate that some passion or emotion is contained in the words to which it is annexed, and it may, therefore, be looked upon as essentially distinct from the rest of the points; the office of which is commonly supposed to be, that of fixing or determining the sense only. Whether a point that indicates passion or emotion, without determining what emotion or passion is meant, or if we had points expressive of every passion or emotion, whether this would in common usage more assist or embarrass the elocution of the reader, I shall not at present attempt to decide: but when this point is applied to sentences, which from their form might be supposed to be merely interrogative, and yet really imply wonder, surprise, or astonishment; when this use, I say, is made of the note of exclamation, it must be confessed to be of no small importance in reading, and very justly deserve a place in grammatical punctuation.

Thus the sentence, *How mysterious are the ways of Providence!* which naturally adopts the exclamation, may, by a speaker who denies these mysteries, become a question, by laying a stress on the word *how*, and subjoining the note of interrogation; as, HOW *mysterious are the ways of Providence?* Expressing our gratitude, we may cry out with rapture, *What have you done for me!* or we may use the very same words contemptuously to inquire, WHAT *have you done for me?* intimating that nothing has been done; the very different import of these sentences, as

they are differently pointed, sufficiently show the utility of the note of exclamation.

It may not be entirely useless to take notice of a common errour of grammarians; which is, that both this point and the interrogation require an elevation of voice. The inflexion of voice proper to one species of question, which it is probable, grammarians may have mistaken for an elevation of voice, it is presumed has been fully explained under that article: by the elevation of voice they impute to this point, it is not unlikely that they mean the pathos or energy, with which we usually express passion or emotion, but which is by no means inseparably connected with elevation of voice: were we even to suppose that all passion or emotion necessarily assumes a louder tone, it must still be acknowledged this is very different from a higher tone of voice, and therefore that the common rule is very fallacious and inaccurate.

The truth is, the expression of passion or emotion consists in giving a distinct and specific quality to the sounds we use, rather than in increasing or diminishing their quantity, or in giving this quantity any local direction upwards or downwards: understanding the import of a sentence, and expressing that sentence with passion or emotion, are things as distinct as the head and the heart: this point therefore, though useful to distinguish interrogation from emotion, is as different from the rest of the points as Grammar is from Rhetoric: and whatever may be the tone of voice proper to the note of exclamation, it is certain the inflexions it requires are exactly the same as the rest of the points; that is, if the exclamation point is placed after a member that would have the rising inflexion in another sentence, it ought to have the rising in this; if

after a member that would have the falling inflexion, the exclamation ought to have the falling inflexion likewise.

An instance that the exclamation requires no particular inflexion of voice may be seen in the following speech of Gracchus, quoted by Cicero, and inserted in the *Spectator*, N° 541.

Whither shall I tùrn? Wretch that I ám! to what place shall I betàke myself? Shall I go to the Cápitol? Alas! it is overflowed with my brother's blòod! Or shall I retire to my hòuse? yet there I behold my mother plunged in misery, weeping, and despàiring!

Every distinct portion of this passage may be truly said to be an exclamation; and yet we find in reading it, though it can scarcely be pronounced with too much emotion, the inflexions of voice are the same as if pronounced without any emotion at all; that is, the portion, *Whither shall I turn*, terminates like a question with the interrogative word, with the falling inflexion. The member, *Wretch that I am*, like a member forming incomplete sense, with the rising inflexion; the question without the interrogative word, *Shall I go to the Capitol*, with the rising inflexion; *Alas! it is overflowed with my brother's blood*, with the falling; the question commencing with the disjunctive *or*, *Or shall I retire to my house*, with the falling inflexion, but in a lower tone of voice.

Thus we see how vague and indefinite are the general rules for reading this point, for want of distinguishing high and low tones of voice from those upward and downward slides, which may be in any note of the voice, and which, from their radical difference, form the most marking differences in pronunciation.

Parenthesis.

THE parenthesis is defined by our excellent grammarian, Dr. Lowth, to be a member of a sentence inserted in the body of a sentence, which member is neither necessary to the sense, nor at all affects the construction. He observes also, that, in reading, or speaking, it ought to have a moderate depression of the voice, and a pause greater than a comma.

The real nature of the parenthesis once understood, we are at no loss for the true manner of delivering it. The tone of voice ought to be interrupted, as it were, by something unforeseen; and, after a pause, the parenthesis should be pronounced in a lower tone of voice, at the end of which, after another pause, the higher tone of voice, which was interrupted, should be resumed, that the connexion between the former and latter part of the interrupted sentence may be restored. It may be observed too, that, in order to preserve the integrity of the principal members, the parenthesis ought not only to be pronounced in a lower tone, but a degree swifter than the rest of the period, as this still better preserves the broken sense, and distinguishes the explanation from the text. For that this is always the case in conversation, we can be under no doubt, when we consider that whatever is supposed to make our auditors wait, gives an impulse to the tongue, in order to relieve them, as soon as possible, from the suspense of an occasional and unexpected interruption.

EXAMPLES.

Notwithstanding all this care of Cicero, history informs us, that Marcus proved a mere blockhead; and that nature (who it seems was even with the son for her prodigality to the father) rendered him incapable of improving, by all the rules of

eloquence, the precepts of philosophy, his own endeavours, and the most refined conversation in Athens. *Spect.* No 307.

Natural historians observe (for whilst I am in the country I must fetch my allusions from thence) that only the male birds have voices; that their songs begin a little before breeding-time, and end a little after. *Ibid.* No 128.

Dr. Clarke has observed, that Homer is more perspicuous than any other author; but if he is so (which yet may be questioned) the perspicuity arises from his subject, and not from the language itself in which he writes. *Ward's Grammar*, p. 292.

The many letters which come to me from persons of the best sense of both sexes (for I may pronounce their characters from their way of writing) do not a little encourage me in the prosecution of this my undertaking. *Spect.* No 124.

It is this sense, which furnishes the imagination with its ideas; so that by the pleasures of the imagination or fancy (which I shall use promiscuously) I here mean such as arise from visible objects. *Ibid.* No 411.

We sometimes meet, in books very respectably printed, with the parenthesis marked where there ought to be only commas. We have an instance of this in Hannah More's Strictures on Modern Female Education; where, describing in the most picturesque and truly satiric style, the confusion, indifference, and insincerity, which reign at routs and drums, she says, "He would hear the same stated phrases interrupted, not answered, by the same stated replies; the unfinished sentence 'driven adverse to the winds' by pressing multitudes; the same warm regret mutually exchanged by two friends (who had been expressly denied to each other all the winter) that they had not met before; the same soft and smiling sorrow at being torn away from each other now; the same anxiety to renew the meeting, with perhaps the same secret resolution to avoid it." Vol. ii. p. 180.

In this beautiful description, the words mark-

ed with the parenthesis belong essentially to the thought, and therefore ought only to have been included between commas.

The same may be observed of a very long intervening member, in a beautiful description of intemperance in eating, by Pope.

> The stomach (cramm'd from ev'ry dish,
> A tomb of boil'd and roast, and flesh and fish,
> Where bile, and wind, and phlegm, and acid jar,
> And all the man is one intestine war)
> Remembers oft the school-boy's simple fare,
> The temp'rate sleeps, and spirits light as air.
>
> *Pope's Imitation of Horace*, Sat. ii.

This insertion of a parenthesis where it ought not to be, is by no means so common a *fault* as that of omitting it where it ought to be inserted. Where it depends on nice distinctions, which is sometimes the case, the fault is pardonable, but not in such as have been here taken notice of.

The Commencement.

THAT we should begin to pronounce whatever we read a little more deliberately, than when we have entered on the subject, is an observation that few will dissent from. Most of our punctuists will admit of a pause after a nominative, when it consists of a long member of a sentence, but none have taken notice of a pause at the beginning of every sentence, which may very properly take place after a single word, when the sentence begins with a proper name, or a word that stands for the subject of the discourse. Thus, in Mr. Addison's description of Good-nature, Discretion, and Cheerfulness:

> Good-nature is more agreeable in conversation than wit, and gives a certain air to the countenance, which is more amiable than beauty. *Spectator*, N° 169.

Discretion does not only show itself in words, but in all the circumstances of action; and is like an under-agent of Providence, to guide and direct us in the ordinary concerns of life. *Ibid.* N° 225.

Cheerfulness bears the same friendly regard to the mind as to the body: it banishes all anxious care and discontents, soothes and composes the passions, and keeps the soul in a perpetual calm. *Ibid.* N° 387.

In these examples we shall find it very proper to pause after the first word in every sentence, that the attention may be the better fixed upon what forms the subject of them. This rule, however, is not confined to such words as form the subject of a sentence. Wherever a word of importance commences a sentence, it ought to be distinguished in the same manner by a pause. Thus in the following sentences:

Man is the merriest species in the creation; all above and below him are serious. *Spect.* N° 249.

Hypocrisy cannot indeed be too much detested; but at the same time is to be preferred to open impiety. *Ibid.* N° 458.

Memory is the purveyor of reason; the power which places those images before the mind, upon which the judgment is to be exercised. *Johnson.*

Wisdom comprehends at once the end and the means, estimates easiness or difficulty, and is cautious or confident in due proportion. *Johnson.*

Man is seldom willing to let fall the opinion of his own dignity; he is better content to want diligence than power; and sooner confesses the depravity of his will than the imbecility of his nature. *Ibid.*

Nature seems to have taken a particular care to disseminate her blessings among the different regions of the world, with an eye to their mutual intercourse and traffic among mankind, that the natives of the several parts of the globe might have a kind of dependence upon one another, and be united together by their common interest. *Spectator*, N° 69.

It is presumed that there are few readers of taste, who would not prefer a pause after the first

word in all these sentences, to such a pronunciation, as should slide into the succeeding words without any rest at all.

Another instance we may borrow from Dr. Price's beautiful picture of virtue.

Virtue is of intrinsic value and good desert, and of indispensable obligation; not the creature of will, but necessary and immutable; not local or temporary, but of equal extent and antiquity with the divine mind; not a mode of sensation, but everlasting truth; not dependent on power, but the guide of all power. Virtue is the foundation of honour and esteem, and the source of all beauty, order, and happiness, in nature.

Mr. Addison furnishes us with many instances where a single person begins a sentence:

Homer is in his province when he is describing a battle or a multitude, a hero or a god. Virgil is never better pleased than when he is in his Elysium, or copying out an entertaining picture. Homer's persons are most of them godlike and terrible; Virgil has scarce admitted any into his poem, who are not beautiful, and has taken particular care to make his hero so. *Spectator*, N° 417.

Plato expresses his abhorrence of some fables of the poets, which seem to reflect on the gods as the authors of injustice; and lays it down as a principle, that whatever is permitted to befall a just man, whether poverty, sickness, or any of those things which seem to be evils, shall, either in life or death, conduce to his good. *Spectator*, N° 237.

Seneca has written a discourse purposely upon this subject, in which he takes pains, after the doctrine of the Stoics, to show that adversity is not in itself an evil; and mentions a noble saying of Demetrius, "That nothing would be more "unhappy than a man who had never known affliction."

Ibid.

Tully was the first who observed that friendship improves happiness and abates misery, by the doubling of our joy, and dividing of our grief; a thought, in which he hath been followed by all the essayers upon friendship that have written since his time. *Ibid.* N° 68.

In all these passages, a good reader will perceive the propriety of pausing after the first word which forms the nominative case, or the

subject of the sentence. By this pause the mind is fixed upon the principal object of attention, and prepared to proceed with clearness and deliberation to the reception of what follows.

The Contrast.

WHEN words or phrases are placed in contrast with each other, for the sake of being more distinctly perceived and more forcibly impressed upon the mind, they require a longer pause than ordinary between the contrasted parts, that each part may be more accurately distinguished; and a difference in the tone of voice with which each is pronounced, that this distinction may be more powerfully enforced. The distinction of voice I would recommend is a higher tone of voice upon the first part of the contrast; and, after a long pause, a lower tone upon the second. This mode of pronunciation will, if I mistake not, at once contribute to the clearness, force, and variety of the whole.

It may be observed, that when the contrast is formed between two persons or things, each of which begins the member of a sentence, they must each of them have the pause we should give to the comma; for though these persons or things form the nominative case to the verb, and consist but of a single word, it will be necessary to pause after each, in order to show the contrast more distinctly.

EXAMPLES.

At the same time that I think discretion the most useful talent a man can be master of, I look upon cunning to be the accomplishment of little, mean, ungenerous minds. Discretion, points out the noblest ends to us, and pursues the most proper and laudable methods of attaining them: cunning, has only private selfish aims, and sticks at nothing that may make

them succeed. Discretion, has large and extended views, and, like a well-formed eye, commands a whole horizon: cunning, is a kind of short-sightedness, that discovers the minutest objects that are near at hand, but is not able to discern things at a distance. Discretion, the more it is discovered, gives a greater authority to the person who possesses it: cunning, when it is once detected, loses its force, and makes a man incapable of bringing about, even those events, which he might have done had he passed only for a plain man. Discretion, is the perfection of reason, and a guide to us in all the duties of life: cunning, is a kind of instinct, that only looks out after our immediate interest and welfare. Discretion, is only found in men of strong sense and good understanding; cunning, is often to be met with in brutes themselves, and in persons who are but the fewest removes from them: in short, cunning, is only the mimic of discretion, and may pass upon weak men, in the same manner as vivacity is often mistaken for wit, and gravity for wisdom. *Spectator*, N° 225.

We have a shining instance of the force of contrast in Cicero, where he is showing the unequal circumstances of Catiline when compared with those of the Roman citizens.

But waving all other circumstances, let us balance the real situation of the opposing parties; from that we can form a true notion how very low our enemies are reduced. Here, regard to virtue, opposes insensibility to shame; purity, pollution; integrity, injustice; virtue, villany; resolution, rage; dignity, defilement; regularity, riot. On one side, are ranged, equity, temperance, courage, prudence, and every virtue; on the other, iniquity, luxury, cowardice, rashness, with every vice. Lastly, the struggle lies between wealth and want: the dignity, and degeneracy of reason; the force, and the phrensy of the soul; between well-grounded hope, and widely extended despair. In such a strife, in such a struggle as this, even though the zeal of men were wanting, must not the immortal gods give such shining virtues, the superiority over so great and such complicated vices? Certainly.

Cicero's Oration against Catiline.

In pronouncing this passage we must carefully pause between every contrasted word, or the whole force of the comparison will be lost; nay, there will be danger of obscuring the sense by blending together opposite qualities, if we do

not carefully keep them separate by pauses, and at the same time give an additional diversity to the opposing parts by a different shade of sound: that is, if we do not give the former part of the contrast a higher sound, and the latter a somewhat lower.

The same observations will hold good in pronouncing the following passage in Cicero's Oration for Roscius of Ameria.

Therefore, O ye Judges! you are now to consider, whether it is more probable that the deceased was murdered by the man who inherits his estate, or by him, who inherits nothing but beggary by the same death. By the man who was raised from penury to plenty, or by him who was brought from happiness to misery. By him whom the lust of lucre has inflamed with the most inveterate hatred against his own relations; or by him whose life was such, that he never knew what gain was but from the product of his own labours. By him, who, of all dealers in the trade of blood, was the most audacious; or by him who was so little accustomed to the Forum and trials, that he dreads not only the benches of a court, but the very town. In short, ye Judges, what I think most to this point is, you are to consider whether it is most likely that an enemy, or a son, would be guilty of this murder.

The Series.

THERE is a species of sentences, which forms one of the greatest beauties of composition, and which, if well pronounced, is among the most striking graces of delivery: that is, where a number of particular members follow in a series, and form something like a gradation or climax. If we consider the nature of such a sentence, it will, in some measure, direct us to a just pronunciation of it. It is a whole composed of many particulars, arranged in such order as to show each part distinctly, and, at the same time, its relation to the whole. In order to mark these

particulars distinctly, they must not be suffered to blend with each other: and at the same time to show that they have a common relation to the whole sentence, they must not be pronounced entirely different. In short, the similitude and diversity in the pronunciation should be an exact picture of the similitude and diversity in the composition. For as a climax in writing ought to rise in force as it proceeds, so the voice, in pronouncing it, ought gradually to increase its force upon every subsequent member. Here is the diversity; but, as the members have a similar form, and stand equally related to the object of the sentence, they ought to have a similar inflexion of the voice. Here is the uniformity: for it is this inflexion or slide of the voice that classes speaking sounds more specifically than any other distinction But as these particulars, when they form a climax, are really emphatical, and require the falling slide, so every series of particulars, whether they really increase in force or not, may, for the sake of gratifying the ear, and giving an importance to the subject, adopt the falling inflexion likewise. This, however, must be understood only as a general rule.

These observations premised, we may proceed to distinguish the series into two kinds: that, where the series begins the sentence, but does not either end it, or form complete sense; which we may call the *commencing* series: and that, where the series either ends the sentence, or forms complete sense; which we may call the *concluding* series. For the pronunciation of these different sentences, we may lay down this general rule.

In a Commencing series, pronounce every particular with the falling inflexion but the last; and in a Concluding series, let every member

have the falling inflexion except the last but one; and this ought to have the falling inflexion likewise, if it be of sufficient length to admit of a pause with a rising inflexion before the end.

In order to convey as clear an idea as possible of the pronunciation of this Figure, a Plate is annexed, delineating the inflexions of Mr. Addison's beautiful description of Milton's Figure of Death. See page 109.

Commencing Series.

To advise the ìgnorant, relieve the nèedy, comfort the afflicted, are duties that fall in our way, almost every day of our lives. *Spectator*, N° 93.

In our country, a man seldom sets up for a poet without attacking the reputation of all his brothers in the art. The ignorance of the mòderns, the scribblers of the àge, the decay of póetry, are the topics of detraction, with which he makes his entrance into the world. *Ibid*, No 253.

The miser is more industrious than the saint. The pains of gètting, the fear of lòsing, and the inability of enjóying his wealth, have been the mark of satire in all ages. *Ibid*, N° 624.

When ambition pulls òne way, interest anòther, inclination a thìrd, and perhaps reason contrary to áll, a man is likely to pass his time but ill, who has so many different parties to please. *Ibid*. N° 162.

As the genius of Milton was wonderfully turned to the sublime, his subject is the noblest that could have entered into the thoughts of man: every thing that is truly great and astonishing, has a place in it: the whole system of the intellectual wòrld, the chaos and the creàtion, Heaven, Earth, and Héll, enter into the constitution of his poem. *Ibid*, N° 315.

Labour or exercise ferments the hùmours, casts them into their proper chànnels, throws off redùndances, and helps nature in those secret distribútions, without which the body cannot subsist in its vigour, nor the soul act with cheerfulness. *Ibid*, N° 115.

Plate II.

To front page 109

The descriptive part of this allegory is likewise very strong, & full of sublime ideas.

The Figure of death,

The regal crown upon his head,

His menace of Satan,

His advancing to the combat

the outcry at his birth,

are circumstances too noble to be passed [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] made [illegible] to this king of terrors.

J. Ryl sc.

' Were the books of our best authors to be retailed to the public, and every page submitted to the taste of forty or fifty thousand readers, I am afraid we should complain of many flat exprèssions, trivial observàtions, beaten tòpics, and common thóughts, which go off very well in the lump.

Ibid. N° 124.

To preserve in Macbeth a just consistency of chàracter, to make that character naturally susceptible of those desires that were to be commùnicated to it, to render it interesting to the spectator by some amiable quàlities, to make it exemplify the dangers of ambition, and the terrors of remórse, was all that could be required of the tragedian and the moralist.

Mrs. Montague's Essay on Shakspeare, p. 198.

The descriptive part of this allegory is likewise very strong, and full of sublime ideas. The figure of Dèath, the regal crown upon his hèad, his menace to Sàtan, his advancing to the còmbat, the outcry at his bírth, are circumstances too noble to be passed over in silence, and extremely suitable to this king of terrors. *Spectator*, N° 310.

Aristotle observes, that the fable of an epic poem should abound in circumstances that are both credible and astonishing. Milton's fable is a master-piece of this nature; as the war in Hèaven, the condition of the fallen àngels, the state of ìnnocence, the temptation of the sèrpent, and the fall of mán, though they are very astonishing in themselves, are not only credible, but actual points of faith. *Ibid*, N° 315.

The inconveniences of attendance on great men are more lamented than felt. ' To the greater number, solicitation is its own reward. To be seen in good còmpany, to talk of familiarities with men in pòwer, to be able to tell the freshest nèws, to gratify an inferior circle with predictions of increase or decline of fàvour, and to be regarded as a candidate for high óffices, are compensations more than equivalent to the delay of favours, which, perhaps, he that asks them, has hardly the confidence to expect. *Johnson.*

Let a man's innocence be what it wìll, let his virtues arise to the highest pitch of perfection attainable in this life, there will still be in him so many secret sìns, so many human fràilties, so many offences of ignorance, passion, and prèjudice, so many unguarded words and thòughts, and, in short, so many defects in his best áctions, that without the advantages of such an expiation and atonement as Christianity has revealed to us, it is impossible that he should be cleared before his sovereign Judge, or that he should be able to stand in his sight.

Spectator, N° 513.

I would fain ask one of those bigotted infidels, supposing all the great points of atheism, as the casual or eternal formation of the wòrld, the materiality of a thinking sùbstance, the mortality of the sòul, the fortuitous organization of the bòdy, the motion and gravitation of màtter, with the like partículars, were laid together, and formed into a kind of creed, according to the opinions of the most celebrated atheists; I say, supposing such a creed as this were formed and imposed upon any one people in the world, whether it would not require an infinitely greater measure of faith than any set of articles which they so violently oppose? *Spectator*, N° 168.

Concluding Series.

Our lives, says Seneca, are spent either in doing nothing at all, or in doing nothing to the púrpose, or in doing nothing that we òught to do. *Ibid*, N° 93.

It was necessary for the world that arts should be invented and imprôved, books written, and transmitted to postérity, nations conquered and cìvilized. *Ibid*, N° 255.

All other acts of perpetuating our ideas, except writing or printing, continue but a short time: statues can last but a few thousands of yèars, edifices féwer, and colours still fewer than èdifices. *Ibid*, N° 166.

This persuasion of the truth of the Cospel, without the evidence which accompanies it, would not have been so firm and so dùrable; it would not have acquired new force with àge, it would not have resisted the torrent of tíme, and have passed from age to age to our own dàys.

Life consists, not of a series of illustrious actions, or elegant enjoyments; the greater part of our time passes in compliance with necèssities, in the performance of daily duties, in the removal of small inconvéniences, in the procurement of petty pléasures. *Johnson.*

A man has frequent opportunities of mitigating the fierceness of a party, of doing justice to the character of a deserving man, of softening the ènvious, quieting the ángry, and rectifying the prèjudiced: which are all of them employments suited to a reasonable nature, and bring great satisfaction to the person who can busy himself in them with discretion. *Spectator.*

Though we seem grieved at the shortness of life in general, we are wishing every period of it at an end. The minor longs to be at àge, then to be a man of bùsiness, then to make up an estàte, then to arrive at hónours, then to retìre. *Ibid*, N° 93.

There is no blessing of life comparable to the enjoyment of a discreet and virtuous friend. It eases and unloads the mind, clears and improves the understànding, engenders thoughts and knòwledge, animates virtue and good resòlutions, and finds employment for the most vacant hours of life. *Spectator*, N° 93.

The devout man does not only believe, but feèls there is a Deity; he has actual sensàtions of him: his experience concurs with his reàson: he sees him more and more in all his intercourses with him; and even in this life almost loses his faith in conviction. *Ibid.* N° 465.

The ill-natured man, though but of equal parts with the good-natured man, gives himself a larger field to expàtiate in; he exposes those failings in human nature which the other would cast a veìl over, laughs at vices which the other either excuses or conceàls, falls indifferently upon friends or ènemies, exposes the person who has oblìged him, and, in short, sticks at nothing that may establish his character of a wit. *Ibid.* N° 169.

For what can interrupt the content of the fair sex, upon whom one age has laboured after another to confer honours and accumulate immunities? those, to whom rudeness is infamy, and insult is còwardice? whose eye commands the brave, and whose smile softens the sevère? whom the sailor travels to adòrn, the soldier bleeds to defénd, and the poet wears out life to cèlebrate; who claim tribute from every art and scìence, and for whom all who approach them endeavour to multiply delights, without requiring from them any return but willingness to be pleased. *Johnson.*

Nature has laid out all her art in beautifying the face; she has touched it with vermìllion, planted in it a double row of ìvory, made it the seat of smiles and blùshes, lighted it up and enlivened it with the brightness of the èyes, hung it on each side with curious organs of sènse, given it airs and graces that cannot be descrìbed, and surrounded it with such a flowing shade of hair as sets all its beauties in the most agreeable light. *Spectator*, N° 98.

Nothing is more pleasant to the fancy, than to enlarge itself by degrees, in its contemplation of the various proportions which its several objects bear to each other, when it compares the body of man to the bulk of the whole èarth, the earth to the circle it describes round the sùn, that circle to the sphere of the fixed stàrs, the sphere of the fixed stars to the circuit of the whole creàtion, the whole creation itself to the infinite space that is every where diffused abòut it: or when the imagination works dòwnward, and considers the bulk of a human body in respect of an animal a hundred times less than a mìte, the particular lìmbs

of such an animal, the different springs which àctuate the limbs, the spirits which set these springs a-gòing, and the proportionable minuteness of these several parts, before they have arrived at their full growth and perfèction. *Spectator*, N° 420.

Should the greater part of the people sit down and draw up a particular account of their time, what a shameful bill would it be! So much in eating, and drinking, and sleeping, beyond what nature requìres; so much in revelling and wàntonness; so much for the recovery of last night's intèmperance; so much in gaming, plays, and masqueràdes; so much in paying and receiving formal and impertinent vìsits: so much in idle and foolish prating in censuring and reviling our nèighbours; so much in dressing out our bodies and talking of fàshions; and so much wasted and lost in doing nothing at all. *Sherlock.*

Question and Answer.

WHEN a speaker puts a question to himself, and immediately answers it, he becomes as it were two persons: and as in all interlocutory discourse, we find the person who questions and he who answers assume a somewhat different tone of voice, so a speaker who assumes both these personages ought also to assume the different tones they make use of; that is, the question should be pronounced in a higher, a more open and declarative tone, and the answer, (after a long pause) in a lower, firmer, and more definite one. Such a distinction of voice is not only proper to distinguish the sense of each sentence, and to keep them from blending together, and confusing the thought, but it gives a more emphatic turn to the meaning, and gratifies the ear by its variety. This figure of speaking is often adopted by the best orators, and merits careful attention in pronouncing it. Thus Cicero, in his oration for Muræna, makes use of this figure, where he says—

——But to return to what I proposed; away with the name of Cato from this dispute; away with all authority, which in a

court of justice ought to have no other influence but to save. Join issue with me upon the crimes themselves. What is your charge, Cato? What is to be tried? What do you offer evidence of? Do you impeach corruption? I do not defend it. Do you blame me for defending, by my pleading, what I punished by law? I answer, that I punished corruption and not innocence; as to corruption, if you please, I will go hand in hand with yourself in impeaching it.

In pronouncing this passage, we may observe that the answers *I do not defend it—I answer, that I punished corruption and not innocence,* ought to be preceded by a long pause, and pronounced in a lower tone of voice than the questions to which they relate.

We have another example of this figure in his oration for Cælius:

The charge of poisoning now only remains to be discussed: of which I can neither see the foundation, nor unravel the design. For what reason could Cælius have to endeavour to poison that lady? That he might not pay back the gold? Pray did she demand it? To avoid the discovery of his guilt? But who charged him? Who would even have mentioned it, had not Cælius impeached a certain person.

In this passage we find one question answered by another; and that question in the first instance, *Pray did she demand it?* requiring the rising inflexion at the end. In this case, however, notwithstanding the question *ends* with the rising turn of voice, the whole must be pronounced in a lower tone than the question which precedes it.

But one of the most animated figures of this kind we find in his oration for Milo:

Were the situation of things to be expressed in painting instead of words, you might then distinguish the traitor from the undesigning person: as the one was sitting in his chariot, wrapped up in his cloak, and his wife by his side; it is hard to say if the cloak, the chariot, or the companion, was the greatest impediment to such an intention. For what can carry less the appearance of a design to fight, than a man entangled

with a cloak, shut up in a chariot, and almost fettered by a wife? Now, my lords, survey Clodius first leaving his seat in a hurry. For what reason? In the evening. Upon what emergency? Late. To what purpose, especially at this season? He strikes off to Pompey's country-house. Why? That he might visit Pompey? He knew he was at his seat by Albium. Was it to view his house? He had been in it a thousand times. Then what could be his motive for all this sauntering and shifting? Why, to loiter; to gain time, that he might be sure to be on the spot when Milo came up.

The three first questions in this example have no answers, but are still to be pronounced in a higher tone of voice than the affirmative propositions, *In the evening*, *Late*, *He strikes off to Pompey's country-house.* But the succeeding questions have all answers, which must, after a considerable pause, adopt a lower tone of voice than the questions that precede them.

Echo.

I HAVE adopted this name for want of a better to express that repetition of a word or thought, which immediately arises from a word or thought that preceded it. Thus Mr. Philips, in Chandler's Parliamentary Debates:

Sir, I should be much surprised to hear the motion made by the honourable gentleman who spoke last but one, opposed by any member in this house. A motion, founded in justice, supported by precedent, and warranted by necessity

Here the word *motion* may be called the echoing word, which ought always to be pronounced as if marked with a note of admiration; that is, with the rising inflexion in a high tone of voice, and a long pause after it, when it implies any degree of passion, as in this example. But when it is merely narrative or didactic, as in the following passage:

Tully was the first who observed, that friendship improves happiness and abates misery, by the doubling of our joy and

dividing of our grief; a thought, in which he hath been followed by all the essayers upon friendship that have written since his time. *Spectator*, N° 68.

Here the word *thought* ought to have the rising inflexion, and a pause after it, but must not be in the high tone which the word *motion* in the former example required, as it is plain sedate reasoning, and totally devoid of passion. But in a speech of Mr. Pitt, before he was Lord Chatham, we find the echoing word require the same inflexion and pause as in the last example, but accompanied with the high impassioned tone heard in the first:

I cannot say, Sir, which of these motives influence the advocates of the bill before us; a bill in which such cruelties are proposed as are yet unknown amongst the most savage nations; such as slavery has not yet borne or tyranny invented; such as cannot be heard without resentment, nor thought without horror. *Chandler's Debates*, 1740.

But the most beautiful example of this figure, in our, or perhaps in any other language, is that we meet with in Hannah More's *Strictures on Female Education*. Speaking on dissipation and the modern habits of life, and particularly on the spirit of gaming, she says,—

With "mysterious reverence" I forbear to descant on those serious and interesting rites, for the more august and solemn celebration of which Fashion nightly convenes these splendid myriads to her more sumptuous temples. Rites! which, when engaged in with due devotion, absorb the whole soul, and call every passion into exercise, except those indeed of love and peace, and kindness and gentleness. Inspiring rites! which stimulate fear, rouse hope, kindle zeal, quicken dulness, sharpen discernment, exercise memory, inflame curiosity! - Rites! in short, in the due performance of which, all the energies and attentions, all the powers and abilities, all the abstractions and exertion, all the diligence and devotedness, all the sacrifice of time, all the contempt of ease, all the neglect of sleep, all the oblivion of care, all the risks of fortune (half of which, if directed to their true objects, would change the very face of the world), all these are concentrated to one point: a point' in which the wise and the weak, the learned

and the ignorant, the fair and the frightful, the sprightly and the dull, the rich and the poor, the patrician and plebeian meet in one common uniform equality: an equality! as religiously respected in these solemnities, in which all distinctions are levelled at a blow, and of which the very spirit is therefore democratical, as it is combated in all other instances.

This passage is at once a brilliant example of the echo and the series; and one hardly knows which to admire most, the beautiful structure of the sentences, the varied and animated imagery of the thought, or the philosophical justness of the moral sentiment.

In pronouncing this beautiful passage, the word *Rites* must become more emphatical with the rising inflexion every time it is repeated, and the pauses after it longer. The words *point* and *equality* ought to have the same pause and inflexion, and the several serieses to be pronounced according to the rules under that head, page 113.

Cicero pleading before Cæsar for king Dejotarus, says,—

What shall I say of his courage, what of his magnanimity, his gravity, his firmness? *Qualities!* which all the wise and learned allow to be the greatest, and some the only blessings of life, and which enable virtue not only to enjoy comfort but happiness.

Again, pleading for the same client, he says,—

The man then who was not only pardoned but distinguished by you with the highest honours, is charged with an intention to kill you in his own house. An *intention*, of which, unless you imagine that he is utterly deprived of reason, you cannot suspect him.

Here the words *qualities* and *intention* require the rising inflexion, with a long pause after them, accompanied with a considerable degree of admiration and surprise.

The same pause, inflexion of voice, surprise,

and admiration, must accompany the word *laws*, in the following passage in his first oration against Antony.

By the dead are the banished recalled. By the dead are the privileges of Rome bestowed, not on private persons only, but upon whole nations and provinces. By the dead, members of corporations have their tribute remitted. We therefore confirm whatever, upon a single but unquestionable evidence, has been produced from this house; and shall we think of ratifying the *acts* of Cæsar, yet abolish his *laws*? Those laws which he himself, in our sight, repeated, pronounced, enacted? *Laws* which he valued himself upon passing? *Laws* in which he thought the system of our government was comprehended? *Laws* which concern our provinces and our trials? Are we, I say, to repeal such laws, yet ratify his acts? Yet may we at least complain of those which are only proposed; as to those which we pass we are deprived even of the liberty to complain.

In pronouncing this passage, it ought to be observed, that the echoing word *laws* ought to be pronounced with increasing force upon every repetition, which will give it a climax of importance, and greatly add to the variety of it. This mode of pronunciation will be more peculiarly proper upon the same word in another passage in his oration against Piso.

During all this time, who ever heard you, I will not say act or remonstrate, but so much as speak or complain? Can you imagine yourself to have been a consul, when, under your government, the man who had saved his country, who had saved the majesty of the senate,—when the man who had led in triumph into Italy, at three several times, the inhabitants of every quarter of the world, declared that he could not safely appear in public? Were you consuls at the time, when, as soon as you began to open your mouths upon any affair, or to make any motion in the senate, the whole assembly cried out, and gave you to understand, that you were not to proceed to business before you had put the question for my return; when, though fettered by the convention you had made, you yet told them, that you wished, with all your heart, that you were not bound up by law? A *law*, which did not appear to be binding upon private subjects; a *law*, branded upon this constitution by the hands of slaves, engraved by violence, imposed by ruffians; while the senate was abolished, all our pa-

triots driven out of the Forum; the republic in captivity; a *law*, contradictory to all other laws, and passed without any of the usual forms. The consuls who could pretend they were afraid of such a law as this were ignorant of the laws, the institutions and the rights, of that very state in which they pretended to a share of the government.

Antecedent.

PRONOUNS that are antecedents to some relative are often pronounced without accent, and by that means render the sense of the sentence feeble and indistinct. The antecedent and the relative are correspondent words, which ought to be distinctly, though not emphatically, marked, in order to show the precise meaning of a sentence. When pronouns are not antecedent to a relative, they are often pronounced without accent; and as the words they refer to are sufficiently understood, this unaccented pronunciation produces no obscurity. Thus in the following sentence:

He cannot exalt his thoughts to any thing great or noble, because he only believes that, after a short turn on the stage of this world, he is to sink into oblivion, and to lose his consciousness for ever.

Here the person spoken of is supposed to be understood, and there is no necessity of laying even accentual stress on the word *he*: but in the following sentence:

He cannot exalt his thoughts to any thing great or noble, who only believes that, after a short turn on the stage of this world, he is to sink into oblivion, and lose his consciousness for ever.

Here we find that pronoun *he* the antecedent to the relative *who*, and perceive the necessity of giving it an accent, and making a considerable pause after it.

When the relative immediately follows the antecedent, the antecedent requires an accent and pause after it in the same manner.

He, that pursues fame with just claims, trusts his happiness to the winds; but he, that endeavours after it by false merit, has to fear, not only the violence of the storm, but the leaks of his vessel. *Johnson.*

This passage will want much of its force and precision, if we do not lay an accent on the pronoun *he*, and make a sensible pause after it.

The same may be observed of the following sentence.

He, that is loudly praised, will be clamourously censured; he, that rises hastily into fame, will be in danger of sinking suddenly into oblivion. *Ibid.*

An attention to the foregoing rule will direct us in some doubtful cases, and give a decision to what might otherwise appear equivocal Thus, when Zanga, in the *Revenge*, is applauding himself for his conduct, and apologising for the obliquity of it, he says,—

And greater sure my merit, who, to gain
A point sublime, could such a task sustain.

It has already been observed, that when the pronoun *my* is in opposition to any other possessive pronoun, it is emphatical, and requires the sound rhyming with *high*. In this instance perhaps, it may be said that *my* is emphatical, as it points out the person of the speaker in contradistinction from every other, and therefore requires the open sound of *y* with a degree of force upon it; and that *who* is here not determinate, but explicative; that is, it does not necessarily restrain the merit to him, because he acts in that manner, but only expatiates on the merit by way of supplement. This may possibly be the case; but since the sense will admit

of the *who's* being determinate, pronouncing the *my* with the emphatic sound takes away all doubt, and gives a completeness to the sense as well as plenitude to the sound of the line.

There is the same necessity for accentual force and a pause, when the pronoun is in the objective, as when it is in the nominative case.

A man will have his servant just, diligent, sober, and chaste, for no other reason but the terrour of losing his master's favour, when all the laws divine and human cannot keep *him* whom he serves within bounds, with relation to any one of these virtues. *Spectator*, N° 202.

This rule leads us to decide upon the pronunciation of the pronoun, when in the objective case, and when the relative to which it corresponds is not expressed but understood.

From what has been observed, we may conclude that, whenever there is an antecedent and a relative, there is a necessary connexion, which requires the former always to have accentual force, to intimate that the relative is in view, and in some measure to anticipate the pronunciation of it.

EXAMPLE.

As folly and inconsiderateness are the foundations of infidelity, the great pillars and supporters of it are either the vanity of appearing wiser than the rest of mankind, or an ostentation of courage in despising the terrours of another world, which have so great an influence on what they call weaker minds; or an aversion to a belief, which must cut them off from many of those pleasures they propose to themselves, and fill them with remorse for many of them they have already tasted. *Spectator*, N° 136.

The antithesis in the latter part of this sentence may at first sight seem to require an emphasis on *them*, as opposed to *those pleasures they propose to themselves*; but if we examine the

state of the antithesis more narrowly, we shall find that the opposite parts will be sufficiently contrasted without a stress on *them*, since the sense would be perfect without this word; but as there is a relative understood before the word *they*, we find the propriety of a stress on the antecedent *them*, in order to correspond to the elliptical relative.

Hannah More, whose language is so pointed and perspicuous, so rich and at the same time so correct, had less need, perhaps, than most writers to mark emphatical words in Italics; yet her knowledge of just pronunciation has induced her to mark an antecedent pronoun, that its correspondence with its relative might be sufficiently intimated. This occurs in a passage which contains perhaps,

What oft was thought, but ne'er so well express'd. *Pope.*

Thus the weakest reasoners are always the most positive in debate; and the cause is obvious; for *they* are unavoidably driven to maintain their pretensions by violence, who want arguments and reasons to prove that they are in the right.
Strictures on Modern Female Education, vol. ii. p. 15.

Variation.

THE causes of variety in reading and speaking are felt in their effects, but are very difficult to describe. The play of a melodious voice, from high to low, from loud to soft, or from quick to slow, charms us with the pleasing transition from one to the other; but affords so little ground for investigating the principles on which it depends, that the generality of writers on this subject content themselves with advising their readers to observe the best pronouncers, and to follow them as closely as possible. This advice is certainly very rational, though not very satis-

factory. Rules are the soul of art and science; and he who can trace one in an art which was supposed to be incapable of rules, has added something, however small, to the mass of general knowledge. A conviction of this has encouraged me to offer a few rules for varying the voice in reading, by an attention to the inflexion of voice on certain parts of a sentence where at first sight there appears to be no necessity for any alteration of voice; or if there were, that any such alteration is perfectly arbitrary. both these mistakes, however, will be rectified by attending to the pronunciation of the following sentence:

When I am in a serious humour, I very often walk by myself in Westminster Abbey; where the gloominess of the plàce, and the use to which it is applíed, with the solemnity of the bùilding, and the condition of the people who líe in it, are apt to fill the mìnd with a kind of mélancholy, or rather thoúghtfulness, that is not disagreeable. *Spectator*, No 169.

If the latter members of this sentence, which are very properly marked with commas, were all to have the same inflexion (or suspension of voice, as it is commonly called), the monotony would strike every one: but let the falling inflexion be placed on *place*, *building*, and *mind*, and an agreeable variety will succeed the monotone, which will convince us that this variety arises from the regular variation of inflexion upon successive members of the sentence.

Under the article *series* it has been seen how much force and variety arise from pronouncing the several successive members with an appropriate inflexion of voice. It may in the same manner be observed, that wherever similar members occur, though no more than three, a variation of inflexion may be adopted with advantage. Thus, in the following example:

Good nature is more agreeable in conversation than wit, and gives a certain air to the countenance, which is more amiable than beauty. It shows virtue in the fairest light, takes off in some measure from the deformity of více, and makes even folly and impertinence suppòrtable. *Spectator*, N° 169.

In the last sentence of this example, by placing the falling inflexion on *light* at the end of the first member, we shall diversify it from the next member, which must have the rising, and so form an agreeable cadence.

In the same manner, where there are three members in the former part of a sentence before the sense begins to form, the falling inflexion upon the antepenultimate member, as it may be called, will give an agreeable variety to the whole.

The philosopher, the saint, or the hèro; the wise, the good, or the great man; very often lie hid and concealed in a plebéian, which a proper education might have disinterred and have brought to light. *Spectator*, No 215.

Here, by placing the falling inflexion on *hero*, we shall diversify it from the rising on *plebeian*, and add considerably to the harmony of the cadence.

It may be observed, when the principal constructive member of a sentence extends to a considerable length before the sense begins to form, that, as soon as the sense begins to form, the voice ought to take every occasion of relieving the ear from the sameness which was necessary to connect the sense in the first member; and for that purpose the falling inflexion should be adopted as soon as possible at the beginning of the second member, both in order to produce a variety and to form a cadence.

As the noblest mien, or most graceful action, would be degraded and obscured by a garb appropriated to the gross employments of rustics or mechánics, so the most heroic sèntiments will lose their efficacy, and the most splendid idèas drop

their magnificence, if they are conveyed by words used commonly upon low and trivial occasions. *Johnson.*

In this sentence, as the voice must preserve a sameness on the subordinate pauses till it comes to *mechanics*, where it adopts the rising inflexion and long pause, so it must adopt the falling inflexion on *sentiments* and *ideas*, to relieve the ear from that sameness, and form a cadence.

Nearly the same observations hold good in the following sentence:

As beauty of body, with an agreeable carriage, pleases the eye, and that pleasure consists in observing that all the parts have a certain elegance, and are proportioned to each òther; so does beaúty of behàviour, which appears in our lives, obtain the approbàtion of àll with whom we converse, from the order, consistency, and moderation of our words and actions.

Spectator, N° 104.

Here the sense extends to *other* before it begins to form, and consequently, the voice must be carried on with little variation till that word is pronounced with the rising inflexion and long pause; after which the voice must adopt the rising inflexion on *beauty*, and the falling on *behaviour*; the falling both on *approbation*, and the word *all*; when the cadence must be formed by the falling inflexion on *order* and *consistency*, the rising on *moderation*; and the rising on *words*, and the falling on *actions*, the voice descending in a gradually lower tone.

On the Period, and the Method of forming a Cadence.

WHEN a sentence is so far perfectly finished, as not to be connected in construction with the following sentence, it is marked with a period. This point is in general so well understood, that

few grammarians have thought it necessary to give an express example of it; though there are none who have inquired into punctuation who do not know, that in loose sentences the period is frequently confounded with the colon. But though the tone with which we conclude a sentence is generally well understood, we cannot be too careful, in pronunciation, to distinguish it as much as possible from that member of a sentence which contains perfect sense, and is usually pointed with a colon. Such members, which may not be improperly called *sententiolæ*, or little sentences, require the falling inflexion, but in a higher tone than the preceding words, as if we had only finished a part of what we had to say; while the period requires the falling inflexion in a lower tone, as if we had nothing more to add. But this final tone does not only lower the last word; it has the same influence on those which more immediately precede the last; so that the cadence is prepared by a gradual fall upon the concluding words, every word in the latter part of a sentence sliding gently lower till the voice drops upon the last. This will more evidently appear upon repeating the following sentence.

This persuasion of the truth of the Gospel, without the evidence which accompanies it, would not have been so firm and so durable: it would not have acquired new force with age: it wóuld not have resìsted the tòrrent of tíme, and have passed from àge to áge to our ówn dàys.

We find perfect sense formed at the word *durable*; but as this does not conclude the sentence, these words, though adopting the falling inflexion, are pronounced in a higher tone than the rest: the same may be observed of the word *age*, which ends the second member; while in the last member not only the word *days* is pronounced lower than the rest but the whole mem-

ber falls gradually into the cadence, *and have passed from age to age to our own days.*

Let us take another Example:

It was said of Socrates, that he brought philosophy down from Heaven to inhabit among men; and I shall be ambitious to have it said of me, that I have brought philosophy out of clósets and lìbraries, schòols and cólleges, to dwell in clùbs and assémblies, at téa-tables and in còffee-houses. *Spectator*, N° 10.

When this sentence is properly read, every ear will perceive a peculiar harmony in the cadence, but few will judge from whence it proceeds. If we analyse it, we shall see that four accented words are contrasted with other four, and that the inflexions on each are in an exactly opposite order. This number of accented words, and this order of the inflexions, is so agreeable to the ear, that a judicious reader will endeavour to fall into it as often as the sense will permit him, as in the preceding example; and if the sense will only allow him four accented words, as in the following example, he will be sure to preserve the same arrangement of inflexions.

Nature seems to have designed the head as the cupola to the most glorious of her works: and when we load it with such a pile of supernumerary ornaments, we destroy the symmetry of the human figure, and foolishly contrìve to cáll off the èye from great and real beauties, to childish gewgaws, rìbbons, and bone-láce. *Spectator*, N° 98.

In pronouncing this finishing sentence of the essay, we ought to begin the cadence after the word *figure:* then to let the voice play up and down upon the words *foolishly* and *contrive*, *call off*, and *the eye*; that is, to give *foolishly* the rising, and *contrive* the falling inflexion—the words *call off* the rising, and *the eye* the falling: then the last member after *beauties*, consisting of four accented words, should have the two inflexions ar-

ranged as they are in the example; that is falling, rising, rising, falling, and these to be pronounced in a gradually descending tone till the close of the sentence.

But here it will be absolutely necessary to observe, that though the period generally requires the falling inflexion, every period does not necessarily adopt this inflexion in the same tone of voice; if sentences are intimately connected in sense, though the grammatical structure of each may be independant on the other, they may not improperly be considered as so many small sentences making one large one, and thus requiring a pronunciation correspondent to their logical dependance on each other: hence it may be laid down as a general rule, that a series of periods in regular succession are to be pronounced as every other series; that is, if they follow each other regularly as parts of the same observation they are to be pronounced as parts, and not as wholes

EXAMPLES.

Some men cannot discern between a noble and a mean action. Others are apt to attribute them to some false end or intention, and others purposely misrepresent or put a wrong interpretation on them. *Spectator*, No 255.

Though the first part of this passage is marked with a period in all the editions of the Spectator I have seen, nothing can be plainer than that it ought to be pronounced as the first member of the concluding series of three compound members. See article, *Compound Series*.

Thus, although the whole of life is allowed by every one to be short, the several divisions of it appear long and tedious. We are for lengthening our span in general, but would fain contract the parts of which it is composed. The usurer would be very well satisfied to have all the time annihilated that lies between the present moment and next quarter-day. The politician would be contented to lose three years in his

life, could he place things in the posture which he fancies they will stand in after such a revolution of time. The minor would be glad to strike out of his existence all the moments that are to pass away before he comes of age. Thús as fàst as our tìme rúns, we should be véry glàd, in mòst part of our líves, that it ran mùch fáster than it dòes.

Spectator, No 93.

Though here are no less than six periods in this passage, and every one of them requires the falling inflexion, yet the voice ought not to fall into a lower tone till the last sentence but one, where the words, *before he comes of age*, must fall gradually to the end. But in order to give variety, and form a cadence, the last sentence must be pronounced in a different manner from the rest; that is, the whole in a lower tone, with the last member falling gradually, and the different slides on the several words, as marked in the example. As the last of these sentences which forms the cadence does not fall into the same accentual portions as in the examples, page 125, 126, the inflexions are repeated in the same order upon the four last as on the four first words, and the last member adopts the same order of inflexions as in the series. See *Elements of Elocution*, page 113.

On Accented Force.

By accent is generally and justly understood a greater force on one syllable of a word than on another; but whether this force was pronounced in a higher, or only in a louder tone, was undecided, till, by distinguishing the voice into its two inflexions the accented syllable was found to be always louder, and either higher or lower than the rest of the syllables, according to the inflexion with which the accent was pronounced*.

* See Elements of Elocution, p. 186.

The seat of the accent, or that syllable in a word which has a right to it, in preference to the rest, is decided by custom, and does not form any part of the present inquiry. The question here discussed is, What is the nature of that force on a certain syllable of a word, which word cannot properly be called emphatical? Thus in the following sentence,

Evil communication corrupts integrity,

not a single word is emphatical. Every word is pronounced with an equal degree of force, and every word has one accented syllable pronounced evidently louder than the rest. But in the following sentence.

Censure is the *tax* a man *pays* to the *public* for being *eminent;*

—in the pronunciation of this sentence, I say, we find the words in Italics pronounced with an equal degree of force, but that the others sink into a feebleness, distinguishable by the dullest ear. If we inquire what degree of feebleness it is which these words fall into, we shall find it to be exactly that which is given to the unaccented syllables of the words *censure*, *public* and *eminent:* so that if we consider the words in Roman letters as unaccented syllables of the others, and joined to them as such, we shall have a precise idea of the comparative force of each. Let us, for example, suppose them written in the manner following:

Cénsure isthetàx amanpàys tothepúblic forbeingèminent;

and we find we have a precise and definite idea of the two forces, and need not recur to the common vague direction of "pronouncing some words more forcibly, but not so as to deprive the rest of all force:"—the forces of these two

kinds of words are as much settled as the two kinds of force on accented and unaccented syllables, and these are sufficiently understood by all who have the gift of speech.

The first obvious distinction, therefore, between the sounds of words, with respect to force, is, into accented and unaccented; and while we know what force we ought to give to the unaccented *syllables* of a word, we can be at no loss for the force on unaccented *words*; and we need but consider these words as the unaccented syllables of the others, to pronounce them properly.

On Emphatic Force.

EMPHATIC force, or that force we give to words either placed in opposition to other words, or suggesting such an opposition,—this force, I say, is not quite so definite as the force of accent: very luckily, however, the degree of emphatic force is not so essential to emphasis, as the degree of accented force is to accented words: if we pronounce the smaller and less important words of a sentence with the same force we do the more significant words, we shall soon find that accent is of much more importance to the sense than emphasis. Let us, for example, pronounce every word in the foregoing sentence (where there is no emphatic word) with an equal degree of force, and we shall find they want that light and shade which are necessary to form a strong picture of the thought. On the contrary, let us preserve the proper inflexions upon the accented syllables of emphatic words, and we shall find the sense fully and clearly brought out, without any more force upon these words than is given to the other ac-

cented words, which are not emphatical. Thus, in the following sentence,

The corruption of the best things, produces the worst.

we find the two words *best* and *worst* are in opposition to each other, and are therefore emphatical; but in order to express this emphasis, we do not find ourselves under the least necessity of pronouncing these words louder or more forcibly than the words *corruption* and *produces*. The word *things* indeed must necessarily be pronounced feeble, like an unaccented syllable of the word *best*; and it is on this feebleness of the word, which belongs to both parts of the emphasis, that the emphatic sense depends much more than on the force which is given to the emphatic words themselves. Let us try to illustrate this by examples.

Prosperity gains friends, and adversity tries them.

In this sentence we find the force of the emphatic words depends entirely on the feebleness with which we pronounce the words common to both parts of the antithesis: for if, instead of pronouncing the words *friends* and *them* as unaccented syllables of *gains* and *tries*, we should give them the same force we do to the latter words, the emphasis and meaning of the sentence would be entirely lost. Let us take another example.

I do not so much request as demand your attention.

Here the words *your attention* may be called the elliptical words: for it is by ellipsis only that they are omitted after request: and these words must necessarily be pronounced like unaccented syllables of the word *demand*, or the sentence will be deprived of its energy. If we pronounce these words feebly, the words *request* and *de-*

mand may only have common accented force, and yet the emphatic sense of the sentence will be very perceptible; but if we pronounce *your attention* with as much force as the words *request* and *demand*, let us increase the force on these latter words as much as we please, we shall find it impossible to make the sentence emphatical.

Thus we see, that pronouncing the elliptical words feebly, and as if they were only unaccented syllables of those to which they belong, is of much more impòrtance to the sense of a sentence than any additional force on the emphatic word. If it be demanded what is the degree of force we must give to emphatic words, when we *do* bestow this force on them, it may be answered, that this will in a great measure depend on the degree of passion, with which the words are expressed; but if we have merely an eye to the expression of the sense (for expressing the sense of a passage, and expressing the passion of it, are very different things) we may make the force of the emphatic words exceed that of the accented words as much as the accented force exceeds the unaccented.

Having thus shown the nature of accent and emphasis, as they are two species of force, and endeavoured to evince the necessity of attending more to the inflexion of the accent than to any greater degree of force upon it; I shall, in the next place, give a concise view of the cause of emphasis, or that particular meaning in the words which requires a more than common force in the pronunciation of them.

What it is that constitutes Emphasis.

IN every assemblage of objects, some will appear more worthy of notice than others. In every

assemblage of ideas, which are pictures of these objects, the same difference will certainly reign among them; and in every assemblage of words, which are pictures of these ideas, we shall find some of more importance than others. It is the business of a speaker to mark this importance, and, consequently, a good speaker will make his pronunciation an exact picture of the words. The art of speaking then must principally consist in arranging each word into its proper class of importance, and afterwards giving it a suitable pronunciation. We have seen, in the last article, that the prepositions, conjunctions, and smaller words, are generally pronounced like unaccented syllables of the nouns, verbs, and participles, to which they belong; and that these are sometimes pronounced more or less forcibly, according to the peculiar meaning annexed to them.

Now what is this peculiar meaning in words, which requires a more than ordinary force in pronouncing them, and properly denominates them emphatical? This question, however difficult it may appear at first sight, may be answered in one word,—*opposition*. Whenever words are contrasted *with*, contradistinguished *from*, or opposed *to*, other words, they are always emphatical. When both parts of this opposition or contrast are expressed, the emphatic words become very obvious; as in the following passage from Pope:

> 'Tis hard to say, if greater want of skill
> Appear in *writing* or in *judging* ill:
> But of the two, less dangerous is th' offence
> To *tire* our *patience*, than *mislead* our *sense*;
> Some *few* in *that*, but *numbers* err in *this*;
> *Ten censure* wrong, for *one* who *writes* amiss.

In this passage, every word in Italics may be said to be emphatical; as every one of these

words is opposed to some other word, as to its correlative or correspondent word. In the second line *judging* is opposed to *writing*; in the fourth, *mislead* is opposed to *tire*, and *sense* to *patience*; in the fifth, *few* is opposed to *numbers*, and *this* to *that*; as in the last one, *one* is opposed to *ten*, and *writes* to *censure*; *wrong* and *amiss* being only two words for exactly the same idea, have no opposition to each other, and therefore cannot be emphatical.

But when the opposition, in which emphasis consists, is elliptical; that is, when but one part of the antithesis is expressed, and the other is to be supplied by the understanding, and made out by the pronunciation; when this is the case, I say, the emphatic word is not so easily discovered. Here then we must have recourse to the general import of the sentence; and whatever word we suppose to be emphatical, must be tried, by pronouncing it more forcibly than the rest of the words; and if this pronunciation suggests a phrase, which, if inserted in the sentence, would explain and illustrate it, we may be sure that word is emphatical. Let us try to make this clear by examples.

> And if each system in gradation roll,
> Alike essential to th' amazing whole;
> The least confusion but in ONE, not all
> That system only, but the whole must fall.

In the third line of this passage, we find an uncommon effort in the author to express "the strong connections, nice dependencies" of one part of the general system upon another: and, if we lay a strong emphasis on the word *one*, we shall find this connection and dependency very powerfully enforced; for it will suggest this antithesis: "the least confusion, not in several or a great many parts of the universe, but even in

one, would bring confusion on the whole." This paraphrase we not only find consistent with the sense of the poet, but greatly illustrative of it: and hence we may determine the word *one* to be emphatical.

Gray's Elegy in a Country Churchyard affords us another striking instance of emphasis, where only one part of the antithesis is expressed. The writer is foretelling what some hoary-headed swain will say of him when he lies numbered among the unhonoured dead.

One morn I miss'd him on th' accustom'd hill,
 Along the heath, and near his fav'rite tree;
Another came, nor yet beside the rill,
 Nor up the lawn, nor at the wood, was he.
The next with dirges due, in sad array,
 Slow thro' the church-way path we saw him borne;
Approach, and read (for *thou canst* read) the lay,
 Grav'd on the stone: beneath yon aged thorn.

Here the words, *thou canst* are emphatical, as they are evidently opposed to *I cannot*, which are understood, a very beautiful way of hinting the simplicity of the swain from his ignorance of the written characters of his language.

In these instances, the opposition suggested by the emphatical word is sufficiently evident; in other cases, perhaps, the antithesis is not quite so obvious; but if an emphasis can be laid on any word, we may be assured that word is an antithesis with some meaning agreeable to the general sense of the passage.

To illustrate this, let us pronounce a line of Marcus, in Cato, where, expressing his indignation at the behaviour of Cæsar, he says,

I'm tortur'd ev'n to madness when I *think* of the proud victor,—

and we shall find the greatest stress fall naturally on that word, which seems opposed to some

common or general meaning; for the young hero does not say, in the common and unemphatic sense of the word *think*, that he is tortured even to madness when he thinks on Cæsar, but on the strong and emphatic sense of this word, which implies not only "when I hear or discourse of him, but even when I *think* of him, I'm tortured even to madness."

As the word *think* therefore rises above the common level of signification, it is pronounced above the common level of sound: and as this signification is *opposed* to a signification less forcible, the word may be properly said to be emphatical. For we must carefully remember, that emphasis is *that stress we lay on words which are in opposition or contradistinction to other words, expressed or understood.*

For a more exact idea of the nature of emphasis, See *Elements of Elocution: Introduction to the Theory of Emphasis*, page 189.

On the different Forces of Emphatic Words.

It is impossible not to have observed in the last article, that the emphatic words of the latter kind, where but one part of the antithesis is expressed, are pronounced much more forcibly than those where both parts of the antithesis are laid down, and the opposition appears at full length. The reason seems to be this: as emphasis always implies opposition, either expressed or understood, when this opposition is expressed it is sufficiently obvious, and needs not a more forcible pronunciation than accented words to make it perceived; but when only one emphatic word is expressed, and the other understood, it is necessary to increase the force upon

the word expressed, that what is in opposition to it, and is not expressed, may become more obvious and intelligible.

If these observations are just, we see an evident reason why most of those books which mark the emphatical words in Italics make almost every significant word emphatical; and why this practice is so much decried by others, as a useless multiplication of emphasis:—both these parties are in the right. The former perceiving great numbers of words in opposition to each other, very properly considered them as emphatical; and perceiving at the same time, that almost every substantive, adjective, and verb, had as much force in the pronunciation as these emphatical words, they knew not how to draw the line between them, and so marked them all indiscriminately as emphatical. The latter finding that very few words were pronounced more forcibly than the words we have just been describing, concluded that very few words were emphatical, because so few were to be pronounced more forcibly than the rest. Thus, for want of a distinction between the two kinds of emphatic words, neither party seems to have understood where the fault lay.

It must be confessed, however, that the practice of marking so many words in Italics, as emphatical, without distinguishing between emphasis *expressed*, and emphasis *understood:* and without telling us precisely the degree of force to be given to the words unmarked, was a much greater source of errour than denying emphasis to such words as had no more force than common substantives, adjectives, and verbs. The latter opinion would at least leave the understanding to judge for itself, while the former would often mislead it. Marking every signifi-

cant word as emphatical, tends greatly to give a turgid and bombastic pronunciation to common words, at the same time that it lessens our attention to such as really deserve extraordinary force. This cannot be better explained than by quoting a passage from one of the best books of this kind, and making a few observations on it. The passage I intend to consider is the latter part of Pope's prologue to Cato, as I find it in the Art of Speaking, p. 86.

Britons, attend! be *worth* like this *approv'd*,
And show you have the *virtue* to be *mov'd*.
With *honest scorn* the *first* fam'd Cato view'd
Rome *learning* arts from *Greece*, whom she *subdu'd*.
Our scene precariously subsists *too long*
On *French translation* and *Italian song*.
Dare to have *sense yourselves*: *assert* the *stage*:
Be *justly warm'd* with your own *native rage*.
Such plays alone should please a *British* ear,
As *Cato's self* had not *disdain'd* to *hear*.

This passage is in general pretty accurately marked: but if we conceive the words in Roman letters to have exactly the same force as the unaccented syllables of the others, we shall soon see that many significant words are thrown too much into the shade. I know it will be said that these significant words, though they have not the force of the marked words, are still to have a sufficient degree of force to express their meaning. But this is the very errour I am combating: this is the vague indefinite rule that echoes through all our books of this kind: this is the old asylum of ignorance and idleness, the constant recourse of those who, for want of ideas, pay us with words. The truth is, we must necessarily give these words the same force as the other words, or only the force of unaccented syllables; between these two forces there is no medium. The line is drawn by nature be-

tween *accent* and *no accent*; and unless we studiously strive to do it, we cannot help striking the two forces in exact proportion to each other. If we pronounce the accented syllable stronger, the unaccented will be stronger likewise, and inversely. Those, therefore, who pronounce the accented syllable too feebly, will be too feeble in those that are unaccented: but we need only make them enforce the former, and the latter will be infallibly rectified.

An Examination of the Propriety of marking the Words in the foregoing Passage.

THE word *this*, in the first line, is certainly entitled to as much force as *worth* and *approved*; and *show*, in the next line, to as much as *virtue* and *moved*. *Honest scorn*, in the third line, is impassioned, and will admit of emphasis above the accented words, as it may, very agreeably to the sense, be supposed to have this antithesis: *not merely with dislike, but with scorn.* The word *first*, in the same line, may be said to be emphatical in the same manner, as it points out Cato the *Censor*, in opposition to Cato of *Utica*, the hero of the prologue. In the fifth, the words *precariously subsists* must necessarily have more force than so many unaccented syllables, and ought therefore to have been in Italics, as well as the words *too long*. The sixth line needs no comment; every significant word is in opposition to another word, and is therefore emphatical. But in the next line, the word *yourselves*, which is opposed to *others*, not expressed (see pp. 132, 133, 134, &c.) and therefore highly emphatical; this word, I say, is not distinguished from the word *sense*, or any other

words that have common force, and is therefore confounded with them: whereas this word ought to have as much more force than the accented words as they have more than the unaccented. The next line affords us an errour of the same kind: the word *native* is emphatical, as it is opposed to *foreign*, not expressed, and therefore ought to have extraordinary force. The word *rage*, which is the elliptical word (see pp. 134, 135, 136, &c.) common both to *foreign* and *native*, ought no more to have the force of native, than if the antithesis had been expressed at length, in this manner: "Be justly warmed, not with foreign rage, but with your own native rage:" nor can we possibly pronounce *rage* with the same force as *native* without depriving *native* of its emphasis. Let it not be objected that *rage* is too significant a word to be sunk into an unaccented syllable of *native*; for if *native* be pronounced with its proper force, *rage*, though unaccented, will be more forcible than an unaccented syllable of a merely accented word. The last line affords an opportunity of strengthening the former observations, by some which are very similar, and founded on the same reasons. The word *self*, in this line, is highly emphatical, as such an emphasis suggests this meaning: "Such plays alone should please a British ear, not only as a person of good sense and nice morals would approve, but such as even Cato himself would approve;" for this meaning is not only agreeable to the sense of the author, but greatly enforces and illustrates it.

A new method of marking the different Forces of Words.

FROM the analysis given in the last Lesson of a passage from Pope, we plainly perceive how delicate a thing it is to mark the emphatic words properly, and how easily we may be misled by the generality of books in use. Advocate, therefore, as I am for the occasional use of marks, I am far from recommending them on all occasions. Many things may be useful at certain times and on certain occasions, which, if used indiscriminately, would be incommodious and embarrassing. Dividing words of difficult pronunciation into syllables may be sometimes useful, even to those who read well: but dividing every word into syllables, would be so far from assisting such a reader, that it would be the surest way to embarrass and perplex him. Italics, therefore, may be very usefully employed in printing to mark emphasis, where it is not obvious, or where the sense of a passage might be mistaken for want of knowing it: but where the language is plain, and the meaning obvious, Italics are not only useless, but distressing to the reader. From the want of a clear idea of the nature of emphasis, and of the difference between accented and unaccented force, those who mark books for pronunciation think they have never done enough, till they have put every single significant word into Italics. For as no distinction of force is settled between these words, and as every one is supposed to have a certain indefinite degree of force, the writer imagines he has done wonders in showing how much force a few words are susceptible of; and the reader, who is struck with the sight of so much force in so small a compass, has not the

least doubt of the emphasis of every one of these words, if he did but know how to pronounce them: thus, by endeavouring to give every word an emphatic force, he deprives those words that are really emphatical of the force which belongs to them, and distorts and adulterates the meaning by a quaint and unnatural pronunciation.

But had we once a clear and distinct idea of emphasis, did we consider how few words are so emphatical as to require a greater force than accented words, that every accented word has an equal degree of force, and that those that are not accented have exactly the force of unaccented syllables; with these principles in view, I say, we might construct a notation, which, it is presumed, would convey a clearer idea of the several forces of speaking sounds than any that has hitherto been hit upon. Let us, for example, take the foregoing passage from Pope; let us consider the less significant words as unaccented syllables of the others, and associate them together accordingly; and let us mark these words only, which have emphasis stronger than accent, with a different character:

Britons, attend! beworth likethis approv'd,
Andshow youhavethevirtue tobemov'd.
Withhonest *scorn* the*first*fam'dCatoview'd
Rome learningarts fromGreece, whomshesubdu'd.
*Our*scene precariously subsists too long
OnFrench translation andItalian song.
Dare tohavesenseyour*selves*; assert thestage;
Bejustly warm'd withyourown *native*rage.
Suchplays alone shouldplease a*British*ear,
AsCato's *self* hadnot disdain'd tohear.

But if writing words in this manner should be found troublesome, or appear too much to disguise them, we need only put a hyphen between the accented and unaccented words, and

the same effect will be produced; that is, the whole assemblage will seem but one word: by which means we shall have an exact idea of the relative force of each. Thus, the foregoing passage may be marked in the manner following:

Britons, attend! be-worth like-this approv'd,
And-show you-have-the-virtue to-be-mov'd.
With-honest *scorn* the-first-fam'd-Cato-view'd
Rome learning-arts from-Greece, whom-she-subdu'd.
Our-scene precariously subsists too long
On-French translation and-Italian song.
Dare to-have-sense-your*selves*; assert the-stage;
Be-justly warm'd with-your-own *native*-rage.
Such-plays alone should-please a-*British*-ear,
As-Cato's *self* had-not-disdain'd to-hear.

Let it not be imagined that this mode of printing is proposed as a model in all cases for teaching to read; no; such unusual combinations might, instead of improving some pupils, perplex and retard them; but there are others, to whom this association may be highly useful in giving them a clear and distinct idea of the three kinds of force, of which all composition is susceptible; and this, it is presumed, is better performed by this than by any method hitherto made known to us.

Another method of marking the different Forces of Words.

FROM the method of marking the words we have just proposed, it is impossible not to have taken notice of a circumstance which arises from it, and which, if properly attended to, will set the utility of this method in a still stronger light; and that is, the classification that necessarily follows the uniting of unaccented words to those that are accented, as if they were syllables of

them: this classification naturally divides a sentence into just so many portions as there are accents. Thus, in the sentence before quoted,

Prosperity | gains friends, | and adversity | tries them,

there are four portions, and these portions to an ear unacquainted with the language would seem to be exactly so many words. Here then is a new principle of dividing sentences independent on the pauses, and which cannot fail to convey to us a clear idea of pronunciation. It has been before observed, that the emphasis which requires more force than the accented words but seldom occurs, and that when it does occur, the sense of the passage depends much more on the inflexion we give to the emphatic word, than on the force we pronounce it with. To these observations it may be added, that, when there is no uncommon emphasis in a sentence, we may often pronounce it with more or fewer accents, without materially affecting the sense. Thus, in the following sentence, *Pitch upon that course of life which is the most excellent, and custom will make it the most delightful*—Spect. No. 447. the two words *excellent* and *delightful* are contrasted with each other, and therefore may be said to be emphatical: but the emphasis on these words, it is evident, requires no more force than several others in the sentence. Now this sentence, without any injury to the sense of it, may be pronounced only in four portions; the four words *that*, *excellent*, *custom*, and *delightful*, having accented force, and the rest unaccented; as if written in the following manner:

Pitchuponthátcourseoflife | whichisthemostéxcellent | and cústom | willmakeitthemostdelíghtful.

Or it may be pronounced in ten portions, with

no other alteration in the sense than to render it upon the whole more sententious and emphatical, thus,

Pítch | uponthát | cóurse | oflìfe | whichisthemòst | éxcellent, | andcústom | willmákeit | themóst | delìghtful.

Where we see the sole difference between the former and latter pronunciation of this passage lies in giving accented force to four words in the one, and to ten in the other.

It must not be imagined that these divisions always indicate pauses: no; this distinction into portions is the separation of a sentence into its accentual impulses: and these impulses, though no pause intervenes, are as much distinguished by the ear as the portions separated by a pause. Thus the ear perceives as great a difference between the first manner of pronouncing the words *most*, where they sound like unaccented syllables of the words *excellent* and *delightful*, and the last where they have an independent accent, as it would do to have a pause inserted or omitted in any other part of the sentence.

This classification of words seems pregnant with instruction: by applying it to sentences of difficult pronunciation, we give the pupil a distinct idea of the different forces of words, and by these means convey to him that idea of them, which we think the best. Let us suppose we wanted to instruct a pupil in the true emphatic force of a passage in Pope's Essay on Man, where the poet is inquiring after happiness.

Plánt | of celèstial | séed, | if dròpp'd | belów,
Sáy | in what mòrtal | sóil | thou déign'st | to gròw?
Fair òp'ning | to some cóurt's propitious shrine,
Or deèp | with díamonds | in the fláming | mìne?

Twín'd | with the wrèaths | Parnássian laurels yield,
Or réap'd | in ìron | hárvests | of the fièld;——
Fix'd to nò spot | is hàppiness | sincére,
'Tis nówhere to be found, | or éverywhere.

If we wished to explain our sense of the manner in which this passage ought to be read, could we possibly take a better method than this of dividing it into such portions as are each of them pronounced like single words? In this mode of marking the lines, each word has its degree of force settled by the easiest method in the world, that of accented or unaccented syllables; and if to these accents are added the slide, or inflexion, with which every accent is necessarily pronounced, we have a notation of speaking sounds that gives us as infallibly the leading notes of speech as the notes of music convey to us the tune of a song; the graces and beauties of singing and speaking must be conveyed by the living voice to the ear, but this does not preclude in either the utility of marks to the eye.

But though I would by no means recommend this association of words as a common lesson for youth, I am well persuaded that, on some occasions, it may be very useful to explain the pronunciation of some difficult passages by it. A youth will have a much clearer idea of the force he is to give to the subordinate words of a sentence, by considering them as syllables of the other words, than by any other explanation we can make use of: and in order to impress this idea, it may not be improper to write or mark phrases, with the words thus associated.

Utility of understanding the different Slides, and different Forces of Words.

IN the same manner I would recommend the

use of accents, to mark the different slides of the voice. Where the language is smooth, and the meaning clear, any kind of marks would do more hurt than good; but where the language is uncouth, and the meaning obscure, nothing can be more certain than the usefulness of some marks to direct the voice in the pronunciation. Let us illustrate this by some passages from Dr. Young. Speaking of the folly of those who delay an amendment of their lives, he says,

How excellent that life they ne'er will lead!
Time lodg'd in their own hands is folly's vales;
That lodg'd in fàte's, to wisdom they consign:
The things they can't but purpose they postpone.

This passage will lose much of its clearness, and all its beauty, if the word *fate's*, in the third line, is not pronounced with the falling inflexion: this inflexion will strongly mark the folly of consigning to wisdom, or using wisely, what is not in their own hands, but in the hands of fate.

The two following lines in this passage afford another opportunity of showing how important to the sense is a particular inflexion on a particular word.

'Tis not in fòlly not to scorn a fool;
And scarce in human wisdom to do more.

If we do not give *folly* the emphasis with the falling inflexion, the thought will be scàrcely intelligible. The same may be observed of the word *themselves* in the second line of the following passage:

All men think all men mortal but themselves;
Themsèlves, when some alarming shock of fate
Strikes through their wounded hearts the sudden dread.

The following passage will afford an instance of

the necessity of adopting the other inflexion on a particular word, in order to elucidate and fix the meaning. The poet, speaking of the original grandeur of the passions, says,

What though our passions are run mad, and stoop
With low terrestrial appetite, to graze
On trash, on toys, dethron'd from high desire;
Yet still through their disgrace, no féeble ray
Of greatness shines, and tells us whence they fell.

If we do not give the word *feeble* the emphasis with the rising inflexion, we shall be led to suppose that not even a feeble ray of greatness shines: a sense directly contrary to the scope of the author.

Milton, who, from his fondness for the ancients, frequently departs widely from the idiom of his own language, affords us frequent instances of the necessity of attending nicely to the inflexion of voice with which we read, in order to preserve his meaning. Thus, where he is describing the fallen angels as sensible of the misery of their state, while they are gathering round their leader, he says,

Nor did thèy nót perceive the evil plight
In which they were, or the fierce pains nót feel.

The words *not* in this passage must necessarily have the emphasis with the rising inflexion, as this specific emphasis is the only way of rendering the sense of the passage intelligible.

As a further proof of the necessity of distinguishing emphasis into two kinds, and of having a distinct and different mark for each, we need only attend to the pronunciation of the following passage from the same author, where he describes Satan's surprise at the sight and approach of the figure of death.

Satan was now at hand, and from his seat
The monster moving, onward came as fast
With horrid strides; Hell trembled as he strode.
Th' undaunted fiend what this might be admir'd;
Admìr'd, not féar'd: God, and his son except,
Created thing nought valu'd he nor shunn'd;
And, with disdainful look, thus first began.
Par. Lost, b. ii. v. 674.

There are few readers, who in pronouncing this passage, would not give *admir'd*, in the fifth line, the rising slide, and *fear'd* the falling: but nothing can be more evident than that this does not bring out the sense of the passage with half the force of a contrary position of the slides. The falling slide on *admir'd*, and the rising on *fear'd*, is agreeable to the general rule the ear always follows, in pronouncing positive and negative members, when it is unembarrassed by the intricacies of poetic language. Thus we see it is of little consequence to tell us a word is emphatical, unless the kind of emphasis is specified, and when this is done we find the sense of a passage is determined.

I shall conclude these observations, on the utility of marks, by showing the very different sense of a sentence according to the different force and inflexion which is given to its several parts. When we take our leave of a person, we sometimes make use of the following sentence:

I *wish* you *all* the *happiness this world* can *afford.*

If we lay an equal stress upon the words *wish*, *all*, *happiness*, *this*, *world*, and *afford*, and pronounce the rest like unaccented syllables of these, we shall find a sense implying that this world *can* afford great happiness; but if we lay an emphasis with the falling inflexion on *all*, and one with the rising on this, and pronounce the rest of the words like unaccented

syllables of these, as if they were written in the following manner:

Iwishyou*àll*thehappiness | *thís*worldcanafford:

Or thus,

I-wish-you-*àll*-the-happiness | *thís*-world-can-afford*.

In this case, I say, we shall find a very different sense produced; for it will strongly intimate that this world has very little happiness to afford.

If these observations are just, we may perceive what great advantages we might reasonably expect from such a knowledge of the voice as would enable us to comprehend and practise the distinction of force, and the two-fold distinction of inflexions here laid down. We should then have a language in which we might converse intelligibly on different modes of pronunciation: we could tell the reader plainly and simply, that such words require one species of force and inflexion, and such words another, without having recourse to such vague and indeterminate directions as saying, that "he must pronounce some words with emphasis, but not so as to deprive others of a certain degree of it." Whoever is curious to see the obscurity which a want of these distinctions occasions, may consult some of our best writers on this subject, where they dispute with each other about the pronunciation of certain passages. Here he may see how men may wrangle without end, and each seem to have the victory, when they neither understand each other, nor even themselves, for want of precise and definite terms.

* In the first method of pronouncing this sentence, it seems to the ear to contain as many words as there are accents; viz. six. In the last, the sentence seems to consist only of two very long words, because there are in reality no more than two accents in it.

RULES FOR READING VERSE.

On the Slides or Inflexions of Verse.

THE first general rule for reading verse is, that we ought to give it that measured harmonious flow of sound which distinguishes it from prose, without falling into a bombastic, chanting pronunciation, which makes it ridiculous. This medium, like all others where excellence resides, is not very easy to hit; and here, as in similar cases, the worst extreme must be avoided. For this purpose, it will not be improper, before we read verse with its poetical graces, to pronounce it exactly as if it were prose: this will be depriving verse of its beauty, but will tend to preserve it from deformity: the tones of voice will be frequently different, but the inflexions will be nearly the same.

But though an elegant and harmonious pronunciation of verse will sometimes oblige us to adopt different inflexions from those we use in prose, it may still be laid down as a good general rule, that verse requires the same inflexions as prose, though less strongly marked, and more approaching to monotones. If, therefore, we are at a loss for the true inflexion of voice on any word in poetry, let us reduce it to earnest conversation, and pronounce it in the most familiar and prosaic manner, and we shall, for the most part, fall into those very inflexions we ought to adopt in repeating verse.

This observation naturally leads us to a rule, which may be justly looked upon as the fundamental principle of all poetic pronunciation: which is, that wherever a sentence, or member of a sentence, would necessarily require the fall-

ing inflexion in prose, it ought always to have the same inflexion in poetry; for though, if we were to read verse prosaically, we should often place the falling inflexion where the style of verse would require the rising, yet in those parts where a portion of perfect sense, or the conclusion of a sentence, necessarily requires the falling inflexion, the same inflexion must be adopted both in verse and prose. Thus in Milton's description of the deluge, in Paradise Lost:

Meanwhile the south-wind rose, and, with black wings
Wide hov'ring, all the clouds together drove
From under Heav'n: the hills, to their supply,
Vapour and exhalation dusk and moist
Sent up amain: and now the thicken'd sky
Like a dark ceiling stood; down rush'd the rain
Impetuous, and continu'd till the earth
No more was seen; the floating vessel swam
Uplifted, and secure with beaked prow
Rode tilting o'er the waves.

Par. Lost, b. xi. v. 738.

In this passage, every member forming perfect sense, if read as so many lines of prose, would end with the falling slide, and this is the slide they ought to end with in verse. The member, indeed, which ends with *impetuous*, ought to have the rising slide, because, though it forms perfect sense, it is followed by a member which does not form sense of itself, and for this reason would necessarily adopt the rising slide if it were prose.

In the same manner, though we frequently suspend the voice by the rising inflexion in verse, where, if the composition were prose, we should adopt the falling, yet, wherever in prose the member or sentence would necessarily require the rising inflexion, this inflexion must necessarily be adopted in verse. An instance of

all these cases may be found in the following example from Pope:

> He, who through vast immensity can pierce,
> See worlds on worlds compose one universe;
> Observe how system into system runs,
> What other planets circle other suns;
> What varied being peoples ev'ry star;
> May tell why Heav'n has made us as we are.
> But of this frame, the bearings, and the ties,
> The strong connections, nice dependencies,
> Gradations just, has thy pervading soul
> Look'd through? or can a part contain the whole?
> Is the great chain, that draws all to agree,
> And drawn supports, upheld by God or thee?
>
> *Pope's Essay on Man.*

If this passage were prose, every line but the fifth might end with the falling inflexion: but the fifth being that where the two principal constructive parts unite, and the sense begins to form, here, both in prose and verse, must be the principal pause, and the rising inflexion. The two questions with which the ninth and tenth line end ought to have the rising inflexion also, as this is the inflexion they would necessarily have in prose; though from injudiciously printing the last couplet, so as to form a fresh paragraph, the word *whole* is generally pronounced with the falling inflexion, in order to avoid the bad effect of a question with the rising inflexion at the end of a paragraph; which would be effectually prevented by uniting the last couplet to the rest, so as to form one whole portion, and which was undoubtedly the intention of the poet.

Having premised these observations, I shall endeavour to throw together a few rules for the reading of verse, which, by descending to particulars, it is hoped will be more useful than those very general ones, which are commonly

to be met with on this subject, and which, though very ingenious, seem calculated rather for the making of verses than the reading of them.

Of the Accent and Emphasis of Verse.

RULE I. IN verse, every syllable must have the same accent, and every word the same emphasis, as in prose: for though the rhythmical arrangement of the accent and emphasis is the very definition of poetry, yet, if this arrangement tends to give an emphasis to words which would have none in prose, or an accent to such syllables as have properly no accent, the rhythmus, or music of the verse, must be entirely neglected. Thus the article *the* ought never to have a stress, though placed in that part of the verse where the ear expects an accent.

EXAMPLE.

Of all the causes which conspire to blind
Man's erring judgment, and misguide the mind,
What the weak head with strongest bias rules,
Is pride, the never failing vice of fools. *Pope.*

An injudicious reader of verse would be very apt to lay a stress upon the article *the* in the third line, but a good reader would neglect the stress on this, and transfer it to the words *what* and *weak*. Thus also, in the following example, no stress must be laid on the word *of*, because we should not give it any in prosaic pronunciation.

Ask of thy mother earth, why oaks are made
Taller and stronger than the weeds they shade. *Pope.*

For the same reason the word *as*, either in the first or second line of the following couplet, ought to have no stress.

Eye nature's walks, shoot folly as it flies,
And catch the manners living as they rise. *Pope.*

The last syllable of the word *excellent*, in the following couplet, being the place of the stress, is very apt to draw the reader to a wrong pronunciation of the word, in compliance with the rhythmus of the verse.

Their praise is still, the style is excellent;
The sense they humbly take upon content. *Pope.*

But a stress upon the last syllable of this word must be avoided, as the most childish and ridiculous pronunciation in the world. The same may be observed of the word *eloquence* and the particle *the* in the following couplet:

False eloquence, like the prismatic glass,
Its gaudy colours spreads on ev'ry place. *Pope.*

If, in compliance with the rhythmus, or tune of the verse, we lay a stress on the last syllable of *eloquence*, and on the particle *the* in the first of these verses, to a good judge of reading scarcely any thing can be conceived more disgusting.

When the Poetical Accent is to be preserved, and when not.

RULE II. ONE of the most puzzling varieties in reading verse is that which is occasioned by the poet's placing a word in such a part of the line as is quite inconsistent with the metre of the verse. It is one of the most general rules in reading, that every word is to have the same accent in verse, that it has in prose. This rule, however, admits of some few exceptions. Many of our good poets have sometimes placed words so unfavourably for pronunciation in the common way, that the ear would be less disgusted with

an alteration of the common accent for the sake of harmony, than with a preservation of this accent with harshness and discord; for, in some cases, by preserving the common accent, we not only reduce the lines to prose, but to very harsh and disagreeable prose. Thus we cannot hesitate a moment at placing the accent on the first syllable of *expert*, in the following line of Pope, though contrary to its prosaic pronunciation:

> Then fell Scamandrius, expert in the chase.

But it will be demanded, is the ear the only rule when we are to pronounce one way and when another? It may be answered; this is the best rule for those who have good ears; but like most of the rules given on this subject, it amounts to no rule at all. To offer something like a rule therefore, where there is none, will not be unacceptable to those at least who have not ears sufficiently delicate to direct themselves, and those who have will not be displeased to find a reason given for such a choice of accent as they approve.

And first, let us try the different effects which these disjointed and inharmoniously accented words have on the ear (for unquestionably they are not all equally disagreeable,) and that perhaps may lead us to something like a rule for directing us when we are to comply with the poetical accent, and when not.

In the first place, let us bring together words of two syllables, with the accent on the first, which the poet has transferred to the last.

> Who now *triúmphs* in th'excess of joy— *P. L.* i. 123.
> In their *triplé* degree, regions to which—— *Ibid.* xi. 140.
> Which of us who beholds the bright *surfáce*. *Ibid.* vi. 472.
> Of thrones and mighty seraphim *prostráte*. *Ibid.* 841.

Male he created thee: but thy *consórt*,— *P. L.* vii. 529.
Not to incur; but soon his clear *aspéct*. *Ibid.* 336.
Beyond all past example and *futúre*. *Ibid.* 840.
To do ought good *nevér* will be our task. *Ibid.* i. 159.
Moors by his side *undér* the lee, while night— *Ibid.* 207.
Abject and lost lay these *cov'ríng* the flood. *Ibid.* 312.
Gods, yet confess'd *latér* than Heav'n and earth. *Ibid.* 509.
These other two *equáll'd* with me in fate. *Ibid.* iii. 33.
And flow'rs aloft *shadíng* the fount of life. *Ibid.* 357.
Second to thee *offér'd* himself to die. *Ibid.* 409.
Which, tasted, works *knowlédge* of good and evil. *Ib.* vii. 543.
To whom with healing words, *Adám* replied. *Ibid.* ix. 290.
Grateful to Heav'n; *ovér* his head behold. *Ibid.* 864.

Preserving the poetical accent on many of these words would be merely turning them into ridicule, and therefore, every reader who has the least delicacy of feeling will certainly preserve the common accent of these words on the first syllable, and let the *metre* of the line shift for itself.

In the next place, let us adduce such words of two syllables as have a contrary transposition of accent, that is, such as have the common accent on the last syllable, which the poet removes to the first.

Next Chemos, th'*óbscene* dread of Moab's sons. *P.L.* i. 123.
And sat as princes, whom the *súpreme* king. *Ibid.* 735.
Encamp their legions, or with *óbscure* wing. *Ibid.* ii. 132.
Our *súpreme* foe in time may much relent. *Ibid.* 210.
Of *mánkind* in one root, and Earth with Hell. *Ibid.* i. 313.
In *cónfin'd* march, forlorn, th'advent'rous bands. *Ibid.* 615.
Forth rush'd the *lévant* and the ponent winds. *Ibid.* x. 704.

In placing the accent on the first syllable instead of the second on these words, as the poet has done, we find no such harshness to the ear as in the former examples, and I think we may there-

fore conclude that something like a rule is discovered respecting words of two syllables.

The management of the misaccented words of three syllables, is not perhaps so easy. After trying every possible way to reconcile the accent and the metre, I have not been able to conceive a better method than that of compromising the demands of each. Perhaps the least offensive method to the ear of preserving the accent, and not entirely violating the quantity, would be to place an accent on the syllable immediately preceding that on which the poet has misplaced it, without dropping that which is so misplaced; by this means the word will be heard with the true accent, which will in some measure abate the impropriety of the false one: and thus, by the succession of two accents, we shall only seem to be enforcing the sense, while we are really hiding the fault of the measure. Thus the word *blasphemous* may be accented both on the first and second syllable.

O argument *blásphémous*, false, and proud! *P. L.* v. 809.
Refrain'd his tongue *blásphèmous*; but anon—*Ibid.* vi. 360.

Here the ear feels no great impropriety, especially as this word is still accented by many speakers (though of the lower order) on the second syllable. But the words *odorous*, *infinite*, and *voluble*, accented by Milton on the second syllable, must be nicely managed in order to prevent a cacophony.

Spirits *odorous* breathes; flow'rs, and their fruit—
P. L. v. 482.

Hoarse murmur echo'd to his words applause
Through the *infinite* host. *Ibid.* 874.

——Whether the prime orb,
Incredible how swift, had thither roll'd
Diurnal; or this less *voluble* earth,
By shorter flights to th' east, had left him there. *Ibid.*

The same rule seems to hold good where the poet has placed the accent on the first and last syllable of a word which ought to have it on the middle syllable.

> —— and as is due
> With glory *attributed* to the high
> Creator? *P. L.* viii. 12.
>
> Only to shine, yet scarce to *contribute*
> Each orb a glimpse of light. *Ibid.* 155.
>
> Shoots *invisible* virtue, e'en to the deep. *Ibid.* iii. 586.

If any thing can render the pronunciation of this very unpoetic line tolerable, it must be placing the accent on the first and third syllable of *invisible.*

After all the attention, that can possibly be paid to many of these rugged lines, rugged they will still remain; and when the reader has done his best to make them as smooth as possible, the author is justly chargeable with the want of poetic harmony. Dr. Watts, who to learning and judgment united a poetical ear, directs us, in his rules for reading verse, so to favour the rhyme as to pronounce the word *liberty* either as *libertee* or *libertie,* just as it rhymes with the end of the former line. Thus,

> " Were I but once from bondage *free,*
> " I'd never sell my *liberty.*

" Here," he says, " I must pronounce the word " *liberty,* as if it were written with a double *ee,* " *libertee,* to rhyme with the word *free.* But if " the verse ran thus,

> " My soul ascends above the *sky,*
> " And triumphs in her *liberty.*

" The word *liberty* must be sounded as ending " in *i,* that *sky* may have a juster rhyme to it."

But as this compliance with the rhyme is now

justly exploded, such verses as these ought never to appear in any modern poetry. The ear of a foreigner (which, as Mr. Addison observes, is perhaps the best judge in this case) is shocked beyond measure at such verses; and natives only bear them because they are accustomed to them. How strangely do two lines that rhyme appear in blank verse where we do not expect them? and can such lines, as have no agreement in sound, appear less strange when a rhyme is expected? Certainly not. But as judicious readers of the present day would rather the verse should appear strange by not rhyming, than strange by altering the accent or sound of a word, so, in a choice of evils, the less seems to be that of preserving as much as possible the proper accent in blank verse, and making the poet answerable for the rest: but, as we have observed above, if there are cases in which the poet may be favoured without departing too widely from general usage, it is incumbent on the reader to pronounce his author to the best advantage, not only by heightening his beauties, but, as much as possible, by hiding his faults.

I am indebted to the Rev. Mr. Robertson, in his elegant Essay on the Nature of English Verse, for many of the examples I have made use of, as well as for many judicious observations on them; and have much to regret, that a gentleman of his real learning and good taste did not carry his observations farther.

RULE III. *How the Vowels* e *and* o *are to be pronounced, when apostrophised.*

THE vowel *e*, which, in poetry, is so often cut off by an apostrophe in the word *the*, and in un-

accented syllables before *r*, as *dang'rous*, *gen'rous*, &c. ought always to be preserved in pronunciation, because the syllable it forms is so short as to admit of being sounded with the succeeding syllable, so as not to increase the number of syllables to the ear, or at all to hurt the melody.

'Tis hard to say, if greater want of skill
Appear in writing, or in judging ill:
But of the two, less dang'rous is th'offence
To tire our patience, than mislead our sense. *Pope.*

———Him the Almighty pow'r
Hurl'd headlong flaming from th'ethereal sky,
With hideous ruin and combustion down
To bottomless perdition, there to dwell
In adamantine chains and penal fire,
Who durst defy th'Omnipotent to arms. *Milton.*

In these examples, we see the particle *the* may either form a distinct syllable or not. In the third line from Pope, the first *the* forms a distinct syllable, but the second is sunk into the succeeding noun. The same may be observed of this particle in the passages from Milton. The same observations, in every respect, hold good in the pronunciation of the preposition *to*, which ought always to be sounded long, like the adjective *two*, however it may be printed, whether as we see it in Pope's Essay on Man,

Say what the use were finer optics giv'n,
T'inspect a mite, not comprehend the Heav'n:

Or in Milton, either abbreviated as in

——— durst oppose
A third part of the Gods in synod met
Their Deities t'assert: who, while they feel
Vigour divine within them, can allow
Omnipotence to none. *Par. Lost*, b. vi. v. 155.

Or at length, as in the following passage,

Yet still they knew, and ought to have still remember'd
The high injunction not to taste that fruit
Whoever tempted ———

Having premised these observations on words, we shall next proceed to sentences; as words arranged into sentences may be properly called the subject matter of the Art of reading.

Of the Pause or Cæsura of Verse.

RULE IV. ALMOST every verse admits of a pause in or near the middle of the line, which is called the Cæsura; this must be carefully observed in reading verse, or much of the distinctness, and almost all the harmony, will be lost.

EXAMPLE.

Nature to all things fix'd the limits fit,
And wisely curb'd proud man's pretending wit:
As on the land while here the ocean gains,
In other parts it leaves wide sandy plains;
Thus in the soul, while memory prevails,
The solid pow'r of understanding fails;
Where beams of warm imagination play,
The memory's soft figures melt away. *Pope.*

These lines have seldom any points inserted in the middle, even by the most scrupulous punctuists: and yet nothing can be more palpable to the ear than that a pause in the first at *things*, in the second at *curb'd*, in the third at *land*, in the fourth at *parts*, in the fifth at *soul*, is absolutely necessary to the harmony of those lines: and that the sixth, by admitting no pause but at *understanding*, and the seventh, none but at *imagination*, border very nearly upon prose. The reason why these lines will not admit of a pause any where but at these words will be evident to those who have perused the former part of this work on the division of a sentence; and if

the reader would see one of the most curious pieces of analysis on this subject in any language, let him peruse the chapter on Versification, in Lord Kames's Elements of Criticism; where he will see the subject of pausing, as it relates to verse, discussed in the deepest, clearest, and most satisfactory manner. It will be only necessary to observe in this place, that though the most harmonious place for the capital pause is after the fourth syllable, it may, for the sake of expressing the sense strongly and suitably, and even sometimes for the sake of variety, be placed at several other intervals.

EXAMPLES.

'Tis hard to say—if greater want of skill.

So when an angel—by divine command,
With rising tempests—shakes a guilty land.

Then from his closing eyes—thy form shall part,
And the last pang—shall tear thee from his heart.

Inspir'd repuls'd battalions—to engage,
And taught the doubtful battle—where to rage.

Know then thyself—presume not God to scan;
The proper study of mankind—is man.

Of the Cadence of Verse.

RULE V. IN order to form a cadence in a period in rhyming verse, we must adopt the falling inflexion with considerable force in the cæsura of the last line but one.

EXAMPLES.

One science only will one genius fit,
So vast is art, so narrow human wit;
Not only bounded to peculiar arts,
But oft in those confin'd to single parts;

Like kings, we lose the conquests gain'd before
By vain ambition, still to make them more;
Each might his sev'ral pròvince—well command
Would all but stoop to what they understand. *Pope.*

In repeating these lines, we shall find it necessary to form the cadence, by giving the falling inflexion with a little more force than common to the word *province.* The same may be observed of the word *prospect* in the last line but one of the following passage:

So pleas'd at first the tow'ring Alps we try,
Mount o'er the vales, and seem to tread the sky;
Th' eternal snows appear already past,
And the first clouds and mountains seem the last:
But those attain'd, we tremble to survey
The growing labours of the lengthen'd way;
Th' increasing pròspect—tires our wand'ring eyes,
Hills peep o'er hills, and Alps on Alps arise.

How to pronounce a Simile in Poetry.

RULE VI. A simile in poetry ought always to be read in a lower tone of voice than that part of the passage which precedes it.

EXAMPLE.

'Twas then great Marlb'rough's mighty soul was prov'd,
That in the shock of charging hosts unmov'd,
Amidst confusion, horror, and despair,
Examin'd all the dreadful scenes of war;
In peaceful thought the field of death survey'd,
To fainting squadrons sent the timely aid;
Inspir'd repuls'd battalions to engage,
And taught the doubtful battle where to rage.
So when an angel, by divine command,
With rising tempests shakes a guilty land,
(Such as of late o'er pale Britannia past)
Calm and serene he drives the furious blast;
And pleas'd th' Almighty's orders to perform,
Rides on the whirlwind, and directs the storm. *Addison.*

This rule is one of the greatest embellishments of poetic pronunciation, and is to be observed no less in blank verse than in rhyme. Milton's beautiful description of the sports of the fallen angels affords us a good opportunity of exemplifying it.

Part curb their fiery steeds, or shun the goal
With rapid wheels, or fronted brigades form,
As when, to warn proud cities, war appears
Wag'd in the troubled sky, and armies rush
To battle in the clouds, before each van
Prick forth the aëry knights, and couch their spears,
Till thickest legions close; with feats of arms
From either end of Heav'n the welkin burns.
Others with vast Typhœan rage more fell
Rend up both rocks and hills, and ride the air
In whirlwind; Hell scarce holds the wild uproar.
As when Alcides, from Œchalia crown'd
With conquest, felt th' envenom'd robe; and tore,
Through pain, up by the roots Thessalian pines,
And Lichas from the top of Œta threw
Into th' Euboic sea. *Par. Lost*, b. ii. 531.

In reading this passage, the voice must drop into a monotone at the commencement of each simile: as it proceeds, the voice gradually slides out of the monotone, to avoid too great a sameness; but the monotone itself, being so essentially different from the preceding style of pronunciation, becomes one of the greatest sources of variety.

RULE VII. Where there is no pause in the sense at the end of a verse, the last word must have exactly the same inflexion it would have in prose. Of that visionary pause at the end of every line in verse, called by some writers the pause of suspension, see a full confutation in Elements of Elocution, p. 288.

Over their heads a crystal firmament,
Whereon a sapphire throne, inlaid with pure
Amber, and colours of the flow'ry arch. *Milton.*

In this example the word *pure* must have the falling inflexion, whether we make any pause at it or not, as this is the inflexion the word would have if the sentence were pronounced prosaically. For the same reason the words *retir'd* and *went*, in the following example, must be pronounced with the rising inflexion.

At his command th' uprooted hills retir'd
Each to his place; they heard his voice, and went
Obsequious; Heav'n his wonted face renew'd,
And with fresh flow'rets hills and valleys smil'd. *Milton.*

RULE VIII. Sublime, grand, and magnificent description in poetry requires a lower tone of voice, and a sameness nearly approaching to a monotone.

This rule will surprise many, who have always been taught to look upon a monotone, or sameness of voice, as a deformity in reading. A deformity it certainly is, when it arises either from a want of power to alter the voice, or a want of judgment to introduce it properly; but I presume it may be with confidence affirmed, that when it is introduced with propriety, it is one of the greatest embellishments of poetic pronunciation.

EXAMPLE.

And if each system in gradation roll,
Alike essential to th' amazing whole,
The least confusion but in one, not all
That system only, but the whole must fall.
Let Earth unbalanc'd from her orbit fly,
Planets and suns run lawless through the sky;
Let ruling angels from their spheres be hurl'd,
Being on being wreck'd, and world on world,
Heav'n's whole foundations to their centre nod,
And Nature tremble to the throne of God:
All this dread order break!—for whom? for thee?
Vile worm!—oh madness! pride! impiety! *Pope.*

The series of grand images which commences at the fifth line fills the mind with surprise

approaching to astonishment. As this passion has a tendency to fix the body, and deprive it of motion, so it is best expressed in speaking by a deep and almost uniform tone of voice: the tone indeed may have a small slide upwards at *sky*, *world*, and *God*, but the words *fly*, *hurl'd*, and *nod*, require exactly the same monotonous sound with which the rest of the line must be pronounced.

What has been just observed in the last Lesson leads us to another rule in reading verse, which, though subject to exceptions, is sufficiently general to be of considerable use.

RULE IX. When the first line of a couplet does not form perfect sense, it is necessary to suspend the voice at the end of the line with the rising slide.

EXAMPLE.

Far as creation's ample range exténds,
The scale of sensual, mental pow'rs ascends.
Mark how it mounts to man's imperial ráce,
From the green myriads in the peopled grass. *Pope.*

This rule holds good even where the first line forms perfect sense by itself, and is followed by another forming perfect sense likewise, provided the first line does not end with an emphatic word which requires the falling slide.

EXAMPLE.

Self-love, the spring of motion, acts the sóul;
Reason's comparing balance rules the whole.
All Nature is but art unknown to thée,
All chance, direction which thou canst not see:
All discord, harmony not understóod,
All partial evil, universal good:
And spite of pride, in erring reason's spite,
One truth is clear, *Whatever is, is right.* *Pope.*

In all these couplets, except the last, the first line forms perfect sense by itself, but the variety

and harmony of the verse require they should be all equally read with the rising slide on the last word. But if the first line ends with an emphatical word requiring the falling slide, this slide must be given to it, but in a higher tone of voice than the same slide in the last line of the couplet.

EXAMPLE.

Vice is a monster of so frightful mien,
As to be hated needs but to be seen;
Yet seen too oft, familiar with her face,
We first endure, then pity, then embrace.
But where th' extreme of vice was ne'er agreed;
Ask where's the North, at York 'tis on the Tweed:
No creature owns it in the first degree,
But thinks his neighbour further gone than he.
E'en those who dwell beneath its very zone,
Or never feel the rage, or never own;
What happier natives shrink at with affright
The hard inhabitant contends is right. *Pope.*

In the first line of the last couplet but one, the word *zone* is emphatical, and requires the falling slide; but this slide must not be in so low a tone as it is in the last word of the next line.

But when the first line of a couplet does not form sense, and the second line, either from its not forming sense, or from its being a question, requires the rising slide; in this case, the first line must end with such a pause as the sense requires, but without any alteration in the tone of the voice.

EXAMPLE.

When the proud steed shall know why man restrains
His fiery course, or drives him o'er the plains;
When the dull ox, why now he breaks the clod,
Is now a victim, and now Egypt's god.
Then shall man's pride and dulness comprehend
His actions', passions', being's, use and end:
Why doing, suffering, check'd, impelled,—and why
This hour a slave, the next a deity.

In this passage the words *restrain* and *clod* ought to have no inflexion, and *plains* and *god* the rising.

In the same manner, if a question requires the second line of the couplet to adopt the rising slide, the first ought to have a pause at the end, but the voice, without any alteration, ought to carry on the same tone to the second line, and to continue this tone almost to the end.

EXAMPLE.

Shall burning Ætna, if a sage requires,
Forget to thunder, and recall her fires?
On air or sea new notions be impress'd,
O blameless Bethel, to relieve thy breast?
When the loose mountain trembles from on high,
Shall gravitation cease, while you go by?
Or some old temple, nodding to its fall
For Chartres' head reserve the hanging wall?

In this passage the three first couplets are questions requiring the rising slide at the end, and must therefore have the first lines end with a sameness of voice, which sameness must begin each succeeding line, and continue till it approaches the end, which adopts the rising inflexion. The last couplet is of exactly the same form as the rest; but, as it ends a paragraph, it must, both for the sake of variety and harmony, have its first line end with the rising, and its last with the falling slide.

The same principles of harmony and variety induce us to read a triplet with a sameness of voice, or a monotone, on the end of the first line, the rising slide on the end of the second, and the falling on the last.

Waller was smooth, but Dryden taught to join }
The varying verse, the full resounding line, }
The long majestic march, and energy divine. }

This rule, however, from the various sense of the triplet, is liable to many exceptions. But, with very few exceptions, it may be laid down as a rule that a quatrain, or stanza of four lines of alternate verse, may be read with the monotone ending the first line, the rising slide ending the second and third, and the falling the last.

EXAMPLE.

Full many a gem of purest ray serene
 The dark unfathom'd caves of ocean bear;
Full many a flow'r is born to blush unseen,
 And waste its sweetness on the desert air.

Gray's Elegy.

On Blank Verse.

The structure and punctuation of blank verse are vast sources of errour and perplexity to young readers. Writers of blank verse affect to end the line without any pause, or with as small a pause as possible; and readers are too apt, where they see no pause at the end of the line, to run the lines together, without attending to such pauses as they would make in prose, for fear we should suppose they do not know how to read blank verse: this makes them frequently pronounce the words at the end of one line and the beginning of the next much more swiftly than any other part of the verse, to the utter ruin of the harmony: for all verse requires a stated regular march of the syllables, and it is in this *march* the grandeur and beauty of the verse consists. In reading blank verse, therefore, care must be taken to steer between the one extreme of ending every line with a pause; and the other, of running one line into another more rapidly than if they were prose.

With respect to the pause of suspension at the end of every line in blank verse, which some writers insist upon as necessary to the harmony, see Elements of Elocution, p. 288, where the subject is fully discussed.

AN EXPLANATION OF THE *FIGURES OF RHETORIC,* WITH DIRECTIONS FOR THE PROPER MANNER OF PRONOUNCING THEM.

HITHERTO sentences have been considered only with regard to their external form, and their plain and obvious meaning. We have seen them in all their variety of simple and compound; have observed them in every diversity of structure; and have examined at large, and with some degree of attention, the connexion that subsists between their several parts, so as to determine the precise meaning and import of the whole. Thus far, however, sentences may be considered as pertaining to grammar only*. There is another view in which we may contemplate them, which may be called rhetorical; and that is, not only when the sentence has a simple and definite meaning, but when this

* Les grammairiens et rhéteurs ayant fait des observations sur les différentes manières de parler, ils ont faites des classes particulières de ces différentes manières, afin de mettre plus d'ordre et d'arrangement dans leurs réflexions. Les manières de parler dans lesquelles ils n'ont remarqué d'autre propriété que celle de faire connoître ce qu'on pense, sont appelées simplement *phrases*, *expressions*, *périodes*; mais celles qui expriment non seulement des pensées, mais encore des pensées énoncées d'une manière particulière qui lui donne un caractère propre, celles-là dis-je sont appelées *figures*, parcequ'elles paroissent, pour ainsi dire, sous une forme particulière, et avec ce caractère propre, qui les distingue les unes des autres, et de tout ce qui n'est que phrase ou expression. *Du Marsais des Tropes*, p. 9.

meaning is cast into a peculiar form, and therefore called a figure: and it is to this latter meaning, that is to the figurative sense of words, that language owes its peculiar force and beauty.

These figures may be divided into two kinds; namely, into such as are common to every species of composition, and into such as belong more particularly to oratory. The former of these, such as Metaphors, Allegories, &c. have no reference to delivery, and may be considered as perfect, whether they are spoken or not: the latter, such as Irony, Aposiopesis, Climax, &c. suppose a pronunciation suitable to each, and without which they have not half their beauty: the first of these figures we may, for the sake of distinction, call rhetorical, and the last oratorical. But, as many of the figures of each of these kinds are nearly allied to both, it may not be improper to give a summary account of both, that each of them may be better understood.

I shall not enter into a minute discussion of the difference between a trope and a figure, but shall content myself with following the accurate and philosophical Du Marsais on this subject, who considers the former as a species of the latter, and defines a figure to be *a manner of speaking distinguished by a particular modification, which reduces it to a certain class; and which renders it more lively, more noble, and more agreeable, than a manner of speaking which expresses the same thought without this particular modification of it.*

This he illustrates by a passage from Bruyère, where he says, "There are certain subjects, in "which mediocrity is intolerable; poetry, music, "painting, and public speaking." 'Here,' says Du Marsais, 'there is no figure, that is to say, the 'whole phrase merely expresses the thought of 'Bruyère, without any turn which particularly

'characterises it;' but when he adds, "What "punishment is it to hear a frigid composition "pompously delivered, or poor verses pro- "nounced with emphasis!" 'This,' says our author, 'is the same thought, but there is added 'to it the expression of surprise and admira- 'tion; and this expression makes it a figure.' Or, in other words, a trope or figure is where a word or sentence is to be understood in a sense different from its most common and ordinary usage; and it is this peculiar sense or form of the thought which constitutes the figure of the expression. This cannot be better illustrated than by the use of the word *taste*. When we say a person has *a fine taste in wines*, the word is used in its most common and ordinary sense; but when we say he has *a fine taste for painting, poetry, or music*, we use the word figuratively: in the latter use of the word, therefore, there is a figure, and in the former none.

Having thus given a general idea of the nature of rhetorical figures, I shall proceed to give a particular account of them; and first of the Metaphor.

Métaphor.

A METAPHOR is an expression, where a word or phrase departs from its more common and ordinary sense to another, which it resembles in some respects, and differs from in others: or, in fewer words, it may be defined to be a simile, or comparison, without the sign of comparison. Thus, when we say *Demosthenes was the bulwark of Athens*, the word *bulwark* is a metaphor; because, as a bulwark guards a place from its enemies, so Demosthenes, by his eloquence, guarded the Athenian state. But if we say *Demosthenes was a bulwark to Athens*, then it becomes a

simile or comparison; so that a metaphor is a stricter or closer comparison, and a comparison a looser and less compact metaphor.

"Metaphors," says an ingenious and judicious author*, "abound in all writings: from "scripture they might be produced in vast va-"riety. Thus our blessed Lord is called a *vine*, "a *lamb*, a *lion*, &c. Thus men, according to "their different dispositions, are styled *wolves*, "*sheep*, *dogs*, *serpents*, &c. And indeed meta-"phors not only abound in the sacred writings, "but they overspread all language; and the "more carefully we examine authors, not only "poets but philosophers, the more shall we dis-"cover their free and large use of metaphors, "taken from the arts and sciences, the customs "of mankind, and the unlimited fields of na-"ture."

Allegory.

An allegory is a continuation of several metaphors, so connected in sense as to form a kind of parable or fable. It differs from a single metaphor, says the above-mentioned author, in the same manner as a cluster on the vine does from a single grape. This we may illustrate by a very happy example of his own, where, speaking of the metaphor, he says. "Of all the "flowers that embellish the regions of elo-"quence, there is none that rises to such an "eminence, that bears so rich and beautiful a "blossom, that diffuses such a copious and ex-"quisite fragrance, or that so amply rewards "the care and culture of the poet or the "orator†."

* Gibbon's Rhetoric, p. 24.
† Ibid. p. 27.

Quintilian observes, that the most beautiful species of composition is that where there is a mixture of the comparison, the allegory, and the trope; an instance of which he gives us in the following passage from Cicero:

"What estuary, what part of the sea, can you imagine so "much vexed with the tossing and agitations of the waves? "How violent the perturbations and fury of our popular as-"semblies, for the election of magistrates! The space of only "one day or night often throws all things into confusion, and "sometimes only a small breath of rumour shall quite change "the opinion of the whole people." *Quintil.* lib. vii. cap. 6.

Métonymy.

A *Metonymy* is a figure, where one name is put for another, for which it may be allowed to stand on account of some relation or coherence between them. Thus, a humane prince is called a *Titus*, a cruel one a *Nero*, and a great conqueror an *Alexander*. Cicero, speaking of the study of eloquence, says,

To omit Greece, which always claimed the pre-eminence for eloquence: and Athens, the inventress of all sciences, where the art of speaking was invented and perfected; in this city of ours, no studies have prevailed more than that of eloquence.

Where the words *Greece* and *Athens* stand to denote the inhabitants of those places; and it is this usage of the city or country for the inhabitants that forms the metonymy,

Synecdoche.

A *Synecdoche* puts the whole for a part, or a part for the whole, as,

Thy growing virtues justified my cares,
And promis'd comfort to my *silver hairs.* *Pope's Homer.*

That is, my *old age.*

Achilles' wide destroying wrath that pour'd
Ten thousand woes on Greece, O Goddess, sing!
Homer's Iliad, b. i. v. 1. *Gibbon's Rhet.* p. 74.

Where we may observe, that putting a certain number for an uncertain one, that is, ten thousand woes for the great number of woes brought on Greece by the wrath of Achilles, forms a species of the figure of *Synecdoche*.

Hypérbole.

An *Hyberbole* is a figure that goes beyond the bounds of strict truth, and represents things as greater or smaller, better or worse, than they really are.

Milton's strong pinion now not Heav'n can bound,
Now serpentlike in prose he sweeps the ground. *Pope.*

Virgil, describing the swiftness of Camilla, says:

——— Camilla
Outstripp'd the winds in speed upon the plain,
Flew o'er the fields, nor hurt the bearded grain:
She swept the seas, and, as she skimm'd along,
Her flying foot unbath'd in billows hung.
Dryden, Æn. vii.

Catachrésis.

The *Catachresis*, or abuse, borrows the name of one thing to express another, which either has no proper name of its own, or, if it has, the borrowed name is more surprising and agreeable, on account of its novelty and boldness: thus the word *drink*, in the following passage, is so bold a figure as to be properly styled a *Catachresis*:

Phemius! let acts of gods and heroes old,
What ancient bards in hall and bow'r have told
Attemper'd to the lyre, your voice employ,
Such the pleas'd ear will *drink* with silent joy.
Pope's Homer's Odyssey.

The figures which follow, and which, for the sake of distinction, may be styled oratorical figures, are such as derive much of their beauty from a proper delivery: this delivery we shall endeavour to describe; and if the description conveys but a faint idea of the proper manner of pronouncing them, it must be remembered that a faint idea of this pronunciation is better than none at all.

Irony.

Irony is a figure, in which one extreme is signified by its opposite extreme; or where we speak of one thing, and design another, in order to give the greater force and poignancy to our meaning. Thus Cicero sometimes applies it in the way of jest and banter, where he says,

> We have much reason to believe the modest man would not ask him for his debt, where he pursues his life.
>
> *Pro Quint.* c. 11.

At other times, by way of insult and derision. Thus, when he would represent the forces of Catiline as mean and contemptible, he says,

> O terrible war! in which this band of profligates are to march under Catiline. Draw out all your garrisons against this formidable body!

And at other times, in order to give the greater force to his argument, he seems, as it were, by this figure to recall and correct what he had said before: as in his oration for Milo:

> But it is foolish in us to compare Drusus Africanus, and ourselves, with Clodius; all our other calamities were tolerable, but no one can patiently bear the death of Clodius.

In pronouncing the first of these passages, we should assume an overacted approbation, and such a tone of voice as seems to exclude all doubt of the integrity of the person we sneer at:

this tone is low and drawling, and must be accompanied by a lifting up of the hands, as if it were a crime to think otherwise than we speak.

In the second passage we must assume a fear, as if occasioned by the most terrible danger. The voice must be in a high tremulous tone, and the hands lifted up, with the palms and fingers open, as if to defend us from approaching ruin.

In the third passage we must assume a disapprobation, approaching to contempt: the voice must be in a low tone, and the right hand with the palm and fingers open, waved from the left to the right, as if to set aside something too insignificant to be attended to; but the last member must have the tone of approbation, as if the object of it were something very noble and sacred. For this sentence, see pp. 75 and 77, and the Plate annexed.

——— Satan beheld their plight,
And to his mates thus in derision call'd.
O friends, why come not on these victors proud?
Erewhile they fierce were coming, and when we
To entertain them fair with open front
And breast (what could we more?) propounded terms
Of composition, straight they chang'd their minds,
Flew off, and into strange vagaries fell
As they would dance; yet for a dance they seem'd
Somewhat extravagant and wild: perhaps
For joy of offer'd peace; but I suppose,
If our proposals once again were heard,
We should compel them to a quick result.

Milton's Paradise Lost, b. vi. v. 609.

This passage, as Mr. Addison observes, is nothing but a string of puns, and those very bad ones too: but whatever may be its merits in other respects, it affords an excellent opportunity of practising the pronunciation of irony. It must begin by an affected surprise, and proceed

with a seriousness and seeming sincerity till the seventh line, when the word *for* is to have an emphasis with the rising inflexion, and to be pronounced with an air of uncertainty whether it were a dance or not. A sneer commences at *perhaps*, which must be pronounced with a sly arch tone, as if perfectly secure of the consequences of another onset.

Ecphonésis.

EXCLAMATION and *Interrogation* have been treated at large in the former part of this work; but there they have been considered only with respect to pause and inflexion of voice: here it will be necessary to consider them more rhetorically, and to endeavour to show what tones, passions, and gestures, they demand.

Ecphonesis, or *Exclamation*, is a figure which shows that the mind labours with some strong and vehement passion. It is generally expressed by such interjections as O! Oh! Ah! Alas! and the like, which may be called the signs of this figure.

But first we may observe, that while other figures are confined to some particular passion, this seems to extend to all, and is the voice of nature under any kind of commotion or concern: this *voice*, however, is not (as we are told in our grammars) always in a high and elevated tone: strong passion is not unfrequently expressed by a low tone; for, though both loudness and highness generally accompany any sudden emotion of soul, it is certain that we may cry out in a loud and high tone without much emotion; and that we may express much emotion, provided it is not sudden, without being either very high or very loud. The tone of the

passion, therefore, must direct the tone of the voice in this figure. Accordingly we find that joy unexpected adopts this figure, and elevates the voice to the highest pitch.

O my soul's joy!
If after ev'ry tempest come such calms,
May the winds blow till they have waken'd death!
Shakspeare's Othello.

O joy, thou welcome stranger! twice three years
I have not felt thy vital beam; but now
It warms my veins, and plays about my heart:
A fiery instinct lifts me from the ground,
And I could mount—— *Revenge*, act iii.

Sorrow in the extreme likewise adopts this figure, and raises the voice into a high tone: thus Lady Constance, in King John, cries out,

I am not mad—I would to Heav'n I were!
For then 'tis like I should forget myself:
Oh if I could, what grief should I forget!

But a slight degree of sorrow, or pleasing melancholy, adopts this figure in a soft middle tone of voice: thus the Duke, in Shakspeare's Twelfth Night, relieving his melancholy with music, says:

That strain again! it had a dying fall!
Oh, it came o'er my ear like the sweet south,
That breathes upon a bank of violets,
Stealing and giving odour.

While the contemptuous reproach and impatience of Lady Macbeth uses the exclamation in a harsh and lower tone of voice:

O proper stuff!
This is the very painting of your fears:
This is the air-drawn dagger, which you said
Led you to Duncan.

Thus Cicero, speaking of his banishment, from which he had been so honourably recalled, begins in a low and mournful tone, but ends in a high and exulting one:

Oh mournful day to the senate and all good men! calamitous to the senate, afflictive to me and my family; but to posterity glorious, and worthy of admiration!

Pro Sext. cap. 12.

Again, in the defence of Cælius, endeavouring to expose his accusers to the indignation of the court, he cries out, in a loud and high tone,

Oh! the great and mighty force of truth, which so easily supports itself against all the wit, craft, subtlety, and artful designs of men!

At other times he adopts this figure to express disdain or contempt; as, when speaking of Pompey's house, which Mark Antony had purchased, he says to him, in a low contemptuous tone,—

Oh! consummate impudence! dare you go within those walls? dare you venture over that venerable threshold, and show your audacious countenance to the tutelar deities which reside there?

Philipp. ii. c. 26.

Thus we see the Exclamation adapts itself to the passion which adopts it, and is either in a high or low tone of voice, as the passion requires; but as it is seldom adopted, but when there is a strong emotion of soul, it is generally heard in a loud tone, though not always in a high one: this distinction of voice is so little understood or attended to, that it is no wonder we find our grammars echoing from each other that this figure always requires a high and elevated tone.

Erotésis.

Erotesis, or *Interrogation,* is a figure by which we express the emotion of our mind, and infuse an ardour and energy into our discourse by proposing questions.

This figure, as it relates to grammar, has been already treated of at large, and that slide or in-

flexion of voice which distinguishes one species of it has been fully explained and inculcated: for, as the learned professor Ward observes, "Every interrogation or question is not figurative. When we inquire about a thing that is doubtful, in order to be informed, this is no figure, but the natural form of such expressions; as if I ask a person, *where he is going?* or *what he is doing?* But it then becomes figurative, when the same thing may be expressed in a direct manner; but the putting it by way of question gives it a much greater life and spirit: as when Cicero says, *Catiline, how long will you abuse our patience? Do not you perceive your designs are discovered?* He might indeed have said, *You abuse our patience a long while: you must be sensible your designs are discovered.* But it is easy to perceive how much this latter way of expression falls short of the force and vehemence of the former."

This figure, like the last, is the vehicle of every passion and emotion of the mind. But if we consider it only as a departure from the declarative form, and not accompanied by any passion, it wonderfully varies and enlivens the style, by holding personal converse as it were with the reader or auditor, and urging him to attention by the answer it leads him to expect. If this figure is formed by the verb only, and without the interrogative words, it frequently commences and continues with a monotone, and ends with an inflexion of voice, which not only pleases the ear by the striking variety it produces, but rouses the attention by its more immediate address to the understanding. But when to these marking properties we annex emotion or passion, this figure becomes the most powerful engine in the whole arsenal of oratory.

How does Cicero press and bear down his adversary by the force of interrogations, when, pleading for his client, he thus addresses himself to his accuser:

I will make you this offer, Plancius; choose any one tribe you please, and show, as you ought, by whom it was bribed; but if you cannot, and, in my opinion, will not even attempt to do this, I will show you how he gained it. Is this a fair contest? Will you engage on this ground? It is an open, honourable challenge to you. Why are you silent? Why do you dissemble? Why do you prevaricate? I repeatedly insist upon this point, I urge you to it, press it, require it, nay, I demand it of you.

His interrogations to Tubero, in his Oration for Ligarius, have the same irresistible force.

What, Tubero, did that naked sword of yours mean in the battle of Pharsalia? at whose breast was its point aimed? What was then the meaning of your arms, your spirit, your eyes, your hands, your ardour of soul? What did you desire, what wish for? I press the youth too much, he seems disturbed. Let me return to myself. I too bore arms on the same side.

As these questions have the nature of a climax, they ought to be pronounced with increasing force to the end; that is, every succeeding question should be pronounced higher and louder than the preceding, and the demand in the last example but one in a lower and louder tone than all.

What uncommon force and spirit do the questions of Germanicus to his mutinous soldiers give to his reproaches!

What is there in these days that you have not attempted? what have you not profaned? What name shall I give to this assembly? Shall I call you sóldiers? yóu, who have besieged with your arms, and surrounded with a trench, the son of your émperor? Shall I call you cítizens? yóu, who have so shamefully trampled upon the authority of the senate? yóu, who have violated the justice due to énemies, the sanctity of émbassy, and the rights of nátions? *Tacitus, Annals*, lib. i.

The beauty of this passage depends much upon the pronunciation of the word *you:* for as it is in opposition to the question beginning with a verb, like that it ought to have the rising inflexion; but this inflexion ought to be pronounced with a large scope of sound, beginning low and ending high, the voice dwelling a considerable time on the pronunciation: this will in some measure express that surprise and indignation with which the questions are charged; and if the second *you* is made more emphatical than the first, and the third than the second, the force and variety of the passage will be considerably augmented. See *Question,* page 93.

Aparithmesis, or Enumeration, Gradation, and Climax.

I HAVE associated these different figures under the same head, because there is something as similar in their pronunciation as in their structure and meaning; and this similitude may serve to illustrate and explain what there is alike in the pronunciation of each. What is common to these figures is an accumulation of particulars, which particulars form a whole; and the pronunciation in all of them should mark strongly that unity and wholeness, in which the force and beauty of the figure consist. This pronunciation has been explained at large in the article *Series,* page 106, and to this the reader must be referred. It seems only necessary to add here, that, in proportion to the degree of passion with which any of these figures are charged, the pronunciation of the latter members should rise in force and elevation of voice above the former, that the whole may conclude with a suitable

force and variety. But even when there is no passion in the enumeration of particulars, and one does not rise above another in importance, it seems highly proper to increase the force and elevation of voice on the latter members, in order to avoid too great a sameness, and to make the sentence end with harmony. Thus when Cicero enumerates the great qualities of Pompey:

What language can equal the valour of Pompey? What can be said, either worthy of him, new to you, or which every one has not heard? For those are not only the virtues of a general which are commonly thought so. It is not courage alone which forms a great leader, but industry in business, intrepidity in dangers, vigour in acting, prudence in concerting, promptness in executing. All which qualities appear with greater lustre in him, than in all the other generals we ever saw or heard of. *Pro Leg. Man.*

In the same manner, when Mr. Addison enumerates the several particulars in Milton's allegorical character of death:

The descriptive part of this allegory is likewise very strong, and full of sublime ideas: the figure of Death, the regal crown upon his head, his menace of Satan, his advancing to the combat, the outcry at his birth, are circumstances too noble to be passed over in silence, and extremely suitable to this king of terrours. *Spectator*, N° 310.

In these enumerations we do not find the particulars rising in force as they proceed: but as their sameness of form requires a sameness of inflexion, in order to show that they are parts of a whole, so a small increase of force and elevation on each subsequent particular seems necessary, in order to make the whole more varied and agreeable.

Climax, or Gradation, taken in the strictest sense, is an assemblage of particulars forming a whole in such a manner, that the last idea in the former member becomes the first in the latter, and so on, step by step, till the climax or

gradation is completed. There is great strength as well as beauty in this figure, when the several steps rise naturally out of each other, and are closely connected by the sense which they jointly convey. This mutual relation of parts we may perceive in the following example:

There is no enjoyment of property without government, no government without a magistrate, no magistrate without obedience, and no obedience where every one acts as he pleases.

This climax is a concluding series, and must have its two first members pronounced with the falling inflexion: the third with the rising, and the last with the falling, in a lower tone of voice than any of the rest.

In the same manner, when Cicero is pleading for Milo, he says,—

Nor did he commit himself only to the people, but also to the senate; nor to the senate only, but likewise to the public forces; nor to these only, but also to the power of him with whom the senate had intrusted the whole commonwealth.

In this climax the circumstances rise in importance, and should therefore have an increasing force and elevation of voice as they proceed. The two first members must end with the falling inflexion—*these only* with the rising, and the last with the falling, but in a more forcible and elevated tone than the rest.

A similar figure from Cicero must be pronounced somewhat differently.

What hope is there remaining of liberty, if whatever is their pleasure, it is lawful for them to do; if what is lawful for them to do, they are able to do; if what they are able to do, they dare do; if what they dare do, they really execute; and if what they execute, is no way offensive to you.

In pronouncing this figure the voice must adopt the falling inflexion on each particular; it must increase in force and elevation till it

comes to the last member, and this must have still more force than the former members, but must be pronounced in a low concluding tone.

A perfectly similar pronunciation will suit the following climax from Shakspeare:

What a piece of work is man! how noble in reason! how infinite in faculties! in form and moving how express and admirable! in action how like an angel! in apprehension how like a God! *Hamlet.*

Mr. Addison has a beautiful climax of circumstances rising one above another, when he is describing the treatment of Negroes in the West Indies, who sometimes, upon the death of their masters, or upon changing their service, hang themselves upon the next tree.

Who can forbear, says Mr. Addison, admiring their fidelity, though it expresses itself in so dreadful a manner? What might not that savage greatness of soul, which appears in these poor wretches on many occasions, be raised to, were it rightly cultivated? And what colour of excuse can there be for the contempt with which we treat this part of our species? That we should not put them upon the common foot of humànity; that we should only set an insignificant fine upon the man who mùrders them; nay, that we should, as much as in us lies, cut them off from the prospects of happiness in anòther world as well as in this, and deny them that which we look upon as the proper means for attàining it? *Spectator*, N° 215.

The falling inflexion with increasing force upon the words *humanity*, *murders*, and *another*, will give that force and colouring to this passage which it so richly deserves.

But the series or climax never appears to such advantage in pronunciation as when it is highly impassioned. Of this kind are the two following examples from Demosthenes:

But since he has insisted so much upon the event, I will hazard a bold assertion. But I beseech you, Athenians, let it not be deemed extravagant,—let it be weighed with candour. I say, then, that, had we all known what misfortune was to attènd our efforts, had we all foreseen the final ìssue: had you

foretòld it, Æschines; had you bellowed out your terrible denunciations; (you, whose voice was never heard), yet even in such a case must this city have pursued the very same conduct, if she had retained a thought of glory, of her ancestors, or of future times. *Leland's Demosthenes.*

In my affection to my country, you find me ever firm and invariable. Not the solemn demand of my pèrson, not the vengeance of the Amphyctionic council, which they denòunced against me, not the terrour of their thrèatenings, not the flattery of their pròmises, no nor the fury of those accursed wretches, whom they roused like wild beasts against me, could ever tear this affection from my brèast. *Ibid.*

Epanáphora.

EPANAPHORA, or *Repetition*, is a figure which gracefully and emphatically repeats either the same words, or the same sense in different words.

This figure is nearly allied to the Aparithmesis and Climax, and requires nearly the same pronunciation; that is, the repeated words must be pronounced with a sameness of inflexion, but with an increasing force and elevation of voice upon each. This expresses that force, uniformity, and diversity, which constitute the beauty of this figure.

There is scarcely a more beautiful instance of this figure than in Cicero's Second Oration against Antony.

As trees and plants necessarily arise from seeds, so are you, A'ntony, the seed of this most calamitous war. You mourn, O Romans! that three of your armies have been slaughtered—they were slaughtered by A'ntony; you lament the loss of your most illustrious citizens—they were torn from you by A'ntony: the authority of this order is deeply wounded—it is wounded by A'ntony: in short, all the calamities we have ever since beheld (and what calamities have we not beheld?) if we reason rightly, have been entirely owing to Àntony. As Helen was of Troy, so the bane, the misery, the destruction of this state—is Àntony.

The first part of this passage forms a kind of dialogue, where both the question and answer require the same inflexion, but in different pitches of voice. Thus, *You mourn, O Romans! that three of your armies have been slaughtered*, must be pronounced in an open middle tone of voice, without much force; but, *they were slaughtered by Antony*, in a lower, louder, and more energetic tone: the two succeeding portions ought to be pronounced in the same manner, with an increasing force and a higher tone on the word Antony: the two last members are of a different structure from the former, and must be pronounced somewhat differently; that is, Antony must be pronounced in a lower tone than in the former members, but with increasing force to the last. In pronouncing this passage in this manner, it has the effect of a climax; every part has a relation to every part; and all the parts belong to each other, and form a striking and harmonious whole.

Sometimes, however, in this figure, especially in verse, the parts do not so necessarily belong to each other as to form a whole; and when this is the case, the pronunciation ought to be as various and as musical as possible, that the repetition of the same words may not too much cloy the ear and injure the melody of the verse.

Thus, in the lamentation of Orpheus for his beloved Eurydice, in Virgil's Georgics, b. iv. v. 465.

> Te dulcis conjux; te solo in littore secum,
> Te veniente die, te decedente, canebat.

> Thée his lōv'd wīfe, along the lonely shores:
> Thée, his lov'd wife, his mournful song deplores;
> Thée, when the rising morning gives the light,
> Thée, when the world was overspread with night.
>
> *Gibbon's Rhetoric*, p. 210.

This beautiful repetition requiring a tender plaintive tone, does not admit of much variety, nor does it stand in need of it. Every *thee* ought to have the rising inflexion, and a pause after it. The first, *his lov'd wife*, may have a pathetic monotone; and the second may have the falling inflexion on *lov'd*, and the rising on *wife*, which will form a variety and add to the pathos. Some variety and pathos may also arise from pronouncing the second and fourth *thee*, with the voice sliding higher and a pause longer than at the first and third.

Thus the beautiful repetition of the word *fall'n* in Dryden's Ode requires such a variety only as is consistent with the harmony. Every *fall'n* ought to have a long pause after it, with such an inflexion as the verse requires; and the tone of voice, with respect to its height, ought to be more elevated on the last than on any of the former.

> He chose a mournful muse,
> Soft pity to infuse;
> He sung Darius, great and good,
> By too severe a fate,
> Fáll'n, fȁll'n, fȁll'n, fáll'n,
> Fáll'n from his high estate,
> And welt'ring in his blood.

Lord Kames, in his Elements of Criticism, tells us, that the line *fall'n*, *fall'n*, *fall'n*, *fall'n*, represents a gradual sinking of the mind, and therefore is pronounced with a falling voice by every one of taste without instruction. It is not easy to understand what his lordship means by the falling voice, with which he says this line is to be spoken. If he means that the voice is to fall gradually lower upon every succeeding word, we need but try this pronunciation, immediately to discover the impropriety of it; but

by the falling tone it is probable was meant a tone of pity, which increases as we repeat the words, but which by no means requires that the voice should drop into a lower key upon every succeeding word: this would entirely overturn the melody of the stanza, for the sake of something like a childish echo to the sense. The truth is, in pronouncing this repetition properly, we must assume a low plaintive tone, pronounce the first *fall'n* with the rising inflexion approaching to a monotone, the second nearly in a monotone with the falling inflexion, the third with the falling inflexion, and the fourth with the rising, without any monotone at all. The fifth *fall'n*, which begins the sixth line must have the rising inflexion sliding very high, that the voice may fall gradually upon the succeeding words, and form a cadence.

There is a similar repetition in the first stanza of this ode, which requires a variety of emphasis in the pronunciation, very important to the sense and harmony of the whole.

> Háppy, hàppy, hàppy páir!
> None but the bràve,
> Nòne but the brave,
> None bùt the brave, deserves the fair.

The first line must be pronounced with the same inflexions as the fifth line of the last example, but in a quite opposite tone of passion; that, in a low mournful tone; this in a high, gay, and lively one. The second line must have the falling inflexion with emphatic force on the word *brave:* the third line must have a stronger emphasis, with the falling inflexion on *none;* and the last line a still more forcible emphasis, with the same inflexion on *but:* and this diversity will be found absolutely necessary to prevent a too great sameness in the pronunciation.

Prolépsis.

PROLEPSIS, or *Anticipation*, is a figure, by which the speaker suggests an objection to what he is advancing, and returns an answer to it. This figure affords an orator a favourable opportunity of altering his voice and manner, and by this means of throwing a greater variety into his pronunciation. The nature of the figure dictates the manner of delivering it. When we propose an objection against ourselves, candour requires a certain fairness and openness of manner, which may show we do justice to the opinion of our adversary, and want to conceal nothing from our judges. This frankness of manner is best expressed by a clear open tone of voice somewhat higher and louder than the general tone of the discourse, nearly as if we were calling out to a person at a distance; after which the answer must begin in a low firm tone, that the objection and answer may be the more clearly distinguished, and that what we oppose to the objection may have more the appearance of cool reason and argument. An excellent example of this figure is in Cicero's Oration for Archias.

How many examples of the bravest men have the Greek and Latin writers left us,--not only to contemplate but to imitate! These illustrious models I have always set before me in the government of the state, and have formed my conduct by contemplating their virtues.

But it will be asked, were those great men who are celebrated in history distinguished for that kind of learning which you so highly extol? It would be difficult, I grant, to prove this of them all; but what I shall answer is nevertheless certain. I own, then, that there have been many men of excellent dispositions, and distinguished virtue, who, without learning, and by the almost divine force of nature herself, have attained to great wisdom and worth; nay, farther, I will allow that nature without learning is

of greater efficacy towards the attainment of glory and virtue than learning without nature: but then I affirm, that when to an excellent natural disposition are added the embellishments of learning, there always results from this union something astonishingly great and extraordinary.

Before the prolepsis in this passage, as generally in every other where it occurs, the voice falls into a low tone, as having concluded some branch of the discourse: this gives it a better opportunity of striking into the higher tone proper to the objection; and when this is pronounced, the voice falls into a lower tone, as it begins the answer, and rises again gradually with the importance of the subject.

We have a beautiful instance of this figure in Cato:

> But, grant that others can with equal glory,
> Look down on pleasures and the baits of sense,—
> Where shall we find the man that bears affliction,
> Great and majestic in his ills, like Cato?

The two first lines of this passage require a plain, high, open tone of voice: and the two last a lower tone, accompanied with a slight expression of reproach for supposing any one could be equal to Cato.

Pope affords us another instance of this figure:

> You think this cruel. Take it for a rule,—
> No creature smarts so little as a fool.

The words "you think this cruel" must be pronounced in a high, loud tone of voice, and the rest in a lower and softer tone.

We have a striking instance of this figure in Pope, where, speaking of the daring flights of the ancients, he says,

> I know there are to whose presumptuous thoughts
> Those freer beauties even in them seem faults:
> Some figures monstrous and misshap'd appear,
> Consider'd singly or beheld too near,

Which but proportion'd to their light or place,
Due distance reconciles to form and grace.
Essay on Criticism, v. 169.

The objection and answer in this passage are so little distinguished by the author, that unless we distinguish them by a different tone of voice, an auditor would not well conceive where the objection ends and the answer begins. In reading this passage, therefore, we must pronounce the two first lines in a high, open, declarative tone of voice, and commence the third in a low concessive tone, approaching to a monotone; this monotone must continue till near the end of the fifth line, when the voice is to adopt the rising inflexion in a somewhat higher tone at the end; and to commence the sixth line in a still higher tone, pause with the rising inflexion at *distance*, and finish the line with the voice going gradually lower to the end.

Synchorésis.

SYNCHORESIS, or *Concession*, is a figure by which we grant or yield up something, in order to gain a point, which we could not so well secure without it.

This figure, with respect to its pronunciation, seems the reverse of the former. For in that, as we must commence in an open elevated tone, and drop into a low and firm one, so in this, we must pronounce the concessive part of the figure in a low, light tone, as if what we allowed our adversary was of no great importance, and then assume the argument in a strong elevated tone, as if we had acquired a double force from the concession we had made. Thus Cicero, pleading for Flaccus, in order to invalidate the

testimony of the Greeks, who were witnesses against his client, allows them every quality but that which was necessary to make them credited.

This, however, I say concerning all the Greeks—I grant them learning, the knowledge of many sciences; I do not deny that they have wit, fine genius, and eloquence; nay, if they lay claim to many other excellencies, I shall not contest their title: but this I must say, that nation never paid a proper regard to the religious sanctity of public evidence, and are total strangers to the obligation, authority, and importance of truth.

The first part of this passage, which forms the concession, should be spoken in a slight easy manner, and in a tone rather below that of common conversation; but the assertion in the latter part should rise into a somewhat higher tone, and assume a strength and firmness expressive of the force of the argument. It may not be improper to remark to those who understand the two inflexions of the voice, that the several members of the concession seem to require the rising inflexion.

Nothing more confounds an adversary than to grant him his whole argument, and at the same time either to show that it is nothing to the purpose, or to offer something else that may invalidate it, as in the following example:

I allow that nobody was more nearly related to the deceased than you; I grant that he was under some obligations to you; nay, that you have always been in friendly correspondence with each other: but what is all this to the last will and testament?

The concession in this passage must be pronounced in a moderate, conciliating tone of voice: but the question at the end must rise into a higher, louder, and more forcible tone.

There is an uncommon force in a passage of Cato's speech concerning the punishment of the traitors in Catiline's conspiracy, which manifestly

arises from the figure upon which we are treating.

Let them, since our manners are so corrupted, be liberal out of the fortunes of our allies; let them be compassionate to the robbers of the public treasury; but let them not throw away our blood, and by sparing a few abandoned villains, make way for the destruction of all good men.

In this example the tone of voice, with respect to height, is nearly the same throughout: but the second member assumes a much stronger and firmer, though rather lower tone, and necessarily ends with the rising inflexion.

Epanorthósis.

EPANORTHOSIS, or *Correction*, is a figure by which we retract or recall what we have spoken, for the sake of substituting something stronger or more suitable in its place.

The use of this figure lies in the unexpected interruption it gives to the current of our discourse, by turning the stream as it were back upon itself, and then returning it upon the auditor with redoubled force and precision. The nature of this figure dictates its pronunciation; it is somewhat akin to the parenthesis. What we correct should be so pronounced as to seem the immediate effusion of the moment; for which purpose it does not only require a separation from the rest of the sentence, by an alteration of the voice into a lower tone, but an abrupt discontinuance of the member immediately preceding. This, however, is one of the most difficult things to execute in the whole art of speaking, and must be managed nicely, not to have the appearance of affectation: for which reason it would be better for the generality of

readers to consider this figure merely as a parenthesis, and to pronounce it accordingly. Cicero makes use of this figure in his oration for Milo:

Can you be ignorant, among the conversation of this city, what laws—if they are to be called laws, and not rather the firebrands of Rome and the plagues of the commonwealth—this Clodius designed to fasten and fix upon us?

The figure in this passage may be read like a parenthesis: the voice should break short at *laws*; at *if* it should assume a lower, swifter, and more indignant tone; at *commonwealth* it should slide upwards into what is called a suspension; and at *this* assume the tone with which the sentence commenced. The same directions may be applied to the interjected member in the following passage of Cicero in his defence of Plancius:

For what greater blow could those Judges—if they are to be called judges, and not rather parricides of their country—have given to the state, than when they banished that very man, who, when prætor, delivered the republic from a neighbouring, and who, when consul, sav'd it from a civil war.

Sometimes this figure comes after the sense is completed, and then the preceding member closes without the break: but in this case we may make a pause after the first words of the correction, as if to demur and to correct ourselves in order to rectify an oversight. This may be exemplified in the following passage of Cicero's Third Philippic.

Octavius Cæsar, though but a youth, nay, rather a boy, inspired with an incredible and divine spirit and courage, at that very time when the fury of Antony was at its height, and when his cruel and pernicious return was so much dreaded, when we neither solicited nor imagined nor desired it, because it seemed utterly impracticable, raised a most powerful army of invincible veterans; for which service he threw away his own estate; but—I have used an improper word—he did not throw it away, he bestowed it for the salvation of the commonwealth.

A pause at *but* and *word*, in the latter part of the sentence, will mark the correction more strongly. It may be remarked also, that though this figure must be pronounced in a lower tone of voice than the former part of the sentence, it ought to have much more force and dignity.

Anástrophe.

ANASTROPHE, or *Inversion*, is a figure by which we place last, and perhaps at a great distance from the beginning of the sentence, what, according to the common order, should have been placed first.

Milton begins his Paradise Lost by a beautiful example of this figure.

> Of man's first disobedience, and the fruit
> Of that forbidden tree, whose mortal taste
> Brought death into the world, and all our wo,
> With loss of Eden, till one greater man
> Restore us, and regain the blissful seat;
> Sing, heav'nly Muse! that on the secret top
> Of Oreb or of Sinai didst inspire
> That Shepherd, who first taught the chosen seed
> In the beginning how the Heav'ns and Earth
> Rose out of Chaos.

The natural order of the words in this passage would have been, *Heav'nly Muse, sing of man's first disobedience*, &c.—and in this arrangement of the words no pause is necessary between the verb *sing* and its object, *of man's first disobedience*, &c.; but when the object of the verb, with all its concomitants, are placed before the verb, as in the example, we then find the pause preceding the verb *sing* increase in proportion to its distance from the beginning of its object, *of man's first disobedience*, &c.

It may be laid down as a good general rule, that whenever the natural order of the words is

changed, there must be a pause between those portions that are disarranged, though no pause would be necessary, if the words were in their natural order. Thus in the following passage from the same author:

> Th'angelic blast
> Fill'd all the regions: from their blissful bow'rs
> Of amaranthine shade, fountain, or spring,
> By the waters of life, where'er they sat
> In fellowship of joy, the sons of light
> Hasted, resorting to the summons high,
> And took their seats.
>
> *Paradise Lost*, b. xi. v. 76.

The natural order of the words would be, *The sons of light hasted from their blissful bow'rs*, &c. where we may observe that a very small pause, if any, would be admitted at *hasted* in this order of the words, but that, as they stand in Milton, a considerable pause is required at this word, and a still greater at *joy*, as it is here the inversion ends and the natural order begins.

We have in Lowth's Grammar another instance of the necessity of pausing when the order of the words is inverted, which is as worthy of being quoted for the good sense it contains as for the opportunity it affords of exemplifying the present rule.

> The connective parts of sentences are the most important of all, and require the greatest care and attention; for it is by these chiefly that the train of thought, the course of reasoning, and the whole progress of the mind in continued discourse of all kinds, is laid open; and on the right use of these the perspicuity, that is, the first and greatest beauty of style, principally depends. *Lowth's Grammar*, p. 128.

The adverbial phrases, *by these chiefly*, and *on the right use of these*, are classes of words which would require a pause, even if they came in

their natural order, after the verbs *laid open* and *depends*; but, as they come before these verbs, and are separated from them by many other words, a long pause after each is indispensably necessary, though in no edition of this grammar that I have seen is there any pause marked.

Apóstrophe.

APOSTROPHE, or *Occasional Address*, is a figure in which we interrupt the current of our discourse, and turn to another person, or to some other object different from that to which our address was at first directed. This figure is seldom used; but when, in a violent commotion, the speaker turns himself on all sides, and appeals to the living and the dead, to angels and to men, to rocks, groves, and rivers, for the justice of his cause, or calls upon them to sympathize with his joy, grief, or resentment.

The tone of voice to be employed in pronouncing this figure, is as various as the passions it assumes; but as these passions are generally very vehement, a higher and louder tone of voice is generally necessary in the apostrophe than in that part of the oration that precedes it. When we address inanimate things, especially if they are supposed to be distant, the voice must rise in height and loudness, as if the speaker were resolved to make them hear him. In this manner we may presume Cicero pronounced that fine apostrophe in his oration for Milo, when, speaking of the death of Clodius, he says:

O ye judges! it was not by human counsel, nor by any thing less than the immediate care of the immortal gods, that this event has taken place. The very divinities themselves, who beheld that monster fall, seemed to be moved, and to have in-

flicted their vengeance upon him. I appeal to, I call to witness, you, O ye hills and groves of Alba! you, the demolished Alban altars! ever accounted holy by the Romans, and coëval with our religion, but which Clodius, in his mad fury, having first cut down and levelled the most sacred groves, had sunk under heaps of common buildings; I appeal to you, I call you to witness, whether your altars, your divinities, your powers, which he had polluted with all kinds of wickedness, did not avenge themselves when this wretch was extirpated? And thou, O holy Jupiter! from the height of thy sacred mount, whose lakes, groves, and boundaries, he had so often contaminated with his detestable impurities:—and you, the other deities, whom he had insulted, at length opened your eyes to punish this enormous offender. By you, by you, and in your sight, was the slow, but the righteous and merited vengeance executed upon him.

In pronouncing this passage, it is evident that the speaker must raise his voice at *I appeal*, &c. and, with a force and rapidity bordering on enthusiasm, continue the voice in this pitch till the invocation of Jupiter, who, as the supreme being, is supposed to be present, and to be too sacred to be addressed with the same violence as inanimate objects; for which reason the speaker must lower his tone into a solemn monotone, and continue in his lower tone with increasing force to the end.

Asyn'deton and Polysyn'deton.

ASYNDETON and *Polysyndeton*, or *Omission* and *Redundance of Copulatives*, are figures by which the thought and language are strengthened and invigorated either by leaving out or repeating the conjunctive particles. The learned Dr. Ward says, that "the *Asyndeton* leaves out the "connecting particles, to represent either the "celerity of an action or the haste and eager"ness of the speaker: and that the *Polysyndeton* "adds a weight and gravity to an expression,

"and makes what is said to appear with an air
"of solemnity, and, by retarding the course of
"the sentence, gives the mind an opportu-
"nity to consider and reflect upon every part
"distinctly."

System of Oratory, vol. ii. pp. 50, 51.

That these figures are very properly employed to signify swiftness or slowness of thought or action it cannot be denied; but that they are not always so employed is evident from a thousand examples. But though we frequently omit the particles, for the sake of a greater variety and compactness of style, and to avoid a too tedious repetition, yet we ought never to introduce them but where the thought requires it, and where they seem to accumulate force and emphasis to a subject.

There is an example of both these figures in a passage of Demosthenes, which may serve to explain these observations.

For as to naval power, and the number of forces, and revenues, and a plenty of martial preparations, and, in a word, as to other things that may be esteemed the strength of a state, these are all both more and greater than in former times; but all these things are rendered useless, inefficacious, abortive, through the power of corruption. *Philippic* iii.

In the first part of this sentence, the repetition of the conjunction *and* seems to add to the strength of the particulars it enumerates, and each particular demands a deliberate and emphatic pronunciation in the rising inflexion; but the last part of the sentence, without the particles, being expressive of the impatience and regret of the speaker, requires a swifter pronunciation of the particulars.

In the exordium to Cicero's Second Oration

against Catiline, we have an instance of the Asyndeton which is much celebrated.

At length, at length, O Romans! have we driven, or dispatched, or forced into a voluntary retreat, Lucius Catiline, intoxicated with insolence, breathing out guilt, impiously meditating the destruction of his country, and threatening you and this city with all the calamities of fire and sword. He is gone, he is vanished, he is escaped, he is sallied out.

The latter member of this passage, which forms the figure Asyndeton, must be pronounced with a swiftness expressive of the flight of Catiline; but this swiftness should rather be in the pronunciation of the words themselves than in omitting the pauses between them: for it may be laid down as a good general rule, that wherever there is a particle omitted there must always be a pause; and though in the present example the pauses should not be so long as in solemn and deliberate pronunciation, yet it ought to be quite as perceptible, and bear the same proportion to the time taken up in delivering the words.

These figures partake of the nature of the Aparithmesis, or Enumeration, and require the same inflexion of voice on each particular, as in the Series or Climax; but as was before observed, though the Polysyndeton, or repetition of particles, generally requires a solemn, deliberate, and emphatic pronunciation on each particular, the Asyndeton, or omission of particles, does not always require a greater swiftness and precipitancy.

I shall illustrate both these positions by examples from the Scripture:

But the fruit of the spirit is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance; against such there is no law.

In pronouncing this passage, we find it necessary to pause considerably after each word, that each may be distinctly apprehended; nothing like swiftness or precipitancy is required here, but a calmness and deliberation suited to the sense of the text: but, in the following passage from Romans, viii. 35, every particular requires a degree of emphasis.

Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? shall tribulation, or distress, or persecution, or famine, or nakedness, or peril, or sword? Nay, in all these things we are more than conquerors, through him that loved us.

Here the members of the sentence, being interrogations beginning with a verb, require the rising inflexion approaching to a monotone, with a considerable stress upon each, but particularly on the last, where the voice must slide much higher than on the rest; but each portion in the succeeding beautiful climax must have the falling inflexion, except the last, at *creature:*

For I am persuaded that neither death nor life; nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers; nor things present, nor things to come; nor height nor depth: nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.

This passage contains five portions of words, each portion, except the last, forming a class of words associated either by their similitude or opposition: each of these classes, except the last, requires the falling inflexion, with some degree of emphasis on the last word. The voice must be low, firm, and deliberate, upon the first portion at *life*, and increase its force, loudness, and elevation, by the smallest degrees; and in the same inflexion on *powers*, *come*, and *depth:* on

creature the voice should adopt the rising inflexion, and then lower its tone deliberately and gradually to the end.

Enantiósis.

ENANTIOSIS, or *Antithesis*, is a figure, by which things, very different or contrary, are contrasted or placed together, that they may mutually set off and illustrate each other.

Few of the figures of rhetoric derive more beauty from a proper pronunciation than this. The understanding is not more enlightened by a contrast in the thought, than the ear is gratified by expressing this contrast with a suitable antithesis of the voice. Nothing can better illustrate the force and beauty of this figure than a passage in Sterne's sermon on the house of mourning and the house of feasting, where, describing the house of feasting, he says:

When the gay and smiling aspect of things has begun to leave the passages to a man's heart thus thoughtlessly unguarded—when kind and caressing looks of every object without that can flatter his senses, have conspired with the enemy within to betray him and put him off his defence—when music likewise hath lent her aid, and tried her power upon the passions—when the voice of singing men and the voice of singing women, with the sound of the viol and the lute, have broken in upon his soul, and in some tender notes have touched the secret springs of rapture—that moment let us dissect and look into his heart—see how vain! how weak! how empty a thing it is! Look through its several recesses—those pure mansions formed for the reception of innocence and virtue—sad spectacle! behold those fair inhabitants now dispossessed—turned out of their sacred dwellings, to make room—for what?—at the best for levity and indiscretion—perhaps for folly—it may be for more impure guests, which possibly, in so general a riot of the mind and senses, may take occasion to enter unsuspected at the same time.

In pronouncing this passage, the voice ought to assume a plaintive tone approaching to a mo-

notone, and proceed in this manner till it comes to the *springs of rapture*, when the former of these words is to have the falling, and the latter the rising inflexion of voice, sliding up to a considerable height; then the voice must fall suddenly into a low tone, with a severity approaching to indignation, at the really wretched state of the heart, under the disguise of so much seeming happiness. This sudden alteration of the voice, from high and plaintive to low and indignant, will wonderfully set off the contrast in the description, and give double energy and beauty to the thought.

We have another instance of this beautiful figure in Shippen's speech, in Chandler's Parliamentary Debates, where he shows the inefficacy of honest counsel, when once vice and luxury have gained the ascendant in a state.

If there are in this new parliament any men devoted to their private interest, and who prefer the gratification of their passions to the safety and happiness of their country, who can riot without remorse in the plunder of their constituents, who can forget the anguish of guilt in the noise of a feast, the pomp of a drawing-room, or the glare of an equipage, and think expensive wickedness and the gaities of folly equivalent to the fair fame of fidelity and the peace of virtue—to them I shall speak to no purpose; for I am far from imagining any power in my words to gain those to truth who have resigned their hearts to avarice or ambition, or to prevail upon men to change opinions, which they have indeed never believed, though they are hired to assert them. For there is a degree of wickedness which no reproof or argument can reclaim, as there is a degree of stupidity which no instruction can enlighten. *Chandler's Parliamentary Debates*, 1741.

In pronouncing this passage, we must begin the first part in a plaintive tone of voice, and continue this tone till the word *virtue;* here the voice must be suspended some time in the rising inflexion, after which it must drop into a low solemn tone on *to them*, &c.—this tone must continue nearly till the end, when, at *For there is*

&c. to this tone must be added a degree of asperity and indignation, with which the passage must close.

There are certain examples of this figure, where, though the words and thoughts are opposed to each other, they are in so small portions, and succeed each other so rapidly, that it would have the appearance of affectation to endeavour to make any great difference in pronouncing them. Thus Cicero, speaking of Pompey, says:

He waged more wars than others had read; conquered more provinces than others had governed: and had been trained up from his youth to the art of war; not by the precepts of others, but by his own commands; not by miscarriages in the field, but by victories; not by campaigns, but by triumphs.

Pro Leg. Man. c. x.

In pronouncing this passage, the opposing parts ought to have no more diversity than what is required by the harmony of the sentence; but, in order to show the contrasted parts distinctly, it will not be improper to make a longer pause between them than if there were no opposition in the sense; a pause of some length at *wars*, *provinces*, *others*, and *field*, will be quite sufficient to show the antithesis in the thought.

The same observations are applicable to the other passage of Cicero, where, opposing the conduct of Verres, when governor of Sicily, to that of Marcellus, who took Syracuse, the capital of that island, he says,

Compare this peace, with that war; the arrival of this governor, with the victory of that general; his profligate troops, with the invincible army of the other; the luxury of the former, with the temperance of the latter; you will say that Syracuse was founded by him who took it, and taken by him who held it when founded.

In pronouncing this passage, it will be necessary to make a considerable pause between each opposing part; and this, with the emphasis that naturally falls on these parts, will sufficiently diversify them to the ear.

There are other instances where, though the contrasted parts consist but of few words, they require, in pronouncing them, a diversity of voice. Thus in Blair's Sermon on Gentleness.

As there is a worldly happiness which God perceives to be no more than disguised misery; as there are worldly honours which in his estimation are reproach; so there is a worldly wisdom which in his sight is foolishness. Of this worldly wisdom the characters are given in the Scriptures, and placed in contrast with those of the wisdom which is from above. The one is the wisdom of the crafty; the other, that of the upright: the one terminates in selfishness; the other in charity: the one is full of strife and bitter envyings; the other of mercy and of good fruits.

The first principal constructive part of the first sentence of this passage must be pronounced in a somewhat elevated tone of voice, and end with the rising inflexion at *reproach*: then, after a pause, the voice must drop into a somewhat lower tone, with which the last member must be pronounced. The opposing parts in the rest of the passage must be pronounced so as to pause after *The one*, &c. and give the first members a higher tone, ending with the rising inflexion on *crafty*, *selfishness*, and *envyings*; then, after a pause, the last member must be pronounced in a somewhat lower tone, and end with the falling inflexion.

Paralépsis.

PARALEPSIS, or *Omission*, is a figure by which the orator pretends to conceal or pass by what he really means to declare and strongly to enforce.

Whatever we seem to give up, as a matter of small consequence, we generally pronounce in a higher and softer tone of voice than the rest: this is accompanied with an air of indifference that seems to make light of what we mention, and this indifference generally leads us to end the particulars with the suspension of voice properly called the rising inflexion. Thus Cicero, in his defence of Sextius, introduces his character in the following manner, with a design of recommending him to the favour of the judges:

I might say many things of his liberality, kindness to his domestics, his command in the army, and moderation during his office in the province; but the honour of the state presents itself to my view, and calling me to it, advises me to omit these lesser matters.

The first part of this sentence should be spoken in a soft high tone of voice, with an air of indifference, as if waving the advantages arising from his client's character; but the latter part assumes a lower and firmer tone, which greatly enforces and sets off the former.

The same observations hold good in the pronunciation of the following passage of his Oration against Rullus, who had proposed a law to sell the public lands:

I do not complain of the diminution of our revenues, and the woful effects of this loss and damage. I omit what may give every one occasion for a very grievous and just complaint, that we could not preserve the principal estates of the public, the finest possession of the Roman people, the fund of our provisions, the granary of our wants, a revenue entrusted with the state; but that we must give up those lands to Rullus, which, after the power of Sylla, and the largesses of the Gracchi, are yet left us: I do not say, this is now the only revenue of the state, which continues when others cease; is an ornament in peace, fails us not in war, supports the army, and does not fear an enemy. I pass over all these things, and reserve them for my discourse to the people, and only speak at present of the danger of our peace and liberties

Every member of this sentence, where there is a pause, must be pronounced with the rising inflexion, commonly called a suspension of voice; the whole must have an air of indifference, except the two or three last members, where the voice must fall into a lower and firmer tone at *and reserve them*, and continue in this tone to the end.

Anacoenósis.

ANACOENOSIS, or *Communication*, is a figure by which the speaker applies to his hearers or opponents for their opinion upon the point in debate. Thus Cicero, in his Oration for Cæcina, appeals to Piso:

Suppose, Piso, that any person had driven you from your house by violence, how would you have behaved?

A similar appeal he makes use of in his Oration for Rabirius.

But what could you have done in such a case, and at such a juncture?—when to have sat still or to have withdrawn, would have been cowardice: when the wickedness and fury of Saturninus had sent for you into the Capitol, and the consuls had called you to protect the safety and liberty of your country? Whose authority, whose voice, which party would you have followed? and whose orders would you have chosen to obey?

"This figure," says an ingenious author, "has "something of the air of conversation; and "though public discourses ought not to be "turned into mere conversation, yet a proper "and decent mixture of such a sort of freedom "entertains our hearers, both on account of its "variety, and its apparent condescension and "good-nature." *Gibbon's Rhetoric*, p. 166.

From the account we have given of this figure, it is sufficiently plain, that it ought to be pronounced in an easy familiar middle tone of

voice; without passion, and with such a frankness and openness of manner, as if we were fully satisfied of the justice of our cause, and venture it to be decided on the common principles of reason and equity.

We have a shining example of this figure in the speech of the Lord Chief Justice to King Henry the Fifth, to excuse himself for committing him to prison for striking him in the execution of his office, when he was prince of Wales.

I then did use the person of your father;
The image of his power lay then in me;
And in th' administration of his law,
While I was busy for the commonwealth,
Your highness pleased to forget my place,
The majesty and pow'r of law and justice,
The image of the king whom I presented,
And struck me in the very seat of judgment;
Whereon, as an offender to your father,
I gave bold way to my authority,
And did commit you. If the deed were ill,
Be you contented, wearing now the garland,
To have a son set your decrees at nought,
To pluck down justice from your awful bench,
To trip the course of law, and blunt the sword
That guards the peace and safety of your person,—
Nay more, to spurn at your most royal image,
And mock your working in a second body.
Question your royal thoughts; make the case yours:
Be now the father, and propose a son;
Hear your own dignity so much profan'd;
See your most dreadful laws so loosely slighted;
Behold yourself so by a son disdain'd;
And then imagine me taking your part,
And in your pow'r so silencing your son.
After this cold consid'rance, sentence me;
And, as you are a king, speak in your state
What I have done that misbecame my place,
My person, or my liege's sovereignty.

The pronunciation of this speech will derive its greatest beauty from an attention to the Anacoenosis, *beginning at the eleventh line.* The

preceding lines must paint the dignity of the office, the atrocity of the blow, and the courage and resolution of the commitment; but the succeeding lines must assume a different style: they must begin by a frankness of manner, approaching to indifference, but gradually assume a dignity, as they begin to describe objects of power, authority, and grandeur. An easy and almost indifferent manner takes place again at *Question your royal thoughts;* but this manner, as in the preceding part, naturally slides into one more dignified at *Hear your own dignity so much profan'd,* &c.—but at the lines *And then imagine me,* &c. the voice again assumes the plain, open, frank, indifferent tone, till the concluding lines *After this cold consid'rance,* &c. when the voice assumes a firmer tone, to indicate a consciousness of the justice of the cause, and a confidence in the uprightness of the determination.

Hypotypósis.

HYPOTYPOSIS, or *Lively Description,* is a representation of things in such strong and glowing colours, as to make them seem painted or transacted to the hearer's imagination.

This is the definition of the Hypotyposis, which we find in most of our books of rhetoric: but if the definition of a figure, which has been given at the beginning of this part of the present work, be a just one, Description is no more entitled to the appellation of a figure than Narration, Contemplation, Reflection, or any similar expression of the mind. But though, rigorously speaking, it may not be a figure of rhetoric, it is a species of writing which deserves a very particular consideration, as it is the subject of delivery; for there is no part of compo-

sition which requires greater taste and judgment than that where the description of objects is strong and vivid, and where the sound seems an echo to the sense. Where the ȯbjects are common, and the subject without passion, the pronunciation ought to be plain, simple, and narrative; but where the objects are grand, sublime, and terrific, the delivery ought to assume those emotions which the objects naturally excite. Where we describe passion, our pronunciation must be impassioned, and thus we shall paint or draw a picture as it were of the objects or transactions we delineate. Those who perceive the necessity and beauty of this rhetorical colouring, and yet want taste and discernment to know where to bestow it, and in what degree, generally overcharge the picture, and give such a caricature as disgusts us more than a total absence of every ornament. Great care therefore must be taken in the delivery of description, that we do not become actors instead of describers, and mimics instead of relators.

Cicero's character of Catiline is a well-known instance of this figure.

He had the appearance of the greatest virtues; he made use of many ill men to carry on his designs, and pretended to be in the interest of the best men; he had a very engaging behaviour, and did not want industry or application; he gave into the greatest dissoluteness, but was a good soldier. Nor do I believe there ever was the like monster in the world, made up of such jarring and repugnant qualities and inclinations. Who at one time was more acceptable to the best men, and who more intimate with the worst? Who was once a better patriot, and who a greater enemy to the state? Who more devoted to pleasures, who more patient in labours? Who more rapacious, and yet more profuse? He suited himself to the humours of all he conversed with; was serious with the reserved, and pleasant with the jocose; grave with the aged, and facetious with the young; bold with the daring, and extravagant with the profligate.

This description of Catiline, though uncommonly strong and animated, contains no striking imagery, no objects of terrour or surprise, no traits of passion or emotion, and therefore requires nothing in the pronunciation but a plainness and distinctness; long pauses between the contrasted parts, and a somewhat higher tone of voice in the former than the latter, in order the better to show the opposition: thus the clause, *Who at one time was more acceptable to the best men,* should be pronounced in a more elevated tone than, *and who more intimate with the worst?* and so of the rest.

But in his description of the behaviour of Verres to a Roman citizen in the island of Sicily, we must accompany the words with every passion excited by the objects, or we shall deprive the passage of its greatest force and beauty.

The unhappy man, arrested as he was going to embark for his native country, is brought before the wicked prætor. With eyes darting fury, and a countenance distorted with cruelty, he orders the helpless victim of his rage to be stripped, and rods to be brought; accusing him, but without the least shadow of evidence, or even of suspicion, of having come to Sicily as a spy. It was in vain that the unhappy man cried out, "I am a Roman citizen! I have served under Lucius Pretius, who is now at Panormus, and will attest my innocence!" The bloodthirsty prætor, deaf to all he could urge in his own defence, ordered the infamous punishment to be inflicted. Thus, fathers, was an innocent Roman citizen publicly mangled with scourging, whilst the only words he uttered, amidst his cruel sufferings, were, "I am a Roman citizen!" With these he hoped to defend himself from violence and infamy: but of so little service was this privilege to him, that, while he was thus asserting his citizenship, the order was given for his execution —for his execution upon the cross!

The beginning of this passage should be accompanied with pity, and something of the dismay of a person under the unhappy circumstances described. The description of the præ-

tor should have a tincture of that fierceness in it which is so strongly marked. *It was in vain the unhappy man cried out, I am a Roman citizen!* &c. should be pronounced in a loud complaining tone: and at *The blood-thirsty prætor*, the voice must again assume a tincture of the fierce. The address to the judges should be pronounced in a lower and more tranquil tone, partaking strongly of the grief such a scene must excite in every generous breast; and the conclusion, *for his execution on the cross*, must be accompanied with a low hoarse tone of voice, expressive of that horrour every Roman must feel to have a citizen suffer a death destined to the meanest slaves.— How little did the orator suspect that this death, the ignominy of which seems to make him shudder, was soon to become the joy and exultation of the world!

INSTANCES of the Hypotyposis in verse are innumerable. Description seems the province of poetry. The scenery of nature naturally inspires us with numbers, and these numbers heighten and embellish the beauties of nature.

What can be more beautiful than the picture of a country life drawn by Virgil, and copied by Dryden.

Here easy quiet, a secure retreat,
A harmless life, that knows not how to cheat,
With home-bred plenty the rich owner bless,
And rural pleasures crown his happiness.
Unvex'd with quarrels, undisturb'd with noise,
The country king his peaceful realm enjoys;
Cool grots and living lakes, the flow'ry pride
Of meads, and streams that through the valley glide;
And shady groves, that easy sleep invite,
And after toilsome days, a sweet repose at night.

Georg. b. ii. v. 467.

This passage presents us with no sounding epithets, no animated strokes of passion; but a judicious reader will not therefore suppose it devoid of expression: he will consider the disposition such a scene would excite in the mind, and accompany his pronunciation with such tones as express this disposition. The tranquillity of this scene, therefore, must be expressed by a soft easy tone bordering on the plaintive; it admits of little or no variety, except dwelling a little longer than common on the word *cool*, the sound of which, it is presumed, is somewhat expressive of the sense.

Milton's description of rural solitude is a masterpiece of this kind.

And when the sun begins to fling
His flaring beams, me, Goddess, bring
To arched walks of twilight groves,
And shadows brown that Sylvan loves,
Of pine or monumental oak,
Where the rude axe, with heaved stroke,
Was never heard the nymphs to daunt,
Or fright them from their hallow'd haunt;
There in close covert by some brook,
Where no profaner eye may look,
Hide me from day's garish eye,
While the bee, with honey'd thigh,
That at her flow'ry work doth sing,
And the waters murmuring,
With such concert as they keep,
Entice the dewy-feather'd sleep. *Il Penseroso.*

The first line, and as far of the second as to *beams*, must be pronounced in a tone expressive of splendour; the succeeding part of the line, and what follows it, must assume a cool tranquil tone as far as *haunt;* then the voice must fall into a lower tone approaching to a monotone, and proceed softly and slowly to the end.

The description of a lady's toilet, in Pope's Rape of the Lock, is superlatively fine.

And now unveil'd the toilet stands display'd,
Each silver vase in mystic order laid.
First rob'd in white, the nymph intent adores,
With head uncover'd, the cosmetic pow'rs:
A heav'nly image in the glass appears,
To that she bends, to that her eyes she rears.
Th' inferior priestess, at her altar's side,
Trembling begins the sacred rites of pride.
Unnumber'd treasures ope at once, and here
The various off'rings of the world appear.
From each she nicely culls with curious toil,
And decks the goddess with the glitt'ring spoil:
This casket India's glowing gems unlocks,
And all Arabia breathes from yonder box;
The tortoise here and elephant unite,
Transform'd to combs, the speckled and the white.
Here files of pins extend their shining rows,
Puffs, powders, patches, Bibles, billet-doux.
Now awful beauty puts on all its arms,
The fair each moment rises in her charms,
Repairs her smiles, awakens every grace,
And calls forth all the wonders of her face!
Sees by degrees a purer blush arise,
And keener lightning quicken in her eyes.
The busy sylphs surround their darling care:
These set the head, and those divide the hair;
Some fold the sleeve, while others plait the gown,
And Betty's prais'd for labours not her own.

This passage requires no great variety of voice, but admits of considerable variety of expression; and, as the style is mock-heroic, this expression may be much stronger than if the composition were simple and unaffected. A dignity, solemnity, and importance of voice and manner must describe the toilet and the nymph's approach to it, in the first six lines; but the fourth couplet must be expressive of the dread and caution with which a timid servant assists a haughty beauty. The succeeding couplet must have all the splen-

dour of pronunciation intimated by its objects, and the next two lines must abate of this splendour, to express the curious toil with which each is culled. The next four lines are to be as splendid and glowing as possible. The files of pins must shine with great dignity and importance, while the several articles of the next line must be pronounced simply and without ornament; but the succeeding couplet has an awfulness and dignity approaching to devotion: the next four lines abate of this dignity, to express rapture and surprise at such sudden and increasing flashes of beauty: while the four last lines descend to an expression of alertness and activity, concluding with a complacency and satisfaction, at having so well performed the important task.

UNDER the figure called Hypotyposis may be classed such words as are naturally descriptive of the things they signify; that is, such words as either from the softness or harshness, length or shortness, of the letters of which they are composed, are expressive of the nature of the objects for which they stand; or, as Pope has happily expressed it, words, the sound of which is an echo to the sense. The occasional coincidence of the sound and sense of words has been an object of attention with all writers both ancient and modern, and those must be severe critics indeed who deny the propriety and beauty of this coincidence. It must be confessed that the affectation of this, like every other affectation, is truly disgusting; but proves, at the same time, that when this coincidence of sound and sense is natural and unaffected, it is really an excellence: for though defects are sometimes the objects of imitation, they are not imitated as defects, but

because they happen to be associated with some beauties which the imitator is unable to represent. That there is much of imagination in this imitation of the sense by the sound of words, must be allowed. A judicious critic has very justly observed, that it most frequently exists only in the fancy of the writer or reader, and that the words we often suppose to echo the sense have no other resemblance than what arises from association*. But whence can arise the very general opinion that so many words are really expressive of the sense they stand for? It must be from their being generally accompanied by a certain emotion of mind, which the meaning of the words excite; and this emotion of mind being constantly associated with the words, the very sound of the words, according to the laws of association, seems tinctured with the emotion, which naturally it has no relation to. This, however, sufficiently shows how natural it is for man to accompany his words with emotions, and to expect emotions when he sees the words that generally accompany them. Hence we may infer this general rule, that wherever there are words expressive of emotions, we ought to pronounce these words with the emotions they signify; that is, when the language is impassioned, and the words are not merely narrative or didactic; for in this case the words expressive of passion are to be pronounced as coolly, as if they stood for the most uninteresting objects. Thus in Pope's Essay on Man:

Love, Hope, and Joy, fair Pleasure's smiling train;
Hate, Fear, and Grief, the family of Pain;
These mix'd with art, and to due bounds confin'd,
Make and maintain the balance of the mind.

* Rambler, No. 93.

It would border greatly on affectation to give the first line of this passage any distinct and marking expression of love, hope, and joy; or the second line any strong expression of hate, fear, and grief; because these passions are presented to the mind in a philosophic view, and only mentioned as the materials of argument: but in the following passage from the same poet:

> Curs'd be the verse, how well soe'er it flow,
> That tends to make one worthy man my foe,
> Give virtue scandal, innocence a fear,
> Or from the soft-ey'd virgin steal a tear.

The first line in this passage, I say, must be pronounced with all that keenness of resentment we naturally feel at injuries done to a worthy character: the second line must have a tincture of approbation on the word *worthy*, to express that character: and the third and fourth lines must assume somewhat of the plaintive, as they naturally excite pity for amiable characters in distress.

But though the words themselves frequently direct us to the passion we ought to express, it must be carefully observed, that there is often a master-passion, which so swallows up the rest, that whatever passions or emotions are mentioned by this leading passion, they have scarcely any expression of their own, but seem to fall into the general expression of the passion that is principal. Thus when the Duke of York, after describing the entry of Bolingbroke, gives an account of that of King Richard, he says,

> As in a theatre the eyes of men,
> After a well-grac'd actor leaves the stage,
> Are idly bent on him who enters next,

Thinking his prattle to be tedious;
Ev'n so, or with much more contempt, men's eyes
Did scowl on Richard; no man cried, God save him!
No joyful tongue gave him his welcome home,
But dust was thrown upon his sacred head,
Which with such gentle sorrow he shook off
(His face still combating with tears and smiles,
The badges of his grief and patience)
That had not God, for some strong purpose, steel'd,
The hearts of men, they must perforce have melted,
And barbarism itself have pitied him.
But Heaven hath a hand in these events;
To whose high will we bound our calm contents.

Shakspeare's Richard II.

In this passage the prevailing passions are grief and pity; these must so possess the speaker, in reciting these lines, that no expression of contempt must accompany that word in the fifth line, nor the least glimpse of joy or acclamation the lines that follow: a slight expression of meekness may accompany the word *gentle* in the ninth line, and the two last lines may with great propriety be a little diversified from the rest, by dropping in some measure the sorrowful, and assuming the tone of reverence and resignation.

Having premised these restrictions, it may be observed, that there are some words which afford a speaker a good opportunity of showing his expression by the very nature of the letters of which they are composed. Thus the word *all* has a full, bold, open, sound, which will admit of being dwelt upon longer than common, especially if the language is animated; either when emphatical, as in Satan's speech to Beelzebub, in Paradise Lost,

——What though the field be lost,
All is not lost:——

or as narrative, in the exordium to the First Book:

Of man's first disobedience, and the fruit
Of that forbidden tree, whose mortal taste
Brought death into the world, and all our wo,
With loss of Eden, till one greater man
Restore us, and regain the blissful seat;
Sing, heav'nly Muse——————

In these instances, as in most others, we seldom hear the word *all* pronounced sufficiently full, and expressive of the extent of its signification. The word *shame* will generally admit of being dwelt on in the same manner, as in the following example:

Strong and weighty, O Catiline! is the decree of the senate we can now produce against you; neither is wisdom wanting in this state, nor authority in this assembly; but we, let me here take shame to myself, we, the consuls, are wanting in our duty. *Cicero against Catiline, Orat.* i.

The word *detestable* is seldom used but when the language is animated, and then an uncommon force upon the accented syllable *test*, that is, as Shakspeare calls it, in his picture of anger, " holding hard the breath, and pronouncing it " through the fixed teeth," will give it an expression of *detestation* very suitable to the idea it excites. This manner of pronouncing may be supposed to be what Shakspeare meant in Hamlet's advice to the players, by " suiting the " action to the word and the word to the ac- " tion." The actor cannot suit the word to the action any other way than by pronouncing it Thus where Cassius, in Julius Cæsar, describes Cæsar and himself plunging into the Tiber.

——————————Upon the word,
Accoutred as I was, I plunged in,
And bade him follow; so indeed he did,

We may with the utmost propriety give a downward plunge with the arm, to express the action implied by the word, and I think as properly accompany this word and action with a full, deep, hollow, forcible tone of voice, as suitable to the action; this, if overdone, or come tardy off, as Shakspeare expresses it, I own is truly disgusting: but let those who dissuade youth from attempting expression, by reminding them of the hazard they run, remember, that every excellence borders closely upon a blemish; but that unless we risk these blemishes, we can never hope to arrive at excellence.

Vision.

VISION is a representation of things distant and unseen, as if they were actually present. This is so nearly related to the foregoing figure, as to be often confounded with it; but there seems to be at bottom as much difference between this figure, where the speaker *sees* the object or transaction, and the Hypotyposis, where he only *describes* it, as there is between a painting and an original. This is certain; Vision requires a much more animated pronunciation than Description: in the former, the passions are excited by the sight of the objects themselves; in the latter, only by the remembrance of them. Vision, therefore, is a figure which is never employed, but when the composition is highly impassioned, and the writer becomes a species of actor. Accordingly we seldom find it employed in prose: it is among the poets we must look for instances; nor are they to be very frequently found even here; for we must not

look upon such examples as are generally brought of this figure as real instances of it: this figure is never genuine but when the writer supposes he actually sees the objects he describes: so that however strong and glowing description may be, yet without this circumstance it is not a true example of the figure in question.

Pope has given us a striking instance of this figure in the beginning of his Elegy to the memory of an unfortunate Lady.

What beck'ning ghost, along the moonlight shade,
Invites my steps, and points to yonder glade?
'Tis she—but why that bleeding bosom gor'd,
Why dimly gleams the visionary sword?
O ever beauteous, ever friendly, tell,
Is it in Heav'n a crime to love too well?
To bear too tender, or too firm a heart,
To act a lover's, or a Roman's part?
Is there no bright reversion in the sky
For those who greatly think or bravely die?

No composition can require a more animated pronunciation than this passage: if the reader does not repeat it nearly as if he saw a ghost beckoning to him, he cannot be said to deliver it properly; the words would contradict the action. Whether an elegy may with propriety begin with so much fire is a question I leave others to decide; but if so much fire be assumed in the writing, it ought undoubtedly to be expressed in the speaking. The truth is, Pope's personal regard for the subject of this elegy, and his feelings for her unhappy fate, seem to have carried him beyond his usual accuracy in composition, as well as his delicacy of moral sentiments. For what can excuse his reproach of Heaven for disapproving of suicide, and his apology for this atrocious crime, by treating those

as mean spirited wretches who dare not be guilty of it*? What is remarkable too is, that the lines in which these sentiments are conveyed are as feeble and childish as the sentiments are shocking; but when the poet descends from this impious flight at Heaven, and describes the truly pitiable view of an amiable object driven to an act of desperation, and of the forlorn and neglected state of her poor remains in a foreign clime—then we feel all the magic of his pen—we sympathise with the object of his pity, and are transported to the very spot where she lies numbered with the unhonoured dead. These beauties are so bewitching as to make us forget the former part of the elegy, which, if united with lines less enchanting, would have startled us with their falsehood and pernicious tendency. But, to quit this digression (which it is hoped will be pardoned for the sake of unexperienced youth, to whom it may be useful,) we ought to pronounce the two first lines of this passage with a strong expression of surprise, mixed with some degree of fear,—the voice assuming a high and soft tone. *'Tis she* must be pronounced with a suddenness expressive of joy at having discovered a lost, loved object; and the rest of the passage must assume the plaintive, with the

* Why bade ye else, ye pow'rs! her soul aspire
Above the vulgar flight of low desire?
Ambition first sprung from your blest abodes,
The glorious fault of angels and of gods:
Thence to their images on Earth it flows,
And in the breasts of kings and heroes glows.
Most souls, 'tis true, peep out but once an age,
Dull sullen pris'ners in the body's cage;
Dim lights of life, that burn a length of years
Useless, unseen, like lamps in sepulchres;
Like eastern kings, a lazy state they keep,
And, close confin'd to their own palace, sleep.

voice in the rising inflexion at the end of every second line.

Shakspeare's description of Dover Cliff is a beautiful instance of this figure: for it is not the description of a thing past or absent, but as actually present to the speaker.

Come on, sir, here's the place—stand still. How dreadful
And dizzy 'tis to cast one's eyes so low!
The crows and choughs, that wing the midway air,
Show scarce so gross as beetles. Half way down
Hangs one that gathers samphire; dreadful trade!
Methinks he seems no bigger than his head!
The fishermen that walk upon the beach
Appear like mice; and yon tall anch'ring bark
Diminish'd to her cock; her cock, a buoy
Almost too small for sight. The murm'ring surge,
That on the unnumber'd pebbles idly chafes,
Cannot be heard so high. I'll look no more,
Lest my brain turn, and the deficient sight
Topple down headlong. *Shakspeare's King Lear.*

This description commences, after a long pause, in a low tone of voice, expressive of surprise and fear, at *How dreadful*, &c. *The crows and choughs*, &c. must have more of surprise and less of fear, and be in a somewhat higher tone of voice. The next sentence assumes a lower tone, with more of fear, especially on the exclamation, *dreadful trade!* The succeeding sentences have a little lighter tone of voice, and more of surprise, with a very considerable pause after each, as if the speaker took some time to consider the object before he described it The last sentence concludes in a lower tone, expressive of uneasiness at the consequences of continuing any longer on so dreadful a precipice.

Simile.

THIS figure may be justly esteemed one of the most useful lights and greatest ornaments of composition. In prose it greatly clears and enforces a thought, and in poetry wonderfully enlivens and embellishes it. Little can be said respecting the pronunciation of this figure when in prose, only it may be remarked, that it generally admits of a longer pause than ordinary before it, that the reader may be prepared for the transition. Thus in Cicero's First Oration against Catiline:

If, in so dangerous a rebellion, this parricide alone should be exterminated, we may perhaps for a short time seem to be relieved from anxiety and terrour; but the danger will remain, and will be wholly shut up in the veins and bowels of the commonwealth. As men grievously sick, when they are in the burning heat of a raging fever, upon taking a draught of cold water seem at first to be refreshed by it, but afterwards are more heavily and violently attacked by their distemper; in like manner this disease, under which the republic labours, will gain a respite by the extinction of Catiline, but will afterwards, as the rest of his accomplices still survive, return upon us with redoubled fury.

The simile in this passage has nothing in it that requires a pronunciation different from the rest; but in poetry this figure always admits of being pronounced in a lower tone of voice than the preceding lines; and this tone generally falls into the plaintive, and approaches to a monotone. For as the mind in forming a simile is seldom agitated with any very strong passion, that tone of voice which expresses serene, tranquil contemplation, seems to be the tone suitable to the simile: and this, if I am not mistaken, will be found to be the plaintive tone, approaching

to a monotone. Not that this monotone is to be continued through the whole simile: if it does but commence with a monotone, it may slide gradually into such a diversity of inflexion as the sense seems to require. So in that beautiful simile in Parnel's Hermit, where a pious mind, agitated with doubts, is compared to a calm lake disturb'd by a falling stone.

A life so sacred, such serene repose,
Seem'd Heaven itself, till one suggestion rose,—
That vice should triumph, virtue vice obey;—
This sprung some doubt of Providence's sway.
So when a smooth expanse receives impress'd
Calm nature's image on its wat'ry breast,
Down bend the banks, the trees depending grow,
And skies beneath with answ'ring colours glow:
But if a stone the gentle sea divide,
Swift ruffling circles curl on ev'ry side;
And glimm'ring fragments of a broken sun,
Banks, trees, and skies, in thick disorder run.

In reading this simile, the voice should fall into a plaintive monotone at *So when a smooth expanse*, and continue this tone till the words *wat'ry breast*, the first of which must have the falling, and the last the rising inflexion. The next couplet must be pronounced differently, that is, the rising inflexion on *grow*, and the falling on *glow*, to express the portion of perfect sense it includes. The rest of the simile must be pronounced with considerable variety: the voice must assume a brisker, swifter tone, and the inflexions must be various, to express the variety of objects thrown together on a sudden.

But in the following simile, from the same beautiful poem, where the youth shows the hermit the cup he has stolen, the voice must continue in a monotone till the last member, *and*

looks with fear, which must end with the rising inflexion:

Then pleas'd and thankful from the porch they go,
And, but the landlord, none had cause of wo:
His cup was vanish'd; for, in secret guise,
The younger guest purloin'd the glitt'ring prize.
As one who spies a serpent in his way,
Glist'ning and basking in the summer ray,
Disorder'd stops, to shun the danger near,
Then walks with faintness on, and looks with fear,—
So seem'd the sire, when, far upon the road,
The shining spoil his wily partner show'd.

The same observations may be applied to a simile in a beautiful poem called The Shipwreck, canto ii. v. 175:

While o'er the foam the ship impetuous flies,
Th' attentive pilot still the helm applies:
As in pursuit, along th' aërial way,
With ardent eye the falcon marks his prey,
Each motion watches of the doubtful chace,
Obliquely wheeling through the liquid space;
So, govern'd by the steersman's glowing hands,
The regent helm her motion still commands.

Here the voice falls into a lower tone at the third line, and continues this tone to the end of the fourth, which concludes with the rising inflexion: the next couplet requires exactly the same tone of voice, but must have the rising inflexion in a somewhat higher tone on *space*, when, after a long pause, the voice begins the last couplet in a higher tone than the two preceding ones, and admits of a variety of inflexion on several of its parts.

But when in descriptive poetry a simile is introduced to illustrate some grand or terrible object, the monotone is no less suitable than in placid subjects. This may be illustrated by a passage from the beautiful poem last quoted:

Rous'd from his trance, he mounts with eyes aghast,
When o'er the ship in undulation vast
A giant surge down rushes from on high,
And fore and aft dissever'd ruins lie;
As when, Britannia's empire to maintain,
Great HAWKE descends in thunder on the main,
Around the brazen voice of battle roars,
And fatal lightnings blast the hostile shores;
Beneath the storm their shatter'd navies groan,
The trembling deep recoils from zone to zone.
Thus the torn vessel felt th' enormous stroke,
The beams beneath the thund'ring deluge broke.

In reading this passage the voice ought to fall into a lower tone at the fifth line, and continue nearly in a monotone till *thunder on the main*, the first of which words must have the falling, and the last the rising inflexion: the next couplet assumes the same low monotone, and continues it to *hostile shores*, which adopt the falling and rising inflexions like *thunder* and *main:* the succeeding couplet commences and continues the monotone like the last till the two words *zone* and *zone*, the first of which has the falling, and the last the rising inflexion, in a somewhat higher tone than in the two former lines; but the last couplet, which applies the simile, begins in a high tone of voice, adopts the falling inflexion on *vessel*, and lowers the voice gradually on the last line to the end.

Prosopopéia.

PROSOPOPEIA, or *Personification*, is the investing of qualities or things inanimate with the character of persons, or the introducing of dead or absent persons as if they were alive and present. This is at once one of the boldest and finest figures in rhetoric. Poets are prodigal in their use of this figure, but orators more sparing,

as nothing but a degree of enthusiasm can make it appear natural. The general rule for pronouncing this species of figure will be easily conceived, when we recollect that, wherever we give language to a character, we must give that language such a pronunciation as is suitable to that character. Thus, when Cicero introduced Milo as speaking to the citizens of Rome:

Should he, holding up his bloody sword, cry out, "Attend, I pray, hearken, O citizens! I have killed Clodius; by this sword, and by this right hand, I have kept off his rage from your throats, which no laws, no courts of judicature could restrain; it is by my means that justice, equity, laws, liberty, shame, and modesty, remain in the city."—Is it to be feared how the city would bear this declaration? Is there any one who, in such a case, would not approve and commend it?

In pronouncing this passage we must give the words of Milo all that energy and fire which we suppose would actuate him on such an occasion. The right arm must be lifted up and extended: the voice loud and elevated, as if speaking to a multitude, and almost every word must be emphatical; a long pause must precede the first question, which must begin in a low tone of voice, and end with the rising inflexion; and as the last question is in opposition to the first, by contrasting approbation with disapprobation, it ought to be pronounced differently, and end with the falling inflexion: according to the rule laid down in the Elements of Elocution, vol. i. p. 297.

But here a question will naturally arise about the force we are to give to this figure when we only read it. Are we, it will be demanded, to give all the force and energy which we suppose Milo made use of, when we merely read it in Cicero's orations? Yes, it may be answered, if we read these orations oratorically. But if we read them only to inform our hearers of the subject,

without assuming the character of the orator, it is certain that there is no necessity for the same force as in the rostrum. The character we assume when we take up the book makes all the difference. The pronunciation expected from a gentleman by a small circle of his friends, is as different from that of the orator, as the language of the orator is from the chit-chat of conversation; but if the gentleman should, for the entertainment of his friends, assume the character of the orator, it is then expected that he should give the composition all the force and energy of which it is susceptible, that is, all the force and energy that would become the characters whose words are assumed. Thus Milton may be read by a person who forms no pretensions to public notice, in a manner very differently from one who pronounces from the rostrum; but if Milton be read to the greatest advantage, it must certainly be in the latter, and not the former manner; though it must still be carefully observed, that these two manners differ only in degrees of force; the tones, inflexions, and gesticulations, are essentially the same in both.

It was observed, in speaking of the Hypotyposis, that there is often a leading passion, which so absorbs the mind of the speaker, as to give every other passion which passes through it a strong tincture of itself. This leading passion may, for the sake of distinction, be called primary, and the other, secondary. If we so far forget the primary passion as to assume the secondary entirely, we fall into mimicry, and render our expression, however just in other respects, ridiculous. Thus, in the following speech of Hotspur in the first part of Henry the IVth:

-For it made me mad
To see him shine so brisk, and smell so sweet,
And talk, so like a waiting gentlewoman,
Of guns, and drums, and wounds, (Heav'n save the mark!)
And telling me the sovereign'st thing on Earth
Was spermaceti for an inward bruise;
And that it was great pity, so it was,
That villainous saltpetre should be digg'd
Out of the bowels of the harmless Earth,
Which many a good tall fellow had destroy'd
So cowardly; and but for these vile guns,
He would himself have been a soldier.
This bald unjointed chat of his, my lord,
I answer'd indirectly, as I said;
And I beseech you let not his report
Come current for an accusation
Betwixt my love and your high majesty.

If the hero who pronounces this description were to divest himself of the primary passions, anger and contempt, and go so far into the secondary as to assume the character he describes, we might laugh at him as a mimic, but should despise him as a man:—no; while the leading passions, anger and contempt, have proper possession of him, they will keep him from a too servile imitation of the object of his resentment; but that a considerable degree of imitation should be allowed in the pronunciation of this passage is not to be disputed. The same observations hold good in pronouncing the words of Cæsar, in a speech of Cassius, where he is describing that hero under the paroxysms of a fever:

-I did hear him groan:
Ay, and that tongue of his, that bade the Romans
Mark him, and write his speeches in their books,
Alas! it cried, Give me some drink, Titinius;
As a sick girl——— *Shakspeare's Julius Cæsar.*

If these words of Cæsar, *Give me some drink,*

Titinius, were to be pronounced untinctured with that scorn and contempt with which Cassius is overflowing, and the small feeble voice of a sick person were to be perfectly imitated, it would be unworthy the character of Cassius, and fit only for a buffoon in a farce.

These observations will lead us to decide in many other cases. There is a beautiful Prosopopeia of a hoary-headed swain, in Gray's Elegy in a Country Church-Yard:

For thee who, mindful of th' unhonour'd dead,
   Dost in these lines their artless tale relate,
If chance, by lonely contemplation led,
   Some kindred spirit should inquire thy fate,

Haply some hoary-headed swain may say,
   " Oft have we seen him, at the peep of dawn,
" Brushing with hasty steps the dews away,
   " To meet the sun upon the upland lawn, &c."

Nothing can be conceived more truly ridiculous, in reading this passage, than quitting the melancholy tone of the relator, and assuming the indifferent and rustic accent of the old swain: and yet no errour so likely to be mistaken for a beauty by a reader of no taste: while a good reader, without entirely dropping the plaintive tone, will abate it a little, and give it a slight tincture only of the indifference and rusticity of the person introduced.

But where the personification is assumed instantaneously, and does not arise out of any other passion, provided we are reading to the public, it ought to have exactly the same force and energy as in dramatic composition. Thus the sublime rage of Gray's Bard:

Ruin seize thee, ruthless king,—
   Confusion on thy banners wait!
Though fann'd by conquest's crimson wing,
   They mock the air in idle state,

Helm nor hauberk's twisted mail,
Nor e'en thy virtues, tyrant, can avail
To save thy secret soul from nightly fears,
From Cambria's curse, from Cambria's tears.

These lines, I say, demand an elevation of voice, and an expression of the utmost rage and resentment: but in this expression we must attend more particularly to the caution of Shakspeare, "that in the very torrent, tempest, and "I may say, whirlwind of our passion, we must "acquire and beget a temperance that may give "it smoothness."

The personification of pride, in Pope's Essay on Man, is not preceded by any other passion, and may therefore be allowed a forcible expression.

Ask for what end the heavenly bodies shine,
Earth for whose use: Pride answers, "'Tis for mine.
"For me kind nature wakes her genial pow'r,
"Suckles each herb, and spreads out ev'ry flow'r;
"Annual for me the grape, the rose renew
"The juice nectareous, and the balmy dew;
"For me the mine a thousand treasures brings,
"For me health gushes from a thousand springs;
"Seas roll to waft me, suns to light me rise,
"My footstool Earth, my canopy the skies."

This passage admits of a certain splendour in the pronunciation expressive of the ostentation of the speaker, and the riches and grandeur of the objects introduced.

Many other Figures of Rhetoric might be adduced; but as few of them deserve the appellation, and none seem to have any thing to entitle them to a peculiarity of pronunciation, I shall at present content myself with those I have given, and hope the reader will not find the directions I have added entirely useless.

MODULATION

AND

MANAGEMENT OF THE VOICE.

ONE of the most difficult things in reading and speaking, where the subject is varied and impassioned, is the modulation and management of the voice; and this perhaps of all the parts of elocution is the least capable of being conveyed by writing; but general rules and useful hints may certainly be given, which will put the pupil in a capacity of feeling his own powers, and of improving himself. Such rules and hints we shall endeavour to lay down in as clear and summary a manner as possible.

The first object of every speaker's attention is to have a smooth, even, full tone of voice: if nature has not given him such a voice, he must endeavour as much as possible to acquire it; nor ought he to despair; for such is the force of exercise upon the organs of speech, as well as every other in the human body, that constant practice will strengthen the voice in any key we use it to; that key therefore, which is the most natural, and which we have the greatest occasion to use, should be the key, which we ought the most diligently to improve.

Every one has a certain pitch of voice, in which he is most easy to himself and most

agreeable to others; this may be called the natural pitch: this is the pitch in which we converse; and this must be the basis of every improvement we acquire from art and exercise. In order, therefore, to strengthen this middle tone, we ought to read and speak in this tone as loud as possible, without suffering the voice to rise into a higher key: this, however, is no easy operation: it is not very difficult to be loud in a high tone; but to be loud and forcible, without raising the voice into a higher key, requires great practice and management. The best method of acquiring this power of voice is to practise reading and speaking some strong, animated passages in a small room, and to persons placed at as small a distance as possible: for, as we naturally raise our voice to a higher key when we speak to people at a great distance, so we naturally lower our key as those we speak to come nearer: when, therefore, we have no idea of being heard at a distance, the voice will not be so apt to rise into a higher key when we want to be forcible: and consequently exerting as much force as we are able in a small room, and to people near us, will tend to swell and strengthen the voice in the middle tone. A good practice on this tone of voice will be such passages as Macbeth's challenge to Banquo's ghost, or any other that are addressed immediately to a person near us:

What man dare I dare:
Approach thou like the rugged Russian bear,
The arm'd rhinoceros, or Hyrcanian tyger;
Take any shape but that. and my firm nerves
Shall never tremble Be alive again,
And dare me to the desert with thy sword;
If trembling I inhibit, then protest me
The baby of a girl. Hence, horrible shadow,—
Unreal mock'ry, hence!———

Instructions for acquiring low Tones of Voice.

As few voices are perfect,—those which have a good bottom often wanting a top, and inversely,—care should be taken to improve by practice that part of the voice which is most deficient: for instance; if we want to gain a bottom, we ought to practise speeches which require exertion, a little below the common pitch; when we can do this with ease, we may practise them on a little lower note, and so on till we are as low as we desire; for this purpose, it will be necessary to repeat such passages as require a full, audible tone of voice in a low key; of this kind are those which contain hatred, scorn, or reproach; such as the following from Shakspeare, where Lady Macbeth reproaches her husband with want of manliness:

——————— ——— ——O proper stuff!
This is the very painting of your fears:
This is the air-drawn dagger, which you said,
Led you to Duncan. Oh, these flaws and starts,
(Impostors to true fear) would well become
A woman's story at a winter's fire,
Authoris'd by her grandam. Shame itself!
Why do you make such faces? When all's done,
You look but on a stool.

Or when Lady Constance, in King John, reproaches the Duke of Austria with want of courage and spirit:

————Thou slave! thou wretch! thou coward!
Thou little valiant, great in villainy!
Thou ever strong upon the stronger side!
Thou Fortune's champion, thou dost never fight
But when her humourous ladyship is by
To teach thee safety! Thou art perjur'd too,
And sooth'st up greatness. What a fool art thou,
A ramping fool; to brag, and stamp, and swear,

Upon my party! thou cold blooded slave;
Hast thou not spoke like thunder on my side?
Been sworn my soldier? bidding me depend
Upon thy stars, thy fortune, and thy strength?
And dost thou now fall over to my foes?
Thou wear a lion's hide! Doff it for shame,
And hang a calf's skin on those recreant limbs.

Or where the Duke of Suffolk, in Henry the Sixth, curses the objects of his hatred.

——————— Poison be their drink,
Gall, worse than gall, the daintiest meat they taste;
Their sweetest shade a grove of cypress trees,
Their sweetest prospect murd'ring basilisks,
Their softest touch as smart as lizards' stings,
Their music frightful as the serpent's hiss,
And boding screech-owls make the concert full;
All the foul terrours of dark-seated Hell!

Instructions for acquiring high Tones of Voice.

WHEN we would strengthen the voice in a higher note, it will be necessary to practise such passages as require a high tone of voice; and if we find the voice grow thin, or approach to a squeak upon the high note, it will be proper to swell the voice a little below this high note, and to give it force and audibility, by throwing it into a sameness of tone approaching the monotone. A passage in the Oration of Demosthenes on the Crown will be an excellent praxis on this tone:

What was the part of a faithful citizen? of a prudent, an active, and honest minister? Was he not to secure Eubœa, as our defence against all attacks by sea? was he not to make Bœotia our barrier on the midland side? the cities bordering on Peloponnesus our bulwark on that quarter? was he not to attend with due precaution to the importation of corn, that this trade might be protected through all its progress up to our own harbour? was he not to cover those districts which we commanded, by seasonable detachments, as the Proconesus, the Chersonesus, and Ténedos? to exert himself in the assembly

for this purpose? while with equal zeal he laboured to gain others to our interest and alliance, as Byzantium, Abydos, and Eubœa? Was he not to cut off the best and most important resources of our enemies, and to supply those in which our country was defective?—And all this you gained by my counsels and my administration.

Leland's Demosthenes on the Crown.

It will naturally occur to every judicious reader, that this series of questions ought to rise gradually in force as they proceed, and therefore it will be necessary to keep the voice under at the beginning; to which this observation may be added, that as the rising inflexion ought to be adopted on each question, the voice will be very apt to get too high near the end; for which purpose it will be necessary to swell the voice a little below its highest pitch; and if we cannot *rise* with ease and clearness on every particular to the last, we ought to augment the *force* on each, that the whole may form a species of climax.

Instructions for the Management of the Voice.

As the voice naturally slides into a higher tone, when we want to speak louder; but not so easily into a lower tone, when we would speak more softly: the first care of every reader and speaker ought to be to acquire a power of lowering the voice when it is got too high. Experience shows us, that we can raise our voice at pleasure to any pitch it is capable of; but the same experience tells us, that it requires infinite art and practice to bring the voice to a lower key when it is once raised too high. It ought therefore to be a first principle with all public readers and speakers, rather to begin *under* the common level of their voice than above it,

Every one, therefore, who would acquire a variety of tone in public reading or speaking, must avoid, as the greatest evil, a loud and vociferous beginning; and for this purpose it would be prudent in a reader or speaker to adapt his voice as if only to be heard by the person who is nearest to him; if his voice has natural strength, and the subject any thing impassioned in it, a higher and louder tone will insensibly steal on him, and his greatest address must be directed to keeping it within bounds. For this purpose, it will be frequently necessary for him to recall his voice, as it were, from the extremities of his auditory, and direct it to those who are nearest to him. This it will be proper to do almost at the beginning of every paragraph in reading, and at the introduction of every part of the subject in discourse. Nothing will so powerfully work on the voice, as supposing ourselves conversing at different intervals with different parts of the auditory.

If, in the course of reading, the voice should slide into a higher tone, and this tone should too often recur, care must be taken to throw in a variety, by beginning subsequent sentences in a lower tone, and, if the subject will admit of it, in a monotone; for the monotone, it is presumed, is the most efficacious means of bringing the voice from high to low, and of altering it when it has been too long in the same key. This may appear paradoxical to those who have not studied the subject; but if every sentence begins high and ends low, or inversely, though the sentences singly considered will have a variety, yet, if considered collectively, they will have a sameness; so, by commencing sometimes with a monotone, though this monotone may have a sameness, yet, as associated with other

tones, it will certainly augment the variety. Grand, solemn, awful subjects, admit best of the monotone: a beautiful example of this offers itself in Akenside's Pleasures of Imagination, on the power of Novelty:

What need words
To paint its pow'r? For this the daring youth
Breaks from his weeping mother's anxious arms,
In foreign climes to rove: the pensive sage,
Heedless of sleep or midnight's harmful damp,
Hangs o'er the sickly taper; and untir'd
The virgin follows with enchanted step,
The mazes of some wild and wondrous tale,
From morn to eve; unmindful of her form,
Unmindful of the happy dress that stole
The wishes of the youth, when ev'ry maid
With envy pin'd. Hence finally by night,
The village matron, round the blazing hearth,
Suspends the infant-audience with her tales,
Breathing astonishment! of witching rhymes,
And evil spirits; of the death-bed call
To him who robb'd the widow, and devour'd
The Orphan's portion; of unquiet souls,
Ris'n from the grave to ease the heavy guilt
Of deeds in life conceal'd: of shapes that walk
At dead of night, and clank their chains, and wave
The torch of Hell around the murd'rer's bed.
At ev'ry solemn pause the crowd recoil,
Gazing each other speechless, and congeal'd
With shiv'ring sighs; till, eager for th' event,
Around the beldame all erect they hang,
Each trembling heart with grateful terrours quell'd.

In reading this passage the voice ought to assume a lower tone, approaching to a monotone, at the word *Hence*, and to continue this tone for about two lines, when the voice will gradually go into a little variety, and slide into a somewhat higher tone; it must again fall into a lower tone; and be in a monotone at *of shapes that walk at dead of night*, &c. and continue in this tone, with very little alteration, to the end of the sentence. The rest of the passage must

preserve the lower tone, and be pronounced so as to be in some measure descriptive of those pleasing, anxious terrours so finely painted by the poet.

If we are speaking extempore, and want to lower the voice, we ought, if possible, to introduce some passion that naturally assumes a lower tone, such as *scorn*, *indignation*, &c. Let us try to illustrate this by an example:

Come, Antony, and young Octavius, come
Revenge yourselves alone on Cassius;
For Cassius is a-weary of the world;
Hated by one he loves, brav'd by his brother,
Check'd by a bondsman, all his faults observ'd,
Set in a note book, learn'd, and conn'd by rote,
To cast into his teeth. Oh, I could weep
My spirit from my eyes! There is my dagger,
And here my naked breast—within, a heart
Dearer than Plutus' mine, richer than gold:
If that thou need'st a Roman's, take it forth;
I, that denied thee gold, will give my heart:
Strike as thou didst at Cæsar; for I know,
When thou didst hate him worse, thou lov'dst him better
Than ever thou lov'dst Cassius.

Shakspeare's Julius Cæsar.

The beginning of this speech naturally carries the voice into a high tone, and, the same passion continuing, there is no opportunity of lowering the voice till the eighth line, when indignation at *Oh, I could weep my spirit from my eyes*, naturally throws the voice into a harsh, low tone, and gives it fresh force to pronounce the rest of the passage.

Rules for Gesture.

It may not perhaps be useless to bestow a few observations on Gesture. This part of delivery, though confessedly of such importance among the ancients, is that which is least cultivated

among the moderns. The reason of this difference is foreign to the present purpose: let it suffice that awkward or improper gesture is a greater blemish in reading and speaking than using none at all; and that in this part of oratory particularly we ought to be more careful to avoid faults than to attain beauties. To descend, however, to a few of those particulars, to which it should seem we ought chiefly to attend—

It may first be observed, that in reading, much less action is required than in speaking. When we read alone, or to a few persons only in private, we should accustom ourselves to read standing; the book should be held in the left hand; we should take our eyes as often as possible from the book, and direct them to those that hear us. The three or four last words at least, of every paragraph, or branch of a subject, should be pronounced with the eye pointed to one of the auditors. When any thing sublime, lofty, or heavenly, is expressed, the eye and the right hand may be very properly elevated; and when any thing low, inferior, or grovelling, is referred to, the eye and hand may be directed downwards: when any thing distant or extensive is mentioned, the hand may naturally describe the distance or extent; and when conscious virtue, or any heartfelt emotion or tender sentiment occurs, we may clap the hand on the breast exactly over the heart.

In speaking extempore, we should be sparing of the use of the left hand, which, except in strong emotion, may hang easily down the side. The right hand ought to rise, extending from the side, that is, in a direction from left to right, till it is on a line with the hip; and then to be propelled forwards, with the fingers open, and

easily and differently curved: the arm should move chiefly from the elbow, the hand seldom be raised higher than the shoulder, and, when it has described its object, or enforced its emphasis, ought to drop lifeless down to the side, ready to commence action afresh. The utmost care must be taken to keep the elbow from inclining to the body, and to let the arms, when not hanging at rest by the side, approach to the position we call a-kimbo; we must be cautious too, in all action but such as describes extent or circumference, to keep the hand or lower part of the arm from cutting the perpendicular line that divides the body into right and left; but, above all, we must be careful to let the stroke of the hand, which marks force or emphasis, keep exact time with the force of pronunciation; that is, the hand must go down upon the emphatical word, and no other. Thus, in the execration of Brutus, in Julius Cæsar:

When Marcus Brutus grows so covetous,
To lock such rascal counters from his friends,
Be ready, gods, with all your thunderbolts,
Dash him in pieces.

Here the action of the arm which enforces the emphasis ought to be so directed, that the stroke of the hand may be given exactly on the word *dash*; this will give a concomitant action to the organs of pronunciation, and by this means the whole expression will be greatly augmented. This action may be called beating time to the emphasis, and is as necessary in forcible and harmonious speaking, as the agreement between the motion of the feet and the music in dancing.

Hence we may see the propriety of a common action in colloquial argumentation, when we wish to enforce the particulars of any series;

which is, by striking the table, at the end of each particular, in order to impress it on the mind. This is the impulse of unpremeditated feeling, and may be truly called the action of nature; and if we can but acquire a habit of accompanying a premeditated series with the same action, we shall give it a force and beauty well worthy the attention of the speaker.

But this emphatic stroke, as it may be called, must be used with judgment. The hand is to give it only to such members as require the falling inflexion of voice, as those which require the rising may be properly accompanied by raising the hand.

Thus, in Cicero's oration against Verres:

I demand justice of you, fathers, upon the robber of the public trèasury, the oppressor of Asia Minor and Pamphy'lia, the invader of the rights and privileges of Rómans, the scourge and curse of Sìcily.

Here the hand may very properly enforce the two first members with the downward stroke, but at the third it should rise with the rising inflexion, and fall with the falling upon the last.

A question, therefore, requiring the rising inflexion on each particular, must have each particular accompanied by a rising of the hand, as in the following example.

Would an infinitely wise being make such glorious beings for so méan a purpose? Can he delight in the production of such abortive intelligence, such shórt-liv'd reasonable beings? Would he give us tàlents that are not to be exérted, capacities that are not to be grátified? *Spect.* No 111.

This elèvation of the hand on each particular, will certainly mark that suspense and degree of surprise which are inseparable from this species of question, as the downward stroke of the hand

accompanying the falling inflexion will give it double force and energy.

If the student wishes to acquire an easy, unaffected, and regular style of action, he may consult Elements of Gesture, prefixed to The *Academic Speaker*.

Thus has been attempted a regular course of instruction, which, from the new points of view in which several of the parts have been placed, it is hoped will be found generally useful. Those who wish to enter more fully into this subject, and have leisure and inclination for philosophical reflections upon it, may consult a work lately published, called *Elements of Elocution;* where the nature of accent and emphasis, the variation and modulation of the voice, and the expression of the passions, emotions, and sentiments, are copiously and systematically considered.

COMPOSITION.

IN a Rhetorical Grammar, it may be justly expected that Composition, which forms so essential a part of Rhetoric, should not be entirely omitted: yet so much has been written on this part of the art, and so ably has it been treated both by the ancients and moderns, that I might well excuse myself by referring my readers to Aristotle, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Quintilian, and Cicero, among the former,—and to Blair, Campbell, and Priestley, among the latter,—for every thing that learning, genius, and experience, have produced upon the subject. What I can offer must be little more than gleanings, after so copious a harvest; and if even these gleanings should be claimed as the property of those who have preceded me, I shall willingly forego my claim, and be content to rank in this field as an humble compiler of a few scattered hints, which have occurred to me in a long course of teaching a part of Rhetoric which has not been so much laboured by my predecessors.

In the first place, we must lay down as a maxim of eternal truth, that good sense is the foundation of all good writing. Understand a subject well, and you can scarcely write ill upon it. This, however, must be understood only of works of science; for works of imagination, beside a thorough acquaintance with the subject

we write upon, require a quick discernment of the happiest manner of presenting a subject to the mind. This opens a wide field to the powers of man, as it takes in all the beauties of poetry and eloquence,—beauties which, though founded in nature and good sense, owe almost all their force to the imagination and address of the writer.

Rhetoric, or the Art of Persuasion, therefore, seems to demand a union of both these powers. Good sense must be embellished with appropriate language, vivid imagery, and agreeable variety; and the imagination must be tempered by good taste, sound judgment, and chaste expression. In short, the rhetorician should above all things attend to the advice of the poet:—

> And mark that point where sense and dulness meet.
>
> *Pope's Essay on Criticism.*

The first thing to be attended to in all composition intended for delivery is, when we have fixed upon a subject, to form a plan of treating it.

The parts which compose a regular oration are these six;—the exordium, or introduction; the state and division of the subject; the narration, or explication; the reasoning, or arguments; the pathetic parts; and the conclusion. It is not necessary that these must enter into every public discourse, or that they must always be admitted in the order in which they are here set down. There are many excellent discourses in which some of these parts are altogether omitted: but as they are the natural and constituent parts of a regular oration, and as in every discourse some of them must occur, it is agreeable to our present purpose to speak of each of them distinctly.

The introduction should be easy and natural: it should always be suggested by the subject; nor should it be planned till after the writer has meditated in his own mind the substance of his discourse. In short, it should be like the preface to a book, which, though presenting itself first, is generally written last; for which reason I have seen a whimsical writer who placed it at the end instead of the beginning of his work. The introduction is seldom the place for vehemence or passion: the audience must be gradually prepared, before the speaker can venture on strong impassioned sentiments. A becoming modesty, therefore, is almost essential to the composition as well as the delivery of this part of an oration.

In dividing a subject, we must be always careful to follow the order of nature, beginning with the most simple points, such as are most easily understood and necessary to be first discussed, and proceeding thence to those which are built upon the former, and which suppose them to be known. In short, the subject should be divided into those parts which grow out of each other, and into which they are most naturally and easily dissolved.

The Narration or Explication is that part of an oration which gives the true state of the question, unfolds every particular which belongs to it, and prepares the minds of the hearers to attend to the arguments which are to be produced in favour of the side we adopt. This part of the oration should be simple, nervous, and comprehensive, and the language plain, precise, and without ornament.

The argumentative part of the oration must be considered as the strong bulwark of the rhetorical fortification. The greatest care must be

taken to select such arguments as are the best calculated to prove that what we advance is either true, right, or fit, or that it is profitable and good. Truth, duty, and interest, are the three great subjects of discussion among mankind. But the arguments employed upon either of them are generally distinct; and he who mixes them all under one topic, which he calls his argument, as is too frequently done in sermons, will render his reasoning indistinct and inelegant.

With respect to the different degrees of strength in arguments, the common as well as the most natural rule is to advance in the way of climax. Nor can I agree with Dr. Blair, or any other rhetorician, that any state of the question will authorise an orator to begin with his strongest argument, and end with his weakest. The last impression is generally what decides in popular addresses, and this should be nicely attended to.* Besides, when once a point is proved, the multiplying of arguments only tends to weaken it; for it ought to be observed, that a number of weak arguments seldom convince the mind so much as one strong one; and, therefore, that we ought to be cautious how we lay too great stress on little things, as scarcely any thing so much implies a weakness of understanding. A great number of weak reasons ought therefore to be carefully avoided, lest we fall into the fault ridiculed by Pope in his Dunciad:——

> Explain upon a thing till all men doubt it,
> And write about it Goddess and about it.

When argument and reasoning have produced their full effect, then, and not till then, the pathetic is admitted with the greatest force and

propriety. When the subject will admit of the pathetic (for all subjects do not), a speaker should cautiously avoid giving his hearers warning that he intends to excite their passions; every previous preparation of this kind chills their sensibility. The orator should steal imperceptibly upon the feelings of his hearers, and engage their passions before they perceive he is addressing them.

To succeed in the pathetic, it is necessary to attend to the proper language of the passions. This, if we consult nature, we shall ever find is unaffected and simple. It may be animated with bold and strong figures, but it will have no ornament or finery. There is a material difference between painting to the imagination and to the heart. The one may be done with deliberation and coolness; the other must always be rapid and ardent. In the former, art and labour may be suffered to appear; in the latter, no proper effect can be produced, unless it seem to be the work of nature only. Hence all digressions should be avoided, which may interrupt or turn aside the swell of passion. Hence comparisons are always dangerous, and commonly quite improper in the midst of the pathetic. It is also to be observed, that emotions which are violent cannot be lasting. The pathetic, therefore, should not be prolonged and extended too much. A due regard should always be preserved to what the audience will bear; for he that attempts to carry them farther in passion than they will follow him annihilates his purpose; by endeavouring to warm them in the extreme he takes the surest method of completely freezing them.

For the expression of these passions by pronunciation or delivery, the student must be re-

ferred to a work entitled Elements of Elocution, where it is hoped he will find a clearer description of the operation of the passions, on the attitude, countenance, gesture, and tone of voice, whether in reading or speaking, than is to be met with in any other work on the subject. Besides, what has never before been attempted, he will there find a mechanical process of exciting the passions in the speaker, so necessary to his communicating them to his hearer, according to the rule of Horace:

> Si vis me flere,
> Dolendum est primum ipse tibi.

Concerning the peroration, or conclusion of a discourse, a few words will be sufficient. Sometimes the whole pathetic part comes in most properly at the conclusion. Sometimes, when the discourse has been altogether argumentative, it is proper to conclude with summing up the arguments, placing them in one point of view, and leaving the impression of them full and strong on the minds of the hearers. For the principal rule of a conclusion, and what nature obviously suggests, is to place that last on which we choose that the strength of our cause should rest.

In every kind of public speaking it is important to hit the precise time of concluding, so as to bring the discourse just to a point: neither ending abruptly and unexpectedly, nor disappointing the expectation of the hearers, when they look for the discourse being finished. The close should always be concluded with dignity and spirit, that the minds of the hearers may be left warm, and that they may depart with a favourable impression of the subject and of the speaker.

Having thus adjusted and prepared the several parts of a subject, the next object is the style in which we are to convey it to others. This has been so elaborately and accurately treated by Dr. Blair, that I shall take the same liberty which others have done, of extracting same of his thoughts on this subject, and refer the student in rhetoric to the Doctor's excellent lectures, foi a more complete view of whatever is necessary to be known.

Style—Perspicuity and Precision.

STYLE is the peculiar manner in which a man expresses his conceptions by means of language. It is a picture of the ideas which rise in his mind, and of the order in which they are produced.

The qualities of a good style may be ranked under two heads—perspicuity and ornament. It will readily be admitted, that perspicuity ought to be essentially connected with every kind of writing. Without this the brightest ornaments of style only glimmer through the dark; and perplex, instead of pleasing the reader. If we are forced to follow a writer with much care, to pause, and to read over his sentences a second time, in order to understand them fully, he will never please us long. Mankind are too indolent to be fond of so much labour. Though they may pretend to admire the author's depth, after having discovered his meaning, they will seldom be inclined to look a second time into his book.

The study of perspicuity claims attention, first, to single words and phrases, and then to the construction of sentences. When considered

with respect to words and phrases, it requires these three qualities—*purity*, *propriety*, and *precision.*

Purity and propriety of language are often used indiscriminately for each other; and, indeed, they are very nearly allied. A distinction, however, should be made between them. Purity consists in the use of such words and such constructions as belong to the idiom of the language which we speak, in opposition to those words and phrases which are imported from other languages, or which are obsolete, or new coined, or employed without proper authority. Propriety is the choice of such words as the best and most established usage has appropriated to those ideas which we intend to express by them; it implies their correct and judicious application, in opposition to vulgar or low expressions, and to words and phrases which would be less significant of the ideas that we intend to convey. Style may be pure, that is, it may be entirely English, without Scotticisms or Gallicisms, or ungrammatical expressions of any kind, and may, notwithstanding, be deficient in propriety. The words may be ill selected; not adapted to the subject, nor fully expressive of the author's meaning. He has taken them, indeed, from the general mass of English language; but his choice has been made without happiness or skill. Style, however, cannot be proper without being pure: it is the union of purity and propriety which renders it graceful and perspicuous.

The exact meaning of precision may be understood from the etymology of the word. It is derived from "*præcidere*," to cut off: it signifies retrenching all superfluities: and pruning the expression in such a manner as to exhibit neither more nor less than an exact copy of his idea who uses it.

The words which are employed to express ideas may be faulty in three respects. They may either not express that idea which the author means, but some other which only resembles or is related to it; or they may express that idea, but not fully and completely; or they may express it, together with something more than he designs. Precision is opposed to these three faults, but particularly to the last; into this feeble writers are very apt to fall. They employ a multitude of words to make themselves understood, as they think, more distinctly; and they only confound the reader. The image, as they place it before you, is always seen double, and no double image is distinct. When an author tells us of his hero's *courage* in the day of battle, the expression is precise, and we understand it fully. But if, from a desire of multiplying words, he will praise his *courage* and *fortitude*, at the moment he joins these words together, our idea begins to waver. He intends to express one quality more strongly; but he is, in fact, expressing two. *Courage* resists danger; *fortitude* supports pain. The occasion of exerting each of these qualities, is different; and being induced to think of both together, when only one of them should engage our attention, our view is rendered unsteady, and our conception of the object indistinct.

The great source of a loose style, in opposition to precision, is the inaccurate and unhappy use of those words called synonymous. Scarcely, in any language, are there two words which express precisely the same idea; and a person perfectly acquainted with the propriety of the language will always be able to observe something by which they are distinguished. In our language, very many instances might be given of

a difference in meaning, among words which are thought to be synonymous; and as the subject is of importance, we shall point out a few of them.

Surprised, astonished, amazed, confounded. We are surprised with what is new or unexpected; we are astonished at what is vast or great; we are amazed with what we cannot comprehend; we are confounded by what is shocking or terrible.

Pride, Vanity. Pride makes us esteem ourselves; vanity makes us desire the esteem of others.

Haughtiness, disdain. Haughtiness is founded on the high opinion we have of ourselves; disdain on the low opinion we entertain of others.

To weary, to fatigue. The continuance of the same thing wearies us; labour fatigues us. A man is weary with standing, he is fatigued with walking.

To abhor, to detest. To abhor, imports, simply, strong dislike; to detest, imports likewise strong disapprobation. I abhor being in debt; I detest treachery.

To invent, to discover. We invent things which are new; we discover what has been hidden. Galilæo invented the telescope; Harvey discovered the circulation of the blood.

Entire, complete. A thing is entire, when it wants none of its parts; complete, when it wants none of the appendages which belong to it. A man may occupy an entire house, though he has not one complete apartment.

Tranquillity, peace, calm. Tranquillity signifies a situation free from trouble, considered in itself: peace, the same situation, with respect to any causes which might interrupt it; calm, with respect to a disturbed situation going before, or

following it. A good man enjoys tranquillity in himself: peace with others; and calm after the storm.

Enough, sufficient. Enough relates to the quantity which we wish to have of any thing. Sufficient relates to the use that is to be made of it. Hence, enough commonly signifies a greater quantity than sufficient does. The covetous man never has enough, though he has what is sufficient for nature.

These are a few, among many, instances of words in our language, which by careless writers, are apt to be mistaken for synonymous. The more the distinction in the meaning of such words is weighed and attended to, the more accurately and forcibly shall we speak and write.

Structure of Sentences.

A PROPER construction of sentences is of such importance in every species of composition, that we cannot be too strict or minute in our attention to it. For whatever be the subject, if the sentences be constructed in a clumsy, perplexed, or feeble manner, it is impossible that a work composed of such periods can be read with pleasure, or even with profit. But, by an attention to the rules which relate to this part of style, we acquire the habit of expressing ourselves with perspicuity and elegance; and if a disorder happen to arise in some of our sentences, we immediately discover where it lies, and are able to correct it.

The properties most essential to a perfect sentence seem to be the four following:—1. Clearness and precision; 2. Unity; 3. Strength; 4. Harmony.

Ambiguity is opposed to clearness and pre-

cision, and arises from two causes; either from a wrong choice of words, or a wrong collocation of them. Of the choice of words, as far as regards perspicuity, we have already spoken. Of the collocation of them we are now to treat. From the nature of our language, a leading rule in the arrangement of our sentences is, that the words or members most nearly related should be placed in the sentence as near to each other as possible, so as to make their mutual relation clearly appear. This rule is too frequently neglected, even by good writers. A few instances will show both its importance and its application.

In the position of adverbs, which are used to qualify the signification of something which either precedes or follows them, a good deal of nicety is to be observed. "By greatness," says Mr. Addison, "I do not only mean the bulk of "any single object, but the largeness of a whole "view." Here the situation of the adverb *only* renders it a limitation of the following word, *mean*. "I not only mean,"—The question may then be asked, What, does he more than mean? Had it been placed after *bulk*, still it would have been improperly situated; for it might then be asked, What is meant besides the *bulk*? Is it the colour, or any other property? Its proper place is, certainly, after the word *object*: "By greatness I do not mean the bulk of "any single object only;" for then, when it is asked, What does he mean more than the bulk of a single object? the answer comes out precisely as the author intends, "the largeness of "a whole view." "Theism," says Lord Shaftesbury, "can only be opposed to poly-"theism, or atheism." It may be asked then, is theism capable of nothing else, except being op-

posed to polytheism or atheism? This is what the words literally mean, through the improper collocation of *only*. He ought to have said, "Theism can be opposed only to polytheism, "or atheism." These kind of inaccuracies may have no material inconvenience in conversation, because the tone and emphasis used in pronouncing them generally serve to show their reference, and to make the meaning perspicuous: but in writing, where a person speaks to the eye, and not to the ear, he ought to be more accurate; and should so connect those adverbs with the words which they qualify, that his meaning cannot be mistaken on the first inspection.

When a circumstance is interposed in the middle of a sentence, it sometimes requires art to place it in such a manner as to divest it of all ambiguity. For instance, "Are these designs," says Lord Bolingbroke, Dissert. on Parties, Ded. "which any man, who is born a Briton, in any "circumstances, in any situation, ought to "be ashamed or afraid to avow?" Here we are in doubt, whether the words, "*in any circum-* "*stances, in any situation*," are connected with "a man born a Briton, in any circumstances "or situation," or with that man's "avowing "his designs in any circumstances, or situation, "into which he may be brought?" If the latter, as seems most likely, was intended to be the meaning, the arrangement ought to have been in this form: "Are these designs, which "any man, who is born a Briton, ought to be "ashamed or afraid, in any circumstances, in "any situation, to avow?"

Still more attentive care is requisite to the proper disposition of the relative pronouns, *who*, *which*, *what*, *whose*; and of all those particles which express the connexion of the parts of

speech with one another. Since all reasoning depends upon this connection, we cannot be too accurate with regard to it. A trifling errour may obscure the meaning of the whole sentence, and even where the meaning is apparent; yet where these relative particles are misplaced, we always find something awkward and disjointed in the structure of the period. The following passage in Bishop Sherlock's Sermons (vol. 2. sermon 15) will exemplify these observations: "It is folly to pretend to arm ourselves against "the accidents of life, by heaping up treasures, "which nothing can protect us against, but the "good providence of our Heavenly Father." *Which* always refers grammatically to the immediately preceding substantive, which here is, "treasures," and this would convert the whole period into nonsense. The sentence should have been thus constructed: "It is folly to pretend, by "heaping up treasures, to arm ourselves against "the accidents of life, which nothing can pro- "tect us against but the good providence of our "Heavenly Father."

We now proceed to the second quality of a well-arranged sentence, which we termed its Unity. This is an indispensable property. The very nature of a sentence implies one proposition to be expressed. It may consist, indeed, of parts; but these parts must be so intimately knit together, as to make upon the mind the impression of one object, not of many.

To preserve this unity, we must first observe, that, during the course of the sentence, the scene should be changed as little as possible. There is generally, in every sentence, some person or thing, which is the governing word. This should be continued so, if possible, from the beginning to the end of it. Should a man express

himself in this manner: "After we came to "anchor, they put me on shore, where I was "saluted by all my friends, who received me "with the greatest kindness." Here, though the objects are sufficiently connected, yet by this mode of representation, by shifting so often the place and the person *we*, and *they*, and *I*, and *who*, they appear in such a disunited view, that the sense of connection is nearly lost. The sentence is restored to its proper unity, by constructing it after the following manner: "Having come to an anchor, I was put on shore, "where I was saluted by all my friends, who "received me with the greatest kindness."

Another rule is, never to crowd into one sentence things which have so little connection, that they might bear to be divided into two or more sentences. The transgression of this rule never fails to hurt and displease a reader. Its effect, indeed, is so disgusting, that, of the two, it is the safest extreme, to err rather by too many short sentences, than by one that is overloaded and confused. The following sentence, from a translation of Plutarch, will justify this opinion: "Their march," says the author, speaking of the Greeks under Alexander, "was through an "uncultivated country, whose savage inhabi-"tants fared hardly, having no other riches "than a breed of lean sheep, whose flesh was "rank and unsavoury, by reason of their conti-"nual feeding upon sea-fish." Here the scene is repeatedly changed. The march of the Greeks the description of the inhabitants through whose country they passed, the account of their sheep, and the reason of their sheep being disagreeable food, make a jumble of objects, slightly related to each other, which the reader cannot, with-

out considerable difficulty, comprehend under one view.

Another rule for preserving the unity of sentences is, to keep clear of all parentheses in the middle of them. These may, on some occasions, have a spirited appearance, as prompted by a certain vivacity of thought, which can glance happily aside, as it is going along. But, in general, their effect is extremely bad; being a perplexed method of disposing of some thought, which a writer has not art enough to introduce in its proper place. It is needless to produce any instances, since they occur so frequently among incorrect writers.

We shall add only one rule more for the unity of a sentence; which is, to bring it always to a full and perfect close. It need hardly be observed, that an unfinished sentence is no sentence at all, with respect to any of the rules of grammar. But sentences often occur, which are more than finished. When we have arrived at what we expected to be the conclusion; when we have come to the word, on which the mind is naturally led to rest, by what went before; unexpectedly some circumstance arises, which ought to have been left out, or to have been disposed of after another manner. Thus, for instance, in the following sentence, from Sir William Temple, the adjection to the sentence is intirely foreign to it. Speaking of Burnet's Theory of the Earth, and Fontenelle's Plurality of Worlds: "The first," says he, "could not "end his learned treatise without a panegyric "of modern learning, in comparison of the an- "cient; and the other falls so grossly into the "censure of the old poetry, and preference of "the new, that I could not read either of these

" strains without some indignation; which no " quality among men is so apt to raise in me as " self sufficiency." The word " indignation" ought to have concluded the sentence; for what follows is altogether new, and is added after the proper close.

WE proceed now to the third quality of a correct sentence, which we called strength. By this is meant, such a disposition of the several words and members, as shall exhibit the sense to the best advantage; as shall render the impression which the period is intended to make most full and complete; and give every word and every member its due weight and importance. To the production of this effect, perspicuity and unity are, no doubt, absolutely necessary: but they are not of themselves sufficient. For a sentence may be obviously clear; it may also be sufficiently compact, or have the required unity; and yet, by some unfavourable circumstance in the structure, it may be deficient in that strength or liveliness of impression which a more happy collocation would have produced.

The first rule that we shall give for promoting the strength of a sentence is, to take from it all redundant words. Whatever can be easily supplied in the mind is better omitted in the expression; thus, " Content with deserving a " triumph, he refused the honour of it," is better than to say, " Being content with de- " serving a triumph, he refused the honour of " it." It is certainly, therefore, one of the most useful exercises of correction, on a view of what we have written or composed, to contract the roundabout mode of expression, and to cut off those useless excrescences which are usually found in a first draught. But we must be careful

not to run into the opposite extreme, of pruning so closely as to give a hardness and dryness to the style. Some leaves must be left to shelter and adorn the fruit.

As sentences should be divested of superfluous words, so also they should appear without superfluous members. In opposition to this, is the fault we so frequently meet with, of the last member of a period being no other than the repetition of the former, in a different dress. For example; speaking of beauty, "The very first "discovery of it," says Mr. Addison, "strikes "the mind with inward joy, and spreads delight "through all its faculties." In this instance, scarcely any thing is added by the second member of the sentence to what was already expressed in the first: and though the elegant style of Mr. Addison may palliate such negligence, yet it is generally true, that language, divested of this prolixity, becomes more strong, as well as more beautiful.

The second direction we shall give for promoting the strength of a sentence is, to pay a particular attention to the use of copulatives, relatives, and all the particles employed for transition and connection. Some observations on this subject, which appear to be worthy of particular remembrance, shall here be noticed.

What is termed splitting of particles, or separating a preposition from the noun which it governs, is ever to be avoided: as if we should say, "Though virtue borrows no assistance "from, yet it may often be accompanied by, "the advantages of fortune." In such instances, a degree of dissatisfaction arises, from the violent separation of two things, which, from their nature, ought to be intimately united.

The simplicity of style is much injured by the unnecessary multiplication of relative and demonstrative particles: Thus if a writer should say, "There is nothing which disgusts me "sooner than the empty pomp of language;" he would express himself less simply than if he had said, "Nothing disgusts me sooner than the "empty pomp of language." The former mode of expression, in the introduction of a subject, or in laying down a proposition to which particular attention is demanded, is exceedingly proper: but in the ordinary current of discourse, the latter is to be preferred.

With regard to the omission or insertion of the relative, we shall only observe, that in conversation and epistolary writing, it may be often omitted with propriety; but in compositions of a serious or dignified kind it should constantly be inserted.

On the copulative particle *and*, which occurs so often in all kinds of composition, several observations are to be made. It is evident that the unnecessary repetition of it enfeebles style. By omitting it entirely we often mark a closer connection, a quicker succession of objects than when it is inserted between them. "*Veni, vidi,* "*vici;*"—"I came, I saw, I conquered;" expresses with more spirit the rapidity of conquest, than if connecting particles had been used. When, however, we desire to prevent a quick transition from one object to another, and when we are enumerating objects which we wish to appear as distinct from each other as possible, copulatives may be multiplied with peculiar advantage. Thus Lord Bolingbroke says, with elegance and propriety, "Such a man might fall "a victim to power; but truth, and reason, "and liberty, would fall with him."

A third rule for promoting the strength of a sentence is, to dispose of the principal word, or words, in that place of the sentence where they will make the most striking impression. Perspicuity ought first to be studied; and the nature of our language allows no extensive liberty in the choice of collocation. In general, the important words are placed in the beginning of the sentence. Thus Mr. Addison: "The pleasures "of the imagination, taken in their full extent, "are not so gross as those of sense, nor so re- "fined as those of the understanding." This order seems to be the most plain and natural. Sometimes, however, when we propose giving weight to a sentence, it is proper to suspend the meaning for a while, and then to bring it out full at the close: "Thus," says Mr. Pope, "on "whatever side we contemplate Homer, what "principally strikes us is his wonderful inven- "tion."

A fourth rule for the strength of sentences is, to make the members of them go on rising in their importance above one another. This kind of arrangement is called a climax, and is ever regarded as a beauty in composition. Why it pleases is sufficiently evident. In all things, we naturally love to advance to what is more and more beautiful, rather than to follow the retrograde order. Having viewed some considerable object, we cannot, without pain, be pulled back to attend to an inferior circumstance. "*Caven- "dum est,*" says Quintilian "*ne decrescat ora- "tio, et fortiori subjungatur aliquid infirmius.*" "We must take care that our composition shall "not fall off, and that a weaker expression shall "not follow one of greater strength." When a sentence consists of two members, the longest

should, in general, be the concluding one. Hence the pronunciation is rendered more easy; and the shortest member of the period being placed first, we carry it more readily in our memory as we proceed to the second, and see the connection of the two more clearly. Thus, to say, "When our passions have forsaken us, we "flatter ourselves with the belief, that we have "forsaken them," is both more graceful and more perspicuous than to begin with the longest part of the proposition: "We flatter ourselves "with the belief, that we have forsaken our "passions, when they have forsaken us."

A fifth rule for constructing sentences with proper strength is, to avoid concluding them with an adverb, a preposition, or any insignificant word. By such conclusions style is always weakened and degraded. Sometimes, indeed, where the stress and significancy rest chiefly upon words of this kind, they may, with propriety, have the principal place allotted them. No fault, for example, can be found with this sentence of Bolingbroke: "In their prosperity, "my friends shall never hear of me: in their "adversity, always;" where *never* and *always*, being emphatical words, are so placed, as to make a strong impression. But when those inferior parts of speech are introduced as circumstances, or as qualifications of more important words, they should invariably be disposed of in the least conspicuous parts of the period.

We should always avoid with care the concluding with any of those particles which distinguish the cases of nouns—*of*, *to*, *from*, *with*, *by*. Thus it is much better to say, "Avarice is a "crime of which wise men are often guilty,"

than to say, "Avarice is a crime which wise "men are often guilty of." This kind of phraseology all correct writers endeavour sedulously to avoid.

Verbs used in a compound sense, with some of these prepositions, are likewise ungraceful conclusions of a period; such as, *bring about, lay hold of, come over to, clear up*, and many others of the same kind; instead of which, if a simple verb can be employed, the sentence is always terminated with more strength. Even the pronoun *it*, especially when joined with some of the prepositions, as, *with it, in it, to it*, cannot, without a violation of grace, be the conclusion of a sentence. Any phrase which expresses a circumstance only, cannot conclude a sentence without great imperfection and inelegance. Circumstances are, indeed, like unshapen stones in a building, which try the skill of an artist, where to place them with the least offence. We should carefully avoid crowding too many of them together, but rather intersperse them in different parts of the sentence, joined with the principal words on which they depend. Thus, for instance, when Dean Swift says, "What I "had the honour of mentioning to your lord-"ship, some time ago, in conversation, was not "a new thought."—(Letter to the Earl of Oxford). These two circumstances, *some time ago*, and *in conversation*, which are here joined, would have been better separated thus: "What "I had the honour some time ago of mention-"ing to your lordship in conversation."

The last rule which we shall mention, concerning the strength of a sentence is, that in the members of it, where two things are compared

or contrasted to one another, where either a resemblance or an opposition is designed to be expressed, some resemblance in the language and construction ought to be observed. The following passage from Pope's preface to his Homer, beautifully exemplifies the rule we are now giving. "Homer was the greater genius; Virgil "the better artist: in the one, we admire the "man; in the other, the work. Homer hurries "us with a commanding impetuosity; Virgil "leads us with an attractive majesty. Homer "scatters with a generous profusion; Virgil "bestows with a careless magnificence. Homer, "like the Nile, pours out his riches with a "sudden overflow; Virgil, like a river in its "banks, with a constant stream. And when we "look upon their machines, Homer seems like his "own Jupiter in his terrours, shaking Olympus, "scattering the lightnings, and firing the "heavens. Virgil, like the same power in his "benevolence, counselling with the gods, laying "plans for empires, and ordering his whole "creation." Periods of this kind, when introduced with propriety, and not too frequently repeated, have a sensible and attractive beauty: but if such a construction be aimed at in all our sentences, it betrays into a disagreeable uniformity, and produces a regular gingle in the period, which tires the ear, and plainly discovers affectation.

HAVING treated of sentences, with regard to their meaning, under the heads of Perspicuity, Unity, and Strength, we will now consider them with respect to their sound, their harmony, or agreeableness to the ear.

In the harmony of periods, two things are to be considered; First, agreeable sound, or mo-

dulation in general, without any particular expression: Next, the sound so ordered, as to become expressive of the sense. The first is the more common: the second the superior beauty.

The beauty of musical construction, it is evident, will depend upon the choice of words, and the arrangement of them. Those words are most pleasing to the ear which are composed of smooth and liquid sounds, where there is a proper intermixture of vowels and consonants, without too many harsh consonants rubbing against each other, or too many open vowels in succession, to produce a hiatus, or unpleasing aperture of the mouth. Long words are generally more pleasing to the ear than monosyllables; and those are the most musical which are not wholly composed of long or short syllables, but of an intermixture of them; such as, *delight*, *amuse*, *velocity*, *celerity*, *beautiful*, *impetuosity*. If the words, however, which compose a sentence, be ever so well chosen and harmonious, yet, if they be unskilfully arranged, its music is entirely lost. As an instance of a musical sentence, we may take the following from Milton, in his Treatise on Education. "We shall conduct you "to a hill-side, laborious, indeed, at the first "ascent; but else so smooth, so green, so full "of goodly prospects and melodious sounds on "every side, that the harp of Orpheus was not "more charming." Every thing in this sentence conspires to render it harmonious. The words are well chosen: *laborious*, *smooth*, *green*, *goodly*, *melodious*, *charming*: and besides, they are so happily arranged, that no alteration could be made, without injuring the melody.

There are two things on which the music of a sentence principally depends: these are, the

proper distribution of the several members of it, and the close or cadence of the whole.

First, we observe, that the distribution of the several members should be carefully attended to. Whatever is easy and pleasing to the organs of speech always sounds grateful to the ear. While a period is going on, the termination of each of its members forms a pause in the pronunciation; and these pauses should be so distributed as to bear a certain musical proportion to each other. This will be best illustrated by examples. The following passage is taken from Archbishop Tillotson. "This discourse, concerning the "easiness of God's commands, does, all along, "suppose and acknowledge the difficulties of "the first entrance upon a religious course; "except only in those persons, who have had "the happiness to be trained up to religion by "the easy and insensible degrees of a pious and "virtuous education." This sentence is far from being harmonious; owing chiefly to this, that there is, properly, no more than one pause in it, falling between the two members into which it is divided; each of which is so long as to require a considerable stretch of the breath in pronouncing it*. Let us observe now, on the contrary, the grace of the following passage, from Sir William Temple, in which he speaks sarcastically of man. "But, God be thanked,

* There is not perhaps so inveterate, or so ill-grounded an errour, as that which prevails among all rhetoricians ancient and modern, of supposing that a long sentence necessarily requires a long effusion of breath, and occasions great difficulty of pronunciation. Those who have perused *Elements of Elocution*, page 25, and the former part of this treatise, will, I flatter myself, see the folly of this notion. Those, above all others, ought not to adopt it, who contend, that every line of verse, whether the sense require it or not, ought to be marked with a pause of suspension. See *Elements of Elocution*, page 288.

"his pride is greater than his ignorance; and "what he wants in knowledge, he supplies by "sufficiency. When he has looked about him, "as far as he can, he concludes there is no "more to be seen; when he is at the end of his "line, he is at the bottom of the ocean; when "he has shot his best, he is sure none ever did, "or ever can, shoot better, or beyond it. His "own reason he holds to be the certain measure "of truth; and his own knowledge of what is "possible in nature." Here every thing is, at the same time, easy to the breath, and grateful to the ear. We must, however, observe, that if composition abounds with sentences which have too many rests, and these placed at intervals too apparently measured and regular, it is apt to savour of affectation.

The next thing which demands our attention is the close or cadence of the whole sentence. The only important rule which can here be given is, that when we aim at dignity or elevation, the sound should increase to the last; the longest members of the period, and the fullest and most sonorous words, should be employed in the conclusion. As an instance of this, the following sentence of Mr. Addison may be given. "It fills the mind," speaking of sight, "with "the largest variety of ideas; converses with its "objects at the greatest distance; and continues "the longest in action without being tired or "satiated with its proper enjoyments." Here every reader must be sensible of a beauty, both in the just division of the members and pauses, and the manner in which the sentence is rounded and brought to a full and harmonious termination.

It may be remarked, that little words, in the conclusion of a sentence, are as injurious to me-

lody as they are inconsistent with strength of expression. A musical close in our language seems, in general, to require either the last syllable, or the last but one, to be a long syllable. Words which consist chiefly of short syllables, as *contrary*, *particular*, *retrospect*, seldom terminate a sentence harmoniously, unless a run of long syllables, before, has rendered them pleasing to the ear.

Sentences, however, which are so constructed as to make the sound always swell and grow towards the end, and to rest either on a long or a penult long syllable, give a discourse the tone of declamation. If melody be not varied, the ear soon becomes acquainted and cloyed with it. Sentences constructed in the same manner, with the pauses at equal intervals, should never succeed each other. Short sentences must be blended with long and swelling ones, to render discourse sprightly as well as magnificent.

We now proceed to treat of a higher species of harmony—the sound adapted to the sense. Of this we may remark two degrees: First, the current of sound suited to the tenor of a discourse: Next, a peculiar resemblance effected between some object and the sounds that are employed in describing it.

Sounds have, in many respects, an intimate correspondence with our ideas; partly natural, partly produced by artificial associations. Hence, any one modulation of sound continued, stamps on our style a certain character and expression. Sentences constructed with the Ciceronian fulness and swell excite an idea of what is important, magnificent, and sedate. They suit, however, no violent passion, no eager reasoning, no familiar address. These require measures brisker, easier, and more concise. It were as ridiculous

to write a familiar epistle and a funeral oration in a style of the same cadence, as to set the words of a tender love-song to the tune of a warlike march.

Besides that general correspondence which the current of sound has with the current of thought, a more particular expression may be attempted, of certain objects, by resembling sounds. In poetry this resemblance is chiefly to be looked for. It obtains sometimes, indeed, in prose composition; but there in a more faint and inferior degree.

The sounds of words may be employed to describe chiefly three classes of objects; first, other sounds; secondly, motion; and thirdly, the *emotions* and passions of the mind.

In most languages it will be found, that the names of many particular sounds are so formed as to bear some resemblance to the sound which they signify; as with us, the *whistling* of winds, the *buzz* and *hum* of insects, the *hiss* of serpents, and the *crash* of falling timber; and many other instances, where the word has been plainly constructed from the sound it represents*. A remarkable example of this beauty we shall produce from Milton, taken from two passages in his Paradise Lost, describing the sound made, in the one, by the opening of the gates of Hell; in the other, by the opening of those of Heaven. The contrast between the two exhibits to great advantage the art of the poet. The first is the opening Hell's gates:

——— On a sudden, open fly,
With impetuous recoil, and jarring sound,
Th' infernal doors; and on their hinges grate
Harsh thunder.———

* For a fuller explanation of this figure in composition, see page 219.

Observe the smoothness of the other:

Heav'n open'd wide
Her ever-during gates, harmonious sound!
On golden hinges turning.

The second class of objects, which the sound of words is frequently employed to imitate, is motion: as it is swift or slow, violent or gentle, uniform or interrupted, easy or accompanied with effort. Between sound and motion there is no natural affinity; yet in the imagination there is a strong one, as is evident from the connexion between music and dancing. The poet can, consequently, give us a lively idea of the kind of motion he would describe, by the help of sound, which corresponds, in our imagination, with that motion. Long syllables naturally excite the idea of slow motion; as in this line of Pope:

Up the high hill he heaves a huge round stone.

A succession of short syllables gives the impression of quick motion: as, in Milton,—

While on the tawny sands and shelves
Trip the pert fairies and the dapper elves.

The works of Homer and Virgil abound with instances of this beauty, which are so often quoted, and so well known, that it is unnecessary to produce them.

The third set of objects, which we mentioned the sound of words as capable of representing, consists of the emotions and passions of the mind. Between sense and sound there appears, at first view, to be no natural resemblance. But if the arrangement of syllables, by the sound alone, calls forth one set of ideas more readily than another, and disposes the mind for entering into that affection which the poet intends to raise, such arrangement may, with propriety, be said

to resemble the sense, or be similar and correspondent to it. Thus when pleasure, joy, and agreeable objects, are described by one who sensibly feels his subject, the language naturally runs into smooth, liquid, and flowing numbers:

O joy, thou welcome stranger! twice three years
I have not felt thy vital beams: but now
It warms my veins and plays around my heart:
A fiery instinct lifts me from the ground,
And I could mount—— *Young.*

Brisk and lively sensations excite quicker and more animated numbers:

The offer likes not, and the nimble gunner
With linstock now the dev'lish cannon touches,
And down goes all before him. *Shakspeare.*

Melancholy and gloomy subjects are naturally connected with slow measures and long words:

In these deep solitudes and awful cells,
Where heav'nly pensive contemplation dwells. *Pope.*

Abundant instances of this kind will be suggested by a moderate acquaintance with the good poets, either ancient or modern.

General Characters of Style.

Diffuse, Concise, Feeble, Nervous, Dry, Plain, Neat, Elegant, Flowery,

THAT different subjects ought to be treated in different kinds of style, is a position so self-evident, that it requires not illustration. Every one is convinced, that treatises of philosophy should not be composed in the same style with orations. It is equally apparent, that different parts of the same composition require a variation in the style and manner. Yet amidst this va-

riety, we still expect to find, in the composition of any one man, some degree of uniformity or consistency with himself, in manner; we expect to find some prevailing character of style impressed on all his writings, which shall be suited to, and shall distinguish, his particular genius and turn of mind. The orations in Livy differ considerably in style, as they ought to do, from the rest of his history. The same thing may be observed in those of Tacitus. Yet in the orations of both these elegant historians, the distinguishing manner of each may be clearly traced; the splendid fulness of the one, and the sententious brevity of the other. Wherever there is real and native genius, it prompts a disposition to one kind of style rather than to another. Where this is wanting, where there is no marked nor peculiar character which appears in the compositions of an author, we are apt to conclude, and not without cause, that he is a vulgar and trivial author, who writes from imitation, and not from the impulse of original genius.

One of the first and most obvious distinctions of the different sorts of style arises from an author's expanding his thoughts more or less. This distinction constitutes what are termed the diffuse and concise styles. A concise writer compresses his ideas into the fewest words; he employs none but the most expressive; he lops off all those which are not a material addition to the sense. Whatever ornament he admits is adopted for the sake of force, rather than of grace. The same thought is never repeated. The utmost precision is studied in his sentences; and they are generally designed to suggest more to the reader's imagination than they immediately express.

A diffuse writer unfolds his idea fully. He

holds it out in a variety of lights, and assists the reader, as much as possible, in comprehending it completely. He is not very anxious to express it at first in its full strength, because he intends repeating the impression; and what he wants in strength he endeavours to supply by copiousness. His periods naturally flow into some length; and having room for ornament of every kind, he gives it free admittance.

Each of these styles has its peculiar advantages, and each becomes faulty when carried to the extreme. Of conciseness carried as far as propriety will allow, perhaps in some cases farther, Tacitus the historian, and Montesquieu, in "l'Esprit des Loix," are remarkable examples. Of a beautiful and magnificent diffuseness, Cicero is, undoubtedly, the noblest instance which can be given. Addison also, and Sir William Temple, may be ranked in some degree under the same class.

To determine when to adopt the concise, and when the diffuse manner, we must be guided by the nature of the composition. Discourses which are to be spoken require a more diffuse style than books which are to be read. In written compositions, a proper degree of conciseness has great advantages. It is more lively; keeps up attention; makes a stronger impression on the mind; and gratifies the reader by supplying more exercise to his conception. Description, when we wish to have it vivid and animated, should be in a concise strain. Any redundant words or circumstances encumber the fancy, and render the object we present to it confused and indistinct. The strength and vivacity of description, whether in prose or poetry, depend much more upon the happy choice of one or two important circumstances than upon the

multiplication of them. When we desire to strike the fancy, or to move the heart, we should be concise; when to inform the understanding, which is more deliberate in its motions, and wants the assistance of a guide, it is better to be full. Historical narration may be beautiful, either in a concise or diffuse manner, according to the author's genius. Livy and Herodotus are diffuse; Thucydides and Sallust are concise; yet they are all agreeable.

The nervous and the feeble are generally considered as characters of style, of the same import with the concise and the diffuse. They do, indeed, very frequently coincide; yet this does not always hold; since there are instances of writers, who, in the midst of a full and ample style, have maintained a considerable degree of strength. Livy is an instance of the truth of this observation. The foundation, indeed, of a nervous or weak style, is laid in an author's manner of thinking: If he conceives an object forcibly, he will express it with strength; but if he has an indistinct view of his subject, this will clearly appear in his style. Unmeaning words and loose epithets will escape him; his expressions will be vague and general; his arrangement indistinct and weak; and our conception of his meaning will be faint and confused. But a nervous writer, be his style concise or extended, gives us always a strong idea of his meaning, his mind being full of his subject, his words are, consequently, all expressive; every phrase, and every figure which he uses, renders the picture which he would set before us more striking and complete.

It must, however, be observed, that too great a study of strength, to the neglect of the other qualities of style, is apt to betray writers into a

harsh manner. Harshness proceeds from uncommon words, from forced inversions in the construction of a sentence, and too great neglect of smoothness and ease. This is imputed as a fault to some of our earliest classics in the English language; such as Sir Walter Raleigh, Sir Francis Bacon, Hooker, Harrington, Cudworth, and other writers of considerable reputation in the days of Queen Elizabeth, James I, and Charles I. These writers had nerve, and strength in a considerable degree; and are to this day distinguished by that quality in style. But the language, in their hands, was very different from what it is at present, and was, indeed, entirely formed upon the idiom and construction of the Latin, in the arrangement of sentences. The present form which the language has assumed, has, in some degree, sacrificed the study of strength to that of ease and perspicuity. Our arrangement has become less forcible, perhaps, but more plain and natural: and this is now considered as the genius of our tongue.

Hitherto style has been considered under those characters, which regard its expressiveness of an author's meaning: We will now consider it in another view, with respect to the degree of ornament employed to embellish it. Here the style of different authors seems to rise in the following gradation: A dry, a plain, a neat, an elegant, a flowery manner. Of these we will treat briefly in the order in which they stand.

A dry manner excludes every kind of ornament. Satisfied with being understood, it aims not to please, in the least degree, either the fancy or the ear. This is tolerable only in pure didactic writing; and even there to make

us bear it, great solidity of matter is necessary, and entire perspicuity of language.

A plain style advances one degree above a dry one. A writer of this character employs very little ornament of any kind, and rests almost entirely upon his sense. But, though he does not engage us by the arts of composition, he avoids disgusting us like a dry and harsh writer. Besides perspicuity, he observes propriety, purity, and precision, in his language; which form no inconsiderable degree of beauty. Liveliness and force are also compatible with a plain style; and, consequently, such an author, if his sentiments be good, may be sufficiently agreeable. The difference between a dry and a plain writer is, that the former is incapable of ornament,—the latter goes not in pursuit of it. Of those who have employed the plain style, Dean Swift is an eminent example.

A neat style is next in order; and here we are advanced into the region of ornament; but that ornament is not of the most sparkling kind. A writer of this character shows that he does not despise the beauty of language, by his attention to the choice of his words, and to their graceful collocation. His sentences are always free from the incumbrance of superfluous words; are of a moderate length; rather inclining to brevity than a swelling structure; and closing with propriety. There is variety in his cadence; but no appearance of studied harmony. His figures, if any, are short and accurate, rather than bold and glowing. Such a style may be attained by a writer whose powers of fancy or genius are not extensive, by industry and attention. This sort of style is not unsuitable to any subject whatever. A familiar epistle, or a law paper, on the driest subject, may be composed with

neatness; and a sermon, or a philosophical treatise, in a neat style, will be read with satisfaction.

An elegant style admits a higher degree of ornament than a neat one; and possesses all the virtues of ornament, without any of its excesses or defects. Complete elegance implies great perspicuity and propriety; purity in the choice of words, and carefulness and skill in their harmonious and happy arrangement. It implies farther,—the beauty of imagination spread over style, as far as the subject allows it,—and all the illustration which figurative language affords, when properly employed. An elegant writer, in short, is one who delights the fancy and the ear, while he informs the understanding; and who clothes his ideas with all the beauty of expression, but does not overload them with any of its misplaced finery.

Style—Simple; Affected; Vehement.

Directions for forming a proper Style.

SIMPLICITY, applied to writing, is a term very commonly used, but, like many other critical terms, it is often used vaguely, and without precision. The different meanings given to the word simplicity have been the chief cause of this inaccuracy. It will not, therefore, be improper to make a distinction between them, and show in what sense simplicity is a proper attribute of style. There are four different acceptations in which this term is taken.

The first is simplicity of composition, which is opposed to too great a variety of parts. This is the simplicity of plan in a tragedy, as dis-

tinguished from double plots and crowded incidents; the simplicity of the Iliad, in opposition to the digressions of Lucan; the simplicity of Grecian architecture, in opposition to the irregularity of the Gothic—Simplicity, in this sense. is the same as unity.

The second sense, is simplicity of thought in opposition to refinement. Simple thoughts are those which flow naturally, which are easily suggested by the subject or occasion, and which, when once suggested, are universally understood. Refinement in writing means a less obvious and natural turn of thought, which, when carried too far, approaches to intricacy, and is unpleasing, by the appearance of being far sought. Thus we should say, that Mr. Parnell is a poet of much greater simplicity, in his turn of thought, than Mr. Cowley.

A third sense of simplicity—that in which it regards style, is opposed to too much ornament or pomp of language. Thus we say, Mr. Locke is a simple, Mr. Hervey a florid, writer.

There is a fourth sense of simplicity, which also respects style: but it regards not so much the degree of ornament employed as the easy and natural manner in which language is expressive of our thoughts. In this sense, simplicity is compatible with the highest ornament. Homer, for example, has this simplicity in the greatest perfection; and yet no writer possesses more ornament and beauty. This simplicity, which is now the object of our consideration, stands opposed not to ornament but to affectation of ornament; and is a superior excellency in composition.

A writer who has attained simplicity has no marks of art in his expression; it appears the very language of nature. We see not the writer

and his labour, but the man in his own natural character. He may possess richness of expression; he may be full of figures and of fancy; but these flow from him without difficulty; and he seems to write in this manner, not because he has studied it, but because it is the mode of expression most familiar and easy to him. With this character of style, a certain degree of negligence is not inconsistent, nor even ungraceful; for too accurate an attention to words is foreign to it. Simplicity of style possesses this considerable advantage, that, like simplicity of manners, it shows us a man's sentiments and turn of mind laid open without disguise. A more studied and artificial mode of writing, however beautiful, has always this disadvantage, that it exhibits an author in form, like a man at court, where the splendour of dress, and the ceremonial of behaviour, conceal those peculiarities which distinguish one individual from another. But reading an author of simplicity is like conversing with a person of rank at home, and with ease, where we see his natural manners and his real character.

With regard to simplicity, in general, we may observe, that the ancient original writers are always the most eminent for it. This proceeds from a very obvious cause, that they wrote from the dictates of natural genius, and were not formed upon the labours and writings of others.

Of affectation in style, which is opposed to simplicity, we have a remarkable instance in our language. Lord Shaftesbury, though an author of considerable merit, can express nothing with simplicity. He seems to have considered it as vulgar, and beneath the dignity of a man of fashion, to speak like other men. Hence he is perpetually in buskins, replete with circumlocu-

tions and artificial elegance. In every sentence the marks of labour are visible,—no appearance of that ease which expresses a sentiment coming natural and warm from the heart. He abounds with figures and ornament of every kind,—is sometimes happy in them; but his fondness for them is too conspicuous; and having once seized some metaphor or allusion that pleased him, he knows not how to part with it. He possessed delicacy and refinement of taste to a degree that may be called excessive and sickly; but he had little warmth of passion; and the coldness of his character suggested that artificial and stately manner which appears in his writings. No author is more dangerous to the tribe of imitators than Shaftesbury, who, amidst several very considerable blemishes, has, at the same time, many dazzling and imposing beauties.

It is very possible, however, for an author to write with simplicity, and yet to be destitute of beauty. He may be free from affectation, and not have merit. The beautiful simplicity supposes an author in possession of real genius, and capable of writing with solidity, purity, and brilliancy of imagination. In this case, the simplicity of his manner is the crowning ornament. it gives lustre to every other beauty; it is the dress of nature, without which all beauties are but imperfect. But if the mere absence of affectation were sufficient to constitute the beauty of style, weak and dull writers might often have pretensions to it. A distinction, therefore, must be made, between that simplicity which accompanies true genius, and which is entirely compatible with every proper ornament of style, and that which is the effect only of carelessness and inattention.

Another character of style, different from

those which have been already mentioned, is the vehement. This always supposes strength, and is not, in any respect, incompatible with simplicity. It is distinguished by a peculiar ardour; it is the language of a man whose imagination and passions are glowing and impetuous. With a negligence of lesser graces, he pours himself forth with the rapidity and plenitude of a torrent. The vehement belongs to the higher kinds of oratory; and is rather expected from a man who is speaking, than from one who is writing in his closet. Demosthenes is the most full and perfect example of this species of style.

Having determined and explained the different characters of style, we shall conclude our observations with a few directions for the attainment of excellence in writing.

The first direction proper to be observed is, to study clear ideas on the subject concerning which we are to write or to speak. What we conceive clearly and feel strongly we shall naturally express with clearness and with strength. We should, therefore, think closely on the subject, till we have attained a full and distinct view of the matter which we are to clothe in words,—till we become warm and interested in it: then, and then only, shall we find a proper expression begin to flow.

In the second place, to the acquisition of a good style, the frequency of composing is indispensably requisite. But it is not every kind of composing which will improve style. By a careless and hasty habit of writing, a bad style will be acquired; more trouble will afterwards be necessary to unlearn faults, and correct negligence, than to endeavour, from a state of entire ignorance, to become acquainted with the first rudiments of composition. In the beginning,

therefore, we ought to write with deliberation and with care. Facility and speed are the fruit of practice and experience. We must be cautious, however, not to retard the course of thought, nor cool the ardour of imagination, by pausing too long on every word we employ. On certain occasions, there is a glow of composition which must be kept up, if we expect to express ourselves happily, though at the expense of some inaccuracies. A more severe examination must be the work of correction. What we have written should be laid by for some time, till the ardour of composition be subsided, till the partiality for our expressions be weakened, and the expressions themselves be forgotten: and then examining our work with a cool and critical eye, as if it were the performance of another, we shall discover many imperfections which at first escaped our notice.

In the third place, an acquaintance with the style of the best authors is peculiarly requisite. Hence a just taste will be formed, and a copious fund be supplied, of words on every subject. No exercise, perhaps, will be found more useful for acquiring a proper style, than to translate some passage from an elegant author into our own words. Thus, to take, for instance, a page of one of Mr. Addison's Spectators, and read it attentively two or three times, till we are in full possession of the thoughts it contains; then to lay aside the book, to endeavour to write out the passage from memory, as well as we can,—and then to compare what we have written with the style of the author. Such an exercise will, by comparison, show us our own defects; will teach us to correct them; and, from the variety of expression which it will

exhibit, will conduct us to that which is most beautiful and perfect.

In the fourth place, a caution must be given against a servile imitation of any one author whatever. A desire of imitating, hampers genius, and generally produces a stiffness of expression. They who follow an author minutely, commonly copy his faults as well as his beauties. No one will ever become an accomplished writer or speaker, who has not some confidence in his own genius. We ought carefully to avoid using any author's particular phrases, or transcribing passages from him: such a habit will be fatal to all genuine composition. It is much better to possess something of our own, though of inferior beauty, than to endeavour to shine in borrowed ornaments, which will, at last, betray the utter barrenness of our genius.

In the fifth place, it is a plain but important rule, with regard to style, that we always endeavour to adapt it to the subject, and likewise to the capacity of our hearers, if we are to speak in public. To attempt a poetical, florid style when it should be our business only to argue and reason, is in the highest degree awkward and absurd. To speak with elaborate pomp of words, before those who cannot comprehend them, is equally ridiculous and useless. When we begin to write or speak, we should previously impress on our minds a complete idea of the end to be aimed at; keep this steadily in view, and adapt our style to it.

We must in the last place, recommend, that an attentive regard to style do not occupy us so much, as to detract from a higher degree of attention to the thoughts. This rule is the more necessary, since the present taste of the age seems to be directed more to style than to thought. It

is much more easy to dress up trifling and common thoughts with some ornament of expression, than to afford a fund of vigorous, ingenious, and useful sentiments. The latter requires genius; the former may be attained by industry, with the aid of very superficial parts. Hence the crowd of writers who are rich in words, but poor in sentiments. Custom obliges us not to be inattentive to the ornaments of style, if we wish that our labours should be read and admired. But he is a contemptible writer, who looks not beyond the dress of language, who lays not the chief stress upon his matter, and who does not regard ornament as a secondary and inferior recommendation.

With respect to the figures of Rhetoric with which style is so much invigorated and embellished, see page 172.

THUS far, with the most trifling alterations, I have followed Dr. Blair, who, in those parts of Oratory called Disposition and Elocution, or a choice and arrangement of words, has exceeded every writer who went before him. I flatter myself that in Pronunciation or Delivery, which forms the last part of oratory, something more systematical and satisfactory has been offered in the present work, than in any that has hitherto been published. But there is another part of oratory called Invention, that has been but little insisted on by our modern writers, which, however, seems to form the basis of the art. Dr. Blair has not only omitted but discountenanced this part of rhetoric; and such an opinion have I of the good sense of this writer, that I should much doubt of its utility, if the very reason of

the thing, as well as the authority of the ancients, and some of the most respectable among the moderns, did not sanction and recommend it. Dr. Priestley's reasons for the use of topics appear to me unanswerable.

"I am aware (says he) that this whole business "of topics is objected to by some as altogether "useless, and what no persons, who are capable "of composing at all, ever stand in need of, or "have recourse to." To this I reply, that in fact no person ever did, or ever can compose at all without having recourse to something of a similar nature. What is *recollection* but the introduction of one idea into the mind by means of another with which it was previously associated? Are not ideas associated by means of their connexion with, and relation to, one another? And is it not very possible, that *particular ideas* may be recollected by means of *general ideas*, which include them?

It is impossible to endeavour to *recollect* (or as we generally say, *invent*) materials for a discourse, without running over in our minds such general heads of discourse as we have found by experience to assist us in that operation. It is even impossible to conceive in what other manner a *voluntary effort* to invent, or recollect can be directed. A person may not have recourse to any particular list, or enumeration of topics; or he may never have heard of the artificial distribution of them by rhetoricians: but if he compose at all, though he may be ignorant of the *name*, he must be possessed of the *thing*. And if a person have any *regular method* in his compositions, he must, moreover, have arranged those topics in his mind in some kind of order; the several particulars of which, being attended to successively, furnish him with *a plan for composition*. Now is it not better to sit down to

composition provided with a tolerably complete list of those topics, digested with care and precision, than make use of such a one as we casually and without any design form to ourselves from general reading only, or a little practice in composition, which cannot but be very imperfect, and inadequate to the purpose to which it is applied?

After previously running over such a table, a person would be much better able to form an idea of the *extent* of his subject, and might conduct his composition accordingly; or perusing it after reading the composition of another, he might with much greater certainty know whether any thing of importance had been left unsaid upon the subject; or whether, if the discourse were necessarily limited to a few arguments, the writer had selected the best.

If we pay any regard to the practice of the famous orators of antiquity, we cannot but be disposed to think favourably of topics; for it is certain that they made great use of topics, as appears in the writings of Cicero and Quintilian. Too much may be expected from any thing, and an improper use may be made of any thing; but this is no argument against the judicious and proper use of it.

It were absurd for any person slavishly to oblige himself to borrow something from every topic of discourse; much more to set it down in the order in which they may happen to be enumerated; but, having glanced the whole, let him take what is most to his purpose, and omit every thing that would appear far-fetched, or to be introduced for the sake of swelling the bulk of a discourse.

I am very ready, however, to acknowledge, that rhetorical topics are more useful in the

composition of *set declamations on trite subjects*, and to *young persons*, than in the communication of original matter, and to persons much used to composition. Original thoughts cannot but suggest themselves, so that all the assistance any person can want in this case is a proper manner of *arranging* them. And a person much used to composition will have acquired a habit of recollection, without any express attention to topics; just as a person used to the harpsichord, or any other instrument of music, will be able to perform without an *express attention* to rules, or even to the manner of placing his fingers. His idea of the tune in general is so closely associated with all the motions of his fingers necessary to the playing of it, and these motions are also so closely associated together, that they follow one another mechanically, in what Dr. Hartley calls a *secondarily automatic manner*, which is almost as certain as a motion *originally* and *properly automatic*.

As rules for invention, or, as Dr. Priestley more properly calls it, *recollection*, are established by such good reasons, and on so respectable authority, I shall present the student with a large extract from the System of Oratory of the learned Dr. Ward, professor of Gresham College. And as this book has long been out of print, and is scarcely to be got, I flatter myself I shall make my reader no unacceptable present, by giving him the learned professor's Lectures on *Invention*, or that part of rhetoric which treats on the method of finding out arguments for the proof of what is proposed.

Of the principal Distribution of Oratory.

THE principal distribution of the subject of oratory is made, by dividing it into three kinds of discourse, called by the ancients *demonstrative, deliberative,* and *judicial.* The *first* of these comprehends all such discourses as relate to the praise or dispraise of persons or things. This is a very extensive field, and contains in it whatever in nature or art, on the account of any good or bad qualities, excellences or defects, is fit to be made the subject of a discourse. By this, virtue is applauded, and vice censured; good examples recommended to the imitation of others, and bad ones exposed to their abhorrence. All panegyric and invective are its proper themes. So that the chief design of these discourses is to inspire men with generous sentiments of honour and virtue, and to give them a distaste to every thing that is base and vicious, by examples of each, which are the most powerful means of instruction. Though, as has been said already, they are not wholly confined to persons. To the *deliberative* kind belongs whatever may become a subject of debate, consultation, or advice. Of this sort are all speeches made in public assemblies, which respect the common good and benefit of mankind, their lives, liberties, and estates; whatever is advised to, or dissuaded from, upon the foot of any valuable interest, which is the end proposed in these discourses, so far as it is consistent with honour and justice. The last head contains all *judicial subjects*; by this property is secured, innocence protected, justice maintained, and crimes punished. All matters canvassed at the bar are of this sort. And it is doubtless a very

valuable and useful end in speaking, to vindicate justice and equity in opposition to fraud or violence. Aristotle is said to have been the author of this division, which seems to be very just; since perhaps there is no subject of oratory, whether sacred or civil, but may be referred to one or other of these heads, as will be shown hereafter, when I come to treat of each of them in particular.

Of Invention in general, and particularly of Common Places.

Invention, considered in general, is the discovery of such things as are proper to persuade. And in order to attain this end, the orator proposes to himself three things: to prove or illustrate the subject upon which he treats, to conciliate the minds of his hearers, and to engage their passions in his favour. And as these require different kinds of arguments or motives, invention furnishes him with a supply for each of them, as will be shown in their order.

I shall first consider that part of *Invention*, which directs to *arguments proper for the proof of a thing*; which, as Cicero tells us, is "the discovery of such things as are really true, or "that seem to be so, and make the thing, for "which they are produced, appear probable." And the things which are thus discovered, are called *Arguments*; for, "an Argument," as defined by him, "is a reason, which induces us to "believe what before we doubted of." If we reflect upon those things, which relate to the common affairs of life, and the numerous transactions between mankind, we shall find that most of them are of a dubious nature, and liable to various constructions, as they are taken in

different views; whence a diversity of opinions is formed concerning them. And where the nature of the thing does not admit of certainty, every considerate and prudent person will give into that side of the question, which carries in it the greater degree of probability. And as these are the subjects with which the ancient orators were principally concerned, we find, by Cicero's definition, that all he requires of such arguments as they commonly made use of, is to render a thing probable. Indeed there are some things which do not so much require reasoning, as a proper and suitable manner of representing them, to make them credible; and because the several ways of illustrating these are also taught by the precepts of this art, they are likewise, in a large sense of the word, called *arguments*.

But as different kinds of discourses require different *arguments*, rhetoricians have considered them two ways; in general, under certain heads, as a common fund for all subjects; and in a more particular manner, as they are suited to *demonstrative*, *deliberative*, or *judicial* discourses. At present I shall treat only upon the former of these. And now, that one thing may receive proof and confirmation from another, it is necessary that there be some relation between them: for all things are not equally adapted to prove one another.

That we may the better conceive this, I shall make use of a plain and familiar instance. In measuring the quantity of two things which we would show to be either equal or unequal, if they are of such a nature that one cannot be applied to the other, then we take a third thing, which may be applied to them both,—and that must be equal at least to one of the two, which,

if applied to the other, and found equal to that also, we presently conclude that those two things are equal; but if it be unequal to the other, we say that those two things are unequal. Because it is the certain and known property of all quantities, that whatsoever two things are equal to a third, are equal to one another; and where one of any two things is equal to a third, and the other unequal, those two things are unequal to one another. What has been said of quantities will hold true in all other cases,—that so far as any two things or ideas agree to a third, so far they agree to one another. And by agreeing, I understand this, that the one may be affirmed of the other. So likewise on the contrary, as far as one of any two things or ideas does agree to a third, and the other does not, so far they disagree with one another, in which respect one of them cannot be truly affirmed of the other. Since therefore in every proposition one thing is spoken of another, if we would find out whether the two ideas agree to each other or not, where this is not evident of itself, we must find out some third thing the idea of which agrees to one of them; and then that being applied to the other, as it does agree or disagree with it, so we may conclude that the two things proposed do agree or disagree with one another.

This will be made more clear by an example or two. Should it be inquired, *Whether virtue is to be loved?* the agreement between virtue and love might be found by comparing them separately with happiness, as a common measure to both. For since the idea of happiness agrees to that of love, and the idea of virtue to that of happiness, it follows that the ideas of virtue and love agree to one another; and therefore it

may be affirmed, *That virtue is to be loved.* But on the contrary, because the idea of misery disagrees with that of love, but the idea of vice agrees to that of misery, the two ideas of vice and love must consequently disagree with one another; and therefore it would be false to assert, *That vice is to be loved.* Now this third thing logicians call the *medium* or *middle term*, because it does as it were connect two extremes, that is, both parts of a proposition. But rhetoricians call it an *argument*, because it is so applied to what was before proposed, as to become the instrument of procuring our assent to it. I have mentioned these plain examples only for illustration, by which we may in some measure perceive the nature and use of arguments.

But whence, and by what methods they are to be sought, I shall now explain.

A lively imagination and readiness of thought are undoubtedly a very great help to invention. Some persons are naturally endued with that quickness of fancy and penetration of mind, that they are seldom at a loss for arguments either to defend their own opinions, or to attack their adversaries. However, these things being the gift of nature, and not to be gained by art, do not properly fall under our present consideration.

But because all are not born with a like happy genius, and have not the same opportunity to cultivate their minds with learning and knowledge, and because nothing is more difficult than to dwell long upon the consideration of one thing, in order to find out the strongest arguments which may be offered for and against it,—upon these accounts art has prescribed a method to lessen in some measure these difficulties, and help every one to a supply of argu-

ments upon any subject. And this is done by the contrivance of *common places*, which Cicero calls the *seats* or *heads of arguments*, and, by a Greek name *topics*. They are of two sorts, *internal* and *external*. As to the former, though things with regard to their nature and properties are exceedingly various, yet they have certain common relations, by means whereof the truth of what is either affirmed or denied concerning them in any respect may be evinced. The ancient Greek rhetoricians therefore reduced these relations to some general heads; which are termed *common places*, because the reasons or arguments suited to prove any proposition are reposited in them, as a common fund or receptacle. And they are called *internal heads*, because they arise from the subject upon which the orator treats; and are therefore distinguished from others named *external*, which he fetches from without, and applies to his present purpose, as will be shown hereafter. Cicero and Quintilian make them sixteen; three of which comprehend the whole thing they are brought to prove; namely, *Definition*, *Enumeration*, and *Notation*; and of the remaining thirteen some contain a part of it, and the rest its various properties and circumstances, with other considerations relating to it; and these are *Genus*, *Species*, *Antecedents*, *Consequents*, *Adjuncts*, *Conjugates*, *Cause*, *Effect*, *Contraries*, *Opposites*, *Similitude*, *Dissimilitude*, and *Comparison*. I shall give a brief account of each of these, in the order now mentioned.

DEFINITION explains the nature of the thing defined, and shows what it is. And to whatsoever the definition agrees, the thing defined does so likewise. If therefore Socrates be a rational creature, he is a man; because it is the definition of a man that he is a rational creature.

ENUMERATION takes in all the parts of a thing. And from this we prove, that what agrees to all the parts agrees to the whole; and what does not agree to any one or more parts, does not agree to the whole. As when Cicero proves to Piso, that all the Roman state hated him; by enumerating the several ranks and orders of Roman Citizens, who all did so.

NOTATION or Etymology explains the meaning or signification of a word. From which we reason thus: If he cannot pay his debts, he is insolvent; for that is the meaning of the word insolvent.

GENUS is what contains under it two or more sorts of things, differing in nature. From this head logicians reason thus: because every animal is mortal, and man is an animal, therefore man is mortal. But orators make a further use of this argument, which they call ascending from the hypothesis to the thesis, that is, from a particular to a general. As should a person, when speaking in praise of justice, take occasion thence to commend and show the excellency of virtue in general, with a view to render that particular virtue more amiable. For since every species contains in it the whole nature of the genus to which it relates, besides what is peculiar to itself, whereby it is distinguished from it,—what is affirmed of the genus must of necessity be applicable to the species.

SPECIES is that which comprehends under it all the individuals of the same nature. From hence we may argue: He is a man, therefore he has a rational soul. And orators sometimes take occasion from this head to descend from the thesis to the hypothesis; that is, in treating upon what is more general to introduce some particular contained under it, for the greater illustration of the general.

ANTECEDENTS are such things, as being once allowed, others necessarily, or very probably, follow. From this head an inseparable property is proved from its subject: as, it is material, and therefore corruptible.

CONSEQUENTS are such things, as being allowed, necessarily, or very probably, infer their antecedents. Hence the subject is proved from an inseparable property in this manner; it is corruptible, and therefore material.

ADJUNCTS are separable properties of things, or circumstances that attend them. These are very numerous, and afford a great variety of arguments, some of which usually occur in every discourse. They do not necessarily infer their subject, but, if fitly chosen, render a thing credible, and are a sufficient ground for assent. The way of reasoning from them we shall show presently.

CONJUGATES are words deduced from the same origin with that of our subject. By these the habit is proved from its acts; as, he who does justly is just. He does not act wisely, therefore he is not wise. But this inference will not hold, unless the actions appear continued and constant.

A CAUSE is that, by the force of which a thing does exist. There are four kinds of causes,—matter, form, efficient, and end, which afford a great variety of arguments. The way of reasoning from them is to infer the effect from the cause: as, Man is endued with reason, therefore he is capable of knowledge.

An EFFECT is that which arises from a cause, therefore the cause is proved by it; as, He is endued with knowledge, therefore with reason.

CONTRARIES are things which, under the same genus, are at the utmost distance from each

other. So that what we grant to the one we utterly deny the other: as, Virtue ought to be embraced, therefore vice should be avoided.

OPPOSITES are such things, which, though repugnant to each other, yet are not directly contradictory: as, to love and to injure; to hate and to commend. They differ from contraries in this, that they do not absolutely exclude one another. An argument is drawn from things repugnant thus; He will do a man a mischief, therefore he does not love him. He loves a man, therefore he will not reproach him.

SIMILITUDE is an agreement of things in quality. Thus Cicero proves, that pernicious citizens ought to be taken out of the state; by the likeness they bear to corrupted members, which are cut off to prevent further damage to the body.

DISSIMILITUDE is a disagreement of things in quality. From this head Cicero shows the preference of his own exile to Piso's Government of Macedonia; by the difference between their conduct, and the people's esteem of them.

COMPARISON is made three ways: for either a thing is compared with a greater, with a less, or with its equal. This place therefore differs from that of similitude on this account, that the quality was considered in that, but here the quantity. An argument from the greater is thus drawn: If five legions could not conquer the enemy, much less will two. And by this the manner of the rest may be easily conceived.

I shall just give one example somewhat larger than I have hitherto done of the manner of reasoning from these heads, whereby the use of them may further appear. If any one therefore should have endeavoured to persuade Cicero not to accept of his life upon the condi-

tion offered him by Antony,—that he would burn his Philippic orations, which had been spoken against him,—he might be supposed to use such arguments as these; partly taken from the adjuncts of Cicero, partly from those of Antony, and partly from the thing itself. And first with regard to Cicero it might be said: That so great a man ought not to purchase his life at so dear a price, as the loss of that immortal honour which, by so great pains and labour, he had acquired. And this might be confirmed by another argument: That now he was grown old and could not expect to live much longer. And from the character of Antony he might argue thus: That he was very crafty and deceitful, and only designed, by giving him hopes of life, to have the Philippics first burnt, which otherwise he knew would transmit to posterity an eternal brand of infamy upon him, and then he would take off the author. And this might be shown by comparison: For since he would not spare others, who had not so highly exasperated him, and from whom he had not so much to fear, certainly he would not forgive Cicero, since he knew well enough, that, so long as he lived, he himself could never be in safety. And lastly an argument might also be fetched from the nature of the thing itself in the following manner: That Cicero by this action would shamefully betray the state, and the cause of liberty, which he had, through his whole life, most courageously defended, with so great honour to himself, and advantage to the public. Upon such an account a person might have used these, or the like arguments with Cicero, which arise from the fore-mentioned heads.

From this account of *Common Places* it is easy to conceive what a large field of discourse they open to the mind upon every subject. These

different considerations furnish out a great number and variety of arguments, sufficient to supply the most barren invention. He can never be at a loss for matter who considers well the nature of his subject, the parts of which it consists, the circumstances which attend it, the causes whence it springs, the effects it produces, its agreement, disagreement, or repugnancy to other things,—and in like manner carries it through all the remaining heads. But although this method will assist us very much to enlarge upon a subject, and place it in different views, yet a prudent man is not so desirous to say a great deal as to speak to the purpose, and therefore will make choice of proper arguments, and such only which have a direct tendency to confirm or illustrate his subject. And for this end it is necessary for him to gain first a thorough knowledge of his subject, and then arguments will naturally spring up in his mind proper to support it; and if he be still at a loss, and find occasion to have recourse to these heads, he will readily perceive whence to take those which are best suited to his purpose.

Of External Topics.

THE nature and design of *Common Places* have been shown already; and a particular account of those which, because they are taken from the subject matter of a discourse, are therefore called *internal*, has likewise been given. But the orator sometimes reasons from such topics as do not arise from his subject, but from things of a different nature, and for that reason are called external. And because the former are more properly invented by him, and the effect of his art, Aristotle calls them *artificial*

topics, and the latter *inartificial.* But as they both require skill in the management, Quintilian very much blames those who take no notice of these latter, but exclude them from the art of rhetoric. I propose, therefore, to make them the subject of my present discourse, and show the methods of reasoning from them. They are all taken from authorities, and are, by one general name, called *Testimonies.*

Now a *Testimony* may be expressed by writing, speech, or any other sign proper to declare a person's mind. And all *testimonies* may be distinguished into two sorts, *divine* and *human.* A *divine testimony,* when certainly known to be such, is incontestable, and admits of no debate, but should be acquiesced in without hesitation. Indeed the ancient Greeks and Romans esteemed the pretended oracles of their deities, the answers of their augurs, and the like fallacies, divine testimonies. But with us, no one can be ignorant of their true notion, though they do not so directly come under our present consideration. *Human Testimonies* are of various kinds; but as they furnish the orator with arguments (in which view I am now to consider them), they may be reduced to three heads; *Writings, Witnesses,* and *Contracts.*

By *Writings* here are to be understood written laws, wills, or other legal instruments, expressed and conveyed in that manner. And it is not so much the force and validity of such testimonies, considered in themselves, that is here intended, as the occasion of dispute which may at any time arise concerning their true design and import, when produced in proof upon either side of a controversy. And these are five: *Ambiguity, Disagreement between the words and intention, Contrariety, Reasoning,* and *Inter-*

pretation. I shall speak to each of these in their order.

A writing is then said to be *ambiguous*, when it is capable of two or more senses, which makes the writer's design uncertain. Now ambiguity may arise either from single words, or the construction of sentences. From single words; as when either the sense of a word, or the application of it, is doubtful. As: *should it be questioned, whether ready money ought to be included under the appellation of chattels left by a will.* Or: *if a testator bequeath a certain legacy to his nephew Thomas, and he has two nephews of that name.* But ambiguity is also sometimes occasioned from the construction of a sentence; as when several things or persons having been already mentioned, it is doubtful to which of them that which follows ought to be referred. For example: a person writes thus in his will: *Let my heir give as a legacy to Titius, a horse out of my stable, which he pleases.* Here it may be questioned whether the word *he* refers to the heir, or to Titius; and consequently, whether the heir be allowed to give Titius which horse he pleases, or Titius may choose which he likes best. Now as to controversies of this kind, in the first case above-mentioned, the party who claims the chattels may plead, that all moveable goods come under that name, and therefore that he has a right to the money. This he will endeavour to prove from some instances where the word has been so used. The business of the opposite party is to refute this, by showing that money is not there included. And if either side produce precedents in his favour, the other may endeavour to show the cases are not parallel. As to the second case, arising from an ambi-

guity in the name, if any other words or expressions in the will seem to countenance either of the claimants, he will not fail to interpret them to his advantage. So likewise if any thing said by the testator, in his life time, or any regard shown to either of these nephews more than the other, may help to determine which of them was intended, a proper use may be made of it. And the same may be said with regard to the third case. In which the legatee may reason likewise from the common use of language, and show, that in such expressions it is unusual to make the reference to the last or next antecedent; and thence plead, that it was the design of the testator to give him the option. But in answer to this it may be said, that allowing it to be very often so, yet in this instance it seems more easy and natural to repeat the verb *give* after *please*, and so to supply the sentence, *which he pleases to give him*, referring it to the heir, than to bring in the verb *choose*, which was not in the sentence before, and so by supplying the sense, *which he pleases to choose*, to give the option to Titius. But where controversies of this kind arise from a law, recourse may be had to other laws, where the same thing has been expressed with greater clearness, which may help to determine the sense of the passage in dispute.

A second controversy from *Writings* is, when one party adheres to the *words*, and the other to what he asserts was the writer's *intention*. Now he who opposes the literal sense, either contends, that what he himself offers is the simple and plain meaning of the writing, or that it must be so understood in the particular case in debate. An instance of the former is this, as we find it in Cicero. A person who died without children, but left a widow, had made this provision in his

will: *If I have a son born to me, he shall be my heir.* And a little after: *If my son die, before he comes of age, let Curius be my heir.* There is no son born, Curius therefore sues for the estate, and pleads the intention of the testator, who designed him for his heir if he should have no son who arrived at age; and says, there can be no reason to suppose he did not intend the same person for his heir if he had no son, as if he should have one who afterwards died in his minority. But the heir at law insists upon the words of the will, which, as he says, require that first a son should be born, and afterwards die under age, before Curius can succeed to the inheritance. And there being no son, a substituted heir, as Curius was, can have no claim where the first heir does not exist, from whom he derives his pretension, and was to succeed by the appointment of the will. Of the latter case rhetoricians give this example: *It was forbidden by a law, to open the city gates in the night. A certain person, notwithstanding, in time of war, did open them in the night, and let in some auxiliary troops, to prevent their being cut off by the enemy who was posted near the town.* Afterwards, when the war was over, this person is arraigned, and tried for his life on the account of this action. Now in such a case the prosecutor founds his charge upon the express words of the law; and pleads that no sufficient reason can be assigned for going contrary to the letter of it, which would be to make a new law, and not to execute one already made. The defendant on the other hand alleges, that the fact he is charged with cannot however come within the intention of the law; since he either could not, or ought not to have complied with the letter of it in that particular case, which must

therefore necessarily be supposed to have been excepted in the design of that law, when it was made. But to this the prosecutor may reply; that all such exceptions, as are intended by any law, are usually expressed in it: and instances may be brought of particular exceptions expressed in some laws; and if there be any such exception in the law under debate, it should especially be mentioned. He may further add, that to admit of exceptions not expressed in the law itself, is to enervate the force of all laws by explaining them away, and in effect to render them useless. And this he may further corroborate by comparing the law under debate with others, and considering its nature and importance, and how far the public interest of the state is concerned in the due and regular execution of it; whence he may infer, that should exceptions be admitted in other laws of less consequence, yet, however, they ought not in this. Lastly, he may consider the reason alleged by the defendant, on which he founds his plea, and show there was not that necessity of violating the law in the present case as is pretended. And this is often the more requisite, because the party who disputes against the words of the law always endeavours to support his allegations from the equity of the case. If, therefore, this plea can be enervated, the main support of the defendant's cause is removed. For as the former arguments are designed to prevail with the judge to determine the matter on this side the question, from the nature of the case,—so the intention of this argument is to induce him to it, from the weakness of the defence made by the opposite party. But the defendant will, on the contrary, use such arguments as may best demonstrate the equity of

his cause, and endeavour to vindicate the fact from his good design and intention in doing it. He will say, that the laws have allotted punishments for the commission of such facts as are evil in themselves, or prejudicial to others; neither of which can be charged upon the action for which he is accused: that no law can be rightly executed, if more regard be had to the words and syllables of the writing, than to the intention of the legislator. To which purpose he may allege that direction of the law itself, which says: *The law ought not to be too rigorously interpreted, nor the words of it strained; but the true intention and design of each part of it duly considered.* As also, that saying of Cicero: *What law may not be weakened and destroyed, if we bend the sense to the words, and do not regard the design and view of the legislator?* Hence he may take occasion to complain of the hardship of such a procedure, that no difference should be made between an audacious and wilful crime, and an honest or necessary action, which might happen to disagree with the letter of the law, though not with the intent of it. And as it was observed before to be of considerable service to the accuser, if he could remove the defendant's plea of equity,—so it will be of equal advantage to the defendant, if he can fix upon any words in the law which may in the least seem to countenance his case, since this will take off the main force of the charge.

The third controversy of this kind is, when two writings happen to *clash* with each other, or at least seem to do so. Of this Hermogenes gives the following instance. One law enjoins: *He, who continues alone in a ship during a tempest, shall have the property of the ship.*

Another law says: *A disinherited son shall enjoy no part of his father's estate.* Now a son, who had been disinherited by his father, happens to be in his father's ship in a tempest, and continues there alone, when every one else had deserted it. He claims the ship by the former of these laws, and his brother tries his right with him by the latter. In such cases therefore it may first be considered, whether the two laws can be reconciled. And if that cannot be done, then which of them appears more equitable. Also whether one be positive, and the other negative: because prohibitions are a sort of exceptions to positive injunctions. Or if one be a general law,—and the other more particular, and come nearer to the matter in question. Likewise which was last made: since former laws are often abrogated, either wholly or in part, by subsequent laws; or at least were designed to be so. Lastly, it may be observed, whether one of the laws be not plain and express, and the other more dubious, or has any ambiguity in it. All or any of which things that party will not omit to improve for his advantage, whose interest is concerned in it.

The fourth controversy is *Reasoning:* as when something not expressly provided for by a law is inferred by similitude, or parity of reason, from what is contained in it. Quintilian mentions this instance of it: *There was a law made at Tarentum to prohibit the exportation of wool, but a certain person exports sheep.* In this case the prosecutor may first compare the thing, which occasions the charge, with the words of the law, and show their agreement, and how unnecessary it was that particular thing should have been expressly mentioned in the law, since it is plainly contained in it, or at least an evident

consequence from it. He may then plead that many things of a like nature are omitted in other laws for the same reason: and, lastly, he may urge the reasonableness and equity of the procedure. The defendant on the other hand will endeavour to show the deficiency of the reasoning, and the difference between the two cases. He will insist upon the plain and express words of the law, and set forth the ill tendency of such inferences and conclusions drawn from similitudes and comparisons; since there is scarce any thing but in some respect may bear a resemblance to another.

The last controversy under this head is *Interpretation*, in which the dispute turns upon the true meaning and explication of the law, in reference to that particular case. We have the following instance of this in the pandects: *A man who had two sons, both under age, substitutes Titius as heir to him who should die last, provided both of them died in their minority. They both perish together at sea, before they came to age. Here arises a doubt, whether the substitution can take place, or the inheritance devolves to the heir at law.* The latter pleads, that as neither of them can be said to have died last, the substitution cannot take place, which was suspended upon the condition, that one died after the other. But to this it may be said it was the intention of the testator that if both died in their nonage, Titius should succeed to the inheritance; and therefore it makes no difference whether they died together, or one after the other; and so the law determines it.

The second head of external arguments are *Witnesses*. These may either give their evidence when absent, in writing subscribed with their name; or present, by word of mouth. And what both of them testify, may either be from

hearsay, or what they saw themselves, and were present at the time it was done. As the weight of the evidence may be thought greater or less on each of these accounts, either party will make such use of it as he finds for his advantage. The characters of the witnesses are also to be considered; and if any thing be found in their lives or behaviour, that is justly exceptionable, to invalidate their evidence, it ought not to be omitted. And how they are affected to the contending parties, or either of them, may deserve consideration: for some allowances may be judged reasonable in case of friendship or enmity, where there is no room for any other exception. But regard should chiefly be had to what they testify, and how far the cause is affected by it. Cicero is very large upon most of these heads in his defence of Marcus Fonteius, with a design to weaken the evidence of the Gauls against him. And where witnesses are produced on one side only, as orators sometimes attempt to lessen the credit of this kind of proof, by pleading that witnesses are liable to be corrupted or biassed by some prevailing interest or passion to which arguments taken from the nature and circumstances of things are not subject, it may be answered on the other hand, that sophistical arguments, and false colourings, are not exposed to infamy or punishment, whereas witnesses are restrained by shame and penalties, nor would the law require them if they were not necessary.

The third and last head of external arguments are *Contracts*, which may be either public or private. By public are meant the transactions between different states, as leagues, alliances, and the like; which depend on the laws of nations, and come more properly under deliberative discourses, to which I shall refer them,

Those are called private which relate to lesser bodies or societies of men, and single persons; and may be either written or verbal. And it is not so much the true meaning and purport of them, that is here considered, as their force and obligation. And as the Roman law declares, *Nothing can be more agreeable to human faith, than that persons should stand to their agreements*,—therefore in controversies of this kind, the party whose interest it is that the contract should be maintained will plead that such covenants have the force of private laws, and ought religiously to be observed, since the common affairs of mankind are transacted in that manner; and therefore to violate them is to destroy all commerce and society among men. On the other side it may be said, that justice and equity are chiefly to be regarded, which are immutable. And besides, that the public laws are the common rule to determine such differences, which are designed to redress those who are aggrieved. And, indeed, where a compact has been obtained by force or fraud, it is in itself void, and has no effect either in law or reason. But on the other hand, the Roman lawyers seem to have very rightly determined, that all such obligations as are founded in natural equity, though not binding by national laws, and are therefore called *nuda pacta*, ought, however, in honour and conscience, to be performed.

Thus I have gone through the common heads of invention, both internal and external, which may be of service to an orator, when his view is to inform his hearers, and prove the truth of what he asserts. But the particular application of them, to the several sorts of discourses he may have occasion to treat upon, I shall now proceed to explain.

Of the State of a Controversy.

THE ancients observing that the principal question or point in dispute, in all controversies, might be referred to some particular head, reduced those heads to a certain number; that both the nature of the question might by that means be better known, and the arguments suited to it be discovered with greater ease. And these heads they call *States.*

By the *State of a Controversy* then we are to understand the principal point in dispute between contending parties, upon the proof of which the whole cause or controversy depends. We find it expressed by several other names in ancient writers: as, *The constitution of the cause*, *The general head*, and *The chief question.* And as this is the principal thing to be attended to in every such discourse, so it is what first requires the consideration of the speaker, and should be well fixed and digested in his mind before he proceeds to look for arguments proper to support it. For what can be more absurd than for a person to attempt the proof of any thing before he has well settled in his own mind a clear and distinct notion what the thing is which he would endeavour to prove? Quintilian describes it to be, *That kind of question which arises from the first conflict of causes.* In judicial cases it immediately follows upon the charge of the plaintiff, and plea of the defendant. Our common law expresses it by one word, namely, the *Issue:* which interpreters explain, by describing it to be, *That point of matter depending in suit, whereupon the parties join, and put their cause to the trial.* Examples will further help to illustrate this, and

render it more evident. In the cause of Milo, the charge of the Clodian party is, *Milo killed Clodius.* Milo's plea or defence, *I killed him, but justly.* Hence arises this grand question, or state of the cause: *Whether it was lawful for Milo to kill Clodius?* And that Clodius was lawfully killed by Milo, is what Cicero in his defence of Milo principally endeavours to prove. This is the main subject of that fine and beautiful oration. The whole of his discourse is to be considered as centring at last in this one point. Whatever different matters are occasionally mentioned, will, if closely attended to, be found to have been introduced some way or other, the better to support and carry on this design. Now in such cases, where the fact is not denied, but something is offered in its defence, the state of the cause is taken from the defendant's plea, who is obliged to make it good. As in the instance here given, the chief point in dispute was the lawfulness of Milo's action, which it was Cicero's business to demonstrate. But when the defendant denies the fact, the state of the cause arises from the accusation; the proof of which then lies upon the plaintiff, and not, as in the former case, upon the defendant. So in the cause of Roscius, the charge made against him is, *That he killed his father.* But he denies the fact. The grand question therefore to be argued is: *Whether or not he killed his father?* The proof of this lay upon the accusers. And Cicero's design in the defence of him is to show, that they had not made good their charge. But it sometimes happens, that the defendant neither absolutely denies the fact nor attempts to justify it; but only endeavours to qualify it, by denying that it is a crime of that

nature, or deserves that name by which it is expressed in the charge. We have an example of this proposed by Cicero: *A person is accused of sacrilege, for taking a thing that was sacred, out of a private house. He owns the fact, but denies it to be sacrilege; since it was committed in a private house, and not in a temple.* Hence this question arises: *Whether to take a sacred thing out of a private house is to be deemed sacrilege, or only simple theft?* It lies upon the accuser to prove, what the other denies; and, therefore, the state of the cause is here also, as well as in the preceding case, taken from the indictment.

But besides the principal question, there are other subordinate questions, which follow upon it in the course of a dispute, and should be carefully distinguished from it: particularly that which arises from the reason or argument which is brought in proof of the principal question. For the principal question itself proves nothing, but is the thing to be proved, and becomes at last the conclusion of the discourse. Thus in the cause of Milo, his argument is; *I killed Clodius justly, because he assassinated me.* Unless the Clodian party be supposed to deny this, they give up their cause. Hence therefore this subordinate question follows: *Whether Clodius assassinated Milo?* Now Cicero spends much time in the proof of this, as the hinge on which the first question, and consequently the whole cause, depended. For if this was once made to appear, the lawfulness of Milo's killing Clodius, which was the grand question or thing to be proved, might be inferred, as an allowed consequence from it. This will be evident, by throwing Milo's argument, as used by Cicero, into the form of a syllogism:

An assassinator is lawfully killed:
Clodius was an assassinator:
Therefore he was lawfully killed by Milo, whom he assassinated.

If the minor proposition of this syllogism was granted, no one would deny the conclusion: for the Roman law allowed of self-defence. But as Cicero was very sensible this would not be admitted, so he takes much pains to bring the court into the belief of it. Now where the argument brought in defence of the second question is contested, or the orator supposes that it may be so, and therefore supports that with another argument, this occasions a third question consequent upon the former; and in like manner he may proceed to a fourth. But be they more or fewer, they are to be considered but as one chain of subordinate questions dependent upon the first. And though each of them has its particular state, yet none of these is what rhetoricians call *The State of the Cause*, which is to be understood only of the principal question. And if, as it frequently happens, the first or principal question is itself directly proved from more than one argument, this makes no other difference, but that all of these arguments, so far as they are followed by others to support them, become a distinct series of subordinate questions, all dependent upon the first. As when Cicero endeavours to prove, that Roscius did not kill his father from two reasons or arguments;—*because he had neither any cause to move him to such a barbarous action, nor any opportunity for it.*

Moreover, besides these subordinate questions, there are also incidental ones often introduced, which have some reference to the princi-

pal question, and contribute towards the proof of it, though they are not necessarily connected with it, or dependent upon it. And each of these also has its *State*, though different from that of the *Cause*. For every question, or point of controversy, must be stated, before it can be made the subject of disputation. And it is for this reason that every new argument advanced by an orator is called a question, because it is considered as a fresh matter of controversy. In Cicero's defence of Milo we meet with several of this sort of questions, occasioned by some aspersions which had been thrown out by the Clodian party to the prejudice of Milo. As, *That he was unworthy to see the light who owned he had killed a man.* For Milo before his trial had openly confessed he killed Clodius. So likewise, *That the senate had declared the killing of Clodius was an illegal action.* And further, *That Pompey, by making a new law to settle the manner of Milo's trial, had given his judgment against Milo.* Now to each of these Cicero replies, before he proceeds to the principal question. And therefore, though the question, in which the state of a controversy consists, is said by Quintilian to arise from *the first conflict of causes*, yet we find by this instance of Cicero, that it is not always the first question in order upon which the orator treats.

But it sometimes happens, that the same cause or controversy contains in it more than one state. Thus in judicial causes every distinct charge occasions a new state. All Cicero's orations against Verres relate to one cause, founded upon a law of the Romans against unjust exactions made by their governors of provinces upon the inhabitants; but as that prosecu-

tion is made up of as many charges as there are orations, every charge or indictment has its different state. So likewise his oration in defence of Cœlius has two states, in answer to a double charge made against him by his adversaries: one, *for borrowing money of Clodia, in order to bribe certain slaves to kill a foreign embassador*; and the other, *for an attempt afterward to poison Clodia herself*. Besides which there were also several other matters of a less heinous nature, which had been thrown upon him by his accusers, with a design, very likely, to render the two principal charges more credible; to which Cicero first replies in the same manner as in his defence of Milo.

Though all the examples we have hitherto brought to illustrate this subject have been taken from judicial cases, yet not only these, but very frequently discourses of the deliberative kind, and sometimes those of the demonstrative, are managed in a controversial way. And all controversies have their *state*. And therefore, Quintilian very justly observes, that *states belong both to general and particular questions, and to all sorts of causes demonstrative, deliberative, and judicial.* In Cicero's oration for the Manilian law, this is the main point in dispute between him and those who opposed that law: *Whether Pompey was the fittest person to be intrusted with the management of the war against Mithridates.* This is a subject of the deliberative kind. And of the same nature was that debate in the senate concerning the demolition of Carthage. For the matter in dispute between Cato, who argued for it, and those who were of the contrary opinion, seems to have been this: *Whether it was*

for the interest of the Romans to demolish Carthage?

As to the number of these *states*, both Cicero and Quintilian reduce them to three. I shall recite Quintilian's reason which he gives for this opinion. *We must*, says he, *agree with those whose authority Cicero follows, who tell us that three things may be inquired into in all disputes; whether a thing is, what it is, and how it is. And this is the method which nature prescribes. For in the first place it is necessary the thing should exist, about which the dispute is; because no judgment can be made either of its nature or quality till its existence be manifest; which is therefore the first question. But though it be manifest that a thing is, it does not presently appear what it is; and when this is known, the quality yet remains; and after these three are settled, no further inquiry is necessary.* Thus far Quintilian. Now the first of these three states is called the *conjectural* state; as if it be inquired, *Whether one person killed another.* This always follows upon the denial of a fact by one of the parties, as was the case of Roscius. And it receives its name from this, that the judge is left, as it were, to conjecture whether the fact was really committed or not, from the evidence produced on the other side. The second is called the *definitive* state, when the fact is not denied, but the dispute turns upon the nature of it, and what name is proper to give it: as in that example of Cicero: *Whether to take a sacred thing out of a private house be theft or sacrilege?* For in this case it is necessary to settle the distinct notion of those two crimes, and show their difference. The third is called the state of *quality*, when the contending parties are agreed both as to the fact,

and the nature of it, but the dispute is, *Whether it be just or unjust, profitable or unprofitable, and the like:* as in the cause of Milo. Aristotle, and from him Vossius, add a fourth state, namely, of *quantity,* as: *Whether an injury be so great as it is said to be.* But Quintilian thinks this may be referred to some or other of the preceding states; since it depends upon the circumstances of the fact, as the intention, time, place, or the like.

From what has been said upon this subject, the use of it may in a good measure appear. For whoever engages in a controversy ought in the first place to consider with himself the main question in dispute, to fix it well in his mind, and keep it constantly in his view; without which he will be very liable to ramble from the point, and bewilder both himself and his hearers. And it is no less the business of the hearers principally to attend to this; by which means they will be helped to distinguish and separate from the principal question what is only incidental, and to observe how far the principal question is affected by it; to perceive what is offered in proof, and what is only brought in for decoration; not to be misled by digressions, but to discern when the speaker goes off from his subject, and when he returns to it again; and in a word, to accompany him through the whole discourse, and carry with them the principal chain of reasoning upon which the cause depends, so as to judge upon the whole whether he has made out his point, and the conclusion follows from the premises. The necessity of this is generally the greater in proportion to the length of a discourse, however exact and artful the composition may be. They, who have read Cicero's orations with

care, cannot but know, that although they are formed in the most beautiful manner, and wrought up with the greatest skill, yet the matter of them is often so copious, the arguments so numerous, the incidents either to conciliate or move his audience so frequent, and the digressions so agreeable, that without the closest attention it is many times no easy matter to keep his main design in view. A constant and fixed regard therefore to the state of the cause and principal point in dispute is highly necessary to this end. But though rhetoricians treat of these states only as they relate to controversies, and become the subject matter of dispute between differing parties, yet every discourse has one or more principal heads, which the speaker chiefly proposes to prove or illustrate. And therefore what has been said upon this subject may likewise be considered as proper to be attended to in all discourses.

I have only to add, that hitherto I have treated of the nature and use of the three states so far as relates to them in general; a more particular account of them, with the arguments which are properly suited to each state, will be next considered.

Of Arguments suited to Demonstrative Discourses.

THE general method of deducing *arguments* from *Common Places* has been already explained. But more fully to show the use of this subject, and the assistance it affords the orator, it may not be improper separately to consider the particular heads which are more especially suited to the several kinds of discourses. These are subordinate to the former, and spring from them like branches from the same stock, or rivulets

from a common fountain: as will evidently appear when we come to explain them.

This is what I propose to enter upon at present, and shall begin with those which relate to *demonstrative* discourses. And as these consist either in praise or dispraise, agreeably to the nature of all contraries, one of them will serve to illustrate the other. Thus he who knows what *arguments* are proper to prove the excellency of virtue, and commend it to our esteem, cannot be much at a loss for such as will show the odious nature of vice, and expose it to every one's abhorrence; since they are all taken from the same heads, and directly the reverse of each other. In treating therefore upon the topics suited to this kind of discourses, I need only mention those which are requisite for praise; whence such as are proper for dispraise will easily enough be discovered.

Now we praise either *persons* or *things*: under which division all beings with their properties and circumstances may be comprehended, so as to take in whatever belongs either to nature or art. But in each part of the division I shall confine my discourse principally to those subjects relating to social life, in which oratory is more usually conversant. And under the former head, which respects persons or intelligent beings, I shall only speak of men. The ancient sophists among the Greeks in their laudatory speeches seem rather to have studied how to display their own eloquence, than to make them serve any valuable purposes in life: for their characters were so heightened, like poetical images, as suited them more to excite wonder and surprise than to become the proper subjects of imitation. And for this reason Aristotle excludes them from the number of civil

discourses, or such as relate to the affairs of society. Though if we consider their nature rather than the abuse of them, they appear to be very proper subjects for an orator, and to come within the main design of his province, which is persuasion. For to what purpose can eloquence be better employed than to celebrate virtuous persons or actions, in such a manner as to excite mankind to their imitation, which is the proper end of such discourses. And indeed, the panegyrics of the Greeks, which were pronounced in the general assemblies of their several states, seem to have been designed to recommend virtue by so public a testimony, as appears by that of Isocrates in the praise of the Athenians. For as to the invectives of Demosthenes against king Philip, they are rather of the *deliberative* kind, and so do not come under our present consideration, since the orator's principal view in those discourses is to animate the Athenians in a defence of their liberties, by a vigorous prosecution of the war against king Philip; to which end he likewise proposes the fittest methods for carrying it on with success. And most of Cicero's invectives against Mark Antony may be referred to the same kind of discourses. But as it is evident, from common observation, that men are more influenced by examples than precepts, so the celebrating virtue, and exposing vice, from particular instances in human life, as patterns to others in what they ought to pursue, and what to avoid, has by wise men been generally esteemed very serviceable to mankind. For which reason likewise the transmitting to posterity the lives of great and eminent men has met with good acceptance, as a useful and laudable design. And therefore the Romans, who were sensible that such discourses were not only

suited for entertainment, but might likewise be made very useful to the public, did not confine them to the schools of rhetoricians and the exercises of young persons: for it was their custom, as Quintilian tells us, to have them pronounced in public assemblies, even by magistrates, and sometimes by an order from the senate. So we read, that a funeral oration was spoken in honour of Junius Brutus by Publicola, his colleague in the consulship. And a like discourse, with a statue and public funeral, was decreed by the senate to the honour of M. Juventius. Though afterwards indeed we generally find this office performed by some relation. In compliance with which custom, as Suetonius relates, Augustus, when but twelve years of age, pronounced a funeral discourse in praise of his grandmother Julia. And Tiberius, when but nine years old, paid the like honour to his deceased father, as the same historian informs us. And Cicero's invective against Piso, with his second against Mark Antony, may be referred to *demonstrative* discourses, as they respect things that were past, and so could not then be subjects for consultation. For all praise or dispraise must either regard what is past or present. And, generally speaking, persons are most affected by present things. Indeed the encomiums of ancient heroes, and their famous actions, are very entertaining, and afford an agreeable pleasure in the recital; but such examples of virtue, as are still in being, or at least yet fresh in memory, have the greatest influence for imitation.

But in praising or dispraising *persons*, rhetoricians prescribe two methods. One is, to follow the order in which every thing happened that is mentioned in the discourse; the other is, to reduce what is said under certain general

heads, without a strict regard to the order of time.

In pursuing the former method, the discourse may be very conveniently divided into three periods. The first of which will contain what preceded the person's birth; the second, the whole course of his life; and the third, what followed upon his death.

Under the first of these may be comprehended what is proper to be said concerning his country and family. And, therefore, if these were honourable, it may be said to his advantage, that he no ways disgraced them, but acted suitably to such a descent. But if they were not so, they may be either wholly omitted, or it may be said, that instead of deriving thence any advantage to his character, he has conferred a lasting honour upon them: and that it is not of so much moment where or from whom a person derives his birth, as how he lives.

In the second period, which is that of his life, the qualities both of his mind and body, with his circumstances in the world, may be separately considered. Though, as Quintilian rightly observes, *All external advantages are not praised for themselves, but according to the use that is made of them. For riches, and power, and interest, as they have great influence, and may be applied either to good or bad purposes, are a proof of the temper of our minds, and therefore we are either made better or worse by them.* But these things are a just ground for commendation when they are the reward of virtue or industry. Bodily endowments are, health, strength, beauty, activity, and the like; which are more or less commendable, according as they are employed. And where these, or any of them are wanting, it may be shown that they are abundantly compensated by the more valu-

able endowments of the mind. Nay, sometimes a defect in these may give an advantageous turn to a person's character, for any virtue appears greater in proportion to the disadvantages the person laboured under in exerting it. But the chief topics of praise are taken from the virtues and qualifications of the mind. And here the orator may consider the disposition, education, learning, and several virtues which shone through the whole course of the person's life: in doing which, the preference should always be given to virtue above knowledge, or any other accomplishment. And in actions, those are most considerable, and will be heard with greatest approbation, which a person either did alone, or first, or wherein he had fewest associates; as likewise those which exceeded expectation, or were done for the advantage of others, rather than his own. And further, as the last scene of a man's life generally commands the greatest regard, if any thing remarkable at that time was either said or done, it ought particularly to be mentioned. Nor should the manner of his death or cause of it, if accompanied with any commendable circumstances, be omitted; as if he died in the service of his country, or in the pursuit of any other laudable design.

The third and last period relates to what followed after the death of the person. And here the public loss and public honours conferred upon the deceased are proper to be mentioned. Sepulchres, statues, and other monuments to perpetuate the memory of the dead at the expense of the public, were in common use both among the Greeks and Romans. But in the earliest times, as these honours were more rare, so they were less costly: for as in one age it was

thought a sufficient reward for him who died in the defence of his country to have his name cut in a marble inscription with the cause of his death, so in others it was very common to see the statues of gladiators and persons of the meanest rank erected in public places. And therefore, a judgment is to be formed of these things, from the time, custom, and circumstances of different nations; since the frequency of them renders them less honorable, and takes off from their evidence as the rewards of virtue. But, as Quintilian says: *Children are an honour to their parents, cities to their founders, laws to those who compiled them, arts to their inventors, and useful customs to the authors of them.*

And this may suffice for the method of praising persons when we propose to follow the order of time, as Isocrates has done in his *funeral oration* upon Evagoras, king of Salamis, and Pliny in his *panegyric* upon the emperor Trajan. But as this method is very plain and obvious, so it requires the more agreeable dress to render it delightful; lest otherwise it seem rather like a history than an oration. For which reason we find that epic poets, as Homer, Virgil, and others, begin in the middle of their story, and afterwards take a proper occasion to introduce what preceded to diversify the subject, and give the greater pleasure and entertainment to their readers.

The other method above hinted, was to reduce the discourse to certain general heads, without regarding the order of time. As if any one in praising the Elder Cato should propose to do it by showing that he was a most prudent senator, an excellent orator, and most valiant general; all which commendations are given

him by Pliny. In like manner the character of a good general may be comprised under four heads,—skill in military affairs, courage, authority, and success; from all which Cicero commends Pompey. And agreeably to this method Suetonius has written the lives of the first twelve Cæsars.

But in praising of persons, care should always be taken to say nothing that may seem fictitious or out of character, which may call the orator's judgment or integrity in question. It was not without cause therefore, that Lysippus, the statuary, as Plutarch tells us, blamed Apelles for painting Alexander the Great with thunder in his hand; which could never suit his character as a man, however he might boast of his divine descent; for which reason Lysippus himself made an image of him holding a spear, as the sign of a warrior. Light and trivial things in commendations are likewise to be avoided. and nothing mentioned but what may carry in it the idea of something truly valuable, and which the hearers may be supposed to wish for, and is proper to excite their emulation. These are the principal heads of praise with relation to men. In dispraise, as was hinted before, the heads contrary to these are requisite; which being sufficiently clear from what has been said, need not particularly be insisted on.

I proceed, therefore, to the other part of the division, which respects *things* as distinguished from *persons*. By which we are to understand all beings inferior to man, whether animate or inanimate; as likewise the habits and dispositions of men either good or bad, when considered separately and apart from their subjects, as arts and sciences, virtues and vices, with whatever else may be a proper subject for praise or dis-

praise. Some writers indeed have, for their own amusement and the diversion of others, displayed their eloquence in a jocose manner upon subjects of this kind. So Lucian has written in praise of a *fly*, and Synesius an elegant encomium upon *baldness*. Others, on the contrary, have done the like in a satirical way. Such is Seneca's *Apotheosis* or consecration of the emperor Claudius; and the *Mysopogon* or Beard-hater, written by Julian the emperor. Not to mention several modern authors who have imitated them in such ludicrous compositions. But as to these things, and all of the like nature, the observation of Antony in Cicero seems very just: *That it is not necessary to reduce every subject we discourse upon to rules of art.* For many are so trivial as not to deserve it; and others so plain and evident of themselves as not to require it. But since it frequently comes in the way both of orators and historians to describe *countries*, *cities*, and *facts*, I shall briefly mention the principal heads of invention proper to illustrate each of these.

Countries then may be celebrated from the pleasantness of their situation, the clemency and wholesomeness of the air, and goodness of the soil, to which last may be referred the springs, rivers, woods, plains, mountains, and minerals. And to all these may be added their extent, cities, the number and antiquity of the inhabitants, their policy, laws, customs, wealth, character for cultivating the arts both of peace and war, their princes, and other eminent men they have produced. Thus Pacatus has given us a very elegant description of Spain, in his *panegyric upon the emperor Theodosius*, who was born there.

Cities are praised from much the same topics

as countries. And here, whatever contributes either to their defence or ornament ought particularly to be mentioned; as the strength of the walls and fortifications, the beauty and splendour of their buildings, whether sacred or civil, public or private. We have in Herodotus a very fine description of Babylon, which was once the strongest, largest, and most regular city in the world. And Cicero has accurately described the city Syracuse, in the island Sicily, in one of his orations against Verres.

But *facts* come much oftener under the cognizance of an orator: and these receive their commendation from their honour, justice, or advantage. But in describing them all the circumstances should be related in their proper order, and that in the most lively and affecting manner, suited to their different nature. Livy has represented the demolition of Alba by the Roman army which was sent thither to destroy it, through the whole course of that melancholy scene, in a style so moving and pathetic, that one can hardly forbear condoling with the inhabitants upon reading his account.

But in discourses of this kind, whether of praise or dispraise, the orator should (as he ought indeed upon all occasions) well consider where, and to whom, he speaks: for wise men often think very differently both of persons and things from the common people. And we find that learned and judicious men are frequently divided in their sentiments, from the several ways of thinking to which they have been accustomed. Besides, different opinions prevail and gain the ascendant at different times. While the Romans continued a free nation, love of their country, liberty, and a public spirit, were principles in the highest esteem among them. And therefore when Cato killed himself that he might not

fall into the hands of Cæsar, and survive the liberty of his country, it was thought an instance of the greatest heroic virtue; but afterwards, when they had been accustomed to an arbitrary government, and the spirit of liberty was now lost, the poet Martial could venture to say,

Death to avoid 'tis madness sure to die.

A prudent orator therefore will be cautious of opposing any settled and prevailing notions of those whom he addresses; unless it be necessary, and then he will do it in the softest and most gentle manner.

Now if we look back and consider the several heads of praise enumerated under each of the subjects above mentioned, we shall find they are taken from their nature, properties, circumstances, or some other general topic, as was intimated in the beginning of this discourse.

Of Arguments suited to Deliberative Discourses

THIS kind of discourses must certainly have been very ancient, since doubtless from the first beginning of men's conversing together they deliberated upon their common interest, and offered their advice to each other.

All deliberation respects something future, for it is in vain to consult about what is already past. The subject matter of it are either things public or private, sacred or civil: indeed all the valuable concerns of mankind, both present and future, come under its regard; and the end proposed by this kind of discourses is chiefly profit or interest. But since nothing is truly profitable but what is in some respect good; and every thing which is good in itself may not

in all circumstances be for our advantage; properly speaking, what is both good and profitable, or beneficial good, is the end here designed. And, therefore, as it sometimes happens that what appears profitable may seem to interfere with that which is strictly just and honourable, in such cases it is certainly most advisable to determine on the safer side of honour and justice, notwithstanding some plausible things may be offered to the contrary. But where the dispute lies apparently between what is truly honest, and some external advantage proposed in opposition to it, all good men cannot but agree in favour of honesty. Now when it proves to be a matter of debate whether a thing upon the whole be really beneficial or not, as here arise two parts, advice and dissuasion, they will each require proper heads of argument: but as they are contrary to each other, he who is acquainted with one cannot well be ignorant of the other. For which reason, as in my last discourse, I recited only the topics suited for praise, leaving those for dispraise to be collected from them; so here, likewise, I shall chiefly mention those proper for advice, whence such as are suited to dissuade will easily be perceived. Now the principal heads of this kind are these following, which are taken from the nature and properties of the thing itself under consideration.

And first, *pleasure* often affords a very cogent argument in discourses of this nature. Every one knows what an influence this has upon the generality of mankind. Though, as Quintilian remarks, pleasure ought not of itself to be proposed as a fit motive for action in serious discourses, but when it is designed to recommend something useful, which is the case here. So,

would any one advise another to the pursuit of polite literature, Cicero has furnished him with a very strong inducement to it from the pleasure which attends that study, when he says: *If pleasure only was proposed by these studies, you would think them an entertainment becoming a man of sense and a gentleman. For other pursuits neither agree with all times, all ages, nor all places; but these studies improve youth, delight old age, adorn prosperity, afford a refuge and comfort in adversity, divert us at home, are no hindrance abroad, sleep, travel, and retire with us in the country.*

A second head is *profit* or advantage, which has no less influence upon many persons than the former, and, when it respects things truly valuable, is a very just and laudable motive. Thus Cicero, when he sends his *Books of Offices* to his son, which he wrote in Latin for his use, advises him to make the best advantage both of his tutor's instructions and the conversation at Athens, where he then was; but withal to peruse his philosophical treatises, which would be doubly useful to him, not only upon account of the subjects but likewise of the language, as they would enable him to express himself upon those arguments in Latin, which before had only been treated of in Greek.

The last head of this kind which I shall mention is *honour*. And no argument will sooner prevail with generous minds, or inspire them with greater ardour. Virgil has very beautifully described Hector's ghost appearing to Æneas, the night Troy was taken, and advising him to depart, from this motive of honour.

O goddess-born, escape by timely flight
The flames and horrours of this fatal night.
The foes already have possess'd the wall,
Troy nods from high, and totters to her fall.

Enough is paid to Priam's royal name;
More than enough to duty and to fame.
If by a mortal hand my father's throne
Could be defended, 'twas by mine alone.

The argument here made use of to persuade Æneas to leave Troy immediately is, that he had already done all that could be expected from him, either as a good subject or brave soldier, both for his king and country, which were sufficient to secure his honour; and now there was nothing more to be expected from him when the city was falling and impossible to be saved; which could it have been preserved by human power, he himself had done it.

But although a thing considered in itself appear beneficial if it could be attained, yet the expediency of undertaking it may still be questionable; in which case the following heads, taken from the circumstances which attend it, will afford proper arguments to engage in it.

And first the *possibility* of succeeding may sometimes be argued as one motive to this end. So Hannibal endeavoured to convince king Antiochus, that it was possible for him to conquer the Romans if he made Italy the seat of war: by observing to him, not only that the Gauls had formerly destroyed their city, but that he had himself defeated them in every battle he fought with them in that country.

But the bare possibility of a thing is seldom a sufficient motive to undertake it, unless on very urgent occasions. And therefore an argument founded upon *probability* will be much more likely to prevail. For, in many affairs of human life, men are determined either to prosecute them or not, as the prospect of success appears more or less probable. Hence Cicero, after the

fatal battle at Pharsalia, dissuades those of Pompey's party, with whom he was engaged, from continuing the war any longer against Cæsar; because it was highly improbable after such a defeat, by which their main strength was broken, that they should be able to stand their ground, or meet with better success than they had before.

But further: since probability is not a motive strong enough with many persons to engage in the prosecution of a thing which is attended with considerable difficulties, it is often necessary to represent the *facility* of doing it as a further reason to induce them to it. And therefore Cicero makes use of this argument to encourage the Roman citizens in opposing Mark Antony, (who upon the death of Cæsar had assumed an arbitrary power) by representing to them that his circumstances were then desperate, and that he might easily be vanquished.

Again: if the thing advised to can be shown to be in any respect *necessary*, this will render the motive still much stronger for undertaking it. And therefore Cicero joins this argument with the former, to prevail with the Roman citizens to oppose Antony, by telling them that *the consideration before them was not in what circumstances they should live, but whether they should live at all, or die with ignominy and disgrace.* This way of reasoning will sometimes prevail when all others prove ineffectual. For some persons are not to be moved till things are brought to an extremity, and they find themselves reduced to the utmost danger.

To these heads may be added the consideration of the *event*, which in some cases carries great weight with it:—as when we advise to the doing of a thing from this motive, that whe-

ther it succeed or not it will yet be of service to undertake it. So, after the great victory gained by Themistocles over the Persian fleet at the Straits of Salamis, Mardonius advised Xerxes to return into Asia himself, lest the report of his defeat should occasion an insurrection in his absence; but to leave behind him an army of three hundred thousand men under his command; with which if he should conquer Greece, the chief glory of the conquest would redound to Xerxes; but, if the design miscarried, the disgrace would fall upon his generals.

These are the principal heads which furnish the orator with proper arguments in giving advice. Cicero in his oration for the Manilian law, where he endeavours to persuade the Roman people to choose Pompey for their general in the Mithridatic war, reasons from three of these topics, into which he divides his whole discourse; namely, the necessity of the war, the greatness of it, the choice of a proper general. Under the first of these he shows that the war was necessary from four considerations; the honour of the Roman state, the safety of their allies, their own revenues, and the fortunes of many of their fellow citizens, which were all highly concerned in it, and called upon them to put a stop to the growing power of king Mithridates, by which they were all greatly endangered. So that this argument is taken from the head of *necessity*. The second, in which he treats of the greatness of the war, is founded upon the topic of *possibility*. For though he shows the power of Mithridates to be very great, yet not so formidable but that he might be subdued; as was evident from the many advantages Lucullus had gained over him and his associates. In the third head he endeavours to prevail with them to entrust

the management of the war in the hands of Pompey, whom he describes as a consummate general for his skill in military affairs, courage, authority, and success; in all which qualities he represents him as superior to any other of their generals, whom they could at that time make choice of. The design of all which was to persuade them they might have very good reason to hope for success, and a happy event of the war, under his conduct. So that the whole force of his reasoning under this head is drawn from *probability*. These are the three general topics which make up that fine discourse; each of which is indeed supported by divers other arguments and considerations, which will be obvious in perusing the oration itself, and therefore need not be here enumerated. On the contrary, in another oration he endeavours to dissuade the senate from consenting to a peace with Mark Antony, because it was base, dangerous, and impracticable.

But no small skill and address are required in giving advice. For, since the tempers and sentiments of mankind, as well as their circumstances, are very different and various, it is often necessary to accommodate the discourse to their inclinations and opinions of things: and therefore the weightiest arguments are not always the most proper and the fittest to be used on all occasions. Cicero, who was an admirable master of this art, and knew perfectly well how to suit what he said to the taste and relish of his hearers, in treating upon this subject, distinguishes mankind into two sorts—the ignorant and unpolished, who always prefer profit to honour; and such as are more civilized and polite, who prefer honour and reputation to all other things. Wherefore they are to be moved by these different

views: praise, glory, and virtue, influence the one; while the other is only to be engaged by a prospect of gain and pleasure. Besides, it is plain, that the generality of mankind are much more inclined to avoid evils than to pursue what is good, and to keep clear of scandal and disgrace than to practise what is truly generous and noble. Persons likewise of a different age act from different principles; young men for the most part view things in another light from those who are older and have had more experience, and consequently are not to be influenced from the same motives. Every nation also has its particular customs, manners, and polity, which give a different turn to the genius of the inhabitants. The speech of Alexander, made to his soldiers before he engaged the Persians, as we have it in Curtius, is finely wrought up in this respect. For, as his army was composed of different nations, the parts of his discourse are admirably well suited to their several views in prosecuting the war. He reminds his countrymen, the Macedonians, of their former victories in Europe; and tells them, that Persia is not to be the boundary of their conquests, but they are to extend them further than either Hercules or Bacchus had done: that Bactra and the Indies would be theirs, and that what they saw was but a small part of what they were to possess: that neither the rocks of Illyrium, nor the mountains of Thrace, but the spoils of the whole East were now before them: that the conquest would be so easy they would scarce have occasion to draw their swords, but they might push the enemy with their bucklers. Then he reminds them of their subduing the Athenians under his father Philip, and the late conquest of Bœötia, the victory at the river Granicus, and the many

cities and countries now behind them and under their subjection. When he addresses the Greeks, he tells them, they are now going to engage with those that had been the enemies of their country, first by the insolence of Darius, and afterwards of Xerxes, who would have deprived them even of the necessaries of life, who destroyed their temples, demolished their towns, and violated both their sacred and civil rights. And then directing his discourse to the Illyrians and Thracians, who were accustomed to live by plunder, he encouraged them with the prospect of booty from the rich armour and furniture of the Persians, which they might be masters of with the greatest ease; and tells them, they would now exchange their barren mountains and snowy hills for the fertile country and fields of Persia.

Of Arguments suited to Judicial Discourses.

IN *judicial* controversies there are two parties, the plaintiff or prosecutor, and the defendant, or person charged. The subject of them is always something past. And the end proposed by them Cicero calls *equity*, or *right and equity;* the former of which arises from the laws of the country, and the latter from reason and the nature of things. For at Rome the prætors had a court of equity, and were empowered, in many cases relating to property, to relax the rigour of the written laws. But as this subject is very copious, and causes may arise from a great variety of things, writers have reduced them to three heads, which they call *states*, to some one of which all *judicial* proceedings may be referred; namely, *whether a thing is, what it is*, or *how it is.*

By the *state* of a cause therefore is meant the principal question in dispute, upon which the whole affair depends; which, if it stops in the first inquiry, and the defendant denies the fact, the *state* is called *conjectural*; but if the fact be acknowledged, and yet denied to be what the adversary calls it, it is termed *definitive*; but if there is no dispute either about the fact or its name, but only the justice of it, it is called the *state of quality*: as was shown more largely before. But I then considered these *states* only in a general view, and deferred the particular heads of argument proper for each of them to this *judicial* kind of discourses; where they most frequently occur, and from which examples may easily be accommodated to other subjects. And this is what I am now particularly to treat of.

All *judicial* causes are either *private* or *public*. They are called *private*, which relate to the right of particular persons; and they are likewise called *civil* causes, as they are conversant about matters of property. *Public* causes are those which relate to public justice and the government of the state; which are also called *criminal*, because by them crimes are prosecuted, whether capital or those of a less heinous nature. I shall take the heads of the arguments only from this latter kind, because they are more copious and easy to be illustrated by examples; from which such as agree to the former, namely, *civil* causes, will sufficiently appear.

And I shall begin with the *conjectural* state, which comes first in the order of inquiry. When therefore the accused person denies the fact, there are three things which the prosecutor has to consider: Whether he *would* have done it, whether he *could*, and whether he *did* it. And hence arise three topics; from the *Will*, the

Power, and the *Signs*, or circumstances which attended the action. The affections of the mind discover the *Will*; as, passion, an old grudge, a desire of revenge, a resentment of an injury, and the like. Therefore Cicero argues from Clodius's hatred of Milo, that he designed his death, and thence infers that he was the aggressor in the combat between them, wherein Clodius was killed. This is what he principally endeavours to prove, and comes properly under this *state*: for Milo owned that he killed him, but alleged that he did it in his own defence. So that in regard to this point, which of them assaulted the other, the charge was mutual. The prospect of advantage may also be alleged to the same purpose. Hence it is said of L. Cassius, that whenever he sat as judge in a case of murder, he used to advise and move the court to examine to whom the advantage arose from the death of the deceased. And Cicero puts this to Antony concerning the death of Cæsar. *If any one, says he, should bring you upon trial, and use that saying of Cassius,* cui bono? *who got by it? look to it, I beseech you, that you are not confounded.* To these arguments may be added hope of impunity, taken either from the circumstances of the accused person, or of him who suffered the injury. For persons who have the advantage of interest, friends, power, or money, are apt to think they may easily escape; as likewise such who have formerly committed other crimes with impunity. Thus Cicero represents Clodius as hardened in vice, and above all the restraint of laws, from having so often escaped punishment upon committing the highest crimes. On the contrary, such a confidence is sometimes raised from the condition of the injured party, if he is indigent, obscure, timorous, or

destitute of friends; much more if he has an ill reputation, or is loaded with popular hatred and resentment. It was this presumption of the obscurity of Roscius, who lived in the country, and of his want of interest at Rome, which encouraged his accusers to charge him with killing his father, as Cicero shows in his defence of him. Lastly, the temper of a person, his views, and manner of life, are considerations of great moment in this matter. For persons of bad morals, and such who are addicted to vice, are easily thought capable of committing any wickedness. Hence Sallust argues from the evil disposition and vicious life of Catiline, that he affected to raise himself upon the ruins of his country. The second head is the *power* of doing a thing; and there are three things which relate to this, the *place*, the *time*, and *opportunity*. As, if a crime is said to have been committed in a private place where no other person was present: or in the night; or when the injured person was unable to provide for his defence. Under this head may likewise be brought in the circumstances of the persons; as if the accused person was stronger, and so able to overpower the other; or more active, and so could easily make his escape. Cicero makes great use of this topic in the case of Milo, and shows that Clodius had all the advantages of *place*, *time*, and *opportunity*, to execute his design of killing him. The third head are the *signs*, and circumstances which either preceded, accompanied, or followed the commission of the fact. So threats, or the accused person being seen at or near the place before the fact was committed, are circumstances that may probably precede murder; fighting, crying out, bloodshed, are such as accompany it; paleness, trembling, inconsistent an-

swers, hesitation or faltering of speech, something found upon the person accused which belonged to the deceased, are such as follow. Thus Cicero proves that Clodius had threatened the death of Milo, and given out that he should not live above three days at the furthest. These arguments, taken from conjectures, are called *presumptions*, which, though they do not directly prove that the accused person committed the fact with which he is charged, yet when being laid together they appeared very strong, sentence by the Roman law might sometimes be given upon them to convict him.

These are the topics from which the prosecutor takes his arguments. Now the business of the defendant is to invalidate these. Therefore such as are brought from the *will*, he either endeavours to show are not true, or so weak as to merit very little regard. And he refutes those taken from the *power*, by proving that he wanted either opportunity or ability: as, if he can show that neither the place nor time, insisted on, was at all proper, or that he was then in another place. In like manner he will endeavour to confute the *circumstances*, if they cannot directly be denied, by showing that they are not such as do necessarily accompany the fact, but might have proceeded from other causes, though nothing of what is alleged had been committed; and it will be of great service to assign some other probable cause. But sometimes the defendant does not only deny that he did the fact, but charges it upon another. Thus Cicero, in his oration for Roscius, not only defends him from each of these three heads, but likewise charges the fact upon his accusers.

I come now to the *definitive* state, which is principally concerned in defining and fixing the

name proper to the fact. Though orators seldom make use of exact definitions, but commonly choose larger descriptions, taken from various properties of the subject or thing described.

The heads of argument in this *state* are much the same to both parties. For each of them defines the fact his own way, and endeavours to refute the other's definition, We may illustrate this by an example from Quintilian: *A person is accused of sacrilege, for stealing money out of a temple, which belonged to a private person.* The fact is owned, but the question is, *Whether it be properly sacrilege?* The prosecutor calls it so, because it was taken out of a temple. But since the money belonged to a private person, the defendant denies it to be sacrilege, and says it is only simple theft. Now the reason why the defendant uses this plea, and insists upon the distinction, is, because by the Roman law the penalty of the theft was only four times the value of what was stolen; whereas sacrilege was punished with death. The prosecutor then forms his definition agreeably to his charge, and says: *To steal any thing out of a sacred place is sacrilege.* But the defendant excepts against this definition as defective; and urges that it does not amount to sacrilege unless the thing stolen was likewise sacred. And this case might once perhaps have been a matter of controversy, since we find it expressly determined in the Pandects, that, *An action of sacrilege should not lie, but only of theft, against any one who should steal the goods of private persons deposited in a temple.*

The second thing is the proof brought by each person to support his definition, as in the example given us by Cicero, of one, *who carried his cause by bribery, and was afterwards prose-*

cuted again upon an action of prevarication. Now if the defendant was cast upon this action, he was by the Roman law subjected to the penalty of the former prosecution. Here the prosecutor defines prevarication to be, *any bribery or corruption in the defendant, with a design to pervert justice.* The defendant therefore, on the other hand, restrains it to *bribing only the prosecutor.*

And if this latter sense agree better with the common acceptation of the word, the prosecutor in the third place pleads the intention of the law, which was to comprehend all bribery in judicial matters under the term of *prevarication.* In answer to which the defendant endeavours to show, either from the head of contraries, that a real prosecutor and a prevaricator are used as opposite terms in the law, or from the etymology of the word, that a prevaricator denotes one who pretends to appear in the prosecution of a cause, while in reality he favours the contrary side: and consequently that money given for this end only, can, in the sense of the law, be called prevarication.

Lastly, the prosecutor pleads, it is unreasonable that he, who does not deny the fact, should escape by a cavil about a word. But the defendant insists upon his explication, as agreeable to the law, and says the fact is misrepresented and blackened by affixing to it a wrong name.

The third state is that of *quality,* in which the dispute turns upon the justice of an action. And here the defendant does not deny he did the thing he is charged with, but asserts it to be right and equitable, from the circumstances of the case, and the motives which induced him to it.

And first, he sometimes alleges the reason of doing it was in order to prevent some other thing of worse consequence, which would otherwise have happened. We have an instance of this in the life of Epaminondas, who, with two other generals joined in the command with him, marched the Theban army into Peloponnesus against the Lacedæmonians; but by the influence of a contrary faction at home their commissions were superseded, and other generals sent to command the army. But Epaminondas being sensible, that if he obeyed this order at that time it would be attended with the loss of the whole army, and consequently the ruin of the state, refused to do it; and having persuaded the other generals to do the like, they happily finished the war in which they were engaged; and upon their return home, Epaminondas taking the whole matter upon himself, on his trial was acquitted. The arguments proper in this case are taken from the justice, usefulness, or necessity of the action. The accuser therefore will plead, that the fact was not just, profitable, nor necessary, considered either in itself, or comparatively with that for the sake of which it is said to have been done. And he will endeavour to show, that what the defendant assigns for the reason of what he did, might not have happened as he pretends. Besides, he will represent of what ill consequence it must be, if such crimes go unpunished. The defendant, on the other hand, will argue from the same heads, and endeavour to prove the fact was just, useful, or necessary. And he will further urge, that no just estimate can be made of any action but from the circumstances which attend it; as the design, occasion, and motives for doing it: which he will represent in the most favourable

light to his own cause, and endeavour to set them in such a view as to induce others to think they could not but have done the same in the like circumstances.

Again; the cause of an action is sometimes charged by the defendant upon the party who received the damage, or some other person who either made it necessary, or enjoined him to do it. The first of these was Milo's plea for killing Clodius, because he assaulted him with a design to take away his life. Here the fact is not denied, as in the case of Roscius above mentioned, under the *conjectural* state, but justified from the reason of doing it. For that an assassinator might justly be killed, Cicero shows both from law and reason. The accuser therefore in such a case will, if there be room for it, deny the truth of this allegation. So the friends of Clodius affirmed that Milo was the aggressor, and not Clodius; which Cicero, in his defence of Milo, principally labours to refute. In the second case the prosecutor will say, no one ought to offend because another has offended first; which defeats the course of public justice, renders the laws useless, and destroys the authority of the magistrate. The defendant, on the other hand, will endeavour to represent the danger and necessity of the case, which required an immediate remedy, and in that manner; and urges that it was vain and impracticable to wait for redress in the ordinary way, and therefore no ill consequence can arise to the public. Thus Cicero in defending Sextius, who was prosecuted for a riot, in bringing armed men into the forum, shows that his design was only to repel force with force; which was then necessary, there being no other means left for the people to assemble, who were excluded by a mob of the contrary party.

Of the third case we have also an example in Cicero, who tells us, that, *in making a league between the Romans and Samnites, a certain young nobleman was ordered by the Roman general to hold the swine (designed for a sacrifice); but the senate afterwards disapproving the terms, and delivering up their general to the Samnites, it was moved, whether this young man ought not likewise to be given up.* Those who were for it, might say, that to allege the command of another is not a sufficient plea for doing an ill action. And this is what the Roman law now expressly declares. But in answer to that it might be replied; that it was his duty to obey the command of his general, who was answerable for his own orders, and not those who were obliged to execute them; and therefore to give up this young nobleman, would be to punish one person for the fault of another.

Lastly, a fact is sometimes rather excused than defended, by pleading that it was not done designedly, or with any ill intent. This is called *concession*, and contains two parts, *apology* and *intreaty*. The former represents the matter as the effect of inadvertency, chance, or necessity. Aristotle gives us an example of inadvertency or imprudence in a woman at Athens, who gave a young man a love potion, which killed him; for which she was tried, but acquitted. Though afterwards this was made criminal by the Roman law. The case of Adrastus, as related by Herodotus, is an instance of chance; who being intrusted by Crœsus with the care of his son, as they were hunting, killed him accidentally with a javelin which he threw at a boar. It is necessity, when a person excuses his making a default from stress of weather, sickness, or the like. Thus Cicero pleaded his illness, contracted by

the fatigue of a long journey, as an excuse for not appearing in the senate upon the summons of Mark Antony; who threatened to oblige him to it by pulling his house down. But what the defendant here attributes to inadvertency, chance, or necessity, the opposite party will attribute to design, negligence, or some other culpable reason; and represent it as a matter injurious to the public to introduce such precedents; and also produce instances, if that can be done, where the like excuses have not been admitted. On the other hand, the defendant will insist on his innocence, and show the hardship and severity of *judging* men's actions rather by the event than from the intention: that such a procedure makes no difference between the innocent and the guilty, but must necessarily involve many honest men in ruin and destruction, discourage all virtuous and generous designs, and turn greatly to the prejudice of human society. He will also consider the instances alleged by the accuser, and show the difference between them and his own case. And, lastly, he will have recourse to intreaty, or a submissive address to the equity and clemency of the court or party offended, for pardon; as Cicero has done in his oration to Cæsar, in favour of Ligarius.

These instances are sufficient to show the nature of the arguments suited to *judicial* discourses, which are deduced from a variety of the general topics.

Of the Character and Address of an Orator.

HAVING in several discourses considered and explained the first part of invention, which furnishes the orator with such arguments as are

necessary for the proof of his subject, I am next to show what are the proper means to conciliate the minds of his hearers, to gain their affection, and to recommend both himself and what he says to their good opinion and esteem. For the parts of invention are commonly thus distinguished; that the first respects the *subject* of the discourse, the second the *speaker*, and the third the *hearers*. Now the second of these, which is what I am at present to explain, is by Quintilian called a *propriety of manners*. And in order to express this, it is necessary, as he tells us, *that every thing appear easy and natural, and the disposition of the speaker be discovered by his words*. We may form an easy conception of this from the conduct of such persons who are most nearly concerned in each other's welfare. As when relations or friends converse together upon any affairs of importance, the temper and disposition of the speaker plainly shows itself by his words and manner of address. And what nature here directs to without colouring or disguise, the orator is to endeavour to perform by his art. Though, indeed, if what a person says be inconsistent with his usual conduct and behaviour at other times, he cannot expect it should gain much credit, or make any deep impression upon his hearers: which may be one reason why the ancient rhetoricians make it so necessary a qualification in an orator, that he be a good man; since he should always be consistent with himself, and, as we say, talk in character. And therefore it is highly requisite, that he should not only gain the skill of assuming those qualities, which the nature and circumstances of his discourse require him to express, but, likewise, that he should use his utmost endeavours to get the real habits implanted

in his mind: for as by this means they will be always expressed with greater ease and facility, so, by appearing constantly in the course of his life, they will have more weight and influence upon particular occasions.

Now there are four qualities more especially suited to the character of an orator, which should always appear in his discourses, in order to render what he says acceptable to his hearers; and these are, *wisdom*, *integrity*, *benevolence*, and *modesty*.

Wisdom is necessary, because we easily give into the opinion of those whom we esteem wiser and more knowing than ourselves. Knowledge is very agreeable and pleasant to all, but few make very great improvements in it. Such, therefore, who either cannot or do not care to give themselves the trouble of examining into things themselves, must take up with the representation of others; and it is an ease to them to hear the opinion of persons whom they esteem wiser than themselves. No one loves to be deceived; and such who are fearful of being misled, are pleased to meet with a person in whose wisdom, as they think, they can safely trust. The character of wisdom, therefore, is of great service to an orator, since the greater part of mankind are swayed by authority rather than arguments.

But this of itself is not sufficient, unless the opinion of *integrity* be joined with it. Nay, so far from it, that the greater knowledge and understanding a man is supposed to have, unless he likewise have the character of an honest man, he is often the more suspected. For knowledge without honesty is generally thought to dispose a person, as well as qualify him, to deceive. Quintilian, in treating upon *narration*, has a very

remarkable passage to this purpose, which I shall here transcribe. *I must not omit*, says he, *how much the authority of the speaker gives credit to what he relates, which is to be gained principally by his life, and partly from his manner of speaking.* And what Quintilian observes here with respect to *narration*, the best writers all recommend as necessary through the whole conduct of an orator.

And to both these qualities the appearance of kindness and *benevolence* should likewise be added. For though a person have the reputation of wisdom and honesty, yet if we apprehend he is either not well affected to us, or at least regardless of our interest, we are in many cases apt to be jealous of him. Mankind are naturally swayed by their affections, and much influenced through love or friendship; and therefore nothing has a greater tendency to induce persons to credit what is said than intimations of affection and kindness. The best orators have been always sensible what great influence the expressions of kindness and benevolence have upon the minds of others, to induce them to believe the truth of what they say; and therefore they frequently endeavour to impress them with the opinion of it. Thus Demosthenes begins his celebrated oration for Ctesiphon: *It is my hearty prayer*, says he, *to all the deities, that this my defence may be received by you with the same affection which I have always expressed for you and your city.* And it is a very fine image of it, which we have in Cicero, where, in order to influence the judges in favour of Milo, he introduces him speaking thus, as became a brave man, and a patriot, even upon the supposition he should be condemned by them: *I bid my fellow-citizens adieu; may they continue flourishing and*

prosperous! may this famous city be preserved, my most dear country, however it has treated me! may my fellow citizens enjoy peace and tranquillity without me, since I am not to enjoy it with them, though I have procured it for them! I will withdraw, I will be gone.

The fourth and last *quality* above mentioned, as necessary to the character of an orator, is *modesty*. And it is certain, that what is modestly spoken, is generally better received than what carries in it an air of boldness and confidence. Most persons, though ignorant of a thing, do not care to be thought so, and would have some deference paid to their understanding. But he who delivers himself in an arrogant and assuming way, seems to upbraid his hearers with ignorance, while he does not leave them to judge for themselves, but dictates to them, and, as it were, demands their assent to what he says; which is certainly a very improper method to win upon them. For not a few, when convinced of an error in such a way, will not own it, but will rather adhere to their former opinion than seem forced to think right, when it gives another the opportunity of a triumph. A prudent orator, therefore, will behave himself with modesty, that he may not seem to insult his hearers; and will set things before them in such an engaging manner as may remove all prejudice, either from his person, or what he asserts. But, at the same time, firmness and resolution are as necessary as modesty, that he may appear to confide in the justice and truth of his cause. For to speak timorously, and with hesitation, destroys the credit of what is offered; and so far as the speaker seems to distrust what he says himself, he often induces others to do the like.

But, as has been said already, great care is to

be taken that these characters do not appear feigned and counterfeit. For what is fictitious can seldom be long concealed. And if this be once discovered, it makes all that is said suspected, however specious it may otherwise appear. If men always loved truth for its own excellency, it would be sufficient to propose it clearly and plainly; nor would the assistance of art be necessary, in order to induce them to embrace it. But it frequently happens, that truth clashes with what men account their interest, and for that reason they will not regard it. An ungrateful truth will either not be heard, or soon discarded. And many times where persons cannot contradict what is offered, yet, if that contradict their settled opinions, they will still suppose it may not be true. Nor is it a difficult thing for persons to bring themselves to such a belief, while they forbear calmly and seriously to consider the arguments offered on the other side. And since matters are thus, it is often necessary for the orator to have recourse to art, in order to obtain that which otherwise he cannot come at. For this purpose, therefore, it is very serviceable to accommodate his discourse to the temper and inclination of his audience. Nor indeed can any one reasonably hope to succeed in this province without well considering the circumstances of time and place, with the sentiments and dispositions of those to whom he speaks; which, according to Aristotle, may be distinguished four ways, as they discover themselves by the several *affections*, *habits*, *ages*, and *fortunes* of mankind. And each of these requires a different conduct and manner of address.

The *affections* denote certain emotions of the mind, which, during their continuance, give a

great turn to the disposition. For love prompts to one thing, and hatred to another. The like may be said of anger, lenity, and the rest of them; as I shall show, when I come to treat of them particularly.

Persons differ likewise according to the various *habits* of their mind. So a just man is inclined one way, and an unjust man another; a temperate man to this, and an intemperate man to the contrary.

And as to the several *ages* of men, Aristotle has described them very accurately, and how persons are differently affected in each of them. I shall content myself with the substance of what he says, to prevent being tedious. He divides the lives of men, considered as hearers, into three stages;—youth, middle age, and old age. Young men, he says, have generally strong passions, and are very eager to obtain what they desire; but are likewise very mutable, so that the same thing does not please them long. They are ambitious of praise, and quick in their resentments: lavish of their money, as not having experienced the want of it: frank and open, because they have not often been deceived; and credulous for the same reason. They readily hope the best, because they have not suffered much, and are therefore not so sensible of the uncertainty of human affairs; for which reason they are likewise more easily deceived. They are modest from their little acquaintance with the world. They love company and cheerfulness, from the briskness of their spirits; and think well of their friends. They imagine they know more than they do, and for that reason are apt to be too positive. In a word, they generally exceed in what they do,

love violently, hate violently, and act in the same manner through the rest of their conduct.

The disposition of old men is generally contrary to the former. They are cautious, and enter upon nothing hastily; having in the course of many years been often imposed upon, having often erred, and experienced the prevailing corruption of human affairs; for which reason they are likewise suspicious, and moderate in their affections, either of love or hatred. They pursue nothing great and noble, and regard only the necessaries of life. They love money, having learnt by experience the difficulty of getting it, and how easily it is lost. They are fearful, which makes them provident—Commonly full of complaints from bodily infirmities, and a deficiency of spirits—Please themselves rather with the memory of what is past than any future prospect, having so short a view of life before them, in comparison of what is already gone; for which reason also they love to talk of things past, and prefer them to what is present, of which they have but little relish, and know they must shortly leave them. They are soon angry, but not to excess. Lastly, they are compassionate, from a sense of their own infirmities, which makes them think themselves of all persons most exposed.

Persons of a middle age, betwixt these two extremes, as they are freed from the rashness and temerity of youth, so they have not yet suffered the decays of old age. Hence in every thing they generally observe a better conduct. They are neither so hasty in their assent as the one, nor so minutely scrupulous as the other, but weigh the reasons of things. They regard a decency in their actions, are careful and industrious; and, as they undertake what appears just

and laudable upon better and more deliberate consideration than young persons, so they pursue it with more vigour and resolution than those who are older.

As to the different *fortunes* of mankind, they may be considered as noble, rich, or powerful; and the contrary to these. Those of high birth, and noble extraction, are generally very tender of their honour, and ambitious to increase it; it being natural for all persons to desire an addition to those advantages, of which they find themselves already possessed. And they are apt to consider all others as much their inferiors, and therefore expect great regard and deference should be shown them. Riches, when accompanied with a generous temper, command respect from the opportunities they give of being useful to others; but they usually elate the mind, and occasion pride. For as money is commonly said to command all things, those who are possessed of a large share of it, expect others should be at their beck; since they enjoy that which all desire, and most persons make the main pursuit of their lives to obtain. But nothing is more apt to swell the mind than power. This is what all men naturally covet, even when perhaps they would not use it. But the views of such persons are generally more noble and generous than of those who only pursue riches, and the heaping up of money. A state contrary to these gives a contrary turn of mind; and, in lower life, persons' dispositions usually differ according to their stations and circumstances. A citizen and a courtier, a merchant and a soldier, a scholar and a peasant, as their pursuits are different, so is generally their turn and disposition of mind.

It is the orator's business, therefore, to consider these several characters and circumstances

of life, with the different bias and way of thinking they give to the mind, that he may so conduct himself in his behaviour and manner of speaking, as will render him most acceptable, and gain him the good esteem of those whom he addresses.

Of the Passions.

THE third and last part of rhetorical invention relates to the *passions*, of which I am now to discourse. And as it is often highly necessary for the orator, so it requires his greatest skill to engage these in his interest. Quintilian calls this, *The soul and spirit of his art.* And, doubtless, nothing more discovers its empire over the minds of men than this power to excite, appease, and sway their passions, agreeably to the design of the speaker. Hence we meet with the characters of *admirable*, *divine*, and other splendid titles, ascribed to eloquence by ancient writers. There is nothing great or noble to be performed in life, wherein the passions are not concerned. The stoics, therefore, who were for eradicating the passions, both maintained a thing in itself impossible; and which, if it was possible, would be of the greatest prejudice to mankind. For while they appeared such zealous asserters of the government of reason, they scarce left it any thing to govern; for the authority of reason is principally exercised in ruling and moderating the passions, which, when kept in a due regulation, are the springs and motives to virtue. Thus hope produces patience, and fear industry, and the like might be shown of the rest. The passions, therefore, are not to be extirpated, as the stoics asserted, but put under the direction

and conduct of reason. Indeed, where they are ungovernable, and, instead of obeying, command, they are, as some have fitly called them, *diseases of the mind*, and frequently hurry men into vice, and the greatest misfortunes of life. Just as the wind, when it blows moderately, carries on the ship; but if it be too boisterous and violent, may overset her. The charge, therefore, brought against this art, for giving rules to influence the passions, appears groundless and unjust; since the proper use of the passions is not to hinder the exercise of reason, but to engage men to act agreeably to reason: and if an ill use be sometimes made of this, it is not the fault of the art but of the artist. So moralists explain the nature both of virtues and vices, that men may know better how to practise one, and avoid the other; but if their precepts happen to have a different effect, they are not answerable for that.

But that an orator may be enabled to manage this part of his province to the best advantage, it is necessary he should, in some measure, be acquainted with the nature, causes, and objects of the passions. Now the passions, as defined by Aristotle, are, *Commotions of the mind, under the influence of which men think differently concerning the same things.* Thus a thing appears good to him who desires it; though it may not appear so to another, or to the same person at a different time. Writers are not agreed as to the number of the passions. But I shall wave this dispute, as the more proper business of philosophy, and only consider them as they come under the cognizance of the orator. And that I may proceed in some order, I shall treat of them as they may be separately referred, either to *demonstrative*, *deliberative*, or *judicial* discourses;

though they are not wholly confined to any of them.

To the *demonstrative* kind we may refer *joy* and *sorrow*, *love* and *hatred*, *emulation* and *contempt*.

Joy is an elation of the mind, arising from a sense of some present good. Such a reflection naturally creates a pleasant and agreeable sensation, which ends in a delightful calm and serenity. This is heightened by a description of former evils, and a comparison between them and the present felicity. Thus Cicero endeavours to excite in the minds of his fellow citizens the highest sense of joy and delight at Catiline's departure from Rome, by representing to them the imminent danger which threatened both them and the city, while he continued among them.

Sorrow, on the contrary, is an uneasiness of mind, arising from a sense of some present evil. This passion has generally a place in funereal discourses, and it may be heightened like the former by comparison, when any past happiness is set in opposition to a present calamity. Hence Cicero aggravates the sorrow at Rome, occasioned by the death of Metellus, from his character, and great services to the public while living.

Love excites us to esteem another for some excellency, and to do him all the good in our power. It is distinguished from *friendship*, which is mutual; and therefore love may continue where friendship is lost; that is, the affection may remain on one side. And when we assist a person from no other motive, but to do him a kindness, Aristotle calls this *good will*. Love takes its rise from a variety of causes. Generosity, benevolence, integrity, gratitude, courtesy,

and other social virtues, are great incitements to love any one endued with such qualities. And persons generally love those who are of a like disposition with themselves, and pursue the same views. It is therefore the chief art of a flatterer, to suit himself in every thing to the inclination of the person whose good graces he courts. When the orator would excite this affection towards any person, it is proper to show that he is possessed of some at least, if not all these agreeable qualities. When the conspirators with Catiline were to be brought to justice, Cicero was very sensible of the envy he should contract on that account, and how necessary it was for him to secure the love of the Roman senate for his support and protection in that critical juncture. And this he endeavours to do in his fourth oration against Catiline, by representing to them, in the most pathetic manner, that all the labours he underwent, the difficulties he conflicted with, and the dangers to which he was exposed on that account, were not for his own sake, but for their safety, quiet, and happiness.

Hatred is opposed to love, and produced by the contrary dispositions. And therefore persons hate those who never did them any injury, from the ill opinion they have of their base and vicious inclinations. So that the way to excite this passion is, by showing that any one has committed some heinous fact with an ill intent. And the more nearly affected persons are by such actions, in what they account of the greatest concern, the higher in proportion their hatred rises. Since life therefore is esteemed the most valuable good, Cicero endeavours to render Mark Antony odious to the citizens of Rome, by describing his cruelty.

Emulation is a disquiet, occasioned by the fe-

licity of another, not because he enjoys it, but because we desire the like for ourselves. So that this passion is in itself good and laudable, as it engages men to pursue those things which are so. For the proper objects of emulation are any advantages of mind, body, or fortune, acquired by study or labour. And persons are generally excited to an emulation of those with whom they converse. So children are often ambitious of the like virtues or honours which they see in their relations or friends. And therefore it was a very proper question of Andromache to Æneas, concerning Ascanius, which we have in Virgil:

"What hopes are promised from his blooming years!
How much of Hector's soul in him appears!"

Emulation therefore is excited by a lively representation of any desirable advantages, which appear to be attainable from the example of others who are, or have been, possessed of them. But where the felicity of another occasions an uneasiness, not from the want of it, but because he enjoys it, this passion is called *envy;* which the ancients describe as a hideous monster, feeding upon itself, and being its own tormentor. Aristotle observes, that it most usually affects such persons who were once upon a level with those they envy. For most men naturally think so well of themselves, that they are uneasy to see those who were formerly their equals advanced above them. But as this is a base and vicious passion, the orator is not to be informed how to excite it, but how to lessen or remove it. And the method prescribed by Cicero for this purpose is, to show that the things which occasioned it have not happened to the envied person undeservedly, but are the just reward of his industry or virtue; that he does not so much convert them to his own profit or pleasure, as to the be-

nefit of others; and that the same pains and difficulties are necessary to preserve them with which they were at first acquired.

Contempt is opposed to *Emulation*, and arises from misconduct in things not of themselves vicious: as where a person either acts below his station and character; or affects to do that for which he is not qualified. Thus Cicero endeavours to expose Cæcilius, and bring him into the contempt of the court, for pretending to rival him in the accusation of Verres, for which he was altogether unfit.

To *deliberative* discourses may be referred *fear*, *hope*, and *shame*.

Fear arises from the apprehension of some great and impending evil. For the greatest evils, while they appear at a distance, do not much affect us. Such persons occasion fear, who are possessed of power, especially if they have been injured, or apprehend so. Likewise those who are addicted to do injuries, or who bear us an ill will. And the examples of others, who have suffered in a like case, or from the same persons, help to excite fear. From the circumstances therefore either of the thing, or person, it will not be difficult for the orator to offer such arguments as may be proper to awaken this passion. So Demosthenes, when he would persuade the Athenians to put themselves in a condition of defence against king Philip, enumerates the several acts of hostility already committed by him against the neighbouring states. And because men's private concerns generally more affect them than what relates to the public, it is proper sometimes to show the necessary connexion these have with each other, and how the ruin of one draws the other after it.

The contrary passion to *fear* is *hope*, which arises, either from a prospect of some future

good, or the apprehension of safety from those things which occasion our fear. Young persons are easily induced to hope the best, from the vigour of their spirits. And those who have escaped former dangers are encouraged to hope for the like happy success for the future. The examples of others also, especially of wise and considerate men, have often the same good effect. To find them calm and sedate, when exposed to the like dangers, naturally creates confidence, and the hopes of safety. But nothing gives persons such firmness and steadiness of mind, under the apprehension of any difficulties, as a consciousness of their own integrity and innocence. Let dangers come from what quarter they will, they are best prepared to receive them. They can calmly view an impending tempest, observe the way of its approach, and prepare themselves in the best manner to avoid it. In Cicero's oration for the Manilian law, he encourages the Roman citizens to hope for success against Mithridates, if they choose Pompey for their general, from the many instances of his former successes, which he there enumerates. We find in history, that artful men have frequently made use of omens and prodigies with the populace, either to awaken or expel their fears, and that with the greatest success. But such arguments are not much regarded by wise and prudent men. In the time of the civil wars between Cæsar and Pompey, when the affairs of Pompey's party were very much broken and shattered, one who was in that interest endeavoured to animate the rest and excite them to push on the war with vigour, from a lucky omen (as it was then thought) of seven eagles, which were observed to settle in their camp. But Cicero, who was then present, and knew very well the vanity of such reasoning, immediately re-

plied: *That such a happy incident might indeed prove of service to them if they were to fight with jackdaws.*

Shame arises from the apprehension of those things that hurt a person's character. *Modesty* has been wisely implanted in mankind by the great author of nature, as a guardian of virtue, which ought for this reason to be cherished with the greatest care; because, as Seneca has well observed, *if it be once lost, it is scarce ever to be recovered.* Therefore the true cause or foundation of shame is any thing base or vicious; for this wounds the character, and will not bear reflection. And he must arrive at no small degree of insensibility, who can stand against such a charge, if he be conscious to himself that it is just. Therefore to deter persons from vicious actions, or to expose them for the commission of them, the orator endeavours to set them in such a light as may most awaken this passion, and give them the greatest uneasiness by the reflection. And because the bare representation of the thing itself is not always sufficient for this purpose, he sometimes enforces it by enlarging the view, and introducing those persons as witnesses of the fact, for whom they are supposed to have the greatest regard. Thus when some of the Athenians, in an arbitration about certain lands which had been referred to them by the contending parties, proposed it as the shortest way of deciding the controversy, to take the possession of them into their own hands, Cydias, a member of the assembly, to dissuade them from such an unjust action, desired them to imagine themselves at that time in the general assembly of the states of Greece (who would all hear of it shortly) and then consider how it was proper to act. But where persons labour under an

excess of modesty, which prevents them from exerting themselves in things fit and laudable, it may sometimes be necessary to show that it is faulty and ill grounded. On the other hand, *immodesty* or impudence, which consists in a contempt of such things as affect the reputation, can never be too much discouraged and exposed. And the way of doing this is to make use of such arguments as are most proper to excite shame. We have a very remarkable instance of it in Cicero's second Philippic, wherein he affixes this character upon Mark Antony, through every scene of his life.

I come now to those passions which may be referred to *judicial* discourses;—and these are *anger* and *lenity*, *pity* and *indignation*.

Anger is a resentment, occasioned by some affront or injury done without any just reason. Now men are more inclined to resent such a conduct, as they think they less deserve it. Therefore persons of distinction and figure, who expect a regard should be paid to their character, can the less bear any indications of contempt. And those who are eminent in any profession or faculty are apt to be offended, if reflections are cast either upon their reputation or art. Magistrates also, and persons in public stations, sometimes think it incumbent on them to resent indignities, for the support of their office. But nothing sooner inflames this passion, than if good services are rewarded with slights and neglect. The instance of Narses, the Roman general, is remarkable in this kind; who, after he had been very successful in his wars with the Goths, falling under the displeasure of the emperor Justin, was removed from the government of Italy, and received by the empress with this taunt: *That he must be sent to weave among the*

Girls: which so provoked him, that he said he would weave such a web as they should never be able to unravel. And accordingly he soon after brought down the Longobards, a people of Germany, into Italy, where they settled themselves in that part of the country which, from them, is now called Lombardy. The time and place in which an injury was done, and other circumstances that attended it, may likewise contribute very much to heighten the fact. Hence Demosthenes, in his oration against Midias, endeavours to aggravate the injury of being struck by him, both as he was then a magistrate, and because it was done at a public festival. From hence it appears, that the persons who most usually occasion this passion are such who neglect the rules of decency, contemn and insult others, or oppose their inclinations; as likewise the ungrateful, and those who violate the ties of friendship, or requite favours with injuries. But when the orator endeavours to excite anger, he should be careful not to exceed due bounds in aggravating the charge, lest what he says appear rather to proceed from prejudice, than a strict regard to the demerit of the action.

Lenity is the remission of anger. The designs of men's actions are principally to be regarded; and therefore what is said ignorantly, or through inadvertency, is sooner forgiven. Also to acknowledge a fault, submit, and ask pardon, are the ready means to take off resentment; for a generous mind is soon cooled by submission. Besides he who repents of his fault does really give the injured party some satisfaction, by punishing himself, as all repentance is attended with grief and uneasiness of mind; and this is apt very much to abate the desire of revenge:

as, on the contrary, nothing is more provoking than when the offender either audaciously justifies the fact, or confidently denies it. Men are likewise wont to lay aside their resentment, when their adversaries happen by some other means to suffer, what they think a sufficient satisfaction. Lastly, easy circumstances, a lucky incident, or any thing which gives the mind a turn to mirth and pleasure, has a natural tendency to remove anger: for anger is accompanied with pain and uneasiness, which very ill suit joy and cheerfulness. The orator therefore, in order to assuage and pacify the minds of his auditors, will endeavour to lessen their opinion of the fault, and by that means to take off the edge of their resentment. And to this purpose, it will be proper either to represent, that the thing was not designed, or that the party is sorry for it; or to mention his former services; as also to show the credit and reputation which will be gained by a generous forgiveness. And this last topic is very artfully wrought up by Cicero, in his address to Cæsar, in favour of Ligarius.

Pity arises from the calamities of others, by reflecting that we ourselves are liable to the like misfortunes. So that evils, considered as the common lot of human nature, are principally the cause of *pity*. And this makes the difference between *pity* and *good-will*, which, as I have shown already, arises merely from a regard to the circumstances of those who want our assistance. But considering the uncertainty of every thing about us, he must seem in a manner divested of humanity, who has no compassion for the calamities of others; since there is no affliction, which happens to any man, but either [illegible] or some other as great, may fall upon him[illegible]ut those persons are generally soonest touched with

this passion who have met with misfortunes themselves. And by how much greater the distress is, or the person appears less deserving it, the higher pity does it excite; for which reason persons are generally most moved at the misfortunes of their relations and friends, or those of the best figure and character. The orator therefore, in order to excite the greater pity, will endeavour to heighten the idea of the calamity, from the several circumstances both of the thing itself, and the person who labours under it. A fine example of this may be seen in Cicero's defence of Muræna.

Indignation, as opposed to *pity*, is an uneasiness at the felicity of another, who does not seem to deserve it. But this respects only external advantages, such as riches, honours, and the like; for virtues cannot be the object of this passion. Aristotle therefore says, *that pity and indignation are generally to be found in the same persons, and are both evidences of a good disposition.* Now the orator excites this passion, by showing the person to be unworthy of that felicity which he enjoys. And as, in order to move compassion, it is sometimes of use to compare the former happy state of the person with his present calamity, so here the greater indignation is raised, by comparing his former mean circumstances with his present advancement: as Cicero does in the case of Vatinius.

These are the passions with which an orator is principally concerned. In addressing to which, not only the greatest warmth and force of expression is often necessary, but he must likewise first endeavour to impress his own mind with the same passion he would excite in others, agreeably to that of Horace:

My grief with others' just proportion bears;
To make me weep, you must be first in tears.



Thus far the learned Professor Ward on that part of Oratory called Invention; in which we perceive he has followed the ancients, step by step, but not without several judicious observations of his own. On all subjects that do not admit of experiment or demonstration, I own I am a great friend to authority: and when the ancients unanimously, and almost all the moderns down to Priestley and Ward, recommend the topics or common places, I cannot think they can be unworthy of attention. Let those who do not feel themselves in want of such assistance enjoy their superiority, and leave the less-gifted part of their species to such resources as are suited to the mediocrity of their abilities. This part of Rhetoric, therefore, which ought to have been the first, is reserved to the last, that the student, if he pleases, may more easily omit the perusal of it.

THE END.

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